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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines what Suglishmen meant when they 
referred to a 'contract' In political discussions around 
the time of the 1688 Revolution, The study of the immense 
volume and considerable variety of writings referring to 
$contract$ reveals that our histories of late seventeenth 
century political thought, and of Contract Theory in 
particular$ have misrepresented the meaning of the ideas 
It appears that there was no Ainsle Contract Theory and 
that appeal to 'contract* was not the monopoly of one 
particular groupq party or side in the political controversies 
of the period* If we concentrate on what the term 'contract' 
was used to. donote In political writing, we are confronted 
by a near hopeless confusion* Ifs however$ we look to the 
-coMgtatj2nx of 
the term and the coherence of arguments 
invoking a 'contractf, a very clear, distinctive and 
significant division of contractarian writing *merges* 
I have argued that there are In fact three different types 
of Contract Theory exhibited In the political literature 
of the periods 'Constitutional'$ $Philosophical' and 
'Integrated$ Contract Theories* My study portrays the 
characteristics of each of these theoriong considers their 
distinctiveness and Interrolational and attempts to present 
a more adequate understanding of what 9contractl meant to 
men In late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Nngland 
than historians have no far given* 
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3NTRODUCTORTs 
OIUA MTER I 
IMMUCTION 
The purposo of the following work in to consider what 
Englishmen understood by the word "Contract" when they readq 
Umtos or talked about it in political discussions during 
the late seventeenth and early elghteenth centuries, The 
period I have rovieved in fairly short in terms of the 
history of modern European Contractuali8t Thought. It 
covers only that generation of English political writers 
who were active during the years between the death of 
Hobbes and the death of Locke* Concentration upon this 
relatively narr w period encourages a more detailed 
consideration of the contemporary meaning of "contract" 
than can easily be accommodated In a general survey, it 
allows a consideration of "contract" an it appears in the 
whole spectrum of political writings from the philosophical 
work to the tract and polemical pamphlet* It enables us, 
in short, to gain an understanding of how the literate 
public of the &go might have been expected to have understood 
references to "contract" in political debatee And since 
it was this sort of public which the writers of the "great 
texts" of seventeenth century Contract Theory (like Hobbess 
5 
Pufandorf Andlocke) were Int*nding to addremag a consiftration 
of how their audiences understood references to "contract" 
Virovides interesting evidence for understanding the texts 
themselves* I Thus the concern with ZnXlLnh political 
thought from 3L679 to 1704 will not only provide evidence 
for reconsidering conventional a6countsof the relations 
between political ideass groups and practices of the periods 
but it will also provide evid*nce for re-wmaining the 
general history of modern Contract Theory. 
ZnSlimh political lift during this time was oxtremely 
unstable and violent& The period began with the Popish 
Plot and Exclusion Crisis - with political assmi tion and 
near civil war . it witnessed Monmouth's abortive rebellione 
the successful revolution of 16880 numerous treason trials 
and assassination plots against SjU the reigning monarchs* 
and It ended with the uneasy settlement of Queen Anne on 
the throne early In the eighteenth conturyo The Political 
literature of the agog multiplIed to $serve' an ever 
Increasing electorates 2 aLtrrorodg enflaimed and reflected 
upon the violence and instability of political lifoo In 
the distinctively political vocabulary of this literature 
the word "contract" features prominantlyd. But It does so 
in a very confusing way* The conventional gen*ralixatiOns 
of political historians and historians of political thought 
appear to boor very little relation to the ways Rnglishmen 
in the late seventeenth century used the word* What, then# 
are these conventional generalixations and In what way In 
6 
the seventeenth century use of "contract" confusing? 
Most of the conventional generalizationx about the 
history of Contract Theory can be found in JoVe Gough's 
D4 SOCIAL S2MjA: L9j . the work which has dominated this 
area of scholarship since Its publication In 1936. According 
to Gough there Ing properly speakingg only one Contract 
Theory and this theory has appeared In a number of more 
or less incomplete "forms" throughout history. The theory 
acquires its distinctiveness from the self. -conscious 
application of a legal analogy to political studies* In 
its fullest "dev*lopnent"'the theory contains two contractse 
or at least two stages of contractingo The first contracts 
the contract of societyg appears an the agreement of 
previously independent individuals to constitute themselves 
Into a societyl the second contracts the contract of 
govex ent, In the subsequent agreement of those individuals 
to forn a government to rule ever theog choose governors 
and define the eztent and ends of their powere The 
"purposes" of the Contzsct Theory$ still according to 
Goughq are first,, to give an historical account of the 
origin of govermwntg the state or socletyl and secondlYs 
to give an account of the nature and llvdts of political 
obligation* Xn possession of theme Idommg Gough depicts 
the history of post-medieval Contract Theory (particularly 
during its "heyday" In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries) as a development from concerns almost exclusively 
with the $contract of government's to concerns with the 
fully developed theory of #contract of societyl and 1contrOct 
7 
of government II to eventually - in the Ituropo of Rousseau . 
an almost exclusive conc*rnwith the loontruct of society, 03 
In the literature that I an proposing to wcamine thenj the 
characteristics of the Ifully developed Contract, Thooryl 
should be clearly In evid*nceo Before reviewing that 
literature to soe, whethtr or not it does portray theme 
characteristlesq wo way enlarge our catalogue of copventional 
views by considering historical accounts =ore specifically 
concerned with English politics in the late seventeenth 
and early eiShteenth centuriese 
If we turn to J*W*, Qoughtx work one* more we finds In 
his chapter on Mocke and the English Revolution' v One Of 
the comonest genera I: Lza tions about Inglish political 
thought In the late seventeenth century* During this 
pariodg Gough writes$ Ruglish, political theory "was divided 
between two =min schools . the Angl$can Royalists who 
believed In the divine hereditary r; LSht of king6hip, and 
their Whig opponent*# who maintained the cause of popular 
rights and a Limited monarchy"q and the contract of 
govermment was a "cardinal principle for the Whigs"* 
An equally 'common-placet remark occurs later In Gough's 
chapter. Locks, he assertal "summed upq and published In 
an easy,, roadablo styles the accoptod componplaces of tho 
political thought of his generatloe. -5 And this views 
that Locko's vark in In some way greprosenUtiV89 of his 
agog finds frequent expression in text book accounts of 
RnSlish politico at the time of the JL688 Revolut-tono The 
common anxertionsl, for example$ that Locke's EM-ond T refit-I-Pe 
8 
contai, ne "an admirable silraming %30 of the principles 'of 
law, which triumphed at the Revolution" 
6, 
and that "Locket* 
general theory of government had its counterpart In most 
exclusion Pamphlets"7, would both seem to Imply that 
Lockets work van representative of his time* But what 
evidence In there, in the political literature of the late 
seventeenth century, for these assertions about Fiontract 
Theory? 
A very superficial acquaintance with Ruglish politics 
in the late seventeenth century reveals that one idea of 
contract was, of considerable importance thene For the 
1688 Revolution itself was officially explained and 
Justified in part in terms of "the original Contract"* 
On the 7th February 3L688/9, j the Convention Parliament 
accepted the House of Coamons resolution thatt 
King James the Secondg having endeavoured to 
subveii-flie Constitution of the Kingdong by 
breaking the original Contract between King 
and People$ and by the Advice of Jesuitx and 
other-wicked Persons$ having violated the 
f, undamental Lawng and having withdrawn Himself 
out of this Kingdoml hax abdicated the Governmentl 
and that the Throne in thereby vacant*8 
But theocontract"referred to here, as Gough himself has 
pointed out, in definitely not the same an that Vb1ch 
appears in the Second Treat: tse. It in notq that in to 
say* "an agreement between individuals to form a civil 
society and 'submit to the determination of the majorityl"*9 
A closer inspection of the massive volume of political 
tracts, pamphlets and treatises that woro published between 
1679 and 1704 can only reinforce our awareness of the 
9 
significance of appeals to-%contrectý'durlng this period. 
Indeed% it does so at the cost of forcing us to question 
whether our conventional accounts of the history of Contract 
Theory can possibly do justice to all the evidencee The 
order, which bas came to be Imposed upon these references 
to"*contract7appears to evaparote as w* encounter more and 
more different wben$ngs of the texul different synonyms 
used for it, and different occasions upon which it in 
: Lnvokod* 
A31 sorts of writers . lawyers, politicianal historianag 
divinex, propogandintsp philosophers and journalists * make 
references to "contract" in their political workX* But 
hardly ever do they appear either aware or concerned that 
they are, employing a traditional political concept. They 
were. mainly interested in advancing a "cause" t or defending 
the activities of a particular political groups or In 
offering an explanation of some past *ventxo The thet 
that arXuuontx famm, "contract" were arguments druving upon 
a legal AnAlosy was generally not their concern* The word 
"contract" frequently appears in the literature and it is 
often considered in conjunction with# or as a synonym for# 
other legal concepts like, "atipulatioh"s "trust"$ "capitulation"s 
"covenant"$ "compact*$ and even "coronation oath" and "low" 
Itself* 10 But equally as oftens when occasion appeared 
to suits writers left the real= of leS&JL analogy and 
considered the idea much more loosely as equivalent to 
simply "promixex"t, "bargainx"t "compromixex"t "barriers" 
10 
and "agreements"o Thus the use of the word "contract" 
J, S 120t OVideUCO th*t A legal analogy in actuAlly being 
employed. 
The varied synonymrs for Wcontract* indicate the 
absence of any precise# single (or even dual) undarxtandins 
of the word in the political literature of the late 
savonteenth centurye The view theulk of J&W* Goush@ and 
after himg of Sir Ernest Barkorg that referencOs tO '10032tract" 
in polAtical debate should be understood as rofer*ncoq to 
either a contract of society or a contract of goverment 
12 
would seem too narrow and specific to do justice to moot 
of the references with which we will be conc*mede And 
the suspipion that this will be so appears more then 
justified when we find not only apparently Imprecise uses 
of the word "contract"g. but. also many specifically different 
typjs of contract being argued about* As we turn the 
page's of the tractsq, pawp#jets and treatisext we or* 
confronted, not by a, governmental contruct and a social 
contract* but by "fundamental contracts"q "constitutional 
pontracts"O *national contracts"q "political contracts"s 
"original contracts"l "mutual coutsucts"l "express Original 
and continuing *so" contractso "imeplAcit contracts" and 
GVOn A "Popular Contract and rectpral Contract"s" 
But the counispu whic# all Ooze references to 
Iscontract"Introduce Into the conventional Interpretations 
of the history of contraot thinking in not the on3Ly reason 
for reexaniminS the late *evonteenth contury. un4orstanding 
(or understandings) of the term* Perhaps even more surprising 
11 
than the variety ofocontracte #I written about in the fact 
thatq In the period immediately following the IL688 Revolutions 
there in no simple correspondence between assorting contract 
ideas and defending the now regimes 211us even so entrenched 
a belief as that English political opinion at the time of 
the Revolution was divided between the two "main schools" 
or Royalist Divine Righters and Whig Contractarians must 
be ree3mmined, For even so a Jacobite pamphleteereq Me 
Jerev3y Collier and Charlwood lAwtonp were prepared to argue 
at least part of their case by referesice to a Ocontractlo 
Nor can the exlat*nce of Tox7 and J*Cobite contract 
arguments be accounted for In terms of the lJobbesion tradition 
of contra etarianime For not only wore these royalist 
arguments concerned with different questions from Hobbes' 
(theirs were arguments about the requirements of English 
constitutional law rather than about the nature and necessity 
of civil society),, but. also there weal properly "akingt 
no tradition of Hobbesian thought in the late seventeenth 
century* At least there were no sigimificant 11obbealan 
disciples$ and there Was no sense or any valuable Hobbemian 
contribution to political speculatione During thin period 
Hobbes van,, In fact,, "th* most rejectedg and politically 
the least iWortantg of all the absolutist writerO* 
14 And 
by ftr the most comon occurance of tba term OHobbist' went 
an we shall seeg as at very general and unspecific labol 
abuse* Tory and Jacobite contract arguments turn out to 
be of a very siwiUr order to many Whig arguments, Udeed, 
12 
in the writings of one man - the colourful Stabert Ferguson 
"the Plotter" ve find tvo of the most popular, political 
pamphlets of the timev both apparently written-in good 
faitht both employing arguments based upon the idea that 
the English Constitution embodied a "contractIlbetween ruler 
and ruledg but one was written4n, defence of Willista of 
Orange and the other in defence of Jamen 111 
1.5 
But our enquiry into what Englishmen'understood by 
the word "contx*ct" in political debate1etween 2679 and 
1704 cannot rest here* The numerouss vari6dq and confusing 
refereuces that we have so Var noted serve to varn us against 
too simplified a view of the meaning of iscontractil,, They 
do not indicate that the term either had no meaning or uas 
used in a purely arbitrary and idiosyncratic wayo 
16 When 
Englishmen talked or wrote about "a contract" during this 
period they neither invented the term nor intended it to 
be understood purely idiosyncratically* They 'were addrooxing 
themselves to a public accustomed to Learins the term with 
a view to persuading It of somethinge That public uss 
familiar with at least some understandings of the word 
"contract"t and it is these public understandings (which 
In the nature of the case must be relatively stable for 
otherwise public debate could not take place) that we must 
attempt to outline and examine, A writer might very well 
misunderstand an ideas or he might wish to modify his 
audience's understanding of its but this can only be 
determined by considering his use of the term In relation 
13 
to the general use and the ideas evoked by it* 
So far I have &iMPlY Suggested t1lat. wAny common ideas 
about the nature of appoals to "Contz*ct" in V()).; Lti'c&]L 
debate appear inadequate or misleading when the evidence 
of the late seventeenth century is considered* Xf we 
now turn our attention to the literature of the major 
constitutional crisis of the period,, the nature and extent 
of this inadequacy becomes clearer, In the controversies 
over the 1688 Revolution we my begin to see-in some sort 
of perspective the si&mificance and varieties of arguments 
from "contract"* The confusions that have arisen because 
of the complexity of the evidence will then start to 
disappear. 
14 
£HAPTER li 
ALLEGXAZICEI. ODLXGATXON, AND CO_WrRACT I- ME 
_C011STITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSIES OVER THE 1688 MOLUTION 
The dxsmatic series of events from J&mG2 IVA second 
Declaration of Indulgence (7 May 1688) to his eventual 
: rlight into France (212 December 1688) producod a deep 
criais in the Ensllz4x political conscience* The myths 
o: C 'Cloryl and 'poacetulness' that have become attached 
to tho 1688 Revolution were not so apparent to tlie majority 
ot Englishmen %dio, were neither ardent WIlliamites nor 
endowed with the hindsisht and critical apparatus o: r the 
"Whiz interprotors of history"'. It may beg as some 
historians have arguadq that the Revolution securod the 
victory of parliamentary govor=ent over royal absolutJLjm 
2 
that it presaged an era of incroasina moral respectability" 
and political stability 
4v 
even that "liberty" had at length 
tzlumphed over "authority" and uus pavinZ the way for 
"enlightonmant". 5o But for most Englishmen educated into 
the Church of England's doctrines of Passive Obodience and 
Non-Resiatancot and living amidst rumours of Irish Massacres 
and French Invasionsq the Revolution meant none of those 
thingse Doubtq confusiong conflict And amilt appeared as 
the most common reactions to James 11's flight* 
Only very recently imve historians begun to recognize 
tho wide disParity between Whiggish 'glorif4cations' of 
tlxo Ilovolution and its appoarance to contempOrariOse This 
15 
disparity In exetTlifieds for wcomple, in the difference 
between Hacaulay's picture of the Revolution and that of 
one of its most recent historiangs For thcaulay# the 
Revolution "averted" the "calamities" of arbitrary and 
despotic got-ornment, "It was a revolution strictly 
defensive". lie tells usq "and IAd prescription and legitiMcY 
on its side"* 
6 But it &ttention is focussed on the dilemmas 
of contemporary Enaliubmen (as ban recently, Ibeen'done by 
R*A* Deddard) the Revolution appears radically different* 
To the ChurcIt or England man$ who# I: r a momber o: C the 
polltically relevant classes$ was Maly to have sworn 00ths 
of allegiance to James, "tho Revolutloft meant breukinX 
taith. with his lAwfUl sovoreign, the violation of Sacred 
oaths, und nothing short'of a national apostacy from the 
doctrines or passive obedience and non-resistances a 
cherished legacy that had come down ftvm the age of the 
apostles. It was impossible for him to acquiesce in 
usuzVation witbout doing violence to his conscioncet, 
70 
The difference between these two views of the 34MOlutiOU : LD 
crucial if we are to understand the relationship between 
political ideas and politically important grQuPB during 
the principal crisis of our period& For the Whig 
interpretation of the Revolution originates in the prOPOSAnda 
of the title and contains the bias of the most convinced 
anti-Jacobites. And yet this interpretation ban come 
to dominate Englishmen's underatandings of the nature of 
16 
the Revolution and han contributed to the genexul acceptance 
of those largely false generalizations about the political 
thought of the late seventeenth century which I noted In 
the previous chapter* 
G, 11j, Trevelyan advanced one such seneraliZatiOn When 
he examined the Convention Parliament (1688-89) in terms 
of Tory defenders of divine right monarchy doing verbal 
battle with Whig contructurianso 
8A 
well defined two.. 
party system had appazuntly &rIsen in Parliament during 
the second half of the seventeenth centuryl And Whig 
interpretations of the conflict between these supposed two 
parties bAvo tended to represent the battle in terms of 
authoritarian$ retrogressive* religious or mystical Toryism 
attempting to stem the tide of libertarian# progrossivej, 
seculAr or zutionalint whiggism9a 
This view of the cbAracter of English political tlu)uSht 
at the time of tho lRavolution has come under the scrutillY 
and attack or some modern historical scholarshipe Mat 
nOtublyt on th* on* hands Ifolle Greenleaf bas clarified the 
rationale and coherence of Divino Right theories 
10 
and 
G*L. Cherry ban "defouded" the legal and philO3OPhic4l 
views of the Jacobiten 
11 
0 And on the other hands G. M* Straka 
hus convincingly argued that it uss a transition in DivinO 
Right theory from "the divine right of kingO to the "divine 
right of Providence" that did most to reconcile Englishmen 
to the Revolutionary Settlements and not the outright victory 
17 
of secular contzeetarlAnism 
12 
0 But even these reassessments 
do not adequately portray the complexity of the intor. 
relationships between ideang attitudes and activities at 
the time of the Revolution* 
If we look at the mass of political literature 
published during the period immediately following the 
rapid decline in Jame# Uts fortunes (from U88 to 16999 
this complexity becomes obvious* We shall findq for examples 
that beliefs In the Divine Right of Kings were by no means 
confined to Tory or Jacobite writlugal that contract ideas 
were hold alike by Williamitext Jacobltesg Tories# Whigno 
Republicanag and defenders and opponents or the revolutionary 
settlementl and that not only were there fierce debate$ 
about the Justification of the series of events which 
constituted the 1688 Revolution$ but also disputes about 
What h&j happened and what should an a cousoquenco be done* 
the-rest of thist chapter I went to so some way 
towards, outlining the Complexity Of the issues and ideas 
involved in the Revolution debates. My main concern in 
with the role played by ideas of contract in those debatem# 
but. thim, con only be appreciated by examining them within 
their =are general context. 
zi 
The imjority of litgrate Inglishmen, became reconciled 
to James Illa fall in three closely related and roughly 
18 
consecutive stages* The first concerned interpratinS the 
evonte culminatiug in James' flightj the secoudg suggesting 
what should be done an a rezultj and the tUrd, explaining 
the status of the now regime* 
and now unother IjAd been isworns 
One oath bad beau brokeng 
What was ýLtx status? I 
shall : first sketch the main views advanced in the : first 
two stages of the. debates and then consider in more detail 
the arguments of the cruclal third stagee 
The yamphlets and books that were published in response 
to the Revolution% together with the records o. C the Convention 
ParlUzuent'a deliberatIonag allow us to piece together at 
least seven dif. Carent contempprary es. -planations of what 
had actually happened to cause James's, withdziwala, One 
legal idea canvassed was that. Jamez had abdicated the 
government and although this was Vigorously contented in 
the Convention it. w&s Ong of the views eventually sanctioned 
by Parliament*" Another view was that James had deserted 
tho govornment -a view loss logalistic than that of 
abdicationj and more acceptable to t4one unprepared to 
Argue that Janos was no-longer Ae. Aur 
14 A third king 
idea suggested, vas that William, had conquered Englandq 
forcing, J"mez to retiret although this wax otton modifieds 
because of the association between conquest and slav*ryl 
Into a view that Willialm had conquered Jaws& but not 
RnSlandi 15 A fourth Interpretation offered was that James 
had been forced to leave by a successful rob, allion and that 
therefore the Revolution was illegal ano allegiance was 
19 
still due to the king now in forced exiIO4,16 A fifth 
idea vas that James had knowingly broken the fundamental 
constitutional laws and had withdrawn$ thus leaving the 
throne vacant$ rather than suffer the reprimand of an 
outraged Parliament*17 A xixth Views in many ways the 
most widely accepted of U119 was that King Janos had simply 
suffered the judgment of Providence for his Wis-governmento 
18 
And finallyg it was also suggested that James had broken 
"the original contract" and that therefore he had either 
ceased to be king or been forced to leave# or againg more 
ximplyg that these two consequences followed from his 
breaking his '91coronation oath" or "trust"* 
19 
The suggestions offered about what should be done in 
the absence of a do fgctg. monarch were similarly vari4do 
Some suggested the immediate unconditional recall of James 
20 
others his reinstAtement upon additional gvarentees or 
Limitations of the prerogative power 
219 
whilat a Regency 
22 
9 
23 24 the crouning of Mary ý, the cxvwning of William I the 
crowning of William and Mary- tog*ther""51 or a republican 
. 2. remodelling-of the government .6 were further serious 
suggestions convasood during the interrognume 
YAny of those different views of the Revolution "re 
not of course mutually incompatible* The argument from 
Providences for examplej could and frequently did feature 
alongside pr*ctically all the other views* Similarlyl 
although Interpretations of what had happened affected 
judgments of what should be done In responsej there wax no 
co 
simple relationship between them& To modern earn most 
of the debato sounds so rarefied that we are tempted to 
dismiss impation'. 61y the soemingly small and excessively 
fine distinctions* But to do so in inevitably to miss 
the point of the debates and therefore the significance 
of the Revolution for its contemporaries. For it is only 
from these debates that the contemporary understandings of 
the Revolution can be properlyassessede, 
The debates about the ptastus of ý the William and Mary 
regime were similarly narked by fine and sometimes rather 
tortuous distinctions. C, F6 Mullat has attempted to 
characterize these debates by-noting that they bear Aý 
closer resemblance to Scholastic disputes than to modern 
political argument* And the reason for this* he explAinSe 
is that during the late seventeenth century political 
questions were still considered &as in essences, & bmach 
of religious enquiry . that the content and language of 
political discourse were closer to toodiaeval, than to moderu 
utyles, 
27 In One'nonse MmUstis observations'are. correct$ 
the litor*ture with which he was-concerned, was writtent in 
general# by far from fIrst-rate miudxg and was concerned 
with 'oaths'* 'revolution' andý #conscience',, spheres in 
which the Church of England could fairly claim to be an 
important and authoritative guide, But greater and more 
perceptive winds were engaged by problems for reecoved from 
those of mediaeval political life* Religious ideals and 
life were undergoing considerable nodification-by the impact 
21 
of enquiries inspired by rationalist, scientific end 
empiricist thought. 
28 This modification had affected 
the practical political debates of the late seventecuth 
centuryo, Arguments from scripture were no longer sufficient 
to resolve disputes$ if indeed they ever had been, and 
accepted doctrines of the Church were scrutinized and changed 
in order to appear "rational"* The apparent conserv*tism 
of the political arguments# the constant app4al to scripture 
and the concern with Church dogma that most of the pamphlets 
portray should not be accepted unquestioningly as evidence 
of mediaeval style* The fAct that It was only In sermons 
that exclusively religious arguments were used in reference 
to political affairaq and that most printed polemics 
appealed to the senarate, tonets of Roasong Religiong History 
and Laws In indicative of this change* Religion appears 
as a vital authority, but as on* amongst othoreq and itself 
open to interpretation and thange, 
The now oaths of allegiance i"sed a positive, sacred 
and public act of, approbutlon upon the literato publJLcg 
and thus a coherent and persuAsiv* justification of the, 
Revolution became of considerable pr*Lctical importance*. 
The oaths of. allegianco to James had beeirbrokon and 
although James#& unpopular actions had alienated practically 
all sections of opinion from him (including the established 
Church), j still most Englishmen recognized a deep gulf 
between their lintorents-in getting rid of James and their 
#duty$ to continue obeying him because of the oaths,, Thus 
22 
the conflict betveen tinterest' and 'conscieneof becamo a 
dominant them* of tho debates during the third stage of 
the Revolution controversiese 
The defenders of the Revolution were concerned to 
portray it ae'tho necessary andg more important* tile Lewful 
succ, basor, to James II's government* If these could be 
proved$'particularly the secondq then the now-oaths of 
allegiance could be taken with. a clear conscience and the 
stability of the regime would be the greAtero, 
Arguments from Inecessityt seemed to carry the least 
conviction* Despite JaIneste unpopularity and the fears 
he had created about the immediate prospect of popery and 
arbitrary powers it was not very satisfactory simply to 
argue from these that therefore resistance had been- 
necessary to safeguard the supposed constitutional liberties 
of the citizens* For this simply avoided the, three 
principal problems which made the debate of such intense 
and important practical'concern: the-problems of mozal 
right,, legal right and the stability of governmente 
At least since the Reformation, it was claimed$ the 
Church of England had officially preached the doctrine of 
passive obedience and non-resistance -a doctrine which 
taughtj as Abodnego Seller reminded Englishmen In 168gg 
That it in the duty of every Christian$ In 
things lawfulq activelX, to obey his Sup*riorl 
in things unlawfull, to PuLtoIC rather than obey, 
and In any caseq or upon any pretence whatsoever 
not to resist$ because* whoever does so* 11MIJ 
Z: o&eA33 
-to 
th-emBOlven DaWatloll, &29 
The established Churchg thong adjudged resistance to be 
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morally wrong and the problems of the moral status of the 
now regime were made all the more intractablo to those who 
bad taken oaths of allegiance to James II. 
But to the problem of moral right was added that of 
the positive law. Statute lawsp for exAmple 13 Charles 
Il at, 2c* I paz*graph 31 undoubtedly part of the continuing 
law of the laudg declared that "it in not lawful upon any 
pretence whatsoever to take arms against the King ... or- 
against those tbAt are comissioned by himol'30 Any 
comprehensive defence of the Revolutiong theng would need 
to take account of such unequivocal statutes which declared 
the enterprise illegalo 
Attempts to overcome these legal difficulties, however$ 
would lu%ve to avoid & further problem. This was that, 
Sivon the widespread belief, an on* writer put It, that 
"the Law is the very soul that anicvLtes this Body Politick"31v 
that arguments overri-ding one law did not threaten "to 
loosen the Bond of due Subj ectjonýj32 and thus threaten the 
stability of any regi=e* 
Tits argumentag then* in defonce of the Revolution from 
the position that "Necessity in exceptional circumstances 
overruled Human laws"33 were clearly inadequate when 
confronted with the problems of moral rights legal right 
and the stability of government* As one defender of, the 
Revolution rewarkedg 'necessity' might explain and in 
certain circumstances texcusel action but-It did not 
1JUMUry, It*, 34 The argument from necessity In fact plays 
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a minor role In the disputes over the Revolution and its 
shortcomings help to explain why most of the defenders of 
the new regime attempted far more ambitious arguments, 
The Revolutiohl they claimed, was certainly necessary but 
much more importantly it was lawfull 
Justifications of-thw"laid"u1ness" of the new reSime 
took many different forms* Not only were there a number 
of related activities to bo proven slawnal . e, Z,, armed 
rosistances transferring allegiance from a living monarch* 
calling a Convention$ breaking or toodifying tho horoditary 
successiong and by-possing statute laws - but also there 
were a number of different standards of law to which appeal 
could be made - ioeog divine Iaw, natural law, the Inv of 
national and positive law. 
Appeals to the higher lawn of nature and God were the 
easier to uphold because they were necessarily more Sonpral 
than the intricate and specific positive low* But just 
because they were more general, they were more easily open 
to dispute* Arguments, from divine law and the will of 
God woro, howevorg some of the principal pwanp whereby the 
legitimacy of the Revolution van defended& The-fierce 
controversy which followedVillian SherlocVs decision to 
take the new oaths of allegiance highlights. the strengths 
and weaknesses Involved in arguments fron Providoucee" 
Sherlockýftltially refused to take the oaths not, 
because he wanted Jamon 11's returng nor because he 
"distrusted Williaw and Maryq but simply,, so he vlaiwed,, 
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"out of pure Principles of Conscience", 
36 Allegiance had 
been sworn to JAmes and was therefore due to him for &is 
long as he remained kingi and no action which disregarded 
the Church's doctrine of paa*JLVO obedi*pce could *ver 
rightfully dianiias a kingo On these grounds Sherlock 
had refused the oathip and was preparodg along with the 
rest of the non. -Juring clergyq to be deprived of his 
bonsficese 
But Sherlock recanted an the eve of losing his 
livellhoodg took the oaths and was promoted to the Deanery 
'Of St. Paults. He justified this change by referring to 
doctrine In Bishqp Overall's Convocation Book* This 
'Work contained the elements of political theory which the 
Convocation of 1606 had found acceptable& It vas a strongly 
royalist book# and had been republished As part of Jamen 
III* defence* But in an* paosage relating to the A-do fActo 
authority ; of the revolutionary goverpoont of the United 
Provincesq Aherlock clained to have found &-Church authority 
to Justify SwOurinS Allegiance to William and M&ry437 In 
bin The Case oL Allegiance Duo to Soverglia-Powers (1691) 
Aborlock argued that the controversies over tho rightIVIness 
of the now oaths had beepme hopelessly confusedt .. 
)kny 
writers, he notedj. bad. j)oe3: t arguing that legal rights were 
the only grounds for paying obediopceq and thus it bad 
b9cq=* necessary to Justify the Revolution on positive law 
&roundo* "But *a* to JuOge truly of this"*,, he clalmodt 
11; requLrox such perfect sicills In law and History, and the 
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Constitution of the gn-Slish Governments that few men are 
capable of making so plain and certain a judgement of its 
as to be a clear and safe Rule of Conscience " 038 Claiming 
Overall's Convocation Book an authority# Sherlock declared 
that the dispute over positive law right was unnecessary* 
The Divine Will was the surest guide and the strongest 
bind of conscience, 
"Subjects are bound to obeys and to pay and aw*ar 
all*giancog" he axsorteds ", *, to those Princes 
whom God hath placed and settled in the Thrones 
whatever Dis3utex there way be about their legal 
Right eeee"3 
The Convocation Book "proved" this by affirming: 
I* That those Princes, uho IwiLve no legal right to 
their Throneng way yet have God's Authority* 
26 That when they are thoroughly settled in their 
Thronexq they are invented with God's Autho4tyl 
and must be reverenced and obeyed by all ***40 
The only questions then$ in reference to 16CB should 
be whether the now regime were thoroughly settled$ and$ If 
it wereq allegiance ought to be sworn to it* Sherlock 
insisted that the "distinction between a King do _juree and 
a King do -VActo, 9 relates only to Human Laws$ which bind 
Subjectas but are not the necessary Rules and Measures of 
the Divine Providence" , 
41 
His; argument was simply that 
it did not matter whether William and Wry could be shown 
to have & legal right to the English thrones it was 
sufficient that they onjoyeO a quiet possession# A 
rightful monarchg that in to may,, need only be gj. ýLhcto 
and sufficiently secure in his position to be able plausibly 
to maintain tbAt he had God's blessing* 
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Sherlocktx arguments provoked a vast number of replies, 
Exception was taken to his views by both the defenders and 
the opponents of the revolutionary settlement* Jeremy 
Colliert from the more extreme wing of the non-juring 
clergy, criticised Sherlock for asserting that "Legal 
Right must always give place to Unjust Power"s 
42 
Since 
the English constitution was clearly monarchical and not 
republicang he insistedg then James# or at the very least 
his now-born song should be king. Sherlock was in fact 
nothing loss thAn a "Hobbistat43 in arguing an he bad. 
The concern shown by Collier for legal rights was 
apparent in most of the other critices of Sherlock and the 
derosatory label of "Hobbist" van freely used* 
41, 
Samuel 
Johnson, for examplet accused Sherlock of setting up "Two 
Kings, one of Risthtg the other kX ProXIdence"45, and of 
implying that the now regime wais "an unjust Usurpationo 
and t1le Ilevolution illaaal". 
46 And Robert Jankin reaffirmed 
the need Cor justifications froin positive law when he 
declared$ against Sherlock$ that "the Laws of that Constitution 
of Government under which wo live# *, o are to deteratin when 
the Authority of Sovereigns ceaseng and the Allegiance of 
Subjectal and we are not to think their Power and Authority 
transforrod, p unless it be transferred legaljy. "47 
Bh'BrlOcklx arguments from the divine right of 
Providenc*9 thong wat with considerable OppositiOns 
There was a widespread desire to so farther and to support 
or oppose William and Mary according to their titles as 
28 
de-I jr. 0 Mao na rch is & Nonetheless the sort-of defence that 
Sherlock presented for taking the new oaths wax of considerable 
importance. By arguing, that It was God's hand that had 
expelled James and established William and Mary Am his 
stead# Sherlock provided one-way in which Englis4ments 
conscionces could be reconciled to the Revolutiom Indoedt 
as G. M. Straka has recently arguedq it uaw-precisely this 
transition in Anglican political theory (of which Sherlock's 
ideas represent the finished proOuct) from the "Stuart 
concept of divine hereditary right" to the post-Rovolution 
theory of 11the divine right of providence" that in'tact 
persuaded most Rngliahmen to accept tlia new regime. 
48 And 
it certainly is the case that arguments from. Providence 
: formed a crucial part of the-juring Churchts self-justificatiOnso 
Bishops Tillotsong Tenizong Burnett Sharp and Lloyd of Ste 
Asaph, all wAde considerable uso of xuchý arguments* taymeng 
too$ like William Atwoodq Samuel Johnsons Sir George Eyrex 
and even Edmund Bobun (wIw was-Filmerve editor In 1685) 
attempted to perxuade their readers that the RevolutIOU WON 
& "miracle" of Providence-649 Williams it max claimedg was 
a king by divine right an isurely an any Engliah klug befor* 
him - he van king by ýthe divine rigbt of Providence and 
therefores as Samuel Johnson claimed, "the Rightfullesst 
King that ever xat upon the English Thronwe"50 
Thus when Showlack asserted that-William and Mary were 
monarchs by divIne right he wag arguing a very widely 
accepted point* It u*n zuther his insIxteUDO that to be 
rightful monarchis they need only be do facto, which created 
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most antagonism* Defenders of the now regime affirmed 
that the now monarchs were do jure, whilat opponents insisted 
that allegiance should be payed to Jameaq the king 40 IM 
who was now in forced exile. Sherlock in fact was frequently 
misrepresenteds zince he never denied that William and Mary 
were dg Jura monarchs* His point was that this was Irrelevant 
to the question of obligation, But in the furors of 
polemical dispute misrepresentation is fair from unusual. 
An an argument to Uphold a -dQ 
facto, prince's right to 
the gLjLlegiance of his subjects9 howeverg Sherlock's writing$ 
were open to an obvious line of criticism* If it were 
possible to dispute whether God actually directed the 
outcome of the Revolution then Sherlock's 'divine right' 
could be made to appear little more than a juatiflOatiOn 
of lauccenrul force'* Without direct evidence of God's 
participation in the Revolutions to justify attributing 
its course to God's wills, theng Sherlock's sort of argument 
might equally be used to justify Crowell while he was 
succesufule And even the stout determined Williamites and 
anti-Jacobites ardently denied any parallel between the 
Civil War and the Revolution* The author of EMvidon-ce 
and Procents 
__Orl 
The Cone of Doing Evil that -Goog may 
jome-gL It U69i) made precisely these criticisms of 
Sherlock. By renting his defence of' William solely on 
an unproven intervention by Godg Sherlock had reduced- 
William's right to "success"* Ands the author continued* 
"if Strength and Force be the only determination of Right 
30 
and Wrong, Religion and Laws will quickly become useless 
When interpreted in this wayt Sberlock's arguments 
appeared little different from another very popular$ but 
short-lived* Justification of the Ilawfulness' of the 
Revolution, This was the Idea that the now regime had 
been established by a Ijust conquest in a just war'* 
Charles Blount$ the supposed author of Kinx YJLW&ra and 
SgnqyeLro 9 (169: )). produced one of the most . 
Mr. 
forthright statements of the 'conquentl cajoe. lie wrote 
the work$ he claimed, because he found "that several, who 
are not yet satIxfied with any thing that hath been 
hitherto offeredo do declare, That if it could be made 
appear that their present Majenties have on their side All 
the Right of Conquest$ they would entirely submit to the 
n Governments and take the Oath,, 945" 
Argvnents from 'conquest' to Justify 1688s howev*ri 
enjoyed only a very short-lived acceptability* In late 
January 1692/3 Pa1*li&MQnt ordered that King Wilj; Lam an4 
juasil ConClUerorn and Bishop Gilbert Burnet I is )?, & xtoAA1 
b2ttgr, (1689) should be burned publicly by the common 
hangman, A pamphlet by William Lloyde Bishop of StI. 
Asaphs would probably also have joined then had not the 
monagers of the case misread the relevant passage. 
53 The 
error of all three books lay in assorting that William and 
Mary were king and queen by right of conquest over James 
III They deserved their fateg according to Parliament$ 
because such an Assortion "tots highly injurious to their 
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majo'Stiest rightful title to the crown of this realm, and 
inconsistent with-the principles on which this government 
in founded, and tending'to tho subvorsion of the rights of 
the peoploo,. 
54 The Licenser of tho Pross,, Edmund Bohun, 
excused hin authorizing tho publicatlon of the works because 
he believed the argument to be "innocent" since "many 
Treatises had'been published higher on this point" and 
noth. ing had an yet been done against thew. 
5-5 In this 
Boliun wan, undoubtedly correct, 
Nonetheless# it vas also true that very few defenders 
of the now regime were prepared to justify it solely upon 
the grounds of conquest* . 
56 The leCitimacy of a conqueror 
seems to have been too questionable for that, Many feltv 
with Locke,, that the consent of the governed was in some 
way nocossary for the legitimate foundation of a government*57 
The strength of this fooling goes some way to explaining 
one of the most extraordinary pieces of tmental gymiastics' 
in the whole of the Revolution debates, For some of the 
proponents of the conquest case attempted to reconcile 
Iconquestv with tconsent', 'William Shorlockq for examples 
in his A V113dicAtion o; C the Came -of 
AlleirlancedtLe to 
Soveraign Powers (1691) argued that since a conquest doxtroyx 
tho previous government it forces the ex-citizens to 
Iconsentl to the conqueror's regime in self-defence, And 
'consentf, he triumphantly assertedg is universally accepted 
an the lawl'ul medium by which rights way be transferredt . 
58 
Timothy Wilson, in a pamphlet entitled God. 11to King. 
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140 ? £220. U of ti . Z. 
RB&te. 
-in 
the JuntiftrARtiL) the CountLe d 
Revolxtio. U (16909 producod a variation of Sherlock's 
argument which was to have far reaching consequencon. 
Wilson here argued that since the purpose of CovornmOnt 
was the protection of its citizens -a common supposition 
in the seventeenth century - whon a country is conquered 
the citizens may swear allegiance to the new government 
without sin or illegalityg because only an effective 
government can fulfil the essential role of securely 
protecting the "Livess Libertical or Estates" of the 
citizen body. 
59 This sort of arguments as Quentin Skinu*r 
bAs suggested$ provIded one of tho main avenues through 
which the idea of conquest uun assimilated into Whis 
thought (thereby allowing the Norman Conquest to find an 
acceptable place in Whig constitutional history), 
60 But 
this we muist clarify later., 
Most defonders of the William and Mary governmentg 
however, s were not prepared to rent their came on appoals 
to the Senersi lawx of God and Nature or on the Divine, 
Will alone, They wanted instead to establish an even 
stronger Ilegall proof of the legitimacy of the now rogimee 
Gilbert Burnet$ in one of his most popular pamphletag 
61. 
stated cleArly the isisues involved in affecting such a 
proof. Ile argued that the problem with tho 'Divine Will* 
sort of argument man that it was uncertain and tended to 
62 
justify "allinurpers, when they are BUCCOSSfUl"O Thusq 
iligtoad of reforring simply to Godts will as the doterwinant 
331 
of politicalýobligations citizens should look to positive 
law: 
The measures of power, and by consequence of 
obediences must be taken from the express laws 
of any state or body of meng from the oaths that 
they swear# or from Immemorial proscription, and 
a long possessions i4hich both give a titles and 
In a long tract of time oak* a bad one become 
good". 63 
In short$ he assertedg "the degreas of all civil authority 
are to be taken from express laws# i=memori&l customag or 
from particUlar oaths* 064 
This riew of the grounds determining political 
obligation was widely accepted, 
6.5 
but as Burnet recognizedl 
it presented a great difficulty in the "ay of Justifying 
the legality of the events of 1688: 
"The main and great difficulty here" lie romrkedf) 
"is that though our governm*nt does Indeed &snort 
the liberty of the subject, yet thero are many 
express laws made, that lodg the militia singly in 
the Kingg that make It plainly unlawful, upon any 
pretence whatsoever, to take up arms against the 
King$ or any commisioned by him", 66 
Burnet was here referring to such statute laws as t1lat of 
13 CI'mrles 11 nt* '2c which I have already quotedb Ilia 
solution to the dilemm involved asserting and Justifying 
four propositions about the nature of laws 
1, All seneral words how large soevers are still 
supposed to have a tacit exception and reserve in 
theml if the matter seems to require it eoe 2,, When there seems to be a contradiction between 
two artiolex in the constitutiont we ought to 
examine which of the two Is evidonts and the most 
. important# *** and then we must give ouch an 
accomodating: sense to that which seems to contradict 
ito that so we my reconcile those together *** 
since the chief design of our whole law &** in to secure and maintain our liberty ooe therefore 
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the other article against resistance ought to be 
so softened, an that it does not destroy us, 
3. .. the not resisting the Kings can only be 
applied to the executive powers that so upon no 
pretense of ill administration in the execution 
of the lawss it should be lawful to resist him: 
but this cannot with any reuson be extended to an 
Invasion of the legislative powers or to a total 
subversion of the government *** 4* **. The 
Ewo ýd] 
King *. imports a prince clothed by law *90 but 
if-ho goes to 3ubvert the whole foundation of the 
govorument he agnuls his own powers and then 
7 ceases to be 
Lug 7 
Burnet's arguments offoring a reint"pretation of the 
English Constitution and the rules for legal exegesis# was 
purely a piýce 0occaujon -a political argument masquerading 
as legal orthodoxy Intendad to justify the extremely 
questionable legality of those events leading to the 
crowning of William and Mary, Lost his defence of the 
Revolution from positive law should fail, Lurnet covered 
himself by assertinZ the "principleg that in all the 
disputes between power and libertys power must always be 
proved, but liberty proves itselfl the one being founded 
only upon a positive law$ and the other upon the law of 
Ivature.,. 68 Thus If the legality of the Revolution could 
not be maintained from positive lawe Burnet was declaringo 
it could certainly be maintained according to natural lawb 
The desire to defend William and Mary asge jure 
monarchs was reflected in the many pamphlets adopting 
arguments similar to Burnet's, One writerg Samuel Johnson, 
empliasised the importance attached to these arguments* 
The Revolution Settlement, lie affirmed, was "founded upon 
Legal Principles" and Uilliam and Mary were thus -4-9 
jur-0 
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monarchs* 
69 The consequence of denying thiss as for 
example Sherlock hads was to maintain in effoett 
L. That all Kingx are abxoluteg and have Authority 
from God to trAmple, upon our Religiong Liberties$ 
and Laws# at their sovereign Will and Pleasure* 
2* That all who joyn'd in Arms with King WI lion 
oo* without Repentance shall rjaceive-DamnatLMe, 3* That King James has still a legal Right to the 
Crowns and therein, $ one would think to our Obedience* 
That he may use Arms to recover gee 
Lhis Right R 
. 5, 
That they w1u) fought against the late 
18L 
in 
IrelaIld, fought against the rIghtful King before 
Providence had declared God's Willo-fu 
Johnsonle supposedly legal arguments in defence of 
the Revolution involved the assertions that the English 
Constitution was "Hereditary an to Familys elective as to 
Persons"; 71 that it was "limitedg and founded in Contmctl 
that a Kingg who Acts without regard to the Fundannutal 
Contract, is not a Legal King"172 and that civil rights 
were rights at positive law and therefore any defence of 
them mmat be 'legmV according to positive law* 
73 But, 
Johnson insisted, it was only InLerjor magistrates who 
could be legally resisted according to the law of the 
ZnXlixh Conatitution*74 
A vast number of pamphlets appeared during the five 
years from 1688 to 1693 containing arguments upholding the 
Usality of the Revolution. In addition to the sort of 
arguments of Burnet and Johnwonv reference was made to a 
variety of sourcesg each fiercely contested, to defend 
this view* For examples it was asserted (in a similar 
way to Burnet) that the design of the law should be the 
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overriding consideration In interpreting particular I&WN*75 
The design of the law uas usually said to be either the 
protection of the citizens or the well-being of tho coumnwityo 
In either cases the point uas that general considerations 
could be used to modify radically or over-rule a particular 
law, Some pamphleteers also argued that the Convention 
Parliament had resolved the problem of "legality" and that 
Its an the legally competent and representative body of 
the nation (a hotly disputed point), should be followed in 
the concluzion that William and Mhry were lawfully kinS and 
queen. 
76 Others again referred to Henry V111s Statute 
of Treasons and to Lord Coke's judgment that English law 
required obedience to be sworn to a do far *77 , to monarch 
Reference vas also made to the notion of the dissolution 
of the government . James 11, it was maintained# had 
d63troyed the laws by his misconduct and the government 
was dissolved, tharefore anything the citizens miSht do 
for their own safety could be accounted "lawfultt*78 And 
finally reference was, made to tho legendary 'Ancient 
Constitutionle whichj it was supposedl James had subverted 
and William "restored"079 
We will return to these arguments again and again 
throughout the rest of our enquiry, but we must now consider 
. 
LLI 
-0-tall 
the role that ideas of $contract$ played in this 
complex constitutional controversies ever the 1688 Revolution* 
37 
lix 
In the previous chapter I remrked that at least one 
Idea of contract was obvlously of considerable lmportanc* 
in justifying the Revolution. This was the notion rofoxx d 
to in the Convention Parliament's resolution concerning 
$the state of the natioul ax a result of James 11's flighto 
James, It was claimodg wax no longer king because he had 
broken "the original Contract between Xing and People"# 
because he had OviolLated the I'lMdAmental lAwim"S and because 
he bad "abdicated the Government"*80 Although this c*ntr&ct 
featured an only one of three explanations or Jamests ranig 
still several writers, amongst them Peter Allixt considered 
that breaking the orix; LMj, -jSoTjtreSt was 
the "foundation" 
of the case against James. 
81 But even if this were an 
accurate assessment of the complicated arguments that I 
have just outlInedg there still appears-considerable varietY 
in the terminology and use of contract ideas in the 
Remrolutionary literature* 
Practically all the 'legal argvmeutol for and against - 
the Ilevolution wore at some time defended by reference to 
the Ocontractf. Appeals were frequently made to an 
"original Contract" Which supposedly beMn the Bnglixb 
Constitution% to a 'contract. 1 that was supposedly eaLbgQjd 
, wilb. in English constitutional laws and to a Icontractl 
supposedly 2Msurro&ed in any legitimate government* But 
there was certainly no general agreement about the specific 
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provisions of those contracts. Xn the Convention Parliaments 
for examples Williamls right to the throne was both defended 
and attacked on the basis or the English contract* The 
Bishop of Zly and the Rarl of Pembroke were loading exponents 
of the contractualist came against the Convention Parliament's 
right to modify the hereditary succession by offering the 
crown to William Pembrokels speech provides an interesting 
illustration of one type of contract argument that may 
appear somewhat surprisings 
"The laws made"l he arguedg "are certainly Part 
of the orininA4 contrAS$3 and by the laws mudes 
which establish the oaths of allegiance and 
supremacy* we are tied up to keep. in the hereditary 
line [of succession to the thron63 ,, There 
(I 
take it) lJoe the reason why vo cannot (of ourgOlVOB) 
without breaking that contract$ break the successiOlls 
uhich in settled by law, and cannot be alter9d but 
by another% which we ourselves cannot makee"02 
This contractualist argument against the legal competence 
of the Convention Parliament occur9d in a debate which 
contained much moro ftwiliar references to 'contract'* 
Sir Thomas Leel for examples upheld a popular right to 
oltor law by appealing to the contmet of govexý ent: 
"But. my Lordal" he said$ "I would ask this queationt 
Whether upon the QrIstinal Co tjMct there were not 
a power preserved in the nation, to provide for 
Its self In such exigencies? 
Tbat contract was to settle the constitution on 
to the 14gislature .. o so we take It to be: And 
It in true$ that It is a part of 
- 
the cantractt the 
making of lavaq and that those laws should oblige 
all sides when medal but yet so* on not to exclude 
this original constitution In all governments tbAt 
cocmence by compactq that-there should be a pow*r, 
in the states to oak* proyision in &31 times$ and 
upon all occasional for extraordinary cases and 
necessitieng such an ours now iso"83 
Only one of the members of the Convention - the Z&rl 
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of QUirendon - Is recorded an rejecting the idea of an 
original contract altogethere He did sol he claimed$ 
because "this breaking the oriZinal contract in a, langmage, 
that hath not been long used In this placel nor known In 
any of our law books$ or publick records* It Is sprunS 
ups but as taken fxvm some Ute authorag and those none 
of the beat received"* 
84 
But thle critique of the legal 
status of the original contract did not prevent tho accoPtoncs 
of the Idea# by the Conventiong as justification for replacing 
uUmes by William and Mary# Clarendon's objections failed 
in this respect partly because they had already been anticipated 
and rejected by a strong body of legal opinlowo 
Whon the Convention Lords first considered tba resolution 
which claimed that James had broken "the original Contract 
between King and People" they suggested-tbat a Committee of 
the whole 11ouse be Instruct*d by "the learned counsel of 
the 3AW **** of what the original contract iss and whether 
there be any such or not*" nine experts In the Common 
Law we" Galled to give thoir views and, although the "cords 
of what they said are far fnmn coWletes It In clear that 
in general they were agreed that somt1iing like an original 
contract was at the root of Znglish laws Sir Robert Atkynst 
for emmimple, is recorded as arguing in the following ways 
I believe none of us bave it Ct#o orizinal controct] 
in our books or casong not aifytIdnS that touchOD 
on It* Thinks it nust, rotor to the first original 
of govornmente Thinks the King never took any 
goVernmento but there was an agreement between 
King and people* Xt Is a limited monarchy and a 
body politieg and the King head of it* If there 
ware an original contract, yet-it is subject to 
variations an the timenb Nr* Hooker says all 
public Government is by agreement* James X& 
himsolf admits in 1609 that there is a paction 
between prince and people. "Every just Kings" 
lie says, "in a settled kingdom in bound to obey 
tho paction made to his pooplo by his lawseff 
Roads preamble to the Act concerning Peter's Penceq 
&c, f, Giving rules; by uhich the prince shall Govern 
and the people obey* This shows what the contract 
ing tho lAws of the kingdom, ALI public regiment 
seems to have arisen by contract between men and 
princes. Grotius do Bolloo : rel, r)lO David vho uas 
made King by Gods called all Israel together at 
11obron, and made a covenant ulth them*65 
Sir Edward liontagus folloirJzg Atkynx* agrood that the law 
books were sileutt but thoughts both "*xa lawyer and in 
reason, Ethat_ý *** Sovcr2=ejjt in nude up of a contrAct al 
Lnteo" Dolben bolieVod "In reasomP that there was "some 
such thing oriGlnally" # and Air Edward Nevill. insitted 
that it "must of necessity be implied by the nature of 
Government*" Bradbury and L*rd Chief Justice Holt were 
AISO firmly convinced that the English government was by 
contract and Pradbury even anxorted tbat the "body of the 
Common Law must be taken to be that original contract. " 
The remaining mcpartal Levinzq Whitolocke and William Petyto 
seemed loss obviously convinced tIAt there was an original 
contract* Lovinz was content to'note that "this contract 
is government according to the Mmg on the one aid* and the 
people on tLe other, You may cAll it an original cýontzactj 
though you know not when it began, because there are cwLths 
on both sides$ Ung and people* one to governs the other to 
obey*" W14telocka accepted that the term unn Appropriate 
at least he max prepared to use it - tor although there was 
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nothing *bout it "printed in booic caseO. at least "there 
is no book caso to the contrary*" And Petyts despite 
apparently not witking use of the word 'contracts, still 
asserted that there "Was alwaYs An agreement in th4l'S&=Ilgl 
timess and so it continues* n86 
An aut1writative group of lawyers$ thong was prepared 
to argue that the notion of an loriginal contractl was 
somethine known to# or at least consistent withs English 
Law. And the Convention Parliament further underlined 
the legal status of the idea by aceepting the clause in the 
resolution concerning James's breaking "the original Contract 
between King and People" with a vote of 54 to 43* Thum 
references to the 'contract' in political debate during 
the Ute seventeenth century could claim to be references 
u6t so much to a legal analogy am to legal fact* The 
judgments of the Convention did not go unchallenged but at 
least some legal opinion could be appealed to an evidence 
of the aLt of an English 'original contract', 
In the disputes which followed the Revolutiont howevors 
ideas of contract were introduced into a variety *; r sorts 
of arsuments Appeal was certainly made to the supposed 
legal fact of an lorigitual English contract'$ but frequently 
the 'contract$ featured as little more than a rhator; Loal 
device with s4tich to label a set of political proposals 
or activities6 It also featured an simply descriptive of 
the activity uhich the Convention. Parliament was principally 
engaged in during the intarregaum. It wage for examples 
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invoked by a rather luke-warm republican as a moanx-to 
gain a, bearing for his proponalse The Conventiong he 
muggextadq was about to'make a now contract now that the 
old one bad been dissolved Sind, ho offered Itis proposals as 
a basis ror that new contract. 
87 Sir James Montgomery and 
Robert Fergusonj, on iseparate b0casions, went further along 
the same linoo and attacIzed William forj as Montgomery, 
insisted$ his "mardLfast intmetions of that original Contract 
which waýxade With himt Upon thO majutAinftg aud preserviAS 
of which our allOgiAnce was oxpressly foundadol'88 TimothY 
Wilson ar$; ued from the new contract of 3.689 that Englishum 
were bound to obey William, and Ma 
9 
and a Jacobite 
Pamphleteer criticisod the whole revolutiomAry settlemut 
&is being '*& government built upon the most destructIve 
principles to the peace and tronquillity of the nationg 
viza. the origipal contsoot with the people". b9o 
OCton# indeed, thO Appeal to contract vas more than 
simply a rhotorýLcal w-oapon*! Sometimes an argument from 
contract UaA Accompanied by a, faixly systovAtic OrAminaticolm 
'O; r'the'thIDOrOt*c*l PrOSUPPOGitions involved in Adopting 
such a position* But at loast as o; Cten contract arguwxits 
subsisted with mAny other types og arguments, (appealing 
to reason or aut1writy, to, JAwj necegsityj religion pad 
history) arranged as a lopsely knit catalogue o; C supposed 
reasoUs for Accepting an Author's. politICAl opinionso 
Tile loose way Ln which controct ideas were Used $AdicatOx 
both the extent to wbich they bAd becolue COMOIIPlAco (&IbG: Lt 
43 
a xeverely criticiped commonplacs from time to time) and 
the Imprecise coungtations that were associated with them* 
Jeremy Collier went so, far as to record that "most Men 
I)GJLilmvO that the protepdod Breach of tll&t jrhich they 0&1, 
ILAO 
-0-r-ir 
dnPI. CoUlracts wap designed Cor no more than a 
popular Flourish, "91 But thin appears to have been more 
the IAncy o: C a conviuce4 Jacobite than the serious reflection 
of an impartial crItice Collier himaelfq au we PhalLO449 
uns prepared to accept that some constitutions legitimtely 
embodied an original contracti Arguments from contract 
: Ceatured in the political va-Itings o: r Williamitose Jacobitesq 
PrO-RevolutioDaries and anti. -Revolutionaries,, clerica and 
laymen alike* This only appears surprising bocause we 
IIAVO become accustomed, to identily appeals to contract in 
tho late seventeauth century with the idaasýand, argumatx 
of Lockets Tmo jEcat&Mg (ies witil opposition to roys]. 
power)* In facts. howevert, an appeal to Ituo coutract, 
implied neither rejectinE 41vino rigiit; arguawntso nor 
denying the patriarphol corigius or ptates, nor ne. cossarily 
upholding a popular rJSht o: C posiptanceo 
Indeed# even some o; C the most ardent defenders of royal 
power and of Jpmes 13LIS Continuing ; vight to the English 
throne accepted that a ccontract ýms tile basis or ori, &: Ln of 
some governments, Jeremy Colliers, for oxampleg an I 
SUSSeUtOd UbOvvv accepted that the couBtitutionx of Flanderms 
Poland and 11ungary were founded upon an explicit contract 
between ruler and ruled* 
92 Ue only denied that England 
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had ouch a cOubtitutiOn And insisted that 11the Silence o; C 
our LAW And HisitorY An tW) ADY Such gglMWo in a BuIT; Lciomt 
disproof of it" * 
93 Collierls ackuowledz3aeut tbut contract, 
could be a legitimte origin of goverment reflectad some 
of the results of historical onquiries Waich were being 
conducted in the late &*Venteonth centurys Svoden, Do=mrkg',, 
Germany$ Polandq Hungary# France. Spaing Arragons England 
and Scotland - In short all the supposed "Gothic Kingdom*" 
sported historians during this period who endeawured to 
portray each original constitution as a limitod monarchy 
founded by contract* 
An well as being consistent with scow royalist historical 
ISIMInento upholding the contractual arigin of govermiont, 
bY no means implied rejecting the dlv; Lne origin o: r royal 
powero Mobert Fergusong for examples argued that all 
gavvrnmnt vas ordained by Gods but he insisted that this 
was for the purpose of the public well-being onlyo Thum 
ruloreq he vlaimedg wore "under Pact &P4 Confinement" to 
God tA) rule in the public interest and this constituted a 
&art of higher contract which no human JAws could alter., 
Human contzoctm# themp simply "prescribe and define what 
shall be the measures and boundaries of the publick Goods 
and unto wbat Rules and Staudards the MmSlstrAt* AhMIL be 
restrained"o" The distinction between Qod's qp4kiniuS 
g9v*rAment in general and humn tresdow to establish particular 
$forms' was widely affirmed by contract theoristse it 
permitted thels to ArSuo, f3mm diVine ri&t Ao omh an any 
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of the "Jure Divino" men, 
96 
Nor did contract arguments necessarily IxWJLy a depial 
of soma patriarchalist arg=entz, Most writers did not 
enter tliQae definitiopAl controverpiep which were o; C ouch 
concern to LoocUe* TyrreU and Sidney*97 The diatinction 
between a f4therIx #economic powers and a magistrate's 
Ipolit; LcAl powarf# by poans of MUch Locke, Tyrrell ond 
Sidney Idisprovedt hardly featured 
in the debate& about the Revolution* Contractarians seemed 
prepored to argue (if the neeO arose) that the first 
CoVertment In the wvrld won a "Gonarcha"698 or a patriarclvml 
COvez, 32ment999 but that this goverpnent was transformed into 
A contractual government either "insousibly"100 or Mien the 
OrUUAI, yat; ýIarchs died or wore overpoweradg 
101 
or when 
men Stopped livIzz for hundreds of years at a tiowl 
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Whether or not the SugLish goverment man founded by 
A contract Was subject to fiercer dispute thap whether any 
&ova nt could legitim! Ltely be founded by contract* But 
even In this contzimersy thero, Vaz ne, simple jr9lationship 
between adopting contruptarian political principles and 
defending the deposition ofJames Ile A Jacobite p&Wjlete*r# 
one Charlwood 4wtonq for o=mpleq argued In JL691 that 
"Our oaths, j%nd the originAl contruct of our. JL&w. bookxl 
bind us to rostore the Kinga, "JL03 And In ILts Utter Egrugrl! r 
ment-to Pre TLIlotmon. and for-Want-of An Anffw*r--z*Ao . 1t)ubIJ&k 
(16907) he outliued that original contzact Ox L13plying tbat 
the English monarchy was hereditaryg that the IdLng could 
do no wrougs and that he wax not accountable to the peoplel 
w4 
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Robert Jenkin argued to a similar point by means of an " 
analogy between the contract of government and a marriage 
contract* The foriginal contracV, he argued$ in a 
contract made before God and thus it is eternally binding& 
Like a marriage contract it In sealed with the command 
Un ggy pul a-woulader "whom Qgd hath-joyned Itgaot 
"q 105 
, her. no L 
And although Jankin was prepared to allow the possibility 
of divorce througli mutual consents or a "mutual Relaxation"g 
hie point in reference to 1688 was that even "If the People 
did not up Kings by Consent and Compactq this In no argument 
that they may depose them. U106 
All of the references to contract that we have noted 
so far woreq in one way or anotherg, concerned with 
constitutional law* Even ]Robert Jenkin's account of the 
eternally binding contract was intended to describe the 
actual constitutional relations between'the people of 
Rnsland and their sovereign* But this understanding of 
contract In torso of constitutional law seems very different 
from the idea of contract presented in the most famous 
political treatise to be published in BuSland during the 
controversies over the status of the Revolution* In 
. 11MMent 
(1689/90) the John Locke's T-wo Trgatisox gt GoX 
"gLix1gal CogM2gt appears as the agreement of independent 
and equal individuals in a Potato of Nature" to form a 
"LP211tical Society" and be governed by "the g1jorAty of 
the CommuujLty". 107 The purpose of the Treatises wax notg 
secording to L*cke himselfg to dexcribe or defend the 
47 1 
particular provisions of -the 
work only very rarely refers 
LocRe's argument was pitched 
than most of the Revolution 
question* which he considers 
abstract kindi 
Znglish constitution and the 
to specific positive lawso 
at a =ýxch more general level 
ýooks and pamphletss and the 
were similarly oV a much more 
Cortainly Locke Ix 171fg Tr6ga-lixes were published as a 
contribution to the disputes pver the ptatux of the William 
and Mary regime. Zu his Preface Locke, exprossed the hop* 
that hip &rVments would, be "pufficient to entabligh the 
108 
-Th" -extorer. 
O-r Y)ro no gL glir Great RU -- ment 
KinK W: Llliaui"* 
Yet Such a hopes initially at leasto wax voln. Lock*1x 
work, was noý an immediate, surcess and In the Closing years 
of the aVventeonth Century the name of 14cke did not 
teftture very prow*nAntly amongst the, fauthorities' of 
pro-Revolutionary. wr#ers*109 One main reason for this 
apparent lack of success was that the Tvv Tr. - *ajLjeA were 
U11typtcal of the political literature of the day* The 
arguments of the Treatises were uot unique - they were in 
tAct, p&r*llql*d in works by Pufendorf* Sidney and Tyrrell* 
But on the, one side Lockets workwas published anonymously 
and enjoyed none of *he Xnevitable respect accorded works 
published by such a famed scholar as Pufandorfs and on the 
other side the Treatises contained. b! krdly wroference to 
the fierce controversies over the historic rights and 
libertiox of VagXiahmen which engaged much of the attention 
of Sidney and Tyrrell and indeed practically every political 
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polemicist in late seventeenth century Nnglands 
There seem, then$ good j=ma favle reasons for 
believinS that Locke's Contract Theory did not exhibit the 
same understandings of $contract# an those contained in 
most of the Revolutionary literature. But the difference 
between Locke-to Icontractl and the constitutional low 
'contracts' cannot be adequately understood in terus of 
the difference between a Social Contract and a Contract of 
Government. 110 The questions with which Locke was concerned 
were different from those of the constitutional controversialixtse 
Where they wanted to know what the particular rights of 
Englishmen were$ Locke wanted to know the natural rights 
of mang where they wanted to explain the origin of the 
English constitution# Locke explained the origin of 
legitimate govornmenti where they questioned the limits 
of the monarchIs or parliamentla powers Locke enquired 
into the necessary limits of political powerl and where 
they wanted to know if Englishmen had a legal warrant to 
rid themselves of James IX9 Locke wanted to know if there 
was a natural right of resistencee Certainly Locke was 
concerned to explain the origin of society and the 
controversialists were not, and certainly Looks did not 
write of a Contract of Government*' But it would have 
been quite consistent with the sort of enquiry that Lock* 
undertook if he had referred to a Contract of Govez ent - 
after A119 Pufendorf and Sidney (writers wtw Locke himself 
believed had written arguments of a similar type to his 
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own)"' had spoken of thix govex ental contract, The 
difference between Lockets understanding of 'contract' and 
the constitutional law understanding cannot be explained$ 
theng by awans of a 'mechanical' division between writers 
interested in a Social Contract and those Interested In a 
Contract of Governseut, And the wisl6ading effects of 
any such attempt are compounded if it to believed that 
speculation about a Contract of Government and speculation 
about a Social Contract aust inevitably be construed an 
different parts of a single Contract Theory. 
112 For this 
#mechanistic' understanding of contractarianism completely 
misses the crucial differences of typos of questions asked 
and tlevell of argumentx that we have Just noted* The 
Contruct of Government to which, Pufondorf reforsq for 
examplev Is invoked in an attempt to explain the nature 
of government and political obligation* It does not lay 
claim, am does the Contract of Government of many of the 
controversialistoo to a positive law status and It doom 
not pretend to a specifiable historical reality* But 
here we are already anticipating the results of an enquiry 
that has not yet been described. 
So ftr we bave encountered a bewildering number of 
different uses of the word Icontrattl in the Political 
dixcourxe of the late seventeenth centurYo This variety 
of uses highlights the Inadequacy of Conventional accounts 
of the history of tontract thinking* Yet our attempt to- 
understand what Englishmen during this period meant when 
so 
they referred to 0 'contract' In their politicaX writinSs 
should not end with thin confusion of meaningve Pomewhat 
paradoxically it is yrecisely the looseness and variety 
of understandings of $contract' In wideranging types of 
political utterance that adds point to pursuing our enquiry* 
Englishmen in the late seventeenth century cýLearly felt 
that politteal capital could be made by introducing the 
notion of $contract' into. their Political writinss* They 
know that they, wer* addressing an audience accustomed to 
the terminology and ideas associated with that notion* 
Thus our and*avour to portray the late seventeenth century 
understanding of the notion must elucidate the associations 
of Ideas which an appeal to the civil contract might have 
been expected to evoke and to outline tht philosophical 
context which made that appeal and Its associations 
plausibleel" If we Concentrate exclusively on what 
'contract' &Mtjej In political argument then ýwe or* rated 
by bewildering confusion* A significant and Interesting 
pattern of meanings howeverg does emerge it we concentrate 
upon the various Sgan.. ýgt&ns of the term& 
I have emphanised that appealx to contract in 
constitutional debate occured in arguments: intendod to 
establish utterly conflicting conclusions* But despite 
the conflicting intentions of thoir-Authoras the references 
to ewntract shared one obvious characteristict the contract 
originated a particular constitution and continued to enjoy 
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the status of Positive constitutional law* I have noted 
also that references to contracts occur In works of 
constitutional history* Theme contractog too, supposedly 
began a particular constitution and established supposed 
fundamental rights and duties which continued an the legal 
birthright of the citimens of the country concernede And 
finally I have noted that an Idea of contract was invoked 
In a very different sort of argument from the constItutlonall 
a seemingly philosophical argument Into the natureq necessity 
and limits of society# govermwent and political powere 
Xn the rest of this work X oball &rips* that these dide 
indeedq represent two very different understandings of the 
word 9contzectloo The one Idea of contract the 
"Constitutional CAMtrACt" as X Shall, Call it f0nMd part 
of a legalistic approach to the understanding of politiene 
References to It were particularly Identifiable by the 
complex of ideas associated with its the Ideas, that in 
to says of Fundamental Laws Fundamental Rightag Fundamental 
or Original Contxuct and Ancient Constitution* The other 
Idea of contract - the "Philosophical Contract" - belonged 
to a more philosophical understanding of the nature of 
politics* It too$ was easily Identifiable In tex=a of 
the distinctive complex of ideas associated with Ite but 
this time It was Ideas of State of Natureq Natural lawo 
Natural Rights$ and Original or Social Contract* But 
although these two contracts wero distinct ftom one anothers 
and although such contract had its own peculiar theoretical 
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frameworkl they still did share certain features in coýon# 
And the recognition, of these common features holps to 
explain the appearance of a third typo of contractualist 
thought evident in the political literature of the late 
seventeent4 century* The imderptandins of contract 
exhibited in thio third t3po or argument wan distinguished 
by the attempt to lintegr*tef the *dens and argiunonts 
axxociated with the other two contracts* By doin- thing 
the third type of contractualint thought . t1jo, "IntagraUd 
Contract" as I phall call it . provided a theoretical 
Justification for reconciling the requirements oC English 
law with what were believed to be the dictates oC reason, 
Moret1s and religion* 
There most certainly was notq then. a single ContrOct 
Theory subscribed to by political writers in the late 
seventeenth couturye Nor was thero a singleg or two-part 
idea of contructo , Ubdoratandings of contract during our 
period. were much more complex than this* Dut precisely 
what these understandings were will become clear only aft*r 
WO have wmmined the useng arguments and theoretical 
underpinnings associated with references to the eiConstitutional 
Contract". the "Philosophical Contract" and the "Intag%%ted 
Contract"& I will begin by wmmining the ConstitutionAl 
Contract Theory. 
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PARr XX 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTARIANISM 
CHAPTER III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT THEORY 
ýWýMwwý 
What I have called lConstitutional Contract 7liaoryl 
uas 'invented' in late seventeenth century England. Its 
origing character and coherence have been entirely over. 
looked by historians of political thought. And yet this 
theory seems to underpin very many appeals to 'contract' 
in late seventeenth century constitutional debate* At 
the very leastg the full force of such appeals to 'contract' 
can only be appreciated in the light of this theory. - The 
clearest and most complete exposition of Constitutional 
Contract Theory in to be found in the writings of the 
constitutional historian and lawyer William Atmood& I 
shall examine Atwood's work In some detail in the following 
chapterg but it will be helpful at this point to note 
briefly the principal elements of his theory. We may 
then proceed and consider the strands of speculation that 
were combined within the theory and the circumstances in 
which that 'combinationt took place before rtturning to 
Atwood once again for a more detailed scrutiny of the theory 
and the 'uses' to which it was put, 
According to Atwoods questions about the requirements 
of the English Constitution should be settled by 
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constitutional lalt alone* This assertions which, xeems 
far from astonishings ves, in factg quito a pointed ravork 
in terms of the contemporary disputes. It was aimed at 
the contributions both divines and laymen were making to 
those disputes with supposedly constitutional argvments 
drawn from natural or divine law, Throughout his, career 
Atwood wais thorouSILly sceptical about the practical political 
usefulness of natural law arguments and he shared this 
scepticism with several other constitutional wr; Lters of 
his day* His contract theory$ then* did not contain any 
substantial references to natuxul lawq natural rights or 
states of nature* Instead, it purported to bo a legally 
and historically valid account of the English Constitution* 
In summaryg his theory was the followings 
At some time in the distant. pastg or to be precise$ 
at the time or the Saxon lieptarchyg our Saxon ancestors 
contzscted together and not up fundamental lawn to secure 
their liberty and property* They agreed to set up a 
monarchy and chose the monarch* The monarchg in turng 
agreed to maintain the fundamental Iowa and any subsequent 
ones made by Kingg Lords and Commons assembled in Parliaments 
The prospective ; cing was made to xwO&r In his coronation 
oath that he would only. act accordinS to law, and the people 
promised to obey him if he kept within the lawAr Thusg 
Atwood argued$ "The Xingla Oath in the real Contract on 
his sidel and his accepting the Government as a Legal Xing 
the virtual one; and so it in LrrIce-versag in relation to 
IL. 9-- 
. 3.: p 
the ALlegiance due from the subjocto"3L -Thix $Ancient 
Constitution# Atwood called tGothicto The Saxons were 
descended from the Goths -a freedom-loving people whot in 
the earliest times, had spread across the whole of Europe 
and Scandinavia setting up the only form of-constitution 
consistent with liberty$ mixed or limited wonarchys The 
Saxonas then% transplanted their Gothic mixed monarchy into 
post. -Rowun Britain and this was the Ancient Zngllsh 
Constitution, And the Unglimbg more than any other of 
their European neighbours had remained faithful to that 
original constitution* Post-Saxon constitutional history 
was interpreted in the light of this belief and considerable 
effort was spent in attempting to show that no substantial 
constitutional change had occured for some eleven centuriezi 
More specificallyb this effort was spent on the innues of 
the Norman CA)nquest and the origin of the House of Commonsi 
The Norman Conquest$ it appearaj was not a conquest at all* 
And the House, of Comsons was a distinct parts though possibly 
not an a separate institution, of the original Saxon 
constitution* 
The Ancient Constitution of Buglands thens wax 
established by contract and followed the Gothic model* The 
coronation oath embodied the original contracts or at least 
it was a representation of it* Thi* interpretation of 
the original contract save rise to,, and provided coherence 
forg several interesting arguments* It provided & way 
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of relating the Ancient'Constitution to the cont"Moraryt 
sovouteenth century constitution$ since all monarchs were 
required by their oaths to swear to keep the laws of their 
predocexsorxg and so on back to the original laws* Here 
was one reasong but by no means the only reason as we shall 
sees why historical enquiries into Saxon and Feudal law 
were of considerable practicul Importance to political 
argument In the late seventeenth century* Purthermoreg 
the original contract became of much greater general 
significance than it could have dono'had it simply referred 
to the post event which created the Ancient Constitution* 
The original contract no longer referred only to that past 
event, It was alsog and much more importantly,, the 
"express Original and continuing Contract", 
2 the process 
WhArsby tits consent of the governed was made a legal- 
requirement for legitimate governimental action* The theory 
also allowed considerable flexibility In interpreting what 
the fund&mbntal laws enjoined* Xn the absence of any 
historical records concerning a constitutional question, 
or as an aid to interpreting the Itrue weanJLnS( of any such 
records, it was relevant and acceptable on this theory to 
argue from the supposed JLMentlýns of the rational and 
fresdom-loving original contractoral 
The Fundamental JAws designed by our Saxon ancestors 
defined and guaranteed their fundamental rights and lib*rtions 
According to Atwood$ the whole body of I theme laws and 
libortiess together with such subsequent ones an wore 
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created to further the 'intentional of the original contractoraq 
constituted the Fundamental Constitution* The most 
interesting thing about th: L3 Fundamental Contititution was 
not so much the particular provIsions that it was supposed 
to have containedg but rather Its barely concealed element 
of rationality. 6 It provided an extraordirAry lleSall 
principle of constitutional Interpretation& Since the 
Fundamental Constitution of Ingland was designed by our 
ancestorxg and since our ancestors were m, tional men, It 
followed, Atwood argued% that they would never have designed 
anything that could be harmful to themselves or their 
descendants, He admitted that they would not have been 
able to foresee the several turns of state that occured in 
later ages, but he argued that they did make constitutional 
provision for dealing with them. Againg they must have 
done this, h* felt$ since they were rational won* They 
neither insisted that all the laws they made should be 
accounted fundamental lawag nor that all fundamental laws 
should remain ýumlterabloa H* thought it was certainly 
true that$ "They that lay the first foundation of a 
Commonwealth,, have Authority to make Laws that cannot be 
altered by ; Posterity, ooe For Foundations cannot be removed 
without the Ruin and Subversion of the whole Building*0 
But this restraint on constitutional change he considered 
onlyg in the last resort, applied to what he called the 
"Chief Fundamental 1AwN. the law that Salug--Z22mli Sumrom-ft 
Lex-ostjaj 
4 
This law* the moat important, oV all the 
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fundamental lawsig the "Foundation" of the original contract 
an he called it, was "th e scog e and o nd of all -g4her 'Lawng 
and of Gover ment il- sel f'? It was the text through'which 
all laws hnd public actions must pass before they could be 
accepted an va3ld according to the constitution* Thimq 
indeed,, was an extraordinary principle of constitutional 
interpretation, Indeedg it was not 'constitutionall at 
all* JAw bookag rocordag hiitoryt all vere ultimately 
subordinate to the fundamontal law of SaiLua Popj4i. 
We need do no more than note the paradox involved In 
this theory of English constitutional law* Atwood insisted 
that his wibte in accordAnce with the constitutional law of 
the land* lie insisted that he could justify the Various 
causes he believed in by reference to historical and legal 
testimony Alono'e But he onded'by &aborting that it vas 
only by being in accord with the vague criterion of the 
'public well-being' that a rule or action could properly be 
described as constitutional, 
Not only did Atwood believe that his Contract Theory 
was legally val: Ldg however, he beli*ved it was historically 
accuZate as well, Countless critics have ridiculed 
contracturians for holding this second belief* But 
Contract Theorists of the late seventeenth century believed 
they had at least one piece of irrefutable historical 
evidence of the Enilish Soriginal contructil no-Xir"r 
2f Justices 
The docum*nt known an Ille Mrror of Jutliggg vas first 
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noted in 1550 by Plowden who believed It was written before 
the Norman Conquest, It was circulated in mauuscript form 
through legal circles and Coke drew many arguments from ite 
Has too, believed that it was mainly pro-Conquest In origin$ 
but thought that Andrew Horn had added to it at the time 
of Edward 1. Th* document was first printed in 1642 and 
wag translated into English in 1648, It was, however, a 
fake* According'to F&V. Maitland it uas probably written 
at the end of the thirteenth century by Andrew Horn from 
old manuscripts and his own imagination, Nonetheless the 
document gained tonsiderable reputation as an original and 
authoritative tiource of Saxon constitutional history and 
lawe 
6 
In Book I Chapter 11 of the documents ontitled "Of 
the Coming of the English", there was recorded an event 
idiich could be interpreted as the English *original contract'-, 
After the Saxon Conquestq it appeared, the Saxonsq 
Of which fon there were an many &s forty 90VOreIgnst 
who all aided each other an follows* They first 
called this land En,,. mlands which theretofore was 
called Britannia Nkjor* And theyq after great 
warx And tribulations and pains long time suffered, 
chose from among themselves a king to reign over 
them and to govern the people of God and to maintains 
and defend their persona and goods by the rules of 
right* 
And at his coming they made him swear that he 
would mairA&in the Christian faith with all his 
powers and would guide his people by law without 
respect of any persons and would submit to justice 
and would suffer right like any other of his people* 
And after this the Kingdom became heritable. 7 
We will moot these mentancox *&&in in the writluts Of 
Atwood$ Tyrr*3Lj and Allix, where they appear ax historical 
6o 
'0 evidence for the Ruglishloriginal contractb Ve $hall also 
encounter references to the Saxon contract and the Mix7vr 
In several other contractarian pamphletse But it Is 
interesting to note here just how Informal the late 
seventeenth century understanding of #original contract' 
might be. The passage from the %-r"l: indicates that 
there vats nothing very $original' about the $original 
contract# and that the contract itself uts not a very 
'democratic' affairo Government was not originated by 
this Saxon contract since "forty sovereigns" already existed* 
All that was achieved was'the constitutional unification 
of Saxon England. It uas not the body of the Saxon people 
vho contracted with their king .. only the forty sovcr*igns 
were involved* This undesweratie feature of the original 
contract howeverg did not contradict its radical implications* 
The insistence that the king "submit to Justicer and 11suff*r 
right like any other of his people" was certainly no less 
repugnant to a divine right monarch for all thate Indeed 
most contractarians in the lato seventeenth century seem 
to have restricted their views of who the original contzsctors 
were to a section of the popul&tlon only. To Atwood, 
Tyrrell and Purendorfs the contractors were #the fathers 
And wmaters of families's or "the proprietorog especially 
of land"I 
8 
to Robert Atkyns the term "the People" referred 
most often solely to "the Freeholders" vho were "the tz-fie. 
Pr<)priators of the Nation and the land" 19 and many of 
Locketis Orgumonts seem to presuppose a similarly limited 
61L 
view of the meaning of the term W*he P*oylelfe 
20 The 
significance of th*so restricted understandings of 'the 
people* in contractualist writings atoms from their 
conxiderations of who had the right to judge when the termx 
of the contract had been broken. But I will return to 
thin point later* 
So, far I have sketched the main outlines of Atwoodlm 
version of the constitutional Contract Theory- It in 
appareut that that theory combined elements of three 
distInguiphable traditions of seventeenth century 
constitutional thoughtl the traditions of the Ancient 
Constitution, of-Gothicismoll and of one kind of 
Contractarianisme SpecuUtion within the fIrst of these 
traditions has been brilliantly examined by Profemsor 
J*G#Ao ]Pocock* 
c -titullon 
In The An 
- and 
the 7 joilt Cona 
-oudal 
Low (1937) 
Professor Pocock present* a study of the peculiaritem of 
constitutional historiography In the seventeenth century* 
One of the principal modex of constitutional argument during 
the century mum historical* Within this field of historical 
study and, argumentq two main schools of thought opposed 
one another, On the one side were the 'common lawyers' 
who believed that the XnSlish Constitution was, Immemoriall 
on the other side wax a much smaller group of dimsentients 
(like Apolman and Drady) who believed that the constitution 
had been, at least. considerably podified by the Norman 
Conquest and the intiro4uction, of Feudal Twave The Common 
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Law view of the English Constitution$ to which the 
Constitutional Contractarians owed mostq maw constitutional 
law as customary laws and custom as 'immemorial and 
unchangingf. In these terms Professor Pocock relates 
the history of seventeenth century constitutional 
historiography from twog connected standpoints* The one 
is the rise of an i2idreasinCly %istorical consciousnessli 
centrIng around the issue of the Norman Conquest as 6 
break in the continuity of 'unchanging custom'* The other 
is the creation of a polemical situation through partizan 
use of the results of historical enquiry. The notion of 
'immemorial cu. 3tom' was retained and used by the advocates 
of limited monarchy., Their arguments were of the forms 
#the riahts and duties of citizens vis-a-vis the monarch 
I-Ave existed "time out of mind",, they are immemorial custom 
and therefore bind the present'. The notion of IdiscoutinuitYl 
was utilized by the advocates of strong monarchyq with 
arguments of the form: 'all laws and thus legal rights 
are the product of the Kingla will, they are the grants 
and concessions of a conqueror and are therefore revocable 
at pleasure'. 
By the time of the Exclunion Crisis these debates had 
firmly crystallized around the critical issues of the Norman 
Conquest and the position of the House of Commons in the 
pro-1066 period. A Tory group (championed by Dr* Robert 
Brady) was asserting that William I bad really conquered 
England and had introduced the system of Feudal law that 
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radically altered traditional Saxon Laws The House of 
Commonsl this group claimedl, vras no more ancient than the 
reigns of 111enry III or Ed-tmrd 1, In the face of those 
assertions# A Whig group (championed by William Petyt) 
souSht to reaffirm tl2at William I neither conquered England 
nor altered the legal system* William had a claim to the 
tlu*ono made Cood by trial of arms, they insisted* Ile wa a 
elected by acclamation and swore to maintain the ancient 
laws in his coronation oath* Some of his actions contradicted 
his oath and itore therefore Illeral but the damage was 
rectified by Henry I* The House of Commonsl they also 
insisted, did not owe its being either to rebellion againsts 
or to tho concession ofq a king ruling by riSht of conquest* 
Xt had existed# although perhaps not as a separate bodyg 
#time out of mind'* The peculiarities of the historical 
arguments employed in these debates will engage our attention 
at several subsequent points in our examination or late 
seventeenth century contractarianiewo At the moment the 
general contours of Ancient Constitutlop argument will 
suffice to identify one of the main traditions from which 
Constitutional Contractarian; tsm draw its inspiration, 
A much more amorphous trodition of constitutional 
speculation than tho Common XAw view located the origin 
of the Ancient Constitution in the Gothic past* The 
specific provisions of the Gothic Constitution might be 
precisely the came as the immemorial customary law of the 
common lawyers' Ancient constitution but the origin vas 
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different* Instead o, f being an indij; ibnous growth, the 
Gothic Constitution was invented by the Goths and transplanted 
into England by the Saxons whos in their turng had been 
educated by, or descended frums the ancient Gotha* 
According to thin tradition the whole of Europe had been 
over-run by Gothic peoples as the Roman Empire declined 
and thus the first post-noman constitutions of turope had 
been of the same kind* Proquentlyg as we shall see$ this 
sort of Gothic history of Europe was connected to biblical 
accountn of the peopling of Europe after the Flood. The 
Coths were often regarded as the direct descendants of the 
cons of Japhet and thus their political arranrements were 
regarded as the first ever to have existed,, The post. 
Roman spread of Gothicitm was thus a restoration of the 
original European constitutions* 
12 
By the late seventeenth century the term IGothic 
constitutioni was very widely used to describe a good, 
orderly and just form of government which operated by 
balancing elements of monarchyg aristocracy and democracyo 
'Gothic Constitution's 'mixed monarchy's $limited monarchy' 
and 'a balanced government' were thus interchangable terms 
in much of the political argument at the end of the 
seventeenth century, And references to the English 
Constitution as 'Gothic' appear in a variety of polemical 
and historical writings intermingled with arguments from 
'contract' and timmcmorial custom'. In shorts by the 
late seventeenth century Mothic thought' appears to bove 
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lost that distinpt*veposs that led Professor Pocock to 
insist that it was sufficiently different from "co in-law so, 
thought" to be excluded from his account of the, lott*r*13 
The third tradition of constitutional speculation 
vehich contributed to the development of Constitutional 
Contract Thooryt, wax that of contra etarianism : itxelfo The 
writers of the, late mevontoenth, century did not Invent the 
Idea that goverpments originated by contract* The 
republ*cation of works containing thin sort of idea by 
authors like Robert Parmonag George Buchanan# William AllOne 
Philip Huntons and John Miltont, an contributions to the 
political debates of the 1680p and 1690m serves as a 
constant rominder of this* But what wail moot obviously 
different about the, majority of arguments fron contract 
In the conatitutional, debaten of the late seventeenth 
century wags that *hey took place within the co, P-text of 
the Ancient Cpnotitution tradition# It appears that 
around JL68() the interpretation of the Ancient Constitution 
an bFised on limmemorial custom$ was replac*d by a view of 
the Ancient Constitution as originated byq and continuing 
to ewbodyq an 'original contract* The critical points 
in the Ancient Constitution-debate concerning the Nonion 
Conquest and the origin of the House of Commns remaiped 
as, contentioux as ever. But the supposed provisions of 
the Ancient Constitution were significantly modified, The 
'common JLawl view of the Ancient Constitution bad, maintained 
that the monarch alone wax, not sovereign,, Supreme power 
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was shared by King, Lards and Commons. The law guaranteeing 
this partnership was $immemorial custowry law'. None of 
these : institutions could lay claim to being 'author# of 
this law ahd thus none of them derived their being frow 
the irill of anY other, & In the 'original Contract# view 
of the Ancient Constitution# on the other hand@ it could 
be claimed that all the institutions of Xing, Lords and 
Commons depended upon the will of the citizens, The 
constitution had been designed by Its citizens and could 
be Changed by them. The reasons why the #immemorial' 
Ancient Constitution lost ground to the toriginal contract' 
Ancient Constitution must be sought in the political 
Conflicts from the Exclusion Crisis to the 1688 Revolution* 
I Will consider first of all the general character of the 
Political arguments surrounding these conflicts* I Will 
then proceed to examine both the evidence for tho transition 
in Whig constitutional tbought from the linmemoriall Ancient 
Constitution to the lorigiml contractl Ancient Constitution 
and the reasons for it, 
During the decade from the'Exclusion Crisis to the 
1688 Revolution constitutional argument in England wax 
dominated by the issues of the Succession and the powerx 
of the monArchy and the House of Commons, 7be tracts, 
pamphlets and books which contributed to these controversies 
were written against the background of an extraordinarily 
bloody and violent political experience and the concepts 
and typeo of OrSumento employed lit them all had a long 
historyo The onemory of violent Civil War h*lpx to explain 
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the apparent I coneek"Usm that X hAve'already noted mks 
characterizing moist parliamentarian tracts. But tho 
continued use of traditional political concepts and 
arguments (most of them with thirly specific connections 
trith the Civil 'War and Protector6te) is more problematic. 
The almost universal disavowal of these associbtionsf, even 
by those writers of the 1680a who counselled active 
resistance to CIvLrles'XI and Jamos'XI,, is itself evidence 
of both lwv deeply the wcparience of the recent past affected 
political argument in the IG$Os and of how dangerous the 
employment of certain arGumonts and concepts might be* 
The fate of an Algernon Sidney only served to underline 
the need to remove any associations with regicide from on 
authorls concepts and arguments. 
14 
Yet this fear of repression and the apparently genuine 
abhorrence of civil disorder,, vrUch both tended to at least 
an Outuurd conservatism in the political, debuteag wt%s 
Checked by a very real and intense fear of popery* Thus 
the demnds for constitutioual innovation to guard Azainst 
a Catholic succossion which the fear of popery engendered# 
were expressed in terms that denied any desire for innovations 
Indeed, practically every pamphleteer and tract writor of- 
the 1680x felt it necessury to dissociate himself frow any 
intention to alter the faudient. frame of the English 
Monarchy' or to re-inatituto a Conmonvealth. Even those 
very few authorzo like Henry Neville and Walter Hoyle# who 
gelfconsciously wrote in the English Republican tradition 
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were concerned to advocate the virtues of limited monarchy* 
15 
In general the various participants in each constitutional 
dispute chose to attack their opponents as innovators and 
to defend their own cause an according with lawg historyp 
reason and religion* This uas the case even thouClig am_, 
we have seen In the debates over the 1688 Revolutiont the 
cause defended might Involve breaking known statute laws 
or breaking the Oaths of Allegiances 
A final general point that requiren oMhaisis liars 
concerns the form of the practical political arguments 
that we are examining* It in interesting to note that in 
practically all save the most abusive and scurrilous of 
political pamphlets, writers attempted to argue and 'provel 
their case by reference to a single not of conventionally 
accepted general authorities* As a results the literature 
of the period portrays a remarkable for. I uniformity, 
Almost every writer attempted to show that his arguments 
represented the most consistent case according to relitiont 
laws history and reason, 
16 It in in terms of the various 
'weights' attached to these separate authoritiess and the 
supposed inter-relationships between thaws that many of 
the most significant differences in the political theories 
of the aSo can be neone The uniformity that convention 
imposed upon political nratment serves to hi; hlight the 
diatinctions that writers on4eavoured to makee A close 
attention to the details of constitutional arl: ument in 
the l6fts reveals the striking transition in Whis theory 
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Iýraw the limmemoriall Ancient Constitution to the foriginal 
dontra6ts Ancient Constitution. 
In 1684 we find Itobert Brady$ M. Dej one of the most 
famous contemporary defenders of royal powers still 
two 
describing his opponents an diVided Into/groups - original 
contract theorists and limmemorialt Ancient Constitution 
theorists* His assortion -was that 
Two sorts of'Turbulent Men there are In the World$ 
who under uJaHsIblo ftelonces have appeared for 
the Liberty of the People ... One of these sort of Men preach to the Poovleq 
That the Origin of all Power and CAg)ye mOW710- &2 
* thel Them; -Týhwt 
Unsm or MxIstrates derly 'r 
morv man wnaz vitie)& tilem .. These men are . A&M, Pretenders to glatonle and, Eutoplall Governmental 
such an never had a Rgal-Existenco In any part of 
the World, hor never can be pruct-icable, amon5st 
any Peopleg or In any Nation whatsoever so* The other sort are such as hold forth to the 
Peoplel týWlgat i&htg and rivileres, which they 
have found out in Recordes and Histories. in 
ChaXjerAq and other &pMeatj of Ant; jquAtYj by 
these Men the People are jjurht to prescribe against 
the Government for many Things they M&S. 221 
Fundamental Rights. 17 
Brady was one of the moxt influential writers on the 
royalist side and it is significant that he should TAve 
divided the opposition into those clearly defined types6 
He was particularly concerned to refute the arguments of 
the second sort of "Turbulent Mae and the opponents he 
singled out were William Petyto William Atwood and Edward 
Cookee 18 All thtee wera concerned to defend parliament 
Agsiu5t wbAt they believed were the illegal encroachmento 
of AU increasingly poWOrful monarch* The arguments they 
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used were, initially very much in the style of Bradyls second 
category. b But, as I have suggrexted$ Atwood was soon to, 
become an exponent of the Constitutional Contract Theory 
a theory which combined arguments from both'of Brady6is 
types,, Edward Cookets arg=ehtag especially in hi's 
orma n n-Lguv (1682)0 were mainly of the Arsttunentum Anti-Xi 
'fundamental rights' kindl but they also contained 
interesting references to the contractual origin of the 
Engliah government and to the kinT,, s of EnZIand deriving 
their authority from the English 4people', And 'William 
Petytj Atwoodle tutor in the Inner Templo and defender at 
10Q-St of his pupil's early writings* portroys in hia 
manuscripts an increasing concern throuZhout the 1680s 
with questions about the origin of government and a 
preference for Hooker's expUnation of tbexe matters* 
What was it then,, th&t led these writ'erx &nd Others 
to modify their defence of parliamentary rightS7 What 
occasioned their increasing reliance upon arSmOnts from 
'the original contract' rather than liminemorial cuStON17 
Three factorx appear relevant to'account for it* Firsts 
there was the serious attack upon the notion of litnewri&I 
custom'. Second# there was the challenge to parliamontary 
rights created by the Irepublication of Filmarls writings 
in 1679-80 and their adoption in the royalist causeý And 
thirdq there was the modification in the claims of the 
parliamentarians of the'168ox from a demand for the 
balanced constitution to a demand fok the legal sovereignty 
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of parliament* 
In the Ancient Constitution debate the notion of custom 
an 'immemorial and unchanging* was attsicked an ridiculouso 
William Petyt noted this attack and attempted to counter 
it in two draftedg but unpublishedl replies to Robert Brady 
during the late 1680so Petyt quoted Prodyfa argument as 
beingi 
What 1, were the Co -- !na of England 0ax now . Represented 
by Knightag Citizens and Burgesseal Ever an Essential 
Constituent Part of the Parliament, 
1. From Eternity? 
24, Before Man wags Created? 
3. Or have they been so Ever since Adam? 
4# Or Ever since England was Peopled7 
50 Or ever since the Dritains, Romans$ and 
Saxons inhabited this Island? 
60 Certainly there was a time when they began 
to be soe reprosented. 19 
Petyt was prepared to accept that there must have been 
a time when the House o: r Commons was ariginatede But he 
refused to agree with Orady when the latter Insisted that 
the Commons first become a part of Parliament in "Atmo 494, 
110 3" (1265 AOD, )* The Commons themselveal Petyt argued# 
regarded their presence in Parliaumt as dating from Itim 
ImmemoriaXI and that was. good *nouSh t*etlmny for hime2o 
This rather weak reply to Bradyfe critic*mm did not 
imply however# an a recent commentator has suggestedg that 
Petyt. -Was only concerned to date the Commons' participation 
in Parliament before *; he coronation of Richard X (3rd 
SepteMbor 1189) - "the date at the common low when legal 
21 
memory began" . "Xmm*morj&: L" ipeant far more to Petyt 
and tho other particýpants in the Ancient Constitution 
debates than simply pro-1189. As the mama commentator 
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notes* Pety-t uns interested in finding out the constitutional 
arrangcments of Norman and Saxon Englaiad'and in lpiovingl 
that the Norman Conquest had not altered the ancient English 
constitution. Ito bolie%ý3d that one could only-conject= 
about the actual origin of t1axt constitution "from zoma 
footsteps remaining in historyes and Iftecords. w22 out. 
had he simply been concorned to locate the origin of the 
Commons in the pro-1189 constitution then the great debate 
about tho Norman Conquort and tho loral continuity of the 
Saxon and Norman governments uould have been irrolovante 
23 
The substitution of an original contzact for immamoriul 
cuStomary law as either the historically 'provublet or the 
'conjectured' origin of the English constitution$ avoided 
the problems; that Brady had pointed out to Votyt. it 
did this by replacing the idea that tho Commons had lalways 
boon' a part of Parliament with the notion that Parliament 
had boon established at a definite time in English history 
with the Commons as an indispensable part of it. Thus 
the force of Brady's assertion that tho Commons must have 
originated at some time could be rocogniseds whilst at the 
same time his further arg-iment that the Commons must owe 
their rights solely to the will of the monarch could be 
denied, In the constitution begun by coutzsctq neither 
King# nor Lords, nor Commons owed their right to participate 
in government to any of the othoraq but all ovad their 
existence to the will of the 'people'. 
As I have already suggested,, William Atwood thoroughly 
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modified-his', account, of the English constitution along 
these lines during the 1680s. William Petytq however, 
did not adopt the Constitutional Contract position In its 
entirety, The words 1contractl or 'compactl rarely occur 
in Petytla writings but during the 1680s he did concern, 
himself with 'conjectures' about the origin of governnwnt4i 
He adopted arguments clearly drawn from Hooker to juitify 
the #most plAusiblet conjecture and he adopted arguments 
about the 'Germanict (or 'Gothic$) origins of the English 
constitution - arguments that were strongly tflavoured' 
with contractualist idea S. 
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So far I have argued that reference to an original 
contract could overcome some of the more Immediate 
difficulties involved in arguing from an ancient 
constitution composed of Immemorial customary Iftwo The 
existence of some historical and legal testimony (like that 
contained in the HIEM St jLustL-cU) apparently referring 
to such an original contract made the change all the more 
acceptable, These considerations go some "ay In accounting 
for the popularity of the : idea or an original contract 'to 
writers like Atwoods Cookeg Hunts Atkynxt Allix and Tyrrell - 
all of whom bad had at least noun legal training and had 
engaged In legalistic justifications of the position of 
the House or commons in the znglish constitution of the 
16806., Ifeverthelbose many or the historical difficulties 
involved in the, Couwn Lav v"jew of the Ancient Constitution 
could not, be overcome simply by replacing the original 
contract for imemorial custom. The principal of these 
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was the Norman Conquenta, 
Xf England had actually boon conquor*d in 10660 an 
Brady and a mounting body of evidence insisted$ then two 
important consequences seemed to follow, * First# there 
appeared no alternative to the view that the constitution 
depended solely upon the will of a conqueror and that it 
was therefore an absolute monarchy in which the rights of 
parliament and subjects could be revoked at the monarchOs 
pleasure. Secondlys therw could be no relevance in 
discussing the pro-Sorman comititution (ioeo the constitution 
that van claimed to be based on contract) because Williams I 
had secured a total change in government, The Constitutional 
Contractarians were concerned to deny both these consequences 
and thin Involved denying that the Norman Conquest was a 
Conquest at all, But although this was necessary if the 
Saxon Constitution were to be shown to have survived the 
coming of the Normanag the problem still rec*ineds why 
not establish the relevant original contract for the founding 
of the seventeenth century constitution after io66 and thus 
avoid the problems of the Norman controversy altogether? 
Indeed# three possible locations featured prominantly In 
the historical debate of the time. 7be first wax the 
earliest date that the ! 3r*dyit* historians would allow 
the House of Commons to have exisitods i, e, the 49th year 
of Henry IXIs reign (1265 A*DO)s The second was Wgna 
Carta# recognised by all sides as a crucial document in 
English constitutional history. And the third van the 
Norman Conquest2*5 itself sinces once again# all sides agreed 
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tbat some change bad oCcUre4 in 1066 althougb they disputed 
the proper significance of it. Why,, we miSht, axkq were 
none of those-*vents 'turned into# the orisinal contract? 
There appear to be several possible answers to this 
question and in notin.,, them come important features of the 
Constitutional Contractarian position become visible, 
First, the constitution would become that much more modern 
and thus its strenZth, thought to be derived from havIng 
stood the #test of time'9 would be that much reduced* 
Secondlyq to have dropped the Noz n Controversy would 
have involved either repudiatinZ those arguments witich had 
hitherto formed the basis of their legal justifications of 
the House of CO ns or of relegating tliem to insignificancee 
In both canon the Constitutional Contractarians could IArdly 
have disguised their loss of one constitutionAl argument 
and their consequent (or apparently consequent) shift of 
grounds, Thirdlyq the alternative dates to the Saxon 
Contract could not offer the same seemingly unequivocal 
historical evidence of a contract an that contained in the 
I! Lmr- Pf JIM-tLSJS-O Out perhaps most important of all was 
the ftet that if any of these other events were taken by 
the defenders of the House of Commons an major turning.. 
points in EnZliah Sovernmonto then the loCitimacy of that 
government itself was open to question, For all these 
events were preceded byg or involved% struwles: struggles 
in defence of the Ancient Constitution the champions of 
the Commons claimed, atruggles for innovation according to 
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their opponents* William Atwood =ado the. general point 
here when he defended Petytlx Ancient Constitution againxt 
Brady's criticisms I 
[Dre 
Bradýj seems to trample on the best 
Constitution$ our Goverument Itself, under 
Colour of its being Nov in the 119the of Ilene 
3 when it arose out of the indigeoted Matter of 
Tumults and Rebelliont and so not having a 
legitimists Birthq as not born in W*dlock between 
the King and Us People; it my be turn'd out 
of Doors* by the help of that Nkxime 
26 
Quod initio non veiletg tractu Umporis non conVolOscits 
We have som that as the basis of a constitutio=l 
theory, the replacement of limmemorlal custom'I by 'ContraCto 
did overcome some historical problems encountered by the 
Cowwn X^w view of the Ancient Constitution, But problems 
of historical criticism are not in themselves sufficient 
to explain JUS &&Minx of this transition in Ancient 
Constitution theory* In order to provide a fuller 
exPlanation3attentlon must be paid to two further aspects 
of the political debate during the 1680a, 
The first concerns the republication of Filmer's works 
in 1679-80o Appearing at the height of the EXcluxiOn 
crisis, the now edition of Filmer's writings added a deeper 
dimenxion to the political d*bate and wmearbated the 
conflict* The Tory case became openly an attack upon 
the position of Parliament* Filmer's work seemed to 
prove that I%row the very nature of glociety political power 
was monarchical, that parliaments were the gifts of kingel 
and thAt9 in the event of conflict betweelm the king and 
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Parliament or -kin and law. the vionarch must be "reme* 
Monarchy and hierarchical society were natural., The 
natural was ordained by God. Thus whoever denied the 
legitimacy of either unfettered monarchy or hierarchical 
soci4ity van guilty of denying aodIs will* 
These arguments presented the Ixelusionists and a3l 
other protagonists of rights against the monarch with 
serious theoretical oppositione A rethinkings or at least 
a "iteration of more basic political principles uas 
necessary* Xf government bad talways been## then given 
the almost universal belief in the validity of Biblical 
historys there seemed no alternative but to concede a 
funftmental point to Filtmer . Adam's authority was of a 
Political nature* Thus monarchy was both the first form 
Of SoVernment and directly created by God, But it this 
were conceded then most of what Filmer bad built upon It 
Would also have to be admittede Goverawwt could no 
longer be hold to rest on consent and could only be legitimate 
if itý were an absolute monarchy* FilmerIx conclusions 
would be almost 'inescapable# because all participants in 
the debate x1ared a number of fundamental beliefs* 
All sides agreed# for o=wples tbAt what government 
was Me at-its origin should be the standard against which 
governments In the present should be judged* If the first 
form Of &'80v*r, 2m0nt, W*rO markedly different from Its 
present forms then the present constitution was illegitimateo 
This was how practically all arguments about legitimacy 
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wore Coswulatode (In facts aim I Shall suggest later$ the 
criterion of legititnacy waa logically prior and history 
was road in the light of that criterion*) Everyone 
acknowledged also that if God had reveekled his will regarding 
the form of government necessary for earthly society# then 
that will had to be obeyed# But Filaerls orsument had 
shown that the first government in tho world had been An 
absolute monarchy tempered only by Adamle paternal cars* 
and that this mn according to GodIs will& Thus a 13L 
should concede that present-day governmentse including 
the Rngliahs were really absolute monarchiops* 
? Ito obvious theoretical eacape ftvm this chain of 
reasoning lay In donyInS first that government #had always 
b**nl 11 and geconny that God had revveled a preference for 
monarchy* The first of these denials Involved the 
roJection, also of ideas of linmemorlal custow'* And current 
Ideas about the contractual origin of govexsment could serve 
as a couvwnient substitute for -cam, I origins# and as 
the basis from wMah to reject both the FlImerian Ideas 
that Adam's authority was poUtical and that Cod bad 
therefore authorIsed obsolute monarchy* 
The a-epublication of Filmerfs vorko tbc% by adding A 
dee"r dimonalon to the constitutional controvorales of 
the Excausion crisis *v4 by forclag the pro-ftelusioulats 
partigularly to re-Q=mino tue lmpie ot thodwr urg%Wwntes 
previdod & further Iapetus for the adoption of constitutional 
controat airsumoata,, Dut tho repubUcaticm of ribrAr was 
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also associated with the second aspect of the political 
debates of tho 16905 Id2ich 1101ps to explain the incroasing 
attraction of the Constitutional Contract* This ims the 
increasingly radical demmnds that were made by the upholders 
of parliamentary rights against the king, The timing of 
the republication of Filmerts political writinZa does not 
seem to have been purely fortuitous. They appeared at 
the h0ight of the Exclusion controversy when the House of 
Commons seemed 6n the verge of successfully barrins Charles 
1128 Catholic brother James from WL19 constitutional right 
to succeed to the throne. The literary resurrection of 
Filmer seeins to'have been a deliberate act of policy intended 
to bolster thb Royalist case. The work carried royal 
approval and the official journal, the LoIldon GaU? Itee 
strongly recommended it. 
27 But by adopting Filmer as 
their champion the Royalists committed themselven to 
attAcking parliamentary rights to a co-ordinsto legislative 
Power with the kinz* Bradyls arguments in defence of 
the English monarch were certainly by implication a denial 
of parliamentary rights to participate in the exorcise of 
legal sovereignty* But Filmerls argument's were explicitly 
SO* 
28 Brady's, arguments did not necessarily involve the 
rejection of the idea that the seventeouth century English 
Constitution was jagStiXgIX a Mixed Monarchy* 
29 Dut to 
rilmer the Idea of a "Limited or Mixed Monarchy" was a 
contradiction in terms*30 
The Common Law view of the Ancient Constitution could 
so 
be employed to, combat royalixt, claims tor-the logialative 
supremacy of the monarch# but. it could nqt,, accomodate 
arguments for parlia"ntary xupremacy* - And yet, parlIamentary 
opposition to the king during the 168og approached closer 
and closer to this demmands As the royalist case for the 
hereditary monarch became openly an attack upon the 
leSislati" authority of Parliamento so the Whig 
Xxclupion$sts and the more determined of their heirs 
retaliated by assorting something very close to the 
legislative supromacy of the Mvxe of Commons. The 
wmertonce of the royalist reaction after the dissolution 
of the Oxford Parliament - most notably concerning the 
Rye House Plot (1683)s Monmouth"s Rebellion (1685)f, the 
the accession of the Catholic, Jamom 11, j the attack on the 
Boroughs, and Countiess and the Declaration of Indulgence 
(1687),. served to, deepou the divisions within English 
political. opinion that bad appeared at the time of the 
Exqlupion Parliaments and to alienate many of moderate 
views from their loyalty to. the person of the monarebw 
The pros4mution and trial of the Seven Bishops in 1687 
*von divIded the loyalist Church of Nngland* With the 
Church dividodl moderate opinion indiffere t towards the 
fortunes of4ames 11# hostile groups at home and a colony 
of exiled antl. ý-monarchlcal groups in Hollandq the, stage was 
not tor the 1688 awolution, 
But if r0sixt4k; %ce were to be justifieds &Ad if 
ParjLumput wers to clAim legialative xovor. oigutY thOu 
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reference would have t; o be mde to noise, other constitutional 
theory than the #common lavt Ancient Constitution* For 
according to this theory both ling and Parliament had 
existed $Ume out of mind$ and thus neither could claim 
supremacy over the other,, because neither d*ponded upon 
the will of the others The foriginal. contractl Anciont 
Constitution provided Just such a theory capable of up.. 
holding both parliamentary sovereignty And a right of 
resistance* For the #original COntrAct9 VIDW Of the 
Ancient Constitution claimed that the Nnglish r; onj3titution 
had been set up by the Rnglish People for a purpose specified 
in the Contract with their nonArcho The constitution 
depended upon the will of the people of EnglAnde Xt was 
a short step from this principlej although one beset with 
many difficulties$ to the assertion that supreme power in 
the constitution must Ile with the political public$ or at 
least their representatives in Parliament. If this were 
the casejýwhenever the king acted against the wishes of 
Parliament he could justifiably be resisted, Here agaft,, 
thent a problem in Whig constitutional thought could be 
resolved by adopting Constitutional Contract arguments 
Instoad of arguments from Immemorial customary law* 
Considerations of theme kindas eoncerned with the 
controversies over constitutional theory and practice during 
the 16809# help to explain the originx and attractiveness 
of the Constitutional Contract Theory, But they do not 
explain of the appeal'of contractuftlist ideas 
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in constitutional controv*rsy during and &: tt*r 'the 1688 
Revolution. Fori mks I noted in th6 previous chapt6r* 
constitutional arguments from contract were, ýnot solely the 
monopoly of the pro-Revolutionaries. To account for this 
broader acceptance of the 6onxtitutional 6ontracts and to 
wTIAin more fully the persuasiveness of the, Constitutional 
Contract Theory$ we must looli; at some general-features of 
a philosophical kind that will illuminate the intellectual 
coherence of Contract Theory In the late sevonteenth conturyS 
Ultimmately the'plausibility, and co'hertnee of 3-ut* 
seventeenth century contract theories can, only be aceoupted 
for by reference to the widespread, though far ftom univermalt 
OcOlOptonce of 0 set of beliefs that F*A* Heyek has termed 
"mtlanallst coustructivina". 31 In assenco theso'bellofs 
were deriv*d from the view that "all the useful human 
institutions were and ought to be the Creation of conscious 
[12UMAnj 
rOA80nel, 
32 This involved a certain conception of 
maul society and history which had important implications 
for the proper study of politicso Li order to got a true 
view of politics and society* according to 'rationalist 
constructivism-9 0 the Initial confusing complwc of political 
society must-be reduced to its *asontlal elements - 
rational mon6 Thong by wcamining the characteristics 
of rational want the tomplox vholo should be rebuilt Cron 
a chain Olt necessary consequencese The recomposed complex 
need not bear much roso=blanco to how the orisinal complex 
(which It WCplaIns) first appeared* Political explanationg 
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then# was largely concernoo with, the elucidation or 
$original. But the *origin# of political institutions 
was by definition the conscious design of rational men. 
The history of those institutions woo cousequently focussed 
on their original design* Changes In the post could-only 
properly be mplainod by reference to the conscious designs 
of rational men, But since what appeared roasonable to 
frationall men In the seventeenth century-van invariably 
assumed to be the some an what would have appeared reasqnAble 
to rational men, In the, earliest time I historical ebanse 
was Senerally felt to have been for the worse* Ideally 
the constitutional history of any particular country would 
exhibit no$ or very littlej change*. The intentions of 
the founders of political institutions, should be the same$ 
in essence$ as the intentions of, their descandepta* Only 
those modifications of institutions which could be shown 
to be in accord with the design of the founders could be 
accounted legitimate* Yet this seemingly severe, restriction 
on the limits of legitimate change in practice amounted to 
hardly any restriction at alls For it was what appeared 
reasonable to seventeenth century men that guided their 
interproationn of the dexigne, of their apeentoraq and not 
vice. -versae 
I will pommins In more detail the salient features of 
'rationalist constructivism' at, utpr points in my argument* 
Here it in isuf: C: Lcient tO uots th* SOU41MI cl*mct4'rl8tic5 
or those beliefs that provide credence and coherence to 
84 
the ideas involVod in the Constitutional Contract Theory* 
An outline of current zationaliark cpnxtructiviat beliefs 
helps to oxplaip, why'appeals to contract in constitutiopal 
controversy cut across the political division of t1le, ]At* 
seventeenth century* It in nonetheless trueg howeverg 
that references to contract appear mucli more frequently 
in, theývritiugs or the proponents of resistance during 
the 1630a and the defenders of the Revolution after 1688 
than in the writings of their oppouents. I have already 
suggested several reasons why this should, liave been the 
Case* But there were also two major difficulties involved 
in, IUVOdnz contract ideAO to justUy resistance and the 
Revolutiont the association of contract theory with, an 
the one hand$ C-Atliolic mr; Ltera of the sixteenth and early 
sevontoenth centuriess andt op the other hands deranderx 
oV regicido And the Cowwpwealths An axamination. of the 
dizputes that &rose concerning those difficulties will 
enable us to appreciate further the meaning of scontractl 
w4en appealed to in the constitutional. dobates of the late 
seventeenth century* 
The Whig. 19zelusionints bAd QbJeoted to the Duke of 
York because he was a Cdtholics Those who champione4 
rexistance argued Cor A. ts necessity it RaSland wore to be 
secure fvom papal domination gnd if protgoitantisp, were to 
survive* Xt. uas tbus Of considerable embarrassment to 
them uhou It was pointed out that. their controct arguments 
'were anticipated in,, ond derived Crova Jesuit writers Me 
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Bellarmines Mariana* Molina and Robert Parsons* Indeed; 
it seems that'Parzons' major works A Conferelige Ab, 6ut *, he 
Nouxt Succongion to tjje, 9mw-u of England (1593). was deliberately 
republished by the royalists in 1681 so an to emphavine the 
Catholic derivation of 'contract# ideas and thus embarrass 
the Excluxioniats* In fact# the whole history of Parsons 
work (ax recounted by royalists and anti-Exclusionixts at 
the end of the seventeenth centuryl, is one of the most 
interesting and least well known of all contractarian 
treatises. Hobart Bradys Abedneso Seller# Sir Thomas 
Craig's editor in 1703s and the author of T 01 Angl hot lRoy 
&XV 
(16806 all emphasised its extraordinary history. According 
to Brady* Part I of the Conference 10-conta_jns for the most 
parts in nine Chapterxg the very Pr-ijjciRjqA of Sedition, and 
Robellion"& It was republished in 16480 he claimed, "as 
a Frogar xtive, to the &6. j)o8itj2P1 and &rther of King 
-Charles 
the First". It was Parsons who provided "all the FaStIgU 
in the late times of Rebellion ** with ArgumentpalReasons. 
Nx-&-gw1. U and Prgtencep for their Seditious Practicese" An 
abridged version of Parsons$ work was published in 1653 
possibly* according to Brody,, Otto set up a Foreigg Titleg 
or make way for OlLyor SLomwell's Xin&shipo"33 And Xiltonq 
34 
Lord John Sotserx#35 Algernon Sidney36 and even Thomas Hobba037 
were all accused by various writers of having raided Parsons 
for their arguments* 
So mattor wbat the truth of these accusations might 
beg it was embarrasing to the Exclusionists and pro. 
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Revolutionaries that their arguments seemed to be of popish 
Parentage, 'Religion and politien were inextricably 
intermingled in the conflicts of the 1680s, And the 
Exclusionist& and defenders of parliamentary rights against 
the kingg presenting themselves an the champions of 
Protestantism, were constantly taunted by claims tI'At, 
"the Popish DOLEMN [Parsonist pseudonyw3 is the Oracle of 
the TULM - PROTESTANT Party. "" For all the contractarians' 
declarations that the lineage of their ideas was irrelOval2t 
to their truth939 for all their catalogues of previous 
Protestant contractorianxg 
4o 
and for all their attempts 
to persuade James"Catholic, supporters to accept their 
arguments precisely because of their popish lineagag 
41 
the issue &rose again and again in the, pamphlot literature* 
But it was not only contractarian writers who suffered 
becau&O of the intarmingling of religion and politics* 
The Church of England itself max deeply divideda, As 
Thomas Hunt described In 1682. the Church wax, belng pulled 
in two opposed directions. On the one side# adherence to 
the traditional Church doctrine of passive obedience led 
to support for$ or acquiesence in, a Catholic monarchy and 
a Catholic succession* On the other x1dei opposition to 
Catholicim= severely tooted and &trained adherence to 
passive obedience* 
42 
Eventually the second of these pulls 
proved the stronger, But Ln the proctus muy promLnent 
churchmen experienced an almoxt tot&l change In their 
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political opinions. A comparison of two stat*ments from 
the pen of Bishop Qilbert Burnet given some indication of 
the extent of this change. Xn the early 16808 we find 
Burnet an ardent champion of passive obediences In this 
role he declared$ 
Of all the g in the World$ there in none 
more hurtful to the overnments in our present 
Circumstancess than the sayings that the Kinxtis 
Promises and the Roonleg FJd*JJty ought to be 
. and that a Failure in the ones cuts off jEecinrocals the otherl for by a very natural Consequence the 
Subject may likewise may, That their Oatlim o- 
Alloreance being founded on the Assurance of His 
MAlepties Protogtion, s the Ono binds no longer than 
the Other is obgoMrods and the Inferences that 
way be drawn from hences will be very terrible, 
if the Loy-aXtX of the so much decx7ed Church p..: Ir 
England does not put a stop to them, 437" 
And yet in 1689 Burnet uas prepared not only to accept 
these "Inferences" but also to actively counsel the maxin 
that he here denies* His Enquiry ligto the 
- 
PrejqjLt. State 
of Affairs (1689) opens with the assertions "It is c*rtain# 
That the Reciprocal Duties In Civil Societies are Protection 
and Allegiance; and wheraaoev*r the one f&ilx IdollYt the 
other falls with it. "44 And from this time onwardso 
Burnet subxcribed to the view that legitimate political 
constitutions were formed byp and embodiedq a contzactl 
Thus far I have outlined the imadiate context from 
which Constitutional Contractarlanism arose and the general 
ideas associated with a Constitutional Contracto But 
before examining in detail the coherent theory of contract 
presented in the wrltingx of William Atwood and implicit 
within the works of many otheraq two characteristics of 
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the arguments we hav* been considering should, be emphasiseds , 
These arc: the uso to which Constitutional Contract Argunents 
were put and the insistence that positive law and not 
natural law should be the proper test or legitimncY* 
Althoughq as I noted in the two precedinZ chapterms 
it is a great oversimplification to view late seventeenth 
century politicul theory in terms of a conflict between 
Ullia contractarians and Tory Divine Righterso there is 
nonetheless some point in this generalization, It certainly 
'was the came that contract arguments were employed much 
more frequently against Charles II and James : Ej than to 
defend them and that the Revolution was more frequently 
justified than opposed by reference to & contracte 
Contemporary vriters tended to adopt a threefold classification 
of the priu'dipal Croupa involvediin the Revolution debates* 
Gilbert Burnotg for OWIMples re: Cerred to three t3ain groups 
during the iUtVrre5Uu34 rOUSILly corrosponding to Jacobiteng 
Tories and Whigs. These were respectively those w1w 
advocated a Regency (until such time as James could be 
conveniently "restored"); those who %unted Hary to succeed 
to the throne as next legitimate heir; and those who argued 
frow the "original contract" to support Williawls right or 
William's and Mar-ytz joint rights to the throne. 
45 Thomas 
Long also adopted a threefold account of the major divisions 
of oyinion over the Revolution, But his division . more 
in line with our conventional historical senoralizations - 
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consisted of "Jure Divino" absolute monarchistal pontractarian 
defendors of the peoplels rights to rasist their legitimto 
king when warTunted by circumstance and the Church of 
England steering a middle course between the two other 
"extremes" with the belief that monarchIs were truly the 
ministers of God rather than of the peopleg though their 
power was conveyod Olradia is Ponulo I* 
1* 6 
141xilst classifications such an these are useful an 
indications of how contempomries imposod order on the 
OOW10X divisions of opinion they witnessed, they should 
not be accepted uncritically, For the complexity that 
I examined in the Rovolutionary debates "up also o; cpresmed 
by a number of oontemporftry writers, Most notable amongst 
this &roup were the two active and famous non-jurorsg George 
Hickes and Joremy Collier. Ilickes emphasined the "amItiform 
variety" of reasons that the jurors were Sivitir, to excuse 
their actions; 
47 
and Collier noted that "Thoueh the 
Gentlemen of the R2vo1-utjgjL seen wall satisfied with their 
now AlleZianzaq, yet the Reasons (if not t1io DeSroes) of 
their Compliance aro very dif; Cprent, 11.48 And yet there 
were still other writors iiho emphasized the importance of 
appeals to contract in the contemporary debates and who 
associated tl-mt appeal vith a specific Icausol or a single 
social group* The 'causal uus either a doConee of the 
Revolution* 08 wo have soen Peter Allix arguing$ 
49 
or else 
it uns more gonarally a defence of the loSitimacy of 
resistancoe John Kettlewell, for examples insisted that 
90 
"all the Potter of the People .... is grounded by the 
Advocates for Resistanceg on the OrIzinal CýQntnct. 1150 
The group identified with these appeals to contract varied 
from the Whigsj! 51 to "Dissenters" generally, 
52 And 
certainly at the time of the )Revolution, arguments from 
contract were of such general appeal as to cause one ardent 
royalist to note with alarm the sudden acceptabco of 
contructualism, "as if the Doctrine were Apostolical"*53 
The second cbAracteriatic of the yolitical debatex 
that should be emommiseds is the insistence that positive 
laws rather than natural or divine law, was the proper 
authority for settling disputes about allegiance and 
resistance. This insistence is to be found in the writiUSS 
of both upholders and opponents of the Ilegality' of 
resistance. Robert Bz*Ldyl for example, rejected Edward 
Stillingrleetto arguments that the "-C&mmola Good" might 
legitimate political action and stressed that$ 
The Legal Constitution by which the Kingdom hoth 
flourishtil and been supported in great Reputation 
for some hundreds of yearaq in the best and **fast 
Rule for all -sobjr . 
&a ... to proceed by* When Men go from the Lawq and legal Establishment, they 
walk In the darkq and go they know not whitherg 
and travel while they make themselves not only 
unoaxie but wiserable. 54 
On the other sides many of the pro. Revolutionaris-T AN We 
have noen, 
5-5 
accepted Robert Jonkinla assertion that "the 
Laws of that Constitution of Government under which we 
liveg see are to datermin when the Authority of Soversignm 
ceaseng and the Allegianc* of Subjectol and we are not to 
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think their Power and Authority tranxforreds unless : Lt be 
trunsforred leCally. m56 
In these debates a clear distinction was. made between 
ethical and legal rights* This point has boon denied by 
J, C* Corson and Sir Po Pollock*57 But their ^rgumentag 
although justified in respect of much political literature 
of the time, have overlooked the ov1denco associated with 
Constitutional Contractarianism. In 16799 for examploo 
the author of A Djaputallono. Prov; L! lr,. That It is Mt 
Ignt to graUt -unto 
Hinjet"r segular Aq4rJedL2tion 
clearly distinguished between the provinces of divine and 
civil law. Ilia argument mass 
A man canxiot be a good judges chancellors nor 
Justice Of PO&ceg nor bear any consideroble office 
in the commonwealths without insight into the laws 
the statute law ... and the common law and customs 
of the realmg and of particular courtag and place. 99 
the knowledgewhereof cannot be attained with 
little painag and times and study, and without 
some experience *** It In made a distinct profession 
and order of men amongst us to be men skilled In 
the law ow Xndeedq no non can be a good divine, 
or lawyer$ that is not a good Christian# and learned 
In the laws of God$ the law of Naturej and 
Christianityl what it is to be undor law to Gods 
and live under his government, To be a right 
divine is to be a heavenly lawyerl but this a 
man may be$ and be ignorant of a thousand **, * 
matters in the laws and customa of England: they 
are so many, and so Intricate, and so uncortaing 
and so out of the road of divinitys and the 
knowledge and study of universal rights that It 
would be against conscience and faithfulness, in 
a ministers to give himself to the study of thewl 
andg without giving himself to the study of themg 
he cannot attain to the knowledge of thou, competent 
for an English judges and political wagiatrate*58 
This distinction botween natural law and divine law on thS 
one sideq and positive human law on the otherg was affirmed 
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by, & U00 of other wr*ters* 
wrote ýin 3LG89: 
samuoi., Jou3zsou, rorý*Xllwple, 
I grant that the Laws of God and NAture are more 
sacred and inviolable than the Laws of our Countreyl 
but they give us no Civil Rights stud Libertieml an 
the lAws of Englagd have done* Zvery Leige. 
Subject of EnjZJaLad, bxx a Legal Property in his 
Lifeg Libertys and Estateg in the free Zxcercise 
of the ProtestAnt Religion established amongst up 
and a Legal Possession may be Legally Defended*5 
The significance of these distinctions for those who 
invoked Constitutional Contract ideas was twofolde Firstly 
they highlight their concern to present a l&&*jly valid 
case according to the r*quire=ents of English constitutional 
law, And this concern was of considerable and enduring 
Practical importance in view of the longstanding controversies 
over James lIts legal right to the throne even after the 
1688 Revolution. Secondly the distinctions served to 
emphasiss an awareness of the problems associated with 
attempting to defend particular activities by reference 
to general or universal laws of naturso This awareness 
W40 will meet most clearly in the writings of Atwoodl but 
at least one reason for it can be seen in Robert Ferguson's 
remark In a treatise of 1673 that "Learned men do wonderfully 
differs and some of them strangely prevaricates In stating 
the Xeasure of natural Law cknd in defining what laws are 
natural'"60 
So far we have conaidored the general characteristics 
of Constitutional Contractarianismo Xf w* now turn to 
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the writings of William Atwoodg we may begin to fill out 
the details of the theory* Having done thing we way then 
consider the uses to which Constitutional Contract argumonts 
were put by reviewing the ideas and extraordinary career 
of Robert Ferguson "the Plottee. 
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, CHAPTER IV 
WILLIAM 
--ýMD 
AND THE CONSTITIMIOLA. L 
- 
CONMCr 
Little is known of the life of William Atwoode He 
was a barristers had Ot least one mong 
I 
and probably died 
in 1705-k 2 Most of his mature years were spent so R 
political pamphleteers for which he was reworded by William 
III with the appointments of Lord Chief Justice and Judge 
of the Admiralty in Now York. He took up these posts in 
August 1701 but max soon suspended (June 1702) for "gross 
corruption and Maladministration"* His circle of friends 
included some of the most eminent men of the age - Robert 
Boyles William Petyt and James Tyrrell* The encouragement 
and example of these men assisted Atwood in overriding the 
fiercest attacks on his intellectual capacity and reputation. 
3 
Modorn historians of the, late seV*nteonth C*ntUrY hAVO 
not paid much attention to Atwood's writinsso Maurice 
Axhley4 and J*W* Qough5 do imply that some of hio work wax 
OUnificOnt and WH, Gre*njea: r notes that be was & prominent 
"co=*nw*&jLtbjwn". 6 Caroline Robbins was even prepared 
to bracket him with Petyt as a 'learned lawyerl,, 
7 But 
Senorally hix writingo aro noSloctedo p9rhapio becauao in 
Laslettla Judgment he Ions "the worst of the Whig 
constitutional writers, " 
8 
This n*Zlecto howevorg has 
J)oen both-unwamuntod and unfortunate* 
If Atwood's constitutional writ: LnZx Or* ax*01580d 
according to ths atandards of cWrent histor$c*3. ý and IpSal 
scholarships they certainly appear strange and inadequate* 
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But this kind of assessment In of no help if we wish to 
vnderstand the significance of AtwoodIs works for the 
audience that he was addressing, Atwpodq even more than 
Petytt was concerned in hip earliest historical works to 
provide the opponents of strong monarchy with a coherent 
legal and historical argument* The vehement attacks he 
encountered from Pr6dy are perhaps indicative more of his 
success ýhan 4*x, failpre in this task* The judgments of 
fellow-travellors support this view* Petyt rosarded him 
p. Aon: Lo Gentleman", e no an "jLn us 
9 Cooke believed he, was an 
"industrious and worthy Gentleman"10 and Henry Neville 
referred to "the loarned discourses lat*ly published by 
Mra Petyt of the Tersple, and Mr* Atwood of Grays-Inni 
being gentlemen whom X do, mentiong lIgnpris causae oil Theme 
t'O$tUwl%: LQB alone W&; "nt some Attention being paid to 
Atwoodliv work1g. And this attention in amply rouarded 
since Atwoodle career highlights a sigmificant transition 
in the constitutional theory of the late seventeenth century 
and his wriltings contain a coherent contract theory of an 
unexp*ctod kindo 
In his political workst Atwood's attentio; 2 Ws 
constantly directed towards contemporary political affairse 
The contract theory which he eventually constructed clearly 
reflected this concern with practice. It differed in 
several important respects from the theories of Lociteg 
Pufendorfe Sidney and Tyrrell. These differences are 
most immediately apparent in terms of the concepts Atwood 
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neglected# or rather felt were unnecessaryg for his theory, 
Ilia contract theory is most remarlable for tho absence of 
any reliance'upon the notions of '#natural lawtg Inatural 
rights' and 'states of nature' that were so obviously of 
crucial importance to the theories of theseýother 
contractarianse Atwood was not in the least tioubled by 
problems of the fartificialityl of contract society or 
of the relationship betwo*n natural law and positives 
fundamental laws He believed that, the cont3*ot with 
which he was concerned was the actualp historically valid 
contract that founded the, English Constitution. It %as 
crucial in his arguments$ not only because it, wtplained 
the otherwise linexplicablol origin of' government# but 
also because it provided a constitutional law which could 
lexalille resistance'to the monarchand other activities of 
similarly 'doubtful' constitutionality* 
AtwoodIs idon. -, of contrectq than, was loss Important 
an an explanation Of the past origin of the English 
Constitution's than an a moons to prove the present 
constitutional law to be what Atwood felt it ought to boo 
in examining AtwoodIs works It will become apparent that 
his contxact theory is r*markabloo His contract Is not 
so much an levontl as an 'express and ContinuinSO #process$ 
whereby the consent of the contractess 10 made A constant 
legal "quiremont for legitimate gov*rnnonto 
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An l, not*d in the previous ebapterg Atwood began his 
career as a political pamphleteer under the tutelage of 
WIII: Lam Petyt . one of the most famous of contemporary 
constitutional, historianoi, 
12 Petyt. was the principal 
advocate In the early 16809 of -the limited Ancient 
Constitution based an Immemorial custom, Atwood's first 
four political vorks" CIox*ly follow*d his tutor's Argumentas 
The critical Issues of the constitutional controversy# 
the Norman Conquest; and the origin or the lJouge of Commonst 
dominate Atwood's early works* Xn his lus AWrlorm ab 
(1680) Atwood declarod that In Petyt Ia and his 
conflict with Dradys 
The Controvorsl* between uss is or Rightl whether 
or no$ the molIxt such as now are r*pros*ntod 
by Mightn9 Citizens* and Bu DWJLO . smes. 
had Right to 
come to Parliamentq any mayq bofor* the 49e of HO 
except$ in the fancy'd way of being represented 
by such as they never choseD Tenants In Caultot 
by jUjJLtaXX Sellrigool4l 
Atwood wax dotermlnQ4 to prove that the Commons were truly 
represented in the constitution not only before the reign 
Of HOM7 III but 1Umm8OrJAllY9 I*** "beyond the account of 
Records or History", 
" The substantiation of this claim 
involveds, as we have "out a denial that the Noxuanx 
conquered England and also the assertion that the 
constitution itself was based upon unchanglnX and Imemorial 
custowo Thus the overall purpose of Atwood'a early works 
4)8 
was "to prove -the continuance of the Nnglish Rightev or 
that William govern1d not an a Conqueror"* 
16 
It in interesting that by the 1680s the controversy 
between the royalistv Feudal law interpretation of the 
constitution and the common lawy*rsl 'immemorial custowl 
Interpretation#, hadýbecome so'exhaustively argued that 
Atwood could look upon those two problems an synonomous. 
If the'Normns could be shown not to have conquered EnglAndl 
then It 'followed' that English rights could be called 
continuous. Atwood does indicate the grounds for this 
assumption that Xnglixh rights were the some In the eleventh 
century and earlier as they were in the saventeenthe These 
grounds were that the law of the constitution was customary 
law$ and that custom was immemorial and unchanging* 
"I have followed the Authority of the Great Fortescueg" 
he xayx, "who taught the World long sincel **. that in all the. times of these several Nations and of 
their Kingov this Realm wax still ruled with the 17 
self. same Customs that it is now govern'd with all"o 
Atwood's avowed purpose for delving into ancient 
records was to -ommort 
"the admirable Constitution by 
King* Lords and Comons 0* 
10 Although in general it appears 
that he wax more concerned to present a view of what the 
seventeenth century constitution ought to bep rather than 
to dexcribe It as it wax$ he did not regard this an his 
Intention* He made every effort to avoid accusations that 
he was prox*ntinS a novel interpretation of the constitution* 
And he insixt*d that he was writing neither aSainst the 
icing nor on behalf of popular sovereignty* Thus he 
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continued in his statement of purpose: "the RJLghts of the 
two last CLords and Commons] tI have I according to my 
capacity* defendedg being they have been controverted, 
But surely no man dares to be so presumptuouss to set 
himself against God's Vicegerentg by Divine Appointments 
put over. us# and that to our Great Happiness in all matters 
or Causes". 
" And In a later works he argued against the 
idea "thats notwithstanding any kind of Establishments the 
dernier resorts and Supremacy of Powar is always in the 
People" because that was "a Notion that would unsettle all 
Goverrunentes making them precarious. Whereas see 'No 
Government can be legallyg or by any lawful power changld 
but must remain for everl once establiab'd llt, 
20 With this 
view of government it Is easy to see why Atwood should have 
been so concerned to repudiate accusations of novelty in 
his interpretatione 21 
Atwood's early political works$ then,, purport to 
defend a conservative view of the Engli, 311 Constitution, 
lie was concerned to avoid what he thought wore the excesses 
of both monarchists and parliamentarians, The form that 
his defence took pretended to be historical* But to our 
eyeav and indeed to the eyes of many Tory historianag it 
was a stranZe sort of history. His arguments involved 
asserting that the Normn Conquest made no material impact 
upon the constitutiong that constitutional law was 
essentially customary lawg and that custom was immemorial 
and unchanging., Yet the arguments were persuasive to 
100 
many, and, thix can only be underxtood by examining the 
practical function they performed and the characteristics 
of 6obtemporary ideas of History, 
Atwood was xcarching for a "Foundation for our 
22- Gover ' nt by Kingi Lords and Commonsw * and that 
foundation he felt'had to be'locat4d in the pastt 
"As on Mr. PetYt's and my side the dejoigg can be no 
other than to show how deeply rooted the Parliamentary 
Rights arel" Atwood explains, "So the Doctors 
[Bradj3 in opposition to oural mmust be to show the 
y . *. and *tin A Question whether he yields 
60carAoue, 
23 these Rights to be more then j2r 
The constitution was the product of history but because of 
the absence of any strongly hold notion of 'historical 
relativity#, and because of the overriding practical 
concern in these historical researches, the 'past' referred 
to was a peculiar one,, It had, -ýa ftmetion to perform for 
the present, It was made to take aiden in a conflict of 
practical concern only for men in the late seventeenth 
century* The criterion for constructing the past wax 
thus the needs of the prexent rather than the non-partiman 
sifting of evidence* The idea of 'historical relativity' 
was practically absent from these enquiries, There was 
no acknowledgementg for exampleg that what happened six 
centuries before could be of no more than interest value 
for the prexento But there was sufficient acknowledgement 
that times changed to require noise notion to "connect' 
the past to the present& It wax In providing this ink 
that the notion of unchanging custom wax of fundamOntal 
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importance to Atwoodlm *Orly wr: Ltingxo 
Imewrial and unchansing customg ms we have xeeng 
eventually gave way to ? contract# an the foundation of 
Parliamqnt's constitutional rights. Dut this contract 
was also viewed historically. Thus a connection between 
the original contract and the present constitution wax 
still required and$ as we *hall seog, mminly through the 
agency of the coronation oath the original contract was 
transformed from m! n original event into a conxtitutional 
procoxe in order to effect this connection* We Will 
return to the Idea of History that IOAt plausibility to 
these arSumentse but firxt. we should exandne the 
Constitutional Contract Theory that begins to appear In 
Atwood's writlngx in the mid-1680s* 
III 
Atwood's early writings w*re, d*sign*d to establish 
bix view of the Rntlixh Canstitution on an unphakable 
foundation* This he located in the past and justified 
on the grounds of imemorial and unfhanging custom* His 
work frow 1689 to 1705 portrays tho "we concern with 
historical foundations but the justification of those 
foundations and the content of the past bad changodo 
In 16909 after the succession of Willium and Mary,, 
Atwood announced what was to be his c*ntral copcern through. 
out the rest of his career as a controverxializt3 
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an X an verily persuaded that our Government stands 
upon such a Rock as has boon unmov'd for many Agesl 
and has no need of a Lie for its Supportl X shall 
with the utmost Faithfulnosx address myself to its 
Defence. 24 
This statement couldl of course, be taken as the central 
theme of all his previous works But by the 1690s a 
defence of the constitution on local and historical grounds 
involved an additional problems far more immedinto then 
the Norman Conquest and Henry III's reign had been to 
defenders of the Ancient Constitution. Jaines XX had 
been forcefully driven from office and replaced by William 
and MaryO who$ although members of the royal familyg were 
not next in line by proximity of blood, 
25 The constitution 
had been broken* Thus if the post-1688 constitution were 
to be proved to rest on "such a Rock an has been wumov'd 
for many Ages", then not only did the No n Conquest and 
the constitutional innovations of Henry III's reign still 
have to be deniedl but also the Revolution itself had to 
be portrayed as complotely constitutional, 
AtwoodIs principal task in ale Fmdam*nta, & Con-stitution 
ot the-Englixh GG-overnment (169o) was, indeed$ to prove 
that "King Willjam and Clueen Mary are RIGHTFUL FAnx and 
Queeng according to the ancient Constitution of the Zngllsh 
Conatitution"s In order to do this, he, Informed his 
readeral 
I shall showl 
I* That the People of 3 an had a rightful 
Power lodgtd with them for the exervation of the' 
Conxtitutiong in Ivertue of which they might declare 
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King Ilia and Queen I%EX King and'-Quoon of am I England and Ireland with all their Dependencies, 
tho J. 2, was alive at the time of such Declaration* 
2, That this rightful Power was duly exercis'd 
in tho late Assembly of Lords and Commons,, and 
aftex rds regularl confirmed by the same Body 
in full Parliament. 'K6 
It wag in proving these two points that Atwood introduc*d 
his notion of an original contract* But Atwood's idea of 
contraat did not play a role within a complex set of 
philosophical notions - i*eo 'natural law#, #natural rights's 
'state of natural, Indeadl throughout his career Atwood 
was extremely aceptical about the use of these notions 
even though they must have been very familiar to hirn from 
the 'writings of other Contract Theorists, rn 16829 he 
argued: 
Admit a Conquestq and the Inheritance which every 
one claims in the Laws will be maintainable only 
as a naked Right. and nakeg &Rbts are thin and 
metapohysica Notional which few are Nhators or 
Judges of*21 
Again, in 16980 lie attacked one of Lockets admirers$ Villiam 
Molyneuxt for his "wheadling Notions of the julleren-to and 
unalienable Rights of Mankind"*28 And in 1704, the year 
before his deathq he reaffirmed his distaste for rhetorical 
"Flourishes about the Law of Gods of Nature, and of Nations"q 
by insisting that "nothing but the Law of EnSland can settle 
Mons Judgements of the Nature of the ID&I. LLh MonarSlil"o 
29 
We pmblems Mch engaged Atwood's attention wom 
conatitutionalg and the answers he save purported to be 
Judges of* 
founded upon a correct interpretation of constitutional 3L&W. 
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All the Opposers of our present Settlements-who 
pretend to talk Sonseg when press'd how*, grant 
that the Constitution of the English Government 
must be the Guide to their Cqnsciences In this 
matter .. * and thus U-mrors u are the best Dire2jorn of Egnscience in this case so* 
The great Unhappiness of this Nation is, 
that Divilgem not only not up for the greatest 
States-Meng but will pretend to be the beat 
Lawyers and Casuists in these points. 31 
If a notion of contract were to be made part of 
constitutional law, it could not, on this view, be one 
Idea in a complex of philosophical notions about the origin 
and nature of political power* Atwood's Idea of contract# 
as I hAvo maid, definitely wasn't this, Instoadq contract 
formed part of a complex of legal notions - i. e., fundamental 
lawg fundamental rightsp fundamental constitutIong coronation 
oath - which were distinct from the philosophicalg although 
there were attempts to relate tho two complexes. 
32 Am we 
shall noel Atwood in the end bad to leave the realm of 
law in order to justify his view of the English Constitution* 
Org more precisely# he had to forsake 'fundamental lawt 
as written and customary lawg and appeal to Ifundamental 
law' an something very close to the law of nature* 
The fundamental constitution that Atwood wished to 
'defend' was essentially quite simple. It consisted of 
a met of basic laws "on which ,,, RgLa .1 
Authority devended, s 
ago well as 
EParliamont's] rights and Priviledsons "33 
The fundamental constitution then "may and doe's In Lnjland 
limit *so Power ob eajerng, "34 The mAjor powers of the 
constitution were Kingj Lords and Commons andq Atwood 
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informs uss their operation through "an Agreement between 
a Mnxq with the LoEdet and a full Representative of the 
g2woons pf Zngland will bid fair je st] to being according 
to the 2U&inaj Constitution of our Gover. ent". 3-5 But 
the monarchy itself, Atwood asserted using a conv*nient 
medieval argument, was "fundamentally an Zlectýye MonarchX9 
keeping within a Family, but not confinsd to the next of 
Blood"*36 This last argvment was much used in attempts 
to uphold the *legality' of the Convention Parliament's 
#election' of William and Wry to the throne, even though 
they were not next in the hereditary line of succannion*37 
At the root of Atwood's view of the constitution seem 
to lie the notions of consent and propertye An early an 
1682 Atwood wrote of, "the Fundamental Constitutions whichl 
as far an I could learns was, and in, that every Pronrietor 
(of &ad especially) should in the qMral SgHML&I of the 
Kingdooso consent to the making those Laws under which they 
were to Liveo"38 This view of the constitutions theng 
although intended to maintain limits upon the power of the 
kings was not particularly radical,, Parliamentle function 
use essentially only to channel the consent of the politically 
relevant subjects (the proprietoraq and not all the subjects) 
to the legislation of the governmant U, e, in effects the 
king), 
The consent of the governed was vital according to 
Atwood because without it a government would be illegitivatee 
To substantiate this idea he appealed to the authority of 
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Hookers 
"]Nkkny have cited the Authority of the AgAi IOAUL 
Hooker till it in throad-barel" he asserts# "to 
provel that It is impossible there should be a 
lawful Kingly Power which in not madiatelyg or 
Immediately* from the Consent of the People where 
#tin exercised*"39 
This concept of legitimacy underlies all Atwoodto speculations 
about the English Constitutionj We have already seen that 
it was of great significance in his early conflicts with 
Bradye 
40 
If the constitution really were modified during 
Henry III's reignj he there argued, then that constitution 
was Illogitimateo For Henry 11118 reign was warred by 
"Tumults and Rebellion", and any constitutional innovation 
arising from those could not be legitimate because it did 
not have "a legitimate Birth", it was "not born in Wedlock 
between the King and his People", And mar* endurance 
could not provide legitimacy for such an innovation since 
"Quod initio non valett tractu temporis non convoloncit"* 
This idea that legitimacy was determined by IbIrth' remained 
one of Atwood$& central principles throughout the whole 
of his career. But in the use he made of this principle# 
an even more fundamental notion becomes apparent. This 
vom that a maxim of reason could always count as et stronger 
argument than any historical evidence* For legitimsey 
was determined by latioegl fbirths'. 
A legitimate govornment was & govornment founded in a 
particular waye The only way thAt legitimato government 
could be founded was by the peaceful,, free co-operation of 
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the government and ýhe governeds, either theýcontjnuouz 
co-operation that had existed 'time out of mind# of the 
Immemorial constitution; or the explicit co-operation 
stipulated in contract of the contract constitution* 
Whichever way the co-operation was conceivedil Illegitimate 
government was identifiable by the absence of any signs, of 
co-operation* Any constitution, then, that did not embody 
the co-operation of the government and the governed wax 
Illegitimate (although the idea of the tgovernedl wax-largely 
restricted to the land-ownins classes), The criterion of 
legitimacy was thus a rational criterion . outside the 
realm of both positive law and historical argumento Thisl 
Of c0urs0, it had to be lost it become weanipglosg . all 
80vex7u3*Uts either powerful 912ough to rules or that had 
ruled in the past would otherwise be legitimte, But In 
Atwood's OudeaVours to prove the ancient Iguglish Congtitution 
to have beens and to have remained, the beat and most 
.0 Saxon timess 
legitimate of all govern=entx At loast zinc 
his history was constantly 'tailored' to the requirements 
of his pro-conceived notion of legitimacy, It %me possible 
for him to do this whilat still maintaining that his 
historical work mus vnl: Ld history because of the prevalent 
view of the nature of History. 
41 
The consent necessary for le. Sitim+, e government would 
be basod on rational SOIC-interest, Atwood believede And 
it ims this thAt 1proved' government to ba founded In 
contractl 
JL08 
Indeed if we considert It will appear, that never 
any Empire or other Civil Society was foundedl but 
there uns an Original Contract or Agroemant among 
the People for the founding of it a., * 
[foi7 surely 
no People ever submitted to ally Lauthority) without 
a prior Obligationg but where they had hopes or 
expectations of Advantages or Base, tho obtaining 
of which if not made a Conditiong was ever 
implie'd. 42 
This nort of araument, about the origin, nature# limito and 
end of sovornment appeared in many tracto of tile, eir, 11tigg 
and nineties. It ix a part of the argument of trationallat 
constructivism' we Imvo already encountered$ that social 
and political institutions are entirely the product of 
hilmon dez: LSnG43 But hero it is Interpretod not onlY a8 
an explanatory devico but also As historically valid, 
Thus Atwood, dencribed the historical origin of the English 
Constitution by omployinZ it as a promisee At the, saino 
time he roaxserted his belief, through the medium of Ciceroq 
that the constitution wax a balance o: r King, loqrds ond 
C14an] judge Cor thomselves upon what Inducement 
Otis fit to enter Into *** a Society *, * and therefore some Man, ominont for Wisdom may have 
been made King# for having proposed such a 
Regulation oT the way of Living together* Oat, 
all happily Unite in promoting the comwn 00049 
by which Plenty and Prosperity is secured to every 
one In particular* These Regulations being 
)ajv. e, tjg1jX aZjEg&d to# became law I and hence the 
proposers of them have b*on esteemed Visa L.: Lw. - 
Some of them,, Me Lff .c HMs may 
have 
, 
divosted 
themselves of ;? pwer for the good or alIg and proposed 
such ftrticipationst *. *as might,, be the most 
effectual means to prevent Comyetitioup and 
Animosities* 
Hance arose the happy Constitution of the 
Engligh Ugnarchys which q; jc-*ro, plainly saw in 
1dat as the most Perfect form of Government. 
44 
mkum 440 somo a 
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Yet this 'proof I of tho tnglish contract was : rar from 
indisputablow Moro historical ev; Ldenco icon noodod and 
hore Atwood,, 341: o many othoral" turned to the Mir"r at 
just". O. S. Thero at loazt, an wo bavo soons was an account 
of an event that could be interpreted as tho EM11sh I 
'original contract' expressed in torms or a coronation 
catl2*46 
Having locptod ýtho oxUinal contract in Enalish historys 
Atwood's next problem %as to prove its relevance to the 
poat-Zorman constitutl6n. Ile continued to dony that AN 
a mattor of li: LxtoricaJL, Cact the Normans had conqupred 
En, Clande But he no longar insisted that tunchanzinZ 
customt linked the pro-Norman to the post-Noman constitution* 
This link vas now ef. Cocted by equating the original contract 
with the coronation, oath and thus vieving English 
constitutional history as a succession of rearfirmations 
of the original contract 1by each now monarcho The importance 
or a notion of con#%ct in Atwood's now view of Rug]-ish 
constitutional, lait and history in clearly evident in his 
examination of tho problem of the Norrann Conquest in 
FjMdaSLqatgj SOMIJAU112n, (1690) t 
III: r it to ruic-I objectedt". he wrote* "that tho 
there might have been a Contractp with a Free 
People at the beginninz [of the English 
Constitutionj'q it cons'd to be so from the tiMe 
of the Conquest* 
X answerl 
10 Till there be a Consent and Agreement to some 
Terms of Government and Subjectiong 'twill be 
difficult* if possible* to prove any Right in a 
Conqueror# but what way be cast Off as SOOU as 
there is an opportunity, o*** 
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2.6 Uvery Slaction of a King trulyo so callId. In 
an Evidence of a Compacti but Ancient Authors tell 
uss that W*I* max elected Kingo nay they are express 
that he was receivtd upon a mutual Contract and 
that 4** he mado a League with the Peoplol ... [and] King William's Coronation-Oath uns [practicallyl 
the same with that Uhich. was taken, by his Saxon 
g radecoafsors *** 
o He neither at the beginning,, nor In the course 
of his Reignq protanded in the least to be a 
Conqueror,, but always insisted upon [the] Title 
(the Choice of the People) and this [_Was not 
disputed evenj before his Victory over Haroldt 
who was always lookid on as a usurper; Do* 6. [Evrq7 if our Ancestors had made an absolute a 
anion to M11.1. an some pretandl in the 
Judgmeat of the Lord Clarendong It would not extend 
to ust 11ror,, says hot if It can be amppos'd that 
any Nation can concur in such a Dogignation and , devexting themselves of all their Right and LIb*rtyq 
It could only bo in reason obligatory to the present 
Contractorst Nor does It appear to us that their 
Posterity must be bound. by so LwlWtty a Concession 
of their Par*ntxol 
The Xing's Oath is the real Contract on his 
xide* and his accepting the Goverment aim a Legal 
King the virtual one; and so it in yie **ct "47 In relation to the Allegiance due fro-m-At-Im subj 0 
Understood in this way the original contract defined 
and guaranteed the legititaucy of the English Constitution, 
The Constitution 'Was 1419itimto because it &rose froml and 
continued withg the tree consent of contracting citizens* 
Xt consisted of ftindamental laws not up In the distant past 
and it was thus both of considerable age and eminently 
reasonablee Xts reasonableness was certain because our 
ancentorxt being reasonable man Me ourselvexq must be 
presumed to have submitted themselves to a goverment for 
some good purposes The original contract was still 
relevent, to the seventeenth century constitution because 
it was represented not simply as a past event but rather as 
III 
a series of events (the taking of coronation oaths W each 
monarch) realTindug the asssontiAlis of the originaX agr*emento 
But in representing the coronation oath an fths contract$* 
Atwood encountered a problem about the fundamental laws 
consentad to by each now monarch. Could thoy alter ov*r 
time? Xf the anaver to this question were not then 
furthOr problems arose about explainingg and accounting 
for$ the Changes that bad in flmct OcCured and which had 
been accepted ax beneficial. If the &now r were yen, 
then the whole point of his historical Onquiriex might be 
called into question, AtwoodIx concernj after max 
to explain the English Constitution of the late goventeenth 
cantury* If the main conatitutionAl laws, the fundamental 
laust Might change over time uhy not simply portray those 
, %&Ich were currantly accapted as law rnther than wcamine 
the Saxon and Norman Constitutions7 Atunod's solution to 
those problems was a compromise: : rundamental laws could 
change over time# but not so radically an to alter the 
]Limited nAtttro of tho zovernmbntý- There were$ apparentlye 
two lavols of fundamental laws* For examplel Atwood 
believed that in the early history of the Enalish monarchy 
the people were protected against their Icing by powerful 
Tribuno-like officials* Those no longer oxisted In the 
seventeenth century and yet he was prepared to accept that 
it was "the Wisdom of this Governmentg to have the like 
Oftices with ux to be no%, r -only Imown in Story"* The point 
of noting their past existence was simply an evidence of 
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what "EnZIlah Liberties" W. O# since those liberties lad 
Y have not changred even though "the Subjects of the l4knarch 
I-Ad grostor Confidence in their Eings,, than to Insist upon 
haVing such actlad Officerstle 
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Tho idea that constitutional law couId chango prov; Lded 
it did not do 3o flmdamentally tmf; isiaxtrIcably connectod 
to the notion of an original$ Constitutional Contract through 
the proposition tbAt 
'They o,,. Imt lay the first ; roundation. of a Co nwealthq 
have Authority to mako Laws that cannot be altered 
by Posterity# in the Mtters that concern the 
Rights both of a IIICJLý and People# For PoundAtions 
cannot be removed vithoXt the Ruin and Subversion 
g of the whole Buildinsel 9 
If this were interpreted strictly it meant that not all 
constitutional law was Amdamentale Atwood did in fact 
adopt this position* The only law that could not be 
altered by posterity was the law of j! jjAs jagpuUt for the 
public good itself was "the Foundation of the Asreement"50 
to form the constitution at the original contract. xt 
was from this ideas an we have gseen#51 that Atwood could 
argue that in all casom vhore the legality of an action 
was in questions it was $legal#* Jrrespect: Lve of the 
diCtAtS2 Of All other Xawxo provided it contrib4ted to 
the public well. -being* In 2.6909 for Wmmple, Atwood 
dof*nded the East India CompanY52 on these lineal 
But did not the Co=on and Statuto Low of the 14ndo 
the Civil Law of the Rometuzg or other Harit4me, or 
HarshAl Live, afford sufficient Matter for an 
Apology [for the EaloCkjo we might hAve Recourse 
to tho Foundation of the= &119 and what upon 
Emergencies suporseeds ^119 the Salut; PQ I To 
which tho Interost of both Frinzo and Poop a must 
, patition,, 
53 give ways whenever there is a Cop; 
113 
But this notion of a Ifoundatioul for all positive law 
brought AtIfood close to mAking the 0,613crtiOn that -021HO 
jDoRjt -9.12 
because it was in accordance vith IL sunroma lex -a 
natural law* He had consistently rofusod to make this 
kind ot assertion in Ids analyaix of the original contract 
and the ilmdamantal law that it established* In one passage 
.1 
Conalltutiglig howavew, lie did argue in Th% EU&49jngj3jLa 
that "by the Law of Naturaq Salua Populi il bqtIx 
&A. 4 -the- 
fIr ., It 
JA f. ja G mind lba. imso 0 Slad d 9f6 
al]'P. Qor 14-W02- &Sd Rr SOYSAMMILI 1 9931"'51 Yet hill 
A 
interpretation of the law of nature in a peculiar onso it 
is not 0112 inmtable standard of right and wronse good and 
bad - the atandards tbAt contomporury philosophers were 
arguing God bad engraved on all men's mindso Instead it 
simply providod additionAl authority for exist: lsýg and 
chanzable positive lAw* Our knowledge of what accorded 
with the laws of Ciod And nature was derived bmm existing 
positive law, and thus natural and divine law could change 
an positive low didlo 
"I wi. U not deny, " he argued. "tb^t Eizingal-I enjoy 
the Crown according to Go-41m Is-wq &Blg La3! 9 and tho J*X 
-of 
I t=t Forip an the great Fortescue 
bA 9 It* AJU JAWx- mu ýU-fshed &Me thair L-tnr- Mon. -b *be lot vuo can Bay buir. Z11850 0040 
my be alterodg as they were 
The vort of argument that Atwood based on this View Of 
natural and div$ze law orten soundso AatoUiSIdZ9* When 
discussinZ J&mG2 XID title to the English th"Uss fOr 
wmwpies he declared: %US Jawil the ilk of Scotlaga 
having. upon an undoubted legal right, been recognized 
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King oiC E&rlan-d .. theroby tho Right bocamo Divinoll, 
56 
p. ovaiji, thon, iras the supremo fundamental law, Sn 
but it Uas POSItivo law for all that6 It wan assential 
for Atmoodfa purposo that it should bo positivo laxis 
because only by mans ot such a vague or Seneral concept 
as ttho public ifell-boinst could the ovonts of 1688 be 
declared flagalf, But he could not allow it tile statu's 
of a natural law becauso such things voro "thin and 
metapbysical Notiouss uhich few aro Ilautors or judgasof". 
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Salwa 
-jDOT)ijjj was supreme 
because It formed the foundation 
of the original contract* Atwood ro: Cused to bollavo that 
rational men could ever live freely under lava that they 
liad not consented to specificallys ]Reasons theng Was to 
be the toost of Ulfs and if the law in any circumstance 
was to be found unntinS it must Siva imy. But anyone who 
argued like this uns lxmediately open to attack for being 
a 'Comwnwealthmn' and therefore the enemy of the English 
Constitution (in the next chapter we shall see Robert 
Ferguson being attacked in this way). Atwood would lave 
repudiated these accusations as vehomontly as auy royalists 
and hence the urgent need he Colt to prove sa. jus n2j3ijU 
to be part of the law of tho English Constitution* 
Yet Atwood'a Bali'§ 2=1111 could at moxt be described 
... 32jjMcLUje of law and not the law itself. It might 
thus be a criterion for changing law$ but the act of change 
could only be described as legal it it were carried out 
through rocognizod constitutional channels.. Rebellion or 
U, 
force could never be such A recognized legal channel* When 
resort in taken to force tho constitution# -in . 22 
ar'los has 
brokon, down. Revolt might be MMSegsa-rY to restore or 
alter a constitution but it could never be styled Ileamll 
accordin, f", to the lavýof that constItutione The only 
standard by uhich rebellion might be called liegallf, is 
the standard of natural (or divine) laws Dut tho legality 
of an act Occording to natural law Is a very different sort 
of lezality from that Uhich. Drison from constitutional lava, 
Having refused to take this possible way out of his dilemmj 
Atwood had to try and reconcile his rational standard of 
the J! ajiag 12.0.1DMIL With existing constitutional lalwo. Hance 
his appeal to an original Constitutional Contracto 
The idea that the English Conbtitutio32 wag in fact 
sot up by a dontract betweau ratioliAl inen ungs aveasily 
comprehonsible 107 Of unitinZ roason and Uutory,. it 
was not entirely satisfactoryl, an Miss 11. Debrous hasý 
6110uns 
58 but it did provide a faIrly plausible basis upon 
whicli to defend the 109mlitY Of 'Williamlis and Harylis reign* 
The, taAk of : Uiterpreting the best relatioasMp between 
goverment and governed vas thrust back upon the original 
framers of tho, constltution* Their declilon. was; enshrined 
In a not of conatitutional 3AIT81 WIdch could fill US ModitiOd 
in some degree by posterity prov; Lded the essentials of the 
arransomnt rerminedo Here lay a strength of the doctrine 
an far as Atwood was concerned. Any attempt to act LU 
accordance with tho saIA13 r2Luji. could be interpreted as 
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an act necessarily in accordance With the xpirit'if, not 
the letter of t1w constitution. Thus any change, of 
constitutional law# even if affected through extra. 
constitutional channelso could be interpreted as a 
-dplgagg of 
theloriginal constitution rather tbAn an 
innovation, It was a defence of the fintentional of the 
original, contractees& 
Only constitutiono founded by contract are logitimtee 
The English C. onstitution výas fou; ftded by contracts therefore 
It In legitimate, Contractual constitutions bAve an their 
supreme law the ga&ug D2pu because all rational. men intend 
8overnment to secure thin*. 
, 
Xt followed Prom theso 
propoýitlonxj Atwood's argument runst 
tbAt where goverment] 00* lulfbiqlded in smactl the X- oblex 4Ld -C-ovapyis my 
Join in the Defence of 
The atipsa of rebOllon could thus be remov*d **om the 
gmppoIrters of the 1688 Revolution. 
The will of God revealed In the Bible did not provide 
evidepce for. roruting this deduction. Despite . 211 the 
orgummuts of the Divine Righters from Biblical sourceng 
Atwood arguedl theyhad missed the points 
Christianity [d*08 n0iý -a*, lay AnY Obligation uP*12 the Subjects# beyond the Duty resulting from the 
particular Constitutions o: e the re active 
Govorninentsl so he [Bishop Uedellb%] does CL*). Iy 
admit that the Laws ad CXJ6J customs of some 61 Countries may allow of Resistance' in some Cases. 
The English Constitution certainly alloved this right. 
And sog in ft I ct, had Donmarkl Swodsnq Norwayl and Franco,, 
62 
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Venice and the German Empiroo63 and oven C]ASsical ItomO964 
at some stage of their histories* 
The resistance that the English bad shoim to James 11 
vans thereforaq logal because -A-It-wood 
believed that it had 
been, uscessarys 
dijmmjjggd Lelthi when Saluis Pgoull a&a Ag g(MMO! 
a -terst on in the gna In n Wl 
Course of he Descent of the Crown]. in Can* of th 
Necessity, A; so, far Vrom a Change of the 
Constitutions thAt Itix by vertue of the Chief Fundaimental Law the EALM ELOJLUj. G5 , 
This theory, of an original Constitutional Co3itractq 
then$ combined elements or seventeenth century rutIonallun 
With, legal history#, The'alemonts wore hold in uneasy 
balancel with the former an the ultimate court of appeal 
Az cases whore the 'reasonable' conflicted with the 29841o 
This was so even though what was deemed to be reasonable was 
apparently a matter for the indivIdualIx reason aloneo 
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The extent to which the requirements of reasonableness 
might override those of strict le&-ality in evidenced in 
Atwood's solution to the problem ot Charles 11's statutes 
which o, utlawed resistance, to the monarch* TUese statuteng 
as I remarked earlierg 
67 
wero wmajor difficulty in the way 
of those who wished to argue that the 1683 Itevolution, had 
been perfectly constitutiorAlo They wore Acts of Parliament,; 
indisputably part of the constitutional law of the lande 
and they #proved$ that armed resistance to James 11 was 
illegal* Thin was p"cisely the conclusion that Atwood 
wished to avoid and hence he insisted that it was "the 
no 
commu rundamental law" which %as "in this came the 
Superior" and which was to "explain and limit the Souse of 
Acts of Parliamout seeming, to the contmry,. 1168 JWd this 
loomon Ftm&moutal law* wast in assnenco# an uo hsvo seeng 
the w1ull awal 
This solution to th4 problets of Charles Ills BUtutou 
in intereating not only because It rests an the idea of a 
lWakjag"I tUadamental laws but also because Atwood *hoxe 
tO COI tb&t Ulf the "COMMOn" fVndftMGntAl 3AW* By the and 
of the sevouteenft century it had become cotmnyjAce amongst 
axsertors of parliamentary rIZUts alpinst Via Crown that 
there existed a fundiamental JAw suarontoolng those rightxe 
The oarlioxt Ooorists of Cmdowatal lawiere nninly comon 
IaWers, lMw Cokeý and Hobart* Danically they believed 
that f=damntal Uw wax sometbins like the $reason of the 
am n law$ - an abstract not of principles that were 
embodied In the hiatory of comoon law* From those ideas 
it van poxxible to argue that any Act of Parliament that 
contrQVIG112*d the *"&son of the camtoon laws vas voids the 
strougth of the argumnt. renting an the superiority of 
comon over statute lAv# 
69 
And a3. thovW:, h this relationship 
was rapidly changings7o when Atwood described his tluxkm*Ut&l 
lAw as the "common Ifundamntal JAw" he wax dmving on two 
sources of Inspiration tbAt helped to asks Ulm arsummt 
more vormummilve to the loss radically ndn&d by conceallng 
Us ultimate rstional bamix upon iddch it rested& The 
main cbexacteristic of At,,. toodfx fundAmental law was its 
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rationality$ but this uzz no longer derived from the 
historical experience of tho common lasr. Insteads tho 
fundamental law uas rational because it uas consciously 
designed by rational men uhol in tho distant past$ had 
decided that government under a not or fundamental lawn 
trould be beneficial to them* 72tus for Atwood to assert 
the superiority of fundamental over statute law was 
tantamount to apsorting that reason should be theýtost of 
law, This vas a perfectly plausible assertion but one 
that Atwood did not wish to make in such an unequivocal 
way* He vanted to argue his case upon the view that the 
only accoptabla test of 'legality$ vas positive law. 
Hence6 when positive law definitely did soon to refute his 
argunentg he appealed explicitly to the "coumn Fundamental 
IAwI!, j where froasont zoomed linked to the accumulated wisdoca 
embodied in positive law* But thin,, quite clearly uas a 
vary different sort of standard from that treason' involved 
in making the gglux 2gDalt the ultimate test of legality. 
As far as Atwood was concerned$ thent resistance to 
the monarch would not only be justified but also logal if 
the salus nopu. Ai wore, throatened,, But two further problems 
remained before his 'proof# of the le3ality of rosistance, 
could be complete* These problems concernod firstg vho, 
was to determine when the "JLux nopull was endangered$ and 
second$ %&at was to happen to tho con3titution if armed 
conflict wero nocassary to resolve a dispute over tho 
public woll-boing? 
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Although Atwood wanted to legal: Lze some resistancD, 
he di& not vant "to go about to loosen tho Bond of due 
Subjection to the Powers which arc over us*071 Thus he 
donned tho c1bak of moderationt 
we, gmlxý. xjegj9j 'when the Lrl .: 
Irin&3. Con_t_rek-ct--! 
-V- and we must Aot resist ; when 
the Ori 1 Contract is nqtoriouols brokenj I_r_o 
cglItIMF nd contradictory Pro sitions *no of . an 'Which jmn-t to be trxie; ý But we mal resist in 
no caveg and we jay. yesist In any compas when Sy= 
no glatrar ed but 'Ex r*A-m, l . 
%Zl 210AM so Are tC 
and tin odds but the Truth lies in the id dlet 
that md my resist in'somo case 'which'cries aloudl 
and justly stirx up a Nation* an w: Lth the Y-gleg Ofý 
ýLo A* 72 
This meant tbAt "If single Permonst or many togother be ' 
injurld, by the Lr. 111ge, thoy are obligId to stiffer quiStlYs 
rather than disturb the Ptiblick po&ce"073 For injuries 
caused to individuals by the government did not constitute 
breaking the contract t 
all the People collectively$ or representatively, 
were but Ong LAM in 22 RUDUIStiont and therefore 
those Act3q by vMch 'a King mu3t-? o-r-ftjit [his thronol 
are LonlyJ such 
, 
as are likoly to take away the 
Rights of the whole Peoples or aim at, changin the Form of the Governments subverting the Lawx*71 
Atwood belifnrodg &a we have just peon, that thego 
occasions would #cry aloud$., But$ all the saw*, "Th*ro 
was and is an extablixhfd Judicature for the great Case 
in quejgtjonto. 
75 This 'Judicature# was the t'Lords and 
Commons in ftll Parliamentov, 76 Its pole was testified to 
by precedenta stretching back to S&xon timos*77 
13y tbo 1690sq th*nl Atwooo was asserting the 
constitutional supremacy or flariiament. He had moved a 
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long way from his defence In the early 1680s of the Comon 
Law view of the balanced# monarchical constitution* in 
sumary the constitution now consisted of "the express 
original and continuing 10ontract. between Prince and People oeo 
with the Legal Judicature OPPOWered to determino conceraing 
78 
The final problem that Atwood felt obliged to consider 
WhOn arguing that 'thO-XUX]Lish Constitution countenanced 
rOSISUMOO JUVOIV*d Opr*Ving* that resisting the Monarch 
did not cause a J)reakdown in tb^t constitution* If it did 
he would have boon forced to admit that the Revolution %ax 
either unconstitutional but neconnaryj or tlegall according 
to Dom other. law than, the purely positive,, "The Kingdors 
I own Is founded in Monarchy",, he argued,,, but this did not 
Iwly ! *that the dinsolution of the Contract between 'the 
. he fo= Of 1, wdiate ftinco and Peoples should dogtroy + 
Govez ent"079 The main difficulty In this rexpect 
concerned the status of the Convention Parliament whichj 
after James XX#s escape to Prances, had determined that 
William and Iftry should be offered the- throne In his xteade 
On the one xide# the defenders of James XX argued Oat the 
Convention wax an 13.1egal body. because a r*gular Parliament 
alone could resolve constitutions! questions and the Lord* 
and Comsons could on]Ly be convvned by the king'a write 
Atwood attacked these argumuts an excessively Iformall, *80 
on the otb*r iside were tbose who 
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SuPPOSO the COU*QquOnCO of 0,0-Igggligtion )of the 
Con&rugl to be a were "lana-Ith- or absolute 
I 
a O"ry Vx an equal share in 
the Go not only lamded meng and others 
With VhOm the BalUnce of tho Power has rentod by 
the Constitutionfi but Copy-holdereg Sorvantog and 
the very Which would not only make 
a'quiet Mection Luipmeticableg but bring In a 
deplorable confusioneft 
The em)r of theglo won, lay in not 1mving attended to 
ftrendores 
82 
and In particular his distinction betlftOn 
two contructise For "accordins to the gugAgjauil EULSWRJ: tv 
by virtue or a double Contracts where the Fi3ndommmtAl 
Constitution Is jf="Ugg&9 ws in England, a MMEQX 
rewminso"83 
The neglect of Pufandort's %risdom was tho error of 
14elw on Zjm JEM . 
11800 24- 9AMOMMI (1690), 6 Loolco IhAd 
published Two Treatises anonymuxly and there in m avidon4o 
to zMest that Atwood know him to be the author# ovm 
thou& Tyrr*110 a ftiand both of Locke and Atwoodq definitelY 
well aware of it,, 
64 Atwood considorad Locka's work to bG 
"tho beat Troatines of CivU Pol: ity which I baVe Mot W; ith 
In the lW; Iitb Thutuo"98-5 Xt succonsfully refuted the 
abourditiois of Vabort Filzmr and OnUbllshod govnvolinni. 
$'upon +. he only truo rom3datione the Choice of the P*oplo to e 
86 
The only glaring ounission of this otherwise great work 
could be rectified by resorting to Pufondorfe And Pufandorf's 
treatiseng we my &sawn frm the extent to which Atwood 
fAlls back on their authorityp oorVrima the beat Imoks an 
civil polity In any tongue* 
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It is interestingg and'instructive of Atwood's central 
concern vith the Enzjish Coustitutiong that in discusaing 
Locke he considered that "his Schome of Goveri=ent is not 
erected as the most parrectt but seems designedly adapted 
to what he takes our Goverument to bog tho not wcpressly 
named"087 Sinco Atwood intorprotod Locko in this tmy he 
could neglect that Part 10: r W-0- Tr-Onjises whic1i c=mined the 
nature of pro-political man - his natural rights and tho 
law OZ nature which Suidod him. Ile could thon conclude 
Via t: 
Whereas he CLockO3 GrGuOst That the poople, are by 
the Monarchts Violation or the Constitutiong restorld 
I natIliCeg there beinS no comon JudS to the gtato 9 
in that 11tals, g; E War to whichIts Injuries force 
thoml no mn who observes how clearly and 
consistently he always reasonag can believe that 
he would apply this to such a state ot the Cuestiong 
as I have shown that our Constitution varrantal 
which depends not upon a single contract between 
the peoples and a Prince and his Holraq whom they iod not over theka, whose Authority coasiuZg they 
were to now mold the Government *, 0,, But there plainly wax a farther contract among 
theuxelveng to prevent Amrchv a d. nfusions at 
any time when the -Thrgng mi&t- 
be vacajLtl and by 
vertue of this -C, -oS$rac* 
they have ragui^rly made 
thoso Slectionas which are frequent in our 
Historieng and are authentick Presidents for 
our late Proceedings*88 ' 
In Atwood's views thong 1, ocke uns correct in arsuing 
that the OnlY legitimate foundation of government was the 
consent of the governedg but his onvaision of Putandorflx 
two contracts could have led to errors in understandinS tho 
English Constitution* But Atwood himself misunderstood, 
or misinterpreted Pufandarffa theory. Pufandort had 
distinguished between the contract whereby a civil society 
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was established 
established and 
theme contracts 
in tho light of 
and natural law 
fromthe contract of submi6sion which 
Suarentooda "Sular ;; ovcrnmcnt4b 
89 
Both 
ifere only comprohenzibla and justifiable 
logically prior beliofs in natural rights 
But Atwood's interprotation of Pufondarfla 
moaning involved neclacting thece ideas. Thusý by the 
first of rufendorf's contracts the English made "a Provision oe., 
for a Monarchy, before any particular Person Was setled in 
the 7brone"o By the second$ the people simply chose a 
Idmas 90 Xt then certainly did follow from the dissolution 
Of At", Odlm, second contracti, that the mounrchical form of 
the constitution would remain uncImnZad. 
I havo now o=minad all the mjor propositions involved 
in Atwoodla Constitutional Contract Theory. From the idea 
that the English Constitution was begun by a dual contractl 
he clicited the firatt fundmentalj constitutional law of 
anull. IUx completed theory made it perfectly M0 U8 12 . 
consistent to argue the case of the constitutional legality 
of the 1698 Revolution* Zf the constitution were really 
as ho wished to persuade his contemporarieu, ther an attempt 
to remove the Incumbent monarch could be called 
Iconstitutionalt provided two conditions were satisfied. 
These were: firstf, that no attempt be minde to alter the 
monarchical form of the conistitutionj and second,, that 
the replacement of the monarch should be justifiable on 
the grounds of the salus-norulL (with the Lords and Co=aans 
acting as final Judge in case of dispute)* Atwood and 
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many of his contemporaries were convinced that both these 
conditions were satisfied in the case of the struggles 
against James 1I. But It was only possible to accept the 
satisfaction of those two conditions as evidence of the 
Sonsjity. U. OSjj= of the 1688 Revolution by accepting a 
contractual view of the English Constitution ax well, Thus 
many meng sympathetic both to the dangorx of arbitrary 
government and to the difficulties involved in upholding 
the Constitutional Contract Theory were atill. faced with 
an unresolved dilemmas Atwood may well have persuaded 
some that #the People of FjZjAnd are actually discharged 
from their Oaths of Allegiance to James Il and were lately 
restorld to that lAtitud* or Choice which . 00 
[in] their 
Original Right". 91 But to, those w1w could not follow him$ 
allegiance still lay with the deponed king* For this groups 
tho distinction between a Ift LOcto and a do AHM king' 
became Increasingly meaningful$ and Atmoodes solution to 
their problemby simply denying its existence van of little 
92 
comfort , 
The principal point of Atwood's Constitutional Contract 
Theory seems to, have been to redefine 'rebellion, ' in xuch 
a way that the sort of resistance exhibited in the 2688 
Revolution could be shown to be legal& L%like, many 
contemporary contractarianes Atwood did not concern himself 
with examining the principles of consent and contract in 
terms of natural law, natural righteg etc* The reason 
for this was cortainly not that there wags a blind-spot 
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In Atwog)dtjo theoretical vision* By 1690 he had read 
L, ockot Tyrrell And their opponent Filmerg an wall as the 
works of Pufoudorf, 
93 But Atwood simply tool; the rerutatson 
of Filmerism Cor gmnted and proceeded to follow his own 
purpose of providinS a foundation of Ilia English Constitution 
Xrom the material of constitutional law alonob From this 
point of-views Pilmer's notions of patriarchalism and divine 
right would appear an ridiculous$ or at most simply 
#stumbling blocks' In the way to a more concrete proof 
from records of law that the events of 1688-g. were 
constitutional* Thus Atwood dismissed the whole Tilmerian 
debate3 
Ax-to the Nation's rightful Power [to act an it 
had in 3.688]9 1 shall not go about to refute the 
fond Notion of an absolute FxWlauebal Power 
descending from Adgm to our Kings j-n- -- we 
umccountable w4yj becauxes tho if it wero trueg 
the" could be no more Compact between Princes 
and their Peoples than In between Fathers and 
Children for establishing the Rights of Fatherhood* 
yet the, d1frerence between a N-trjar an 
&nagghig&L Authority* In so well -stated and 
proy'd by my Lea=ed Friend Mr 1; =j; that raw 
besides the unknown Author or the two late 
lEggtises of Govgj=gn, i could have gained Reputation after blue in exposing the false 
P 
., r"SijRlq. zI and 
Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and 
his Admirersio 4b *e Wherefore I way well think that 17 Pa. 
over the Stumblinz-Blocks which such Men Fi. 
Ueriansý 
lay in the way to my Proofs that the Power whereby 
this Nation is governd# is originally under God 
derived fzý the Peoples ^ud, was never absolutely 
parted with*94 
There could be no political power before controatt 
Pufeudorfs Tyrrell and Locke had proved that muche But 
they bad done so by means of philosophical notions of a 
state of nature inhabited by men with natural rights and 
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guided by the dictates of natural law* Atwood was 
prepared to adopt their conclusions$ but-not to engage 
in that sort of enquiry himself. The conclusionag indeadq 
were necessary postulates for him but his sceptism of 
Imetaphysicall notions seems to have made him hesitate in 
accepting their Oproofsl* His concerng anywayq was with 
constitutional questions whose solutions he felt must be 
sought in constitutional law alone, If the original 
contract were historically validg establishing fundamental 
laws that defined and protected the rights and dutiesof 
Englishmeng and if the fundamental constitution could be 
shown to be the present constitution, then the defence of 
those rights which Atwood wished to uphold could take an 
historical or pseudo-historical form without necessitating 
recourse to "thin and metaphysical Notions", " 
A justification of the 1688 Revolution, theng need 
only take the form of 4% correct oxuminatjL*n of the 
constitution, *sPeci&llY as it concerned the monarchy# 
Dixputes about Divino R: Lght and Patriarchalism were needless - 
all that was required was a knowl*dSe of the provisions of 
the fundamental constitutions 
Men [who argue for Divine Right] will have it, 
'that the Nxtont of the Power of a KInSI as ! Unx 
is ascertained by God himself, which I must needs 
sayq X could never yet find provId with any coloure But to avoid a Dispute needless herej since the 
Question In not so much of the Zxtent of Powerg an 
of the Choice of Personal Whether any Choice is 
allowable for us# must be determin'd by the 
fundam*ntal or subsequent Contract ... 1 and ItIn 
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this which must resolve use whether the 
Goverment sball continue Elective* or Hereditary 
to them that stand next In the Course of Nature 
or limited only to the Bloods with a Liberty in 
the People to prefer which they think most-fit, 
all Circumstances considored, 96 
But the constitutions Atwood insisted$ had to be 
examined correctly* By this he meant not only the careful 
selection of historical records but also that* in the 
absence of records 'proving' certain desired provisions to 
Iýe'constitutional* appeal could be vmde to 'the roasonabl*l* 
The validity of this vIewq howovers depended on the ideas 
that government was rationally designed and that history 
embodied a rational purpose* Philosophical contractarianism 
oxauin*d most explicitly the first of these Ideas, 
97 Thus 
when Atwood explained the purpose and method of his ThI 
Fundamental Sgnotitution (1690). he was utillaing conclusionxg 
the 'proofs"of which he refused fully to endorsel 
"that the People of Nnglond have lawfully and 
rightfully renouneld their Allegiance sirorn to J. 2 
and transferr'd It to the most deserving of the 
Blood, " he explained, "I &hall evincev not only 
from the Sguity of the iaw and Reservations 
necessarily luplied In their Submission to a 
Kingj but from the very Letter,, explain'd by the 
. 
Practice of the Kingdomv both before the reputed 
Conquest, and sincee"98 
The idea of History that gave Atwood's arguments coherence 
and credibility needs closer examination, 
IV 
Atwood1m; constitutional theory was predowinRntlY9 
perhaps *Von completelYe A Construction of r*ason* At 
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its cantre was the, idea of a contract by which men designed 
a conatitution for their own advantage. The enlightened 
self-wintorest of the designers occasioned the constitution, 
was embodied within-its provisions, and was the chief 
fundamental law which all others must serve. The theory 
was produced for a practical political purpose - to show 
that resistance to a monarch*who acted against the public- 
interest was a legal duty according to the constitution* 
This conclusion did in fact follow from Atwood's premisses 
and thus the legitimacy of the Will. i&VA and Mary regime 
could be established* But the credibility of the whole 
enterprise depended upon the credibility of its premissesq 
particularly those concerning the place of reason in 
constitutional history and law, 
One of the most remarkable features of Atwood's theory 
was his insistence thAxt 110 was only concerned With positive 
law* Natural law and natural rights were explicitly 
outside his purview because he believed they were unnecessary 
complications that served only to confuse those wishing to 
know where their constitutional allegiance lay after the 
upheavals of 16884, The idea that legitimate government 
everywhere began by contract was crucial to his arguments 
but he believed that nothing more than a knowledge of 
constitutional history was necessary to establish ito 
Thus despite the clearly rationalist argument that he 
presents . the argument from rational orixLnx and from 
design, proving Salus Donull to be the chief fundamental 
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law . he claimed that It was founded upon historical 
evidence alone& If the original contract could be shown 
to be historically validj then the galus ponuji was truly 
the chief fundamental law provIded all of Atwood's other 
asswTtions serving to rolAte Past to present were acceptable* 
We may assume that Atwood thought himself successful 
in proving the historical validity of the English Constitution's 
"express Original and continuing Contract", But# &part 
from the single reference to the unification of Saxon 
. of 
Jug-tigeas the only England that appeared in the hLrrgr 
evidence that Atwood brought to support his contract turns 
out to be arguments from 'reason' and not from history* 
11istorical evidence of the contract, in other words, took 
the form of arguments from the existence of governm*ntsto 
categorical statements of what must have been their origins* 
This$ of course* was not to argue $historically' at all* 
Beginning from historical evidence$ Atwood proceeded to 
enunciate the necessary conditions for the appearance of 
that evidcnceo And whilst we might tentatively accept 
in historical nazz tive an arsu- nt from 'what vast to 
$what gdat have boon't, the rationalist argument from 
'what was' to 1what must have been' is of an entirely 
different order* Yet Atwood found his argument satisfactory 
and so did many of his contemporaries* 'Why was thia no? 
The problem confronting us here has been clearly 
outlined by Betty Behrens In her study of the Wbig theory 
131 
of the constitution in the raisn, of Charles 11. There va a 
a clear contradictions she Claimzq between arguments from 
r4azon and from history: 
"In SPitQ Of assumptions to the contrary". she 
asserts, the argument from thistoryt "won not to 
be reconciled with the argument fro! s 'reasons, 
Orhe 'historical argument'] .. involved not merely 
the idea Of a law Oquall'y applicable to and binding 
upon all mong and of Justice impartially adminixteredg 
but also the idea that# in a more extended Senseq 
the law van supreme because its oxs*ntial provisions 
regarding the constitution were unalterable* 
How remote all this was from the conclusions 
dictated by 'reason' iS easily apparent* if 
jglug zmnuliL is suvrema lox there can be no limit 
to the extent to which the constitution can be 
alteredo"99 
But in Atwood's work we find that the _Val_Um Rglouli, M 
the 
'chief fundamental laws and yet there was a definite limit 
to how far the constitution could be altered, Before 
concludingg howeverg that Atwood was totally confused in 
claiming that his rational constitution was the yroduct of 
historical evidence aloneq it Is necessary to re-examine 
those "assumptions to the contrary"* to which Minis Behrens 
refers* From this re-examination it will appear that 
whilst Atwood way well have been 'mistaken' in the 
conclusions he reachodg he most certainly was not confused* 
For whether reason and history lead to different conclusions 
depends on how their respective logics and Inter-relationships 
are conceived* 
Atwoodle idea of the OXtent, and limits of the individualls 
reasoning faculties creates little difficulty for our 
understandinSo An I hAve ludicatedg his views seem to 
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Coincide : r&; Lrly cousixtently with the neventeentih Aud 
eighteenth century tradition of 'Constructivist Rationalisol 
which rrafessor llayeU bas dencribeds 
100 But the extent 
of his rationalism was to some extent disguised by his 
frequent appeals to the traditional #authorities' in 
religion and history& These authoriticag Atwood believed, 
were as unquestioningly to be followed as they bad been 
in previous cepturlexe But thin did not moan that Atwood 
was any the less rationalist in his approach to these 
lauthoritiesto Ile still claimed tho oxclumivo right to 
determina. the best Interpretation of an lauthorityl or to 
choose who was to be the beat interpreter. Thus what was 
acceptable to Atwoodfa reason was not offered to his public 
as the logical consequence derivable from simpleg explicit 
and fundeniablel premi4s63o ; Ustead it was offored an 
019 tEHe 
-view of 
the Itraditionall customary or. habitualt, 
Atwoodg arter alls was explicitly concerned with history - 
with the experience of the Eng]LjsW., j)ast* 
Ila often Insistedg an he did in his nerlections; umen 
a Troolonable Opinion (1696) for examples that ,, a vjýewo 
were '"for tho most parte 
Ilixdom of the Natione"101 
the Rosult of the Collective 
And he clearly folt a groat 
veneration for the antiquity of English political institutions* 
At one point he lauded tho "Axn xiiab Par ljoMent in comparison 
with vhLch we are but or X eg vr dav and I MOLf notbII="*l02 
Whilst in a later pazaage lie reaffirmed this ideag so 
thoroughly anti-rationalist though it geemsq by asserting 
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that "Mankind *** have greater Benefit and Freedom by 
submitting to equal constitutionsg Iona established, than 
they-could reasonably propose to themselves by innovations 
of any kindnIO3 But a closer examination of Atwood's 
historical arguments reveals that these anti-rationalist 
statements did not really conflict with the rationalism 
of the rest of his arguments* lie was convinced that the 
past actually was an he described$ even though it included 
on original contract and could not accommodate the Norman 
Conquest* His rationally constructed past mas, for hims 
the genuinely historical past, 
This view of history was founded upon two inain premisseso 
The first was that $'the People that is now, in common 
presumption is the sAme which first settled the Succession"104 - 
that people in the past were e=ctly the same as p*ople in 
the proxent, The second was that "where Authorities [in 
historY3 are received$ and the only question in about the 
Souse of theml the true Sense is an capable of demonstrationg 
an any proposition in Euclidenlo. 
5 
From the first promise it was possible for Atwood to 
argue that since he could conceive of no obligation without 
consentg 
lo6 
men at the beginning of history IW&t have 
thought the same. Furthermoreg the actual propositions 
that Atwood would consent to in the late seventeenth century 
must have boon those consented to in the paste Times did 
change, Atwood was not denying that$ but the more reasonable 
the actors ill history the loss change would occur* Now 
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problems sLight iarime in politics requiring changes to 
existing lawag but the principal problems had been 
inviolably solved by the original contractorse it. 
was theme solutiens Oat Post concerned Atwood and his 
method of ascertaining wbAt they had been was such that 
history was bound to reveal the answers he wantede it 
was bound to do this because according to the second promise 
historical actions must be. undorstood by the light of reason* 
Tbuss far exampleg when analyzing the relationship between 
England and Ireland according to the, laws of the historical 
contract constitution Atwood could arguot 
'Tin certaint that whether we consider the PeOPIG 
of the same Nation, or the relation which one 
Nation lias to anothers their state or conditions 
must depend upon Constitutions and Agreomentst 
express or tacit oooes what Constitutions and 
Agreements arebindingg and for what times will 
fall under the considerations of Reasons either of 
itselfg or aided and assisted by Revelatione 107 
This declaration occurs at the beginning of a study 
supposedly concerned with the historical and legal relations 
of England and Ireland* But the ultimately rational basis 
of the forthcoming 'history' in plainly visible* For 
all his assertions that the constitution was the product 
of the *Colloctiv* Wisdom" of the ageag each constitutional 
provision had to stand or fall by the test of reason* it 
was not the antiquity of the provixionog it was rather 
"those Laws of ftgrjoglble- NatMKI, and of EltIonjog which 
[ultimately] obllge Mon to keep to the Sgatr6jels their 
Forefathers entred into 0 
108 The assistance that reason 
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might possibly require f=m 111,8volAtions In thia did not 
sPring : from &nY inherent liMitatiou in reason's powor, o 
Not only uax it true that "the Scriptures meddleg not with 
particular Constitutional'* 
109 but any poxitive low "if it 
have due regard to i.. the Sg2ream lawg the good of the 
Peoples is that which Induces or Occasions the Divine 
Ri 10 110 God was on the side of reason . indeed% Ile 
was rational - and anything in the political world which 
reason supported could injo L&&to claim God's support* 
Divine help explained the endurance of legitimate gove ents 
not the reason for its logitJLMKCY* 
III The majority of 
men were not sufficiently aware of their true Lnterestxg 
as the diversity of history provedg but history also showed 
that they could not be kept in subjection for all tim** 
God was truly the ruler of the universe but He ruled 
according to rational principles* 
112 The principles by 
which He ruled were discoverable through the e3cercise of 
right reason alone* But because most men did not use 
their reasoning faculties to the fulls and because reason 
could only claim to make 'Faiths redundant at the coat of 
charges of blasphemy$ reason still requIzed acknowledged 
assistance and confirmation from rovelationel" In Atwood's 
works this *acknowledged assistance' wax gained by drawing 
God into partnership with man and by attributing to Him 
the mental processes of man* God's w1ll in respect of 
human affairs was knowablo by His actions* But Ilia 
actions were comprehensible because they accorded with what 
44 r. 
. 4%0 
ratLonal man would doe 
Divine intervention was 'proved' by the endurance of 
legItimato "Kingdoms and Common-wealths",, 
114 but there was 
no possibility of arguing from endurance to legitimacy* 
Atwoodle criterion of legitimacy was determined independently 
of his historical studies and was ujsecl an the key to 
understandings particularly* English constitutional 11istoryS 
"Quod initio non valets tractu temporis non convalencit. "115 
The logitimey of a government was detenLined by its 'birth& 
ijL6 
The idoaýof legitimacyg therefore* wax the construction of 
reason and since the history of a legitirtate government 
consisted of reaffirmations of its $birth#, that history 
too was a rational construction* The history of illegitimate 
governments wax also an essentially rational construction 
because the same criterion of relevance had to be applied 
to whatever evidence existed. Available historical evidence 
did impose some limits upon what a particular history could 
containo Dut since the discipline of history was conceived 
as a didactic enterprise In which meaning was "as capable 
of demonatzipitiong as any proposition in Euclid"g thou thoxe 
limits were so wide as to be practically inxignificante 
An far as Atwood maim concerned, then, the universo was 
actually created and ruled by God,, but God was as a rational 
Man* History was the story of God's rules therefore 
history man rationale On thin view of the world and the 
conclusions concerning the nature of history* it was 
perfectly consistent for Atwood to argue that since reason 
1 
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taught that contract vas the only proper foundation of 
legitimate governmentg then this inuat be historically valid* 
All legitimate governments existing in the world were 
actually foxmded by an historically specifiable contract* 
Furthermore, since all contracts embodied the will of the 
contractors it followed that the MIaRn dletr-e of all 
. 
U. Sal-us DO-Dull legitimate CoVermwouts was the "Jun g2RLU 
thoreforet was necessarily the highest law of the contract 
constitution. 
Theme conclusions ond the idea of History that gave 
then coherence, were widely shmred in the late seventeenth 
contury, 
l"' But the practical political "Wesgagelt associated 
with Constitutional Contractarianion wax by no meanji always 
the some an appears in Atwood's works* I have so far 
considered the mature and coherence of the Constitutional 
Contract Theory. AtwoodIn writings have served an one 
of the clearest statements of the doctrine. Xf we now 
turn to wmmine the political career of ]Robert Perguson we 
way begin to appreciate the extent of the theory's appeal 
and the variety of @causes' that it was used to promotes 
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CHAPTER V 
ROBERT FERGUSON - -THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT AND 
ERACTICAL POLITICS 
Tile political, career of Robert Ferguson wax most 
amazing* He was; educated in Scotland an a non-conformist 
divine but moved to England in the 16.50s and began a 
controversial life as a publicist and political activist. 
I 
In 1663 lie wag; imprisoned for thres and a half months for 
"being concerned. in, raising money in support of ejected 
ministeraq and for other treasonable practicog. "2 Thiol 
hawever, waa the only, term of impri"nMent that he served 
in his I; Lfo:, a remarkable achieVemmant for one whose 
Political Activities during the 1680a and 190s gained him 
the Uickname of "the Plotterlto 118 was Involved In 
practically all the cqnmp; Lraci*s ogaiust Charles Us 
J4wQS X1 and Willialm and, Mary that were discovered, and he 
wrote a popular. defeace of each side involved in the 
constitutional upheaval of 168843 He nePms to. have had 
a passion for losing causes* All or the Iplotal in which 
he played a prominent, part (including the famous Rye House 
Plot and 34onmouth's, Rebellion) were failures. He appears 
not to, have. ha; l any significant involvement in the only 
successful Ireb*11ion' of the period - the 1680 Revolution 
and after *be Revolution he stopped supporting the victorious 
side and devoted hip energies to tits Jacob$. ts cause. 
This career of controversy and conspirAcY f&lla Into 
139 
three fairly clear divisionse And Ferguson"s writings 
can boat be ommiued in these terms* From 1668 to 169o 
his works were all principally concerned with the religious 
controversies of the day. Ono of the books lie wrote during 
this period warrants our attention because it contains a 
coherent attack an 11obbeaq a reasonod derence of natural 
law and the first general statement of his contractarian 
position* The your 1600 saw the publication of his first 
purely political tractg and for tho next decade his pamphlets 
were all eoncerned with Justifying attacks on Charles XX 
and James Iz. After IL690 lie continued to write political 
pamphletal but his scorn vus turned against William III 
and the defenders of the Revolution. 
The complete volte-rAut in Fersusonts PoliUcal 
Perouasion after the Revolution earned him the contempt 
of many of his contemmp()raries. In 17049 for oxample, an 
opponent reflected on Ferguson's activities and concluded$ 
Now since Mro Ferstuggn's idtale Life has been one 
continued Nkno of Intricate dInxs. Zminxxt 
ShiLSinza. 
- 
Doublings. Scull6ings. n1gyinit Uo-peeps 
and RLasembIl Ere alimit and Bet YIng (like 
a perfidious Jesuit* Mankind he hnd treated 
withq *** he has made it a H*rculean Task to find 
out what he truly is-4 
Although the writer was particularly concerned with 
Ferguson's change from an opponent to & supporter of 
James 119 his bewilderment might also be taken to refer 
to Ferguson's ideas about the nature of goveron-ent in general 
and of the English Constitution in particulare Ferguson's 
politiLcal writiuSs all had an Umediately 'practical' 
I'lo 
character* Their main concern was to gain support for 
the variety of causes Ferguson champiouedq and to this end 
all else$ including coherence and consistency in ideast 
seemas to have been subordinated* This makes any 
interpretation of the meaning of the concepts he employed 
somewhat difficult. There in a danZer of imputinS not 
only 1precisions uharo none in fact existed$ but oleo of 
'consistency$ where the tactics of dispute might have 
necessitated contradictions. 
But in a very general wayt as we shall see, Ferguson's 
political arguments do entail a constitutional theory 
romarkably similar to William Atwoodts* The central 
propositiona of this theory were: that the English. 
Constitution both embodied and was the product of an 
original contracts and that in disputes over the requirements 
of constitutional law reference must be made to the 'intentions 
of the original contracteest an well as to statute and common 
laws The distinctions between 'reason's Inatuml lawl 
and $civil law$ were accordingly blurred and almost anything 
that Ferguson believed Ireasonablel could be presented an 
$legal** Ferguson's attack on Hobbes in 1673 contains 
his early reflections on these essential concepts of 
Ireason's4civil lawq' and natural law., 
n 
In 1673 Ferguxon published A Sober Unc-3WLEX int2.. Ih-O 
)"t-urom x2assums- and Pringivio oL Moral Virt-mLl Itg 
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diptinctlog from Go! Mg-Hoiinenx. His main purpose wan 
to show that Grace was an essential part of the Christian 
Religion and thust "that* the 1Aw of lUture is no sufficient 
Measure of Religion: and consequ*ntly that all Religion 
consists not in the mor practice of Tortue 000 And that 
the Christian Institution is not a =*or digest of the 
Zternal Rules of Nature & right Reason",, 
5 In order to do 
thlxt Ferguson felt it necessary to emphasis* the limits 
of the power of human reason and to attack Hobbes' woral 
theory* 
F*rguson began his examination of Hobbexl woral 
relativism with a view or man and his place in the universe 
that was widely accepted in the sevent, eenth. contury: 
It Is a contradiction for waýn to be such a creature 
as he ing and not to be obliged to love, tear and 
obey God* All creaturas according to their 
re"ative and several natureog are necoxxorily 
subject to him that made them. It is impossible 
that whatever owes its entire being to God$ should 
not also be in a suitable subjoction to him* Mmn 
then being a Itational creature$ nuxt pwe God a 
rational subiretion. 6 
Xantx reasoning faculty# howeverg could never be & sufficient 
guide to the whole duty owed both to God and to God*s 
creatures, Ferguson's dedication of the 
-Sober 
EaggiUM to 
Sir Charles Wolseley praised him for degrading "; Zeason from 
that Supreme Judic-aturelthat some would erect it Into", and 
for having "rightly vested it in whatever belongs to it 
as an Instrument of diacerning and conduct* "7 And, later 
he argued: "what a miserable, condition the World had been 
in, even in reference to the most Obvious duties Of "Oralityl 
i lin 
had mankind been left to the sole conduct of Watural 
Light". 
8 Yet despito the limited power of human reason, 
laan was still essentially a rational creature and thorofore 
his obliZations must be intellinible to him - "rational 
subjection" could mean nothing less than this. Mango 
natural obliZations constituted the moral law and the moral 
law was the law of nature* The limitations of human reason 
arose because of original sing and the confusion that 
resulted concerning moral duties was only to be cl*areds 
and could only be cleýkred as far an, Ferguson van copcOrnOds 
by direct divine interVOntiOU3 
our RealM *** was a sufficient,.: Ep 
conveyance [of the law of nature while we abode 
in the state of Integrity. [Butý It is truet since 
the fall it in otherwises many Dictates of the Law 
of Nature', being grown inav 
, 
identg obscures subject 
to controversies not easyg If at &jig to be definedg 
without the advantage and assistance of Scripture- 
light e*', So that now the only sure universals 
perfect SXst2W of natural Laws is the Decalogue, of 
Mpses. - This-in a true draught of what by the Law 
of Creation wo were under the Sanction ofg A 
transcript and written impression of the whole 
Original law* 9 
Natural lawO thong was the moral law ordained by God 
when He created the world* It could be known in two ways: 
"either an 'tin Subjectime in imant or as Itim Objective in 
the Decaloguell* 10 But since mnla reason was defective$ 
the first way had to be supplemented by the second. Thung 
"Grace in our Medicine by which our Avernatlon and Weakness 
in reference to the original Law in removed and healed", 
" 
This practical necessity for Grace in no way detracted from 
the "rational subjection" that inen were under to obey the 
1113 
moral law-b For goo4 men could-still know the requirements 
or naturni law through the exercise of right reason alones12 
and anyvey the Christian religion was eminently 'reasonable' 
an an explanation-of the origin-and nature of the univarsc, 
13 
Because they were the law of Creationg "every ftocept 
of the Low of Nature is'of unchangeable and unalterable 
ablizotion". 
14 Thus Hobbosian ideas of moral relativim 
InOt OnIY contradicted the nature of natural law, but also 
proved their assortors to be atheists: 
not only Ey . 37hog 
ElDicurual Etc. of oldl but Hobks 
and some other wildq Atheistically disposed persons 
of lates have managed an opposition to all natural 
"was contending that all things ore in themselves 
indifforentj that Moral Good and EvijLq result only 
from wens voluntary restraining and limiting of 
themselves; and eso that antecedontly to tho 
constitutions# appointments and custom's of 
Societlesq there is neither Vertue nor Vice$ 
Turpitude nor Honextyp justice nor injustices 
that there are no laws of Right and Wrong previous 
to the laws of the Commonwealth$ but that all Inen 
are at liberty to do as they please, 15 
Hobbes had denied the existence of anything that 
Ferguson would bave recognized an natural law. This denial 
was danaerous not only because Hobbes might mislead many 
readers concerning their moral dutieng but also because 
there already existed confusion over the actual requirements 
of natural law* As we have Just seent Ferguson considered 
the latter problem easily resolved - the Ton Comnandments 
constituted an objective record of the whole original law* 
But whilst the situation continued %there "Learned men do 
wonderfully differg and some of them strangely prevaricateg 
in stating the Measure of the natural Law and in defininZ 
1114 
what Laws are natuml"s 
3L6 then 
might seem very permunsiveo 
The grounds for believing 
thong had to be reasserted and 
task with all the assurance of 
The Principles then up 
we build our assertion 
roduced to foura The 
Hobbeist radical notions 
in Christian Natural Low, 
Ferguson entered :. Lnto thin 
a devout Christian Divine: 
on whichi *at so many Pillars, 
of a natural TAVI way be 
first Is thins There or* 
on uocso JLY 
But since the refutation of Hobbes began tram theological 
assumptions which Hobbes did not accept$ it could no more 
constitute a proof of Hobbes' exx rx than Dr* Johnson's 
stone did of Derkeleylse Forgusonla remaining "Principles" 
were all based upon a theo3ogical, viou of the nature of 
man and his dependence on God, and thus they too are wide 
of the mark* For the theological understanding of man 
in not argued# it is merely asserted* Perguson listed 
the rest of his prine-tples &a followat 
0 
Forguison based his belief in the existence of an 
eternally binding natural law that governod tho moral. 
14!; 
world an theno four principles* But he did consider 
evidence of a different kind and from our point of view 
it is this evidence that warx Utz most attention because 
It concerns the relationship between natural lawq original 
contract and civil lawo After noting thAt th4re, had Uever 
been "at any time a Nation or People that did not 
aelmowledg a distinction of Good and Ivil"t3*9 Forsuson 
COUti32U*d 8 
if there be no 14w of Nature constituting what is 
Good and what is Evilq antecedently to Pacts and 
Agreommntz Awngst Mong I"e mill huxiane 14yA 
xismif; L2 In-Effect jZjl--nothinx. For-if there be 
no antecedent obligation binding to obey the just 
Laws and constitutions of the Con=onwealthq then 
way they at any time be broken without Sin: and 
Rebellion will be as lawful as obedience# nor notdo 
anyone to continue longer Loyal, than he hopes to 
mend his condition by turning Rebel* 20 
Thum the danger of understanding CivijL Society in a 
Hobbosian way was, according to Ferguson$ that it denied 
any moral obligation to obey civil law. By making 
obligation conditional upon self-interestg Uabbos had 
rendered precarious the ties of Civil Society, It was 
thus to st"ngthon civil law that Ferguson saw the necessity 
of positing a natural lawo But it must be emphasised 
that it was neither SLU civil law nor S1.1 commonwealths 
that Ferguson understood an commanding obedience based 
on natural law, It was onlY "the Just Laws and 
constitution* of the commonwealth". 
21 Indeed$ if the 
moral law were to be plausibly the ground for obedience 
to clvi3. low (a humn artofact) some distinction between 
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good and evil civil laws had to be admitted, A civil law 
requiring men to break the natural law could hardly be 
said to coic nd obedience based on that naturel law* 
Furthez reo as Ferguson later argued,, '"the laws and customs 
of nations have 1jeen so different and opposite# that vhat 
bath been accounted vice by one nationg hath been hold for 
vertue in another", 
22 These different and opposing laws 
could not all be held to cormand the same sort of obligation* 
Only those that assistedg or at least did not hinder# the 
implementation of the Ton Counandments could be hold to be 
"Just" according to Fersuson0s understanding of the 
"unalterable and unchangeable" law of nature which was 
"the alone Rule and measure of Moral Vertuelt. 23 Thus 
although FerSuEon argued that the obligation to obey 2. U 
civil law was basod on natural law, lie nonetheless explicitly 
regarded only-just civil laws as obligatorys 
"All Humane Lawag suppose the law of naturej and "T*W seeing velation extends not to every places where 
Humana Laws are in forces that Civil Laws do at 
all obliges must be resolved into Natural lAwo 
Obligation of Conscience with respect to the Laws 
of Meng is a conclusion doduced from two premiseal 
whereof the Tirpt is$ the law of Nature enjoyning 
Subjection-and Obedience to Magistrates in whatever 
they justly command; 7IW2- SeC4 nd in* the LaU of 
Man under the Character of the justj from both 
of which results the obligation of Conscienco to 
such a Law*" 24 
The purypse of Fergusonts argument had been to rescue 
civil law from the potential anarchy that he saw implicit 
in Hobbes' th*orye But he left civil law In as 'dangerous$ 
a state as before* He Introduced the condition that civil 
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law must be 1justl if it is to command obodiencoo but he 
found no adequate and unequivocal determinant of what 
constituted justice in the particularity of human a: rfairz, 
We must assume that Ferguson would have argued that the 
Ten Commindmentag the natural law as; "ttis ObjgcUve", 
could fulfil this role* But the general nature of the 
Commud onto and thair restricted scope wo; ild XoAvo a 
legislator or judge at a loss v4ien specific decisions were 
r4quLred in specific cases* At all events$ Ferguson 
never addressed himself to this question and we can only 
conclude that he believed he had successfully rebutted 
Hobbes and established the moral obligation to obey civil 
law* There is at least no evidence to the contrary* The 
merit of his argument lay in its practical usefulness not 
for the upholders of civil law and magistrates$ but for 
their opponents, By making obedience conditional upon 
'justice',, and by seating justice in 'conscioAcal guided 
by the Decaloguag 25 a moral duty was I=pXied not only to 
refuse to obey unjust lawas but to atte=pt to return to 
the ways of justices Yet the decision as to wbat constituted 
an injustice was offect*voly left to the individuals in 
the troubled political conditions of England during the 
16608 the potentiality of this theory of law for justifying 
the Ilegalityl of resiptance to w^&iztr%tea was increasingly 
realisede. Indeed# Ferguson himself, in his own contractarion 
writingos was in the forerront of those who pushed this 
potentiality towards fulfilment. 
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III 
In 1680 Farcuson wrote the first of a Ions series of 
political pamphlets designed$ in tho most Seneral termag to 
ZScUrO political safeguards for the Protestant religion* 
26 
more specifically. his pamphlets of the 1680s wore inteade4 
to support the causes of the Exclusionists and tile Duke of 
Ho3%mouth* although after tho succession of James 11 and 
the failure of Monmouth's Rebellion he turned simply to 
oppose the king and ovcntually (for a short period) lie 
supported William of Oransee 
Like practically vill the anti-royalist writors of the 
time$ Ferguson took considorablo, trouble to avoid possible 
charges o: C tile lillcgalitYl or tile activities he was defendinge 
Ile insisted that he was "of moist sincere loyalty to the 
Kins and the Government" 027 Dut this was hardly sufficient 
to prevent an opponent declaring that he and "his Ear-tys oeo 
would willingly be at the old Saine of For6tX and Igrt-Y -Ono 
again". 
28 Indoedl AttACUS on thO Shaftesbury Whiase of 
whom Ferrunon wan tho principal pauq4%letsert 
29 for boins 
regicides and commonwealthmen were quite frequent* Anothor 
of ForCusonla opponentag for e=mple, accusod him of plotting 
"to havo all thinZs in Common, to have the Power in the 
People" 9 
30 
and of holding out "that Coumn-wealth ZLiZ. 0 
as the "Reward"31 for anti-monarchical activities, 
To be accused of being a 'conmonwealthma]2' wSs a 
serious cotter in the 1680s. Hardly anyone wished to 
3LI19 
experience again tho uphoaVals of civil war or to be 
responsible for causing them* Thus to combat those 
accusations Ferguson adopted the arguments of Sir William 
Joneal Attorney General at the time of the Exclusion 
Parliamentse Jones's pamphlot was originally published 
In 1681# and Ferguson republished it with minor alterations 
(but without acknowledgement) in 1689.32 In a clever and 
rather dovious arguments JOnGS attempted to mako the 
accusation of 'coomonwealthmn' rebound upon the accusers: 
*#It Is strange" he notedq Ithow this Word Cco njj"jLtU] should so change its signification 
with us in the space of twenty years. All 
MonarclAes in the world# that are not purely 
barbarous and Tyrannicalg h4ve ever been called 
-Commo eallhs* 
RONO it Belf altered not that 
Names when It fell under the Sword of the Cd-Qx&r-W eee And in our dayss it dotb not only belong to ýcGv 
a Ma. switzWmadj and the itAA V"^W4"na of 
te NqtherAand France, &, But to alMlinyl Sleins 
Swedong RpJ& 
. -nd# 
and all the Kingdoms of 
May It not therefore be apprehended that our 
present Ministerog who have so much decried this 
)(()r6d so well known to our Laws, so ofton used by 
our boot Writers$ and by all our King* until this 
days are Enemies to the thing? And that they who 
=mks it a brand of Infamy to be of ColMOMIth 
ZriggIpIL99 that Lot devoted to th - 0 good of the 
P*opleo do intend no other but the hurt *oe of that People? " 33 
By thus redefining 'commonwealth# &is a state governed 
for the good of its citizens$ Jones and Ferguson were able 
to Acculle their attackers of a "fondness of ooo Arbitrary 
Powers and [a3 Poo design to met it ups by subverting our 
Ancient Legal Monarchy$ instituted for the benefit of the 
Comonwe&ltho, 034 But this won obviously achieved at tho 
cost of redefininS the term in a way that their opponents 
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would not have acceptedo To Jones and Forgusong noxortors 
of fconsonwealth principles' had become "men passionately 
devoted to the Publick goods and to the co=on Service of 
their Country* who believe that Kings were instituted for 
the good of the Peoples and the Govera ent ordained for 
the sake of those that are to be governed, and 
[%Iho] 
therefore complain or grieve sdien it Is used to contrary 
ends". 
35 AlthouZb tbo royalists migbt well bave disagreed 
with these lprinciples'. they certainly would not have 
recognised then an the essence of 'the co=onvealth causete 
To them the distingulohinS charmeter of the Icommonwealthmns 
plain or grieve was not that his ideas mient lead bim to corr 
about abuses in government but rather it vas exactly that 
design which Jones and Ferguson attempted to dissociate 
themselves from, L&e* the "design of setting up a 
Vemoc=tical Government# in Opposition to our legal 
Monarchy, * "36 And the only answer Jones could Sivo to 
this alleged motive of the Exclusionists was that it was 
"a Calimmy ... in order to the 1U)-inr. upon others the blame 
of a design to overthrow the Govornment, j1hich only belongs 
unto themselves. "37 
Xn all his anti-royalist writings of the 1680sl Ferguson 
clairsed that there was "no maru. of an intention to change 
any yart, of the Ancient Governmentg but to provide against 
the Violation of itn, 
38 Accusations of unconstitutionality 
wore levelled against the opposition* Thust for o: mmple, 
a parliamentary right tO alter the auccesuion -a le&&l 
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issue at the centre of tho controversies of the 1600a . 
became a right never "questioned or gainsaid till a fev 
Mercinary Poople about ton years ago 
[i. 
e. during the 
Exclusion CrIsis]g endeavoured to obtrude upon us A pretended 
Divine* and unalterable kight tO the Succmszi0n"6 
39 These 
peoplet in Fergusons eyes# were the onell "guilty of 
designing [constitutjonaý] Lunovations. 1140 
Even the JL688 Revolution itself* as we have Scent WOO 
defended by many writers along these linese The Ancient 
Conutitution had at last been saved, they claimedg and 
their opposition to CbArlem 11 and James II over the previous 
decade h6d thus truly been grounded on positive law* 
rerguson was amongst this number and his claim to be able 
to Justify resistance to James II "from Principles Which 
our Constitution and Laws do Administer"g4l followed a 
familiar patt*ruo Ilia argument focused an jamoo ZZs 
"breach of all stipulations and Promises *., his violating 
the Original Contracto"42 An explored and developod by 
Ferguson$ this view clearly involved a constitutional 
theory similar in many respects to William Atwoodise But 
before examining In soon detail Forgusonts Constitutional 
Contract Theory It should be noted that on* crucial Idea - 
that there was more to constitutional law than the records 
and law books revealed - was not solely subscribed to by 
the anti-royalists, A critic of F*rguzon'st for example, 
attacked him in 1681 for contradicting constitutional law, 
But the criticism revealed a similar view of the relationship 
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between civil and natural law an that we have examined in 
Ferr. usonts writinZs of the mid-1670s: 
"the Malice or Arrogance of my Antagonists and 
oundry Others*" the critic Insisted$ "has carried 
them so far, as to trample upon all the Positive 
and Fundamental Laws of the Land$ by Publishing 
dayly in Print$ e9o to the manifest Hazard of the 
State* That HonArchy In not so much i 
Naturg. S. or unalterable by Human Power, iý, ý-ut 
apparent Violencel but All FgWs of Qovernment 
are Changeable at the Will and Pleasure of the 
People", 43 
Yergusonla theory of government and ]Law which formed 
the beisis of his case for the 'legality# (as opposed to 
the sheer 'necessity') of resisting the kingg was implicit 
In his earliest political writings* In ! he SOc2Ad. W: L 
. -P"tg. st_ gf -!! 
q alit Plojý (1682)0 for example, he argued thats 
As the IAw is both the Measure and Bond of the 
Subjects Duty and Allegianceg zo it in not only 
the 
' 
be st security Which they have to trust unto 
for their peace and safety# and the established 
fence and hod& for the protection of their lives 
and propertiesl but it was intended, and always 
ought to be the Rule and Standard by which the 
Prince is to defend and govern his people* 44 
The lawg then$ was above both king and people, Yet the 
law was "detigned for and *** rolied upon for 
[the 
people$', 
] 
preservation* , 
45 
The people were thus "obligod by 
their Interest,, an well an by the ties of Conscience# to 
honour and maintain all duo Aglegiance to their Suprome 
Governours. , 46 Rulers were "not only bound by'the 
StiRulatlon, which they have made with their peopleg but 
by the respect which they bear to the preservation of the 
Constitution and the safety of their Crowns"*47 Thus It 
was effectively Only the rulers Who were under an onerous 
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obligation* for rulers bad the duty to avoid ruling In 
such a way that their subjects might fear for their own 
ssfety* If rulors did not avoid this then they simply 
forfeited tho *due AllgXjan&' of the citizon body since 
"whensoever Uws @eane to be a security unto meng they will 
be sorely teopted to appreh, siln LsIq3 themselves cast into 
a state of War# and Justified In having recourse to the 
best mans they can for their shelter and defence*"48 
By 1688/9# howeverl a tial and oxpl: Lcit just: Lfication 
Of the l3L*Sml; itY' Of rGsistAnC0 wDs required if the events 
Of the Revolution wore to be defendod &g I&wfu],,, Thin 
need spurred Ferguson to produce his oftglo most extensive 
OnOlYXIx of the nature of government ond the English 
. un_tJLfA2jjjgjj. " 1bg priMS gj 
Constitutions A R"It j 
gEMAU 'A Reacent- Iola England &ad of MAI_ NInfidoms latm 
ReCOMAL ILAMO SiMC6 BOV*rrAWnto he obse; rveds 
derives its Ordination and zustitution from God, 
no It Im circumscribodg and limited by Ilia* to 
be exercised according to the Laws of Naturee .. 
: In subsorvioncyt to the Slory of the Creatorg and 
the benefit of )Unk: Lndo 49 
Zaqmnx: Lx was still placed on the rulor's dutlext but now 
those duties were formalised Into a contract between God 
and the king* "All Rulers are thus far under Pact and 
Confinement"$ he asserted# "that they are obliged by the 
Almighty and Suprean Sovereign, to exert their Governing 
Power# for the Safetys'Wolfaro, and Proxperity of those 
over wtiovi they are Extablished. "50 rergumonlo argment 
here seems to be an abridgement or the theory of nature. 1 
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law that be examined In detail in bis A Sober 1CwcLu-JLj: X IgLtg 
. xj 
Thus 
-the 
NatuEg. Mensgrg. and-. PXlncij2l-Le of MgXjL YP ue-b 
since natural law provided a sufficient moral and practical 
limit an the authority of ruleral Ferguson could argue: 
There, need no previous Compactge and AgroeMents, 
between Princes and Peoples as to these Liseo that 
government should be conduct d for the good of the 
forasmuch an they poopl* and the honour of God 
are setled and determined by the Law and Appointment 
of the Divine Legislatorg and of the Universal 
Sovereign. Whosoever refuseth to Gavern in 
Subord*nAtioia unto and for 4ods and in order to 
the protection and benefit of the Community, coaseth 
to answer the Ends unto which Mhgistracy was 
Institutedo 51 
And ceasinZ to answer these ends meant losing the right to 
the su. 13jects' obedience* 
Out it seems that the contract between God and ruler# 
was of a far too general nature to provide a community with 
a workable constitution* God simply laid down the general 
character of gover=ent when he ordained it and no. -one 
subsequently had a right "to enlarge and extend the power 
of those whom they constitute Rulers % -beyond the Limits 
and Boundaries9 unto which God hath staked and confined 
Magistrateag in the Charters of Nature and ReveUtiono "52 
The constitutional detail necessary it the government 
ordained by God were to be practical$ had to be established 
through a 'Con4titutional Contract's 
Now God having In the Institution of Nagistracyl 
confined such as shall be chosen Itularse within 
no other limits in reference to our civil concernst 
save that they are to Govern for the good of thoxeg 
over whom they come to bo Rmtablishadq it remains 
free and entire to the people at their first Xrection 
155 
ofo and Submission to Government* to proscribe and 
define what shall be the measures and boundaries 
of the publick Goods and unto wbat Rules and 
Standards the Magistrate shall be restrainedg in 
order to his defending and promoting the benefit 
of the Societyq of which he is created the CivýU 
and Political floade And evory one being equally 
MAster of his own Property and Liberty* antecedently 
to their Agreement with one another# and to the 
compact of the Universalityl or at least of the 
Majorityl with Him or Those whom they call to Rule 
over theml it evidently follows, that those who 
come to be cloathed With Magistracy# can lay claim 
to no more Authority than what the Ck)mmunity 
conferred upon them$ upon the prospect of the 
advantages arising unto them from their living in 
Societies and under Magistrates, 53 
The familLiar contractarian Ideas and aissumptiona about 
the origin and purpose Of government are all contained in 
this passage. Goverment originated from tile conscious 
design of the prospective citizens uboo reallsing tho 
potential advantages of civil societyg decided to set one 
UP* The act of combination consixted of outlining and 
agreeing to a body of constitutional laws and naming the 
principal office. -holders, The main concern of the 
contractors was to protect their 'antecedent' property and 
libortyl the form of government erected was inevitably 
some kind of 'limited government'. The only extraordinary 
aspect Of FOrguson's theory thus far wax the eaphasis, placed 
on the role of God in these proceedings, 
This theory,, howeverg wax far from comprehensive#, 
)kny enquiries were left unamamined (for e=mples Questions 
cOnc*rtdng the xt&t* of nature$ natural rights, and the 
'artificiality' of civil society based on contra ct!; 
4 ), 
but Ferguson's concern was essentially the practical one 
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of justifying the activities of WJIJLJ&m of Orsngob Ilia 
attention was thus focused on the English Constitution even 
though he was compelledg because of the peculiar case that 
he wished to defend as OconstItutional#9 to enquire into 
more general questions about the nature of government, 
-Ion 01 the Erjac2 of Thus he began his A Bj: W jMztjLjc2. t 
Orag&elg Dexceilt lAto Rnalend by remarkLn. %, - that the 
"Consideration of Government in generaig ix none of my 
Province at this time; farther than to observe 
but then proceeded to devote a quarter of the lengthy 
pamphlet to sununarizing his contractarian view of 
"Govers ant in general"* The reason for so long an 
introduction to the main concern of the pamphlet vaug as 
wo shall seat that his principal 1constitutionall arguments 
depended upon it for their coherence and persuasiveness* 
In the course of Ferguson's outline of government in 
generalg it becomes clear that "Force and Conquest give no 
just nor legal Title over a People, eoo until they by sow* 
consent either tacit or 2M11cit, 9 declare their submission 
and acquiuscence e. -o upon 
the best Terms which they can 
obtain" . 
56 In this notion of legitimacy Ferguson once 
again coupled the 'Juatt with the flegalf, but now it was 
made clear that it was via "consent". an idea crucial to 
that of contracting, that the tvio were relatedo Because 
the consent of the contracting parties ensured a 'Just' 
settlementg Ferguson could argue thate 
r,, 7 
ýq 
no Qovernment is lawfulo but what In founded upon 
Compact and agreement between those chosen to. governg 
and them who condescend to be governedl Land] 
the Articles upon which they stipulate týe one with 
the other# become the Fundamentals of the respective 
Constitutions of Nationag and together with auperadded 
positive Laws$ are both the limits of the Rulers 
Authorityq and the Measures of the Subjects 
Obedience@ 57 
Like wanY Of his contemporarieng Ferguson believed 
that the English Constitution was unique. But that 
uniqueness he understood in a way that only controctarians 
could have accepted* yet It was essential for the coherence 
of his arguments aZainst Charles II and Jones M 
"Eng, land has been the most provident and careful of 
all Nations"s he asserted, "in reserving unto Its 
self, upon the first Institution of, and its 
submission unto Regal Government, all such Rightst 
Priviledges and Liberties,, an were necessary to 
render it either Renowned and Honourable abroadq 
or Safeq Happy and Prosperous at homel so it hath 
with a Courage *** peculiar to it, maintained its 
Priviledges and Liberties through a large and 
numerous Series of Ages", 58 
It was by reference to this rationally constructed 
constitution of the original contractg preserved and augmented 
throughout historys that Ferguson Wtaminod the tlegal-ttyl 
of the anti. -royalist movements of the 1680se He did this 
secure In the knowledge that If a conflict arose between 
llawl and freasont then the latter must override the former. 
After all, to subordinate positive laws to the dictates of 
reason was simplyq on this view, to remove inconsistencies 
from the constitution by referring to the most basic 
constitutional laws's The problem, thong of the #legality' 
of resistance could be4asily resolvede The assertion that 
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English kings "can plead nothing for what they enjoy,, or 
claiml but fundamental and positive Lawfil and *** the 
Subjects Xnterest to his Liberty and Property are conveyed 
unto him by the eame Terms and Channels"*59 did not really 
signify a restriction to the scope of constitutional debate* 
whilst much effort was still expended in finding authority 
in Law Books and precedent for various political activitisse 
disputes were not settled according to the strongest legal 
case* whenever Ferguson ran into legal or historical 
difficultiest" he took recourse to treason',, whicht 
according to the Constitutional Contract Theoryg was simply 
a higher or more basic judge# and not in the least 1098 
I legal. 0,6 
Ferguson understood the English Constitution in terms 
of a balance between king and parliamantg although ultimatelyq 
as we shall sees the balance was tipped in the latter's 
favour, b His #justification* for this view was essentially 
that same stranZe mixture of arguments from tho 'Ancient 
Constitution$ and from Ire&zon' as we have examined in 
detail in AtwoodIs writings* Thus the Norman Conquest was 
not a conquest at allt William I conquerod no-One save 
Harold and his few associates. 
61 
The absence of ra"rds 
indicatinZ tho founding of an Institution deemed 'good$ 
by the writer# proved that institution to have boon "co-aval 
with the first Constitution of our Govers ant"(2 and thus 
inviolable* Englishmen's rights were derived from the 
original contract and the immemorial constitution, not ftvn 
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the grant or concession of the king. 
63 And finally, XmXna 
Carta was not forced from King John but was simply a 
re&ffirmat: Lon of the vancient Rights of the Peoples"64 
Thus Ferguson's #balanced constitution's like AtwoodIxq 
was always depicted an issuing from the window of our 
ancestors* "Thus wisely did our Ancestors provide that 
the K. and Hits People should have frequent need of out 
another"g he argued, "and by having frequent opportunities 
of mutually relieving one anothers wants, be sure ever to 
preserwv a dutiful affection In the Subjects and a fatherly 
tenderness in the Prince#"(1*5 The executive power is "both 
by our Common and Statute Lawas conveyed unto and vested in 
the Kings 'but at the name time there is sufficient provision 
made both in the Terms of our Constitutions and in our 
Parliamentary Actst to prevent this from being hurtful to 
Use" The executive powers, that Ix, In "delegated eew as 
a Trust" . 
66 
The constitutional limitation on the executive 
was the "Right of overseeing the Rxecution of the Laws 1,0 
67 
a right established by the wisdom of "our Predecessors and 
Ancestors vho have *at left nothing to the Kingla private 
discrationg much less to his ArbitruryVills but have 
assigned him the Lewo-as the Rules and Measures he Is to 
govern by"*68 
The House of Commonss "among other capacities in which 
they sit and Acts are by the EgnstitutL2H to be the great 
Inquest of the Kingdoms to search Into all the Oppressions 
and Injustices of the King's Ministers#* 
69 And in order 
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to ensure the ettective. performance of this functions even 
against the wishes of the king# Ferguson declared that the 
"Wisdom of our Ancestors has providodg by divers Statutems 
both for the holding Parliaments annuallyg and oftner if 
need bel and that they should not be Prorogued or Diaxolvvd 
till all tho, Petitioun and Bills before them wore answered 
and reoressedo"70 The House of Lordal, "among their several 
other Rights and Priviledges"s Ferguson argued% "stand 
cloathed with the Power and Authority of the High Court of 
Judicature of the Nation 6,,, of this all Agog afford us 
Presidents"071 But the most interi 
of the Lords# indeed$ "the very end 
was to mAintain the balance between 
be a skreen between the Monarch and 
his Invading the Priviledges of the 
eating zeneml function 
of a House of Pears" , 
kin& and Commonog "to 
the Co no, to prevent 
Peoples and them 
72 usurping upon tho Prerogatives of the Crown". 
These frequent references to the Sisdom of our ancestors' 
played a, vital role in. Ferguson's constitutional theory, 
His higl4y questionable views about the nature of the 
Xr-Slish Constitution gained plausibility from them,, The 
constant reference of each pretended law to the intentions 
of 'our ancestors' meant, in the last resortg that attention 
was directed away from the judgoments of legally qualified 
contwiporaries to the supposed Idesigns' of the original 
contractorso 
The question of the succession to thO thrOnO w&G one, 
of tho centrOl constitutional issues of thO 1680xi And 
JL61 
Fergusonex attempts to Justify an ultimate parliamentary 
right to determine this question led him to modify the 
bar ny of his balanced constitution* His lprowrl of the 
constitutionAlity of this supposed "Parliamentary right" 
followed a faistiliar pattern* He claimed that the right 
existed 'Iftom the first Original of the Government"I 
73 
and bad continued to exist despite "the comin: in of the 
EUMA ftcg, 6"74 And even In his first political pamphlet 
Ferguson asserted along these lines that SC 02 Stmat 
concornme I- tw 19 Ithe lMgdLa-'tg aRrar-ont Heir ill the Regal 
l. 
.- 
]&I cpasi-doz JbIl the Parliament of Rnslandp A .. M 
do 
hatll -oftgn iD qXldea. a 
SUCC r OMor -to : th e G2nrwent. lal 
the InLealil 
. 
gg &be -PubIL12 . 
j, 
-- qM 
15 LAt, Z. 0 r jjjg ; Lt e75 
Altbaugb Idstorical mmmples could allow that tho Crown 
had at times descended in irregular and unusual waya and 
that the principle of heredity had not alimyx governed the 
successiong It in difficult to see how those Iiiatoricol 
oxamplais constitUted 'legal procedantals Persubon clairsed 
that thoy did76 and to give credence to that claim "th* 
Parliamentary right" was OXtended beyond the sphere of 
succession* Thus instead of attempting to WaL-e out & 
strong local case for the ultimsto parliamentary right to 
determina a Succossorl PerSuson proceeded to elicit ^ 
parliamentary right to determine any constitutional questions 
Parliament was both the interpreter of the "Interest of 
the Publick" and the ultimate interpreter of the 
constitution* To have a parliament now appeared an "the 
16n 
most Fundamental and essential" of all "the Rights and 
Priviledgan appertaining unto us"t 
For thereby we are inabled to make such micconsive 
and continual provisionss as the preservation of 
the Society$ and the Temporal or Eternal Welfare 
of the Subjects *hall be found to render needful 
or expedient* 77 
Parliament alone was the proper interpreter of the constitutions 
or rather It van "the IMMemorial course of Administration# 
with the sense of the whole Society. signified by their 
Rej2r9pMjgUYgs in ParlIgn-ment upon emerging occasions"* 
At all eventog in disputes over the requirements of 
constitutional law 01the Opinlog! of particular man of 
what Rank or Order poever they bett wore, not to be admittod*78 
Parliament, an distinct from the king, thus became the 
dominant partner in Ferguson's constitutional theory. it 
was both tile interpreter and the guardian of tlutt Ancient 
Constitution vhich had been set up by contract in order to 
fill in the details of the 'lawful' Government ordained by 
God. On this view of the English Constitution Ferguson 
could allow that the 1688 Revolution had been perfectly 
legalo 
James III Ferguson arguedg had committed a number of 
"unUufull' acts and those %fore the things "whereby a lately 
departed King hath unqualified himself"979 They Wero 
listed by Ferguson ass dispensing with the Oath Of 
Supremacy and therefore opening the door to papal dominationg 
overthrowing "the whole LeSislative part of the Government" 
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and subverting "the very I'mdaimental Constitutions or 
the Realm"s and reducing the Courts to "Ministers or his 
Will# Pleasuret and unruly Lusts". 
80 
These were the 
activities that cmused$ 
the legal and regular Monarchy of the Nations to 
be &walled into an Arbitrary and V*xpotiei 
Power# So that all the Franchises and Rishtst 
which by Original Contracts and Subsequent Laws 
had been reserved unto the Peoples wore entirely 
overthrown# or enjoyed precariously* 81 
To suffer such absolute power was "a plain destroying of 
all natural an well as Civil UbartyleO2 And this destruction 
or the constitution ambantl according to Fargusonts theoryg 
putting "us from the tiong which by vortum, *: r JýW&imontal 
S112HIM1100st and, Sta-tyle Jews- we formerly lay undorl's 
63 
Yet even in this "state ot nature" an he called its 
Fortuxon. Insisted that It was flawfults &lboit "both Lawful 
and Nocessaryf) to recover that by Forc*0 VhIch had boon 
wx sted from us by Usurpation". 
84 The only possible law 
that could give this a legal character was 'nAtvx*JLI not 
Lconstitutionall lawe But Ferguson himself did not 
understand the #legality' of the Revolution in only moral 
terms, He had declared his ability to justify the Revolution 
"from Principlex which our Constitution and lAws do Administer"o 
8.5 
The Sen"*1 constitutional th*oz7 that he subscribed too 
enablod his to reconcile this claim with his belief that 
Jones's actions had resolvod England Into & 'state of 
naturels, For James$ actions had only roaddred the English 
Constitution Inoperativeg they had not dixxolved the body 
politics The English so"-n=qnj had been Idissolvedl 
jL64 
but the former citizens rema; Lned RnSlAshmem, This fact 
soverely limited the renge of possibilities open to them 
in IthO StSkt* Of nAtIWOI* Thux he argued$ 
But though Ja on the Second stand unqualified, and 
morally di ed from being any more Kingg yet It 
in indispensably necessary we should haVe Ono* a 
King being no 1683 essential in the Body Politick 
of &=Land* than the Head in in the Body Natural* 
To dream of r69ducilm, England to a Democratical 
Republicks in incident only to persons of ShAllow 
Capacities* and such &a are unacquainted with the 
Nature of Governments$ and the Genius of Nationso 
For an the Mercurial and Masculine Temper of the 
English people(j in not to be moulded or accomadated 
to a Democracyj so it in Impracticable to establish 
such a Comon-wealthg where there in a Numerous 
Nobility and Gentryd, 86 
The community was dissolved into a state of nature, 
where the only ruls 48 to vhAt should be done wan the 
POOPIO's "Wllll guided and regulated by t, 20 Measures of 
wb3t is most conducible to thO publick good". 
87 But this 
apparent liberty amounted to littleg for It soon appeared 
that all that "remains to be done* is to declare tho 
Prince of Orange ! 6jM to 
88 
"For until then, the Govar, ent 
can exert it self but in faw of its proper operational nor 
can It either Repeal ill laws, nor Enact such good ones as 
we want and need. 1"89 
What appears remarkiLble about Fergusonla "state of 
nature" in how little it signified* James 11's actions 
bad resulted in "the depriving himself of all Right to 
claim any things and a restoring of the People to their 
State and Condition of Primitive Freedowe"90 Yet all 
that was required to ractify this situation uas to make 
William kingS 
16.5 
IV 
Within eighteen months of the success of williamls 
expedition to England& FerSuson "as suspected of being 
engaged in Jacobite plots* 
91 This auspIcion was probably 
well founded, Although Ferguson exceped arrest once &gains 
when he next appeared in print it wav ax anýardent opponent 
of the Revolution* He acknowledged that the reader aftht 
be "mxprized to hear this kind of Theology, and Politics 
from molls but wVlained that he had been "heretofore misled 
by false Notions$ and *** Hypotheses about Govornmnt neither 
reconcileable to our Lawav nor to the Peace of Communities"* 
92 
The #mistaken ideas' that Ferguson now wanted to 
repudiate were of considerable practical import&UGO* ]jut 
wbat is most significant for our purposes in that ho never 
abandoned the Ad" that the essOnOO of the English COustitutiOn 
was Its contractual natureo His opposition to W=Uam IIXj 
hiß clo: rence of Jamen 11 und hin, calln for a Illegal$, revolt 
AfAin5t, the new regime were all defended on e=ctly the O&NO 
ballis as tbO: Lr Oppouiten had boon in the 16DO&O 
Fersuson's re.. ovvLtuation of jamell 3: Xlx reign almot 
cwvletely reversed the judgwants he had made at the timeo 
It seemed to him that he had not only misinterpreted the 
intentions of James$ WiLliam. of Orange and the Whigag but 
also the emat requirements of the constitutlopal. laws 
He became convinced that "it was neither King ilwjoga's 
Interest to destroyq or the Prince of . 
2EMSZ, 6. *5 to protect 
the Prot England had-been "deluded" 
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by William III and an a result its citizens were "translated 
out of a Canaan$ where only too much Safety, Same and 
Plenty$ nude them complaint and brought Into an unpresidentod 
and intolerable Thraldoms"94 
The Revolution bad been justified on religious grounds. 
It had been nocessary't it was claimeds for the preservation 
of P%vtostantisme But this toog Ferguson believede uan 
an error* The "Whig Party"s who were "the warmest Promoters 
of the Revolution! $* appeared to him now an a "Compound of 
the Atheistical of all Opinionx and Persuasions wbatnoovere"95 
Ferguson even attempted to persuade hie readers that the 
Revolution bad been a Catholic plot rather than a ProtesUnt 
032ae The Catholicaq he insisted "undertook the deposing 
a Prince of their own Church$ because he would not support 
the Supremacy of the Popes*' They then "procured Resolutions 
from Rome s*9 to authorize the Catholicks in Enxiand to 
tranxfor their Allegiance from King JgMg to King W1111AIg j, 96 
And thin van not an self-destructive as atight appear$ because 
king William tons a Catholic in I'disgulse"J97 
As well an reversing mny of bin judgpents of J&MOS 
Ills policies* Ferguson modified his interpretation of 
BugUsh constitutional laws Whilst re. -examining the 
religious motives behind the Revolutions for examples he 
went so far an to assort thatt 
in no Circumstances of Danger into whieU our 
Religion and civil TAberties could be brought nor 
under any Hazards we could fall into of losing and 
having them suppressed, we were either permitted 
or Itipowereds by the Pimdamentals of our Governiments 
the rt4Lez of our Constitutiong or by the common or 
statute Law of tho Kingdom, to rebel against the 
King, or to dethrone or drive him AvOYs 98 
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Ferguson felt that he had either neglected or mis- 
interpreted three essential #constitutional laws$ during 
the period up to his conversion to the Jacobite cause* 
These laws constituted the main legal grounds upon which 
the Jacobites bad opposed the Revolution and which were 
therefore the principal letal *problems# that the U%igs had 
attempted to overcome* Ferguson continued to auxert that 
"the areat End of the Laws Evas] *** the Publick Good" 
and that "the first and the highest Uw or the Society 
is that of SnJun B2Uuj: L1*99 but he refused to draw the 
constitutional conclusions that he had before the 
Revolution* Instead he insisted, first that "no 1, aw 
or Contract, existent in the King's Times had provided that 
we might fly to A=st' to protect legal rights, 100 Second$ 
he accepted that "there were divers express Statutes then 
in being$ by which it was made and declared to be jMggja 
t&-j&p. ho P-m- &as Sgainat [the king] oeo up()n any EEetenc-e W. 6 
!! hAtso=C* 11101 And finally he admitted that since the 
"Wisdom of our Ancestors mmde it an ýZjgm of our Governiment 
and States . 
2.2al 1he MM C-0111 d-o- ao. tr [. 2nifs it followed 
that "therefore no Accusation of him could be justified# 
and much less any Force against him l4, w,. UO"1O2 
The 1688 Revolutions thong bad boon unconstitutionalo 
But rerguson still retained his basic belief thAt tho 
ConstitutIOU Uss Onsentially the product of an original 
contract# though supplementod and modified throup.. li time, 
The 'source# for determining t1jo logal rights and dutigg 
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of citizens thus rom&: Ln*d at bottom the intentions of 
the original contractors and the rational conattitution'that 
they must be supposed to have extablisli6do It waxg th*n,, 
the Revolution parlimmentS or 1688/9 that bads 
In defiance Of All the Rules and Measures of the 
Conatitution-9 and in a treacherous Violation of all 
the Trust and-Confidence reposed in them by their 
Countryt chaneed the uhole EssentialL and Fundamental. 
Frame of the Government of jn2ZUndq and from an 
11axeditary No r&U fh&C vGdo it an BlectIve one 
*#9 and by dizzolvInit th9t LinL- in the- 1-natrument 
and Hadiing- of our Government, they have destroyed 
it an-to-iffiat it wafig and what it still ought to 
beg according both to the rundamentals of our first 
Establishment into ft Po1jtY4 and the Common and 
Statute Laws of the Kingdom* 103 
The royalist constitutiowl theories o: r Robert Brady 
and Edmund Bobung which formed the banis of the most 
frequently voiced attacks on the Revolutions played no 
part In Ferguson's Jacobitism* Such theories as th*seo 
declarin, t; that Englishmen's rights derived from the 
concessions or absolute monarchs whose titles to rule 
depended either on 'conquest' or tpatriarchalism's were 
in fact explicitly rejected by Ferguson. In 16959 for 
examples he made this point in a mnner that could well 
have appeared in any of his pr*-Revolution tracts$ 
Forq Sirg sulTer we to tell you$ Th&t & Right and 
Title to the Freedom of our Persons *a* doth not 
accrue &Ad OrLDO uUtO uJ3 either from Me=*---CbartA$ 
the 201titiOn Of RjAghtj or the Statute-of 11aboup 
ut it was reserved unto us, and we were 
I. D 
U- 
Iv Po. ss ke p Possession of it* by the very Nature and 
Frame of our Constitution* For our whole Government 
was founded upon the Supposal and Concessions Mint 
it was to be a Government of and over Free-men ,, And the agoat Cher-ter, and the other Laws# which I 
have mentioned# did not create =Zf ve U's A Right 
to the fagdoIg of our Persondl but they did only 
asscrtt vindicate# and fence it about* They were 
not 1, aws of manumission from Bondazo, but Declaratory 
of our Antecedent and imherent Title to Liberty, 104 
3M 
Royalist constitutional historyg then$ man deficient 
as an account of the origin of Englishmen's rights* But 
Ferguson did made one concession to it and in doing so he 
implicitly outlined a solution to a major contemporary 
problem of constitutional interprotation. The wctreme 
royalists were arguing that Englishments rights originated 
In concessions from monarchs* They then believed it 
'lawful' for monarchs to withdraw those concossions* Many 
Of the anti-royalisto an sire shall sectIO-9 believed that 
Englishman's rights were something like 'the natural rights 
of man, modified and made practicable by the or; LSinajL 
contract establishing the 8n; lish Constitutions. They 
then proceded to argue tLaut the *defence' of these rights 
provided a Constitutional Justification for armed resistance* 
Both xidep argued from fixed points of historical origin to 
the provisions of the DOVO)atwwth Century constitution# 
without allowing for any aignlfýcant changes in the 
intervening centuries* Wheng however. Ferguson argued 
that "unquestionably many 7bings were at first wanted in 
the Crown" he went on to Allow for the possibility of a 
divorce between historical origins and later JuStifications 
of laws and institutions. 110 did noto however* mko use 
of this distinction in his constitutional analysis* To 
have done so would have implied that the historical original 
contract wan lArgely irrelevant for understanding the 
contemporary constitution# Xnatend of this he offectivoly 
reintorproted tho concept of an original contract end its 
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relation to the Congstitutioni, The 'original contract' 
bocame simply one of nany contractx *Zroad by rulers and 
ruled througliout Iiistory$ sdiereby the Constitution was 
altered an CireUustauces required. 
lo6 In t7alis : C&zbion 
Ferguson defen4cd James 11 not only for having had no 
ti4ll I)egign against our Religion" but aliso for having been 
prepared '#to Ilave granted a Stipulatory Law,, uftich should 
IAve bad the Force and Virtue or at Ma-vj* CIwEjak or 
Egng"tutional SgnýXagjj and to have made the Protestant 
Religion *09 a Fundamental in the Governm t or all other 
aoigns*t, 107 
Th, m ; L,, dea O; C a constitutional contract was thus reduced 
to little more than a synonym for constitutional laws The 
elaborate zroundwork for the Whig theory of the #legality* 
of the Revolution was further swept away when Ferguson 
declared that constitutional laws and precedents did not 
justify the enforcement of the contract against a recalcitrant 
king* He now asserted: 
Indeed the Constitution both instructs Princes for 
what and we pitched upon this lnel-ge . 6* of Regal Governments and directs them to rule for the 
Safety# Uterests and ftv"rLty of their Subjectul 
but thero in Do Qriz4na&-CoutroSt. nor stipulatory 
AXre*ments by which it In provJLd*ds That AX Princes 
do not as they bhould, they do eiti2er forfeit their 
Soveraign Authoritys or that we way lawfully rebel 
against and dethrone theme Nor do any Presidents 
or Examples .. * shows that it was lawfuig or a 
Thing that oither the Constitutions or zubmaquent 
Lawx* did authorise and countengneel but they 
only declared vdiat a provoked People will sOnOtIales 
do soe And Xjdj fact; L is not always via-ju. =, I* 108 
Appeals to the origImal contract of the AnciOnt English 
Con, gtitutiong then* were no longer AccOptAblO for l*fjtjm; L=jxiZ 
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resistance* Even if James 11 had broken a 'constitutional 
contractle it could t1never be allowed either to Officers 
or People to resist$ be the KirIZIS Comnands what they will". 
109 
TI-to only lositimate courson of action open to citizens In 
these circumstances were "'to address God by Proyerst and 
[the kinej *** by Petitionsl and after refusinZ to 
be our selves the Instruments in axecutinýg his Arbitrary 
and I116gal will, both to complain ot thooe tImt area and 
to persue all the Methods of Law for getting them punishedo"110 
Yet Ferguson still believed that the constitution that 
had been overthrown in 1688 had been based on a contract* 
The principal reason why that constitution had worked so 
wall up to the early soventeenth century at lemst9l" was 
because no. one had abused the "trust" which "is the BARIJI 
of every Societyp and the Foundation or the Fakr: Lck of &11 
Go, vex Outall 0 
112 But lie interpreted the contract embodied 
in that constitution in a much loonor way than before$ 
And an for that -CojjjK2St 
Uf it might be called 
one) Uhich Was Involved and tacitly wrapt UP in 
the Constitutiong the whole Msport of it was, to 
declare the Ends for which our Princes were to 
rule so* and to touch and instruct theins that they 
were to govern us by Lawal but It In no ways 
provideds that they should be accountable untas or 
arraignable by their Subjectaq if they did notl 
leaving them for that only responsible to Clode 113 
Contractualisms passive obedience and divine right 
were IyArmoniously incorporated in the pro-Rcm1utionary 
constitution* But the CABO Was otherwise with the $new, 
constitution* of 1683. For "whatever therewas of an 
0 -act 
between tormer Xings and the rroo P(Mplo . Eistingj 
g2ntr 
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of these Kingdoms, yet it its lmdoniables there in a very 
form]. and a:: -6, n . 
11cito Ono betwoon S. William and them. 013*14 
The arrangements made at this now contract wereq accordIns 
to Ferguson$ defoctive, in two major respects. The first 
was precisely the advantaco he had onee claimed for the old 
contractual constitution: tho king was placed in a precarious 
position. King William, Ferguson argued, "may be sure$ 
that they who could extort and wrest from the C2nstitutbHe 
which gave no such Allovanceg and much less Authority, a 
Power and Right to dethrone K, Jamos **, will be ready and 
forward enough when the Humor and Caprice takes them# to 
treat him in case of Miscarriages after the riamo rate"alls 
The second defect arose because the legally binding 
Ancient Znglish Constitution had been replaced by an illegal, 
do a -jL - . 
jt2 rogimo* Xing William's Zovernmentq Ferguson 
declarod in 1695* had "no more 109AI Power to dispose of 
the Property of the Subjoctss than the Committee or Officers 
have who Isit in the Gjard_11ouse by Ijbitehall.,, 116 The 
Revolution bad dissolved the lawful constitution and although 
thert bad boon a new contract with William of Oranseq it 
afforded no legal obligation* William was "Only Kin&,. ft 
La'Stot notg2 IUX2. "117 The Parliaments that had contracted 
with William had had no authority to do so becauxes by 
attackinz "some Essentials and Fundamentals or the Xnxlixh 
Goxw=ntle when they deposed James Ils they "thereby 
immediately dentroy[ed] themsolvest and *** 
[bacAmýj divested 
of all Power and Authority they have or claim; because, 
IL73 
d*rIving all their Jurisdictions frcým the Constitution 04, * 
whensoever that in ovarturned and ssubvertedl all other 
Powers sink and fall with ItOt"a 
Since this 4g agll Covernment had bocome nothing less 
than "the Prince of OramaIx T. Yranny". 1" it was necoxxoryg 
in FergusonIx opinions to oppose force with force* Yet 
once ogain he justilried this courxo in torogg of its 
flegautys# ; Its principle that he appgaled to won "WMI 
Wh Uil-SAIslo"S olltrAX IM LaSjljMZ kX Eagt_ kS JaXjUjjX 
anawmimott" But thin times when counsolling the use 
of force against the William and Wry rezimmog Ferguson van 
vury mpocifte about the RAnd of *legality# involved* in 
one passogo in Isis first attackýon the Roviolution Sottlemonts 
lie explicitly declared that Uhm tonstitutional law lad 
been Violated recouXXe smist be taken to natural laws 
whon tho 1,41WID Or a Corlatitution are publickly 
Violatede *#* we may Wive recourse to the Laws of Natures 144Ch Put us t'ax)A it common Level W: Lth those 
that were antecedently our Rulersq and give us 
14berty to oppose them, and defend our selves and 
our Goverment bY Laws ostabUshede 123. 
r*rguwnls Justification or the flexalityl Or resisting 
William XXX thus rested on the same basis as many lied 
justiried oppouition to James XX. Xndo*do the passage I 
have just quoted was taken by Ferguson grow Burnet'* Zh& 
ft9MN It dignoev a WilIJAmite tract published in 1688* 
Ferguson quoted the arSumont with approvals characterinti. ently 
priding hiw*0Ir for being able to turn the opposition against 
itselfs But In adopting the argument h* woroly further 
underlined the peculiarities and lindtations Of the 
Constitutional Contract Theory as a way Of Justifying the 
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liesolityl of resistance* 
V 
Forgusonta use of the Constitutional Contract Theory 
is interesting in a number of wayse His political 'Writings 
wore all designed to persuade his audience to take aides in 
the political and constitutional controversies of the times 
They were all* that is to sayg more concerned with the 
practice of politics than its theory. In the preceding 
sections I have attempted to outline the theory that lay 
behind Ferguson's arguments$ and the uses to which lie put 
it. Perhaps what emerges most clearly Is the considerable 
extent to which ideas of a constitutional contract penetrated 
Into the political debates of the 1680s and 190so 
I have emphasized the practical usefulness of the theory 
as a imeans of providing Ilegalt Justifications bor the 
anti-royalist cause* Ferguson's writings provideq in 
facts one of the clearest indications of the connection 
between constitutional law and 'original contract' in the 
political ideas of the late 3eventeenth century* Ilia 
insistence that "no government Is lawfult but whet is 
founded upon Compact", and that "the Articles upon which 
[the 
contractors] stipulate the one with the other# become 
the Fundamentals of the respective Constitutions of 
Nat, ons"122 q provided, as we have seeng exactly the connection 
between civil law and reason that enabled Ireasonablenesst 
3L 
to be credited an a legal standard for Judging actiouý 
The loose way Ferguson used the idea of contract 
indicated both that he was more concerned with *practice# 
than with consistency in ideas and that he felt considerable 
capital could be made by employine the term. An uo have 
soon, lie sometimes used the idea of contract to explain 
the historical origin of the English Constitution; sometimes 
to explain the historical origin of all 'Just$ constitutions; 
and sometimoss indeed inost frequently, as little more than 
a synonym for constitutional law. Those ideas were 
nowhere examined in a rigorous way, They were simply 
used to provide coherence and weight to the cAune Ferguson 
'Pioninge 
This lack of rigour can be soon even Una chum 
more clearly in respect of the ideas that trore closely 
associated with that of a constitutional contract: for 
example Ifundamental law* Ifundamental rights' and 
'fundamental duties* Although Ferguson constantly used 
these notionag he nevor examined them critically, And 
thiss despite the fnct that the idea of fundamental law 
moo the focal point of his changed political persuasion 
after 1690. 
But the most significant outcome of our examination 
of Forguxon's career is the light it sheds on the polemical 
importance of ideas of contract in the Revolutionary period* 
For this reason alone his ideas would zoom to deserve 
greater attention than historians have hitherto devoted to 
them. Charles Bastido is one of the few hiatorians who 
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have examined contract ideas in England during the late 
seventeenth century in any detail, But he simply dismissed 
Ferguson as one of "lei; vulgaires conspirateurs"123 who 
were part of an English refugee colony at Rotterdam in the 
1680s. But to dismiss him In this way could lend us to 
miss an important point, It is often assumed that the 
1688 Revolution represents the Victory of Non-conformist, 
ILow Church Protestant and Whig groups employing notions 
of 'contract' and 1consentlo over High Church, Anglican and 
Tory groups employing notions of #divine right' and 
#absolute monarchy'. But in Fersuson0a writinze we have 
seen a Non-conformist divine using ideas of contract to 
show that William of Orange's regime van illegal and 
pressing for the return of James IX whose authorlty and 
right to rul* rested upon the contract "Implied" In the 
Ancient English CA)nxtitutiono Thus Ferguson's political 
career Indicates that during the 16803 and 1909 there was 
no inevitable connection between having lVhlgf sympathiesq 
viewing the constitution or the nature of the state in 
tsrM8 Of A contractp and supportIng Williall 111 and the 
Revolutionary Settlement* 
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PARr -xrx 
PIIXLOSOPHICAL CONTRACTARIAMISMI 
CHAPTER VI 
THR SOCIAL COWRACT THEOlkir 
In a paper written the year before hix death, L*cke 
not down his ThouLhtz CgLSeM! nr--P-eadinjj and Study j2r. ^ 
Gev&j! tMR. The paper contained* amongst much elses an 
examination of the nature of polit. -, Lca]L sýudiex and a selected 
list of suggested reading* 
9 Lack* declared, "Contains t"O Parts "Politics" the others tho one , very different the One from , containing the original Of societies and the rise 
and eXteut of political powers the others the art 
or governing men in sociOtY*" I 
14eko might be Interpreted here an distinguishing betvaen 
an historical enquiry into the origin of government and a 
practical$ 'manual for govornoris', sort of enquiry* out 
this turnx out not to be the cases Ifix readins lists and 
further comments on the two differont parts of political 
study Indicate that the foriCinst he uas concerned with 
were rational, not historical* History ano, oxperience 
were relevant to the second part of politics . the part 
concerned with the study of, particular constitutional with 
law making In. particular circumstances and* in genoralg 
with 'policy making', Thus Locke continued after the 
passage just quoteds 
The first of these hath been go bandied amongst 
us for this sixty years baclaord that OUS Can 
hardlY miss books of this kinds Those Which X 
think Are most talked of in English are the first 
178 
book of Mro Hookerls ItacIlls: tasliggl I 144-9ý and Mr* Algernon Sydney's book of Government; the 
latter of these I never read* Lot we here add 
TWO jCggtj-A&m Qr%Wa**mman+ - sww utod 26 a 
treatise of EMI E-g-111 9 print d this ynsrar, 703, 
written by Peter Paxtonýe To these one wAy add 
P"rendorr D OCCACIO Uý $go and DJ m4104 a 61 FAX 0- UIM 
N&IM . 
W-M. - 4 in+# 
351; t is the beist W-Oli- X!! -- num- v 
; Mob ins 
of that Ic: Lnd* 
An to the other part of politics which concerns 
the art of sovers I that X think Is best to be 
learned by experience and historyg especially that 
of a awns own country* And therefore I think an 
English gentlemn should be well versed in the 
history of Nnglande taking his rise as far back an 
there are any racords of itl joining with it the 
laws -that were made In the *worsl egos as be soon 
along in his history# that he may observe from 
thence the several turns of states and how they 
have been produc*d* In Mro Tyrrells HistoCK at 
he will find all along those a ral authors 
which have treated of our affairs and which he w^y 
have recourse to concerning any point *Mcb, either 
his curiosity or judgement shall load him to enquire 
int, Oo 
With the history he way also do well to read 
the ancient lawyerov.. (v. mh an are Muctq)ns Fletag 
Henninshaing Win U Hy Lord Cook on 
the second IngJAIMS-4 w AM 
tire I-Mb-dus Tgr&Mdi 
PorAIgmeatM# and others of that W whom be may 
find quoted in the late controversies between 
Mro Petitl Mr* Tyrrell Mro Atwood, stool with Dro 
Bradyl an also# I suppose$ In Sedlor's treatise 
of 
--8 
gr Mnpdgm. gng 93! AJOU of MC 
Ange 0--@I wherein he will find the ancient 
%rW - Jon of the govo *nt of England* There 
are tw volumes of printed since the 
Revolution in which ny things relating 
to tho Covernoont of England* 2 
I bave quoted Lockels tullest single statement on 
political studies almost without abridgement because It 
reveals something of the distinction in Lockets mind, between 
a constitutional, and a philosophical coutzectuallm* Xn 
accepting the traditional dixtinction between theoretical 
and practicwkl political wrltingl he recognised that both 
contained arguments using the concept of fcontractfb The 
theoretiefAl and practical treatowts oro distingulabod by 
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their terminology* , rn the practical literature that 
Locke recommend* we constantly run Into terms like 
#fundamental law's 'fundamental rights's #fundamental 
liberties's 'fundamental# or 'original contract' and 'ancient' 
or Ifundamental constitution#, In the theoretical literature, 
we constantly meet terms like tstate of naturell, 'natuml 
lawfo 'natural rights's 'original* or #social contract' 
and #civil' or tpolitical society$* These differences 
in -rocabulary reveal much more substantive differences 
between the two types of contractarian argument* The 
questions posed in each were differente Social Contract 
Theory was addressed to cIU09t: LOUB of a much moro general 
kind than thoso which concerned Constitutional Contract 
Theorists, No doubt the questions and issues actually at 
stake were often the samee But at least in appearanceg 
Social Contract Theory was concerned with questions of a 
universal kind whereas-Conatitut: LonajLýContract Theory was 
concerned with particular issues and events. Social 
Contract Theory asked: idxy In civil society necossaryq 
what Is the essential nature of civil society and4hat 
sort of government should men have? It wax not concerned 
with the questions that preoccupied Constitutional Controot 
Theorists - Ioe. how did the English (or any other particular) 
Constitution originate, uhat sort of constitution u0s It, 
vhat specific rights and liberties did its laws define and 
guarantee and what did all thin imply for the conduct of 
prosent political affairs? 
Just as the different vocabularies of the two Contract 
loo 
Theories reveal that different questions are being askedg 
so they highlight that different ovidence is being appealed 
to. For the Constitutional Controctarians the evidence 
of Low Books and history was essential (even though such 
evidence might be Interpreted In a very cavalier fashion): 
Social Contract Theory did not depend on this evidence 
for Its coherence and persuasiveness. In Social Contract 
Theory, the crucial concept was that of the #natural',, in 
Constitutional Contract Theory it wait the #fundamental$. 
By tradition, speculation about the tnaturall concerned 
Reason and Divine lAw whereas the *fundamental' was firmly 
wadded to history and human laws 
We have horeg thong an initial characterization of 
two very different Contract Theories, Locke, s use of 
the traditional diotinction between practical sud theoretical 
political writing ham revealed some awareness on his 
part of these two typ*x of theory. But 'theoretical' 
here does not mean Ophilosophicall, Much of the reading 
that Locke recommendo to the would-be student of the theoretical 
part of political studies turns out to be týxndamentally 
tPracticall In charactero Nonethelesal I have called the 
Contract Theory that appears in this writint #Philosophical 
Contractarianiamto I have done so In order to capture the 
distinctive connotations (rather than donotations) of the 
terms and concepts employeds Those tersis and concepts; 
wore part of a philosophical lauXuageo Yroquently they 
were lborrow6d' and put to use In practical political 
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writinge It will be an important'pArt of our enquiry to 
assess ilhen this is bein. - done* Sbmo distinction must 
be made between 'Genuine* and taham' philosophyt since 
the understanding of Icontractl exhibited in each will 
be different. This point will become clearer ab our 
enquiry advances, But sufficient has been said to expose 
the limitations of our initial characterization of the 
differences between Constitutional and PhilosopUcal 
Contractarianism, Differences in vocabulary way serve to 
indicate differences in meanincl, but, the use of a Istandard' 
vocabvlary Is no Warentee of a similarity in moaning,, 
Xn the remainder of this chapter, then$ im will be 
concerned to portray what sort of theory this Philosophical 
Social Contract Theory nens during our period. We trust 
exhibit the Bo: U of zp;. -,: --. ntion in which the late seventeenth 
century modifications of the theory grow. We must consider 
how radically the theory differed from Constitutional 
Contractarianismo And we must Giamine whether all womples 
of the consistent employment of the vocabulary of Philosophical 
Contractarianism were genuinely *philosophical' writingse 
First, we need to consider the basic character of 
Social Contract speculation* In the seventeenth century$ 
Social Contract Theory sought to wcplain the rationality 
of civil society by locating its tsourcel or 'origin# in 
the nature of the individual, The enterprise was inforw*d 
by the resolutive-compositive method of the famous Paduan 
methodoloSistse Thus the complex relations Of civil 
JL82 
society were broken down into their simplest parts and wore 
then reconstructed from them* The process Of Onalysis was 
essentially one of rational abstraction, Tho process of 
reconstruction essentially Involved the pursuit of the 
logical consequences of the Interaction between Inatural 
men'* This van the kind of enquiry that I have referred 
to above an #rationalist constructiviumt*3 But although 
the procedures of analysis were abstractive and hypothetical, 
although the 'state of nature, to which civil society woo 
reduced was In essence a rational construction$ this did 
not mean that history and OmPLrJLcal evidence were irrelevant 
to the onquixyO The Social Contract writers of the 
seventeenth century did not make rigid distinctions between 
reason and historye At the v*ry least most of them believed 
that the evidence of history and experience nhould not 
contradict a true account of the state of nature and the 
characteristics of natural mans In some works this 
Interweaving of rationals historical and "Tirical enquiry 
reveals that a particular Christian view of the universe 
is being appealed too This view presented the universe 
an the creation oftýa Divine Willi it presented human 
affairs an guided by that Divine Willi and it understood 
the Divine Will ass a ]Rational Will* Xn other works# this 
interweaving reveals sbvly that the writer in engaged in 
political controversy and Is concerned to cover his flanks 
from all anticipated attacks, We sball meet 5=6 pecullar 
results of the appeal both to reason and history when 
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examining the literature of what X have called 'Xntegrated 
Contractarianism'. 4 But even the great seventeenth century 
Social Contract Theorists like Grotius$ Hobbess Spinamaq 
Puf*ndorf and Locke were not always clear about the role 
of historical and empirical evidence in their theories, 
5 
Xn our period, Pufendart's reputation clearly marked 
him out as the foremost proponent of Social Contract Thoory6 
He provided the model of the standard theory and worked it 
out best, Of Rnglish wr: iters# Looks alone had the distinction 
of writing in purely Social Contract terms. Both Pufendorf 
and Locks, then# demand our close attention if we are to 
comprehend the nature of Social Contract thought in late 
seventeenth century Rngland, I will examine L*cko's work 
in detail in the next chapter, He Is by far the most 
famous of the ZnXlixh contractarians with whom we are 
concerned and the status of his work has boon the subject 
of great disagroomento An examination of Pufondorf Ia 
theory will provide a clear view of the distinctiveness of 
Social Contract Theory* Thisq in turng will cost light 
an the disagreements over the intellectual status of Lockes 
Two Troatings-of Gov*=-menl* After all, as we have just 
seeng Locke believed that Pufandorf had written the "boat 
book" of the same kind as his own Two Treatisest a book, 
that in to Days which would instruct the reader "in the 
natural Rights of Mon, and the Original and Foundations of 
Societyq and the Duties resulting from thence*" 
6 
, 
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Pufendorf'x importance derives from his immense stature 
in the European IRepublic of Lettdral of his time* Practically 
all of his works on philosophy,, law, politics$ history and 
religion were reviewed favourably in contemporary learned 
Journals like Pierre Bayle's &augellex do Is RS"nubliqu dex 
b2ttrext Henri Saxnagetx Hiatoire-des OgWitex des S. Savanx 
and J, C, do I& Crozet* The Hist&orX of Loarnijage His 
excellence was so widely acclaimed that it moved Andrew 
Took* to note in the Preface to his Nnglish translation Of 
Do Orriclo Hominis el-Civis in 1691 thats 
Concerning the Author 'tin enough to says thit 
he has surely had as great regard paid him from 
Personages of the highest degree, as perhaps ever, 
was given to the most learned of men* 7 
Most of Puf*ndorf1x major works were translated into Englisht 
or summarized in Rnglishq between 1690 and 1705. They 
were all well received* In particular his political works 
were found most illuminating by Atwood and Locke* Indeed, 
to Atwood Pufendorf appeared as the "Judicious Civilian 
PuLondoELI one of the Ornaments of the present Age"a and 
his Dg Jul: * Naturge gt-Gen-tiuM was "that Book of his which 
in counted the Standard of the Law of Nations". 
9 Lockets 
and Atwood's Contract Theories contained distinctive echoes 
and explicit references to Pufondorf's works and so did 
many of their contmporariiest works. We must consider 
the difference* particularly between Lock* and Pufendorf 
later* But first we should examine the character of 
Pufandorf's Social Contract Theory. 
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Putendorf himself regarded the xpeculations contain*d 
in his throe main works - RIMMentgME Jur: Lx]2QWogti; kg 
V_h1nrg_&l&s (1660)9 Do J9M_)k1ur_ae gt Gent&-um (1672) and 
Do OfQcI2 k1gainix ot Cl-vin (1673) - an contributions to 
the same, kind of enquiry an had engaged the attention of 
Grotius and Hobbes* Pufandorft that is to says self. 
couxelouxly set out to portray the rationality of civil 
society by constructing a Xatural, Law Theory. After the 
Impact of Grotius' writings early in the seventeenth contury9 
Natural Law Theory. was concerned to ground Natural Low on 
roaxop alone since this wax regarded an a more self-sufficient 
foundation than theology* The attempt to do this was seen 
as Involving the explanation of the moral and political 
world by reference to the undeniable facts of individual 
human oziptepep &Ion*# Hpman reason alone was capable of 
demonstratinS with mathematical, cortainty the requirements 
of the moral law, In Its essentially political enquiries, 
Natural Law Theory attempted to reconcile Its methodological 
Individualism with community and sovereignty, Plafondorf's 
Natural Law 7beory exhibited theme characteristics of the 
post-Grotium. Natural Law treditione In the Prpface to 
D& Jur-e Naltim-so- ot Gont-Lum, j, for example, Pufonderf declared 
"this study concerns not Christians alone but all mankind"* 
Thus he could not begin an account of the moral law Jýrou 
the Christian doctrines of the Yell and Original Sin, 
Instead he had to start from "such a principle as no ones 
186 
provided he be of sound mindo can dony"s ieco that man is 
by naturo sociableelo And in his 
! &JjMMjig Pufandorr asserted that his purpose was to 
estabUsh certain knowledge of the moral law whore hitherto 
it had generally boon felt that "all knowladge of such 
matters rests upon probabla opinion onlyo" Previous 
arguments about the moral law had boon dofective, because 
they were "not embodied in wmm demanstrutions"*31 
Theme cbaracteristiax of swrenteenth century Natural 
Law Theory reflected two more general and distinctive 
features of the century's Intellectual lifel the passion 
for certainty and the rejection of traditional authorities* 
As Professor Krieger has notedg in "politics as in natural 
science and philosophy the characteristic inteljLectUalL Of 
the sovanteenth century 90ught a new axis of explanation,, 012 
And these changes have been nummarixod by X*R, Minogue in 
terms of the rise of a Olquite now wood In intellectual 
history$ one in which men for the first time rejected their 
intellectual heritage and began the work of understanding 
(as they thought) anew*" lie continues a 
Perhaps the beat way of bringing out this point Is 
to observe that the seventeenth century In pre- 
eminently the time when knowledge uas conceived 
of an It It were a buildingi rationalist philosophy 
was the attempt to construct now foundations* Any 
ouch redevelopment Involves a good deal of dostructiont 
so that the site may be cleared*** The new division 
in philosophy was between those who put their faith 
In obsoxv tion of the world* and those who nought 
to build the house of knowledge upon the solidities 
of reason$ a division, that Is. between empiricists 
and rationalintse 13 
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Even though we might ocknowledg*,, with W, von Leyden$ that 
the difference between "classical empiricism and rationalism" 
was a different of "degree" or "tendency" rather than of 
kinds" the essential point remainas in the distinctively 
seventeenth century schools of philosophy the search for 
certainty took the form of a search for the irroduceabl* 
'sources# or $original of knowledge,, and the mechanical 
Iconstructiont of the world from theins 
Pufendorf andeavoured to 'construct# the political 
world after the fashion of Grotius and Hobbes and he used 
materials taken from theme He believed that Grotius had 
been correct to emphasis* mants natural sociability and to 
base his account of civil society upon It, But Grotius' 
account was defective for a number of reasonst it under- 
rated the great force of self-interest in human motivation 
and it perpetuated traditional confusions by upholding the 
doctrine of divided sovereignty and property. Hobbeal on 
the other hand$ had overplayed bin selfish individualisme 
Thus his analysis of the state of nature and his rigorously 
logical account of political obligation suffered from a 
nar2 w one-sidedness* Althoughq Pufondorf feltp Do-Cive 
was "for the most part extremely acute and sound"t 
15 
and 
although Hobbes had boon right to insist that the state 
was an "artificial man"g still his writings "eavoured" of 
the profane and he had confused matters by regarding the 
terms #supreme power@ and funlimited powert an interchangeabloo 
Pufondorf wanted to uphold the supreme authority of rulorships 
but he also wanted to insist that the ruler's supreme 
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authority was not necessarily unlimitedo Both GodIs Will 
with man and the evidence of contemporary European states 
seemed to him sufficient reason for this* Ile, agreed with 
Hobbes that the governed community could not possibly have 
any rights against its governorg but he insisted aSainat 
Hobbes that, individualx bad substantive* defensable rights 
against their government* 
16 
It was partly because Pufandorf felt the Justice of 
both Hobbest and Grotiust basic conceptions of =anfs naturog 
and partly because he wanted to reconcile abstract and 
immmgined hypothetical xtate=ents about natural, man with 
empirical and historical evidence, that he developed a dual 
notion of the state of nature* In some form or other this 
understanding of the, state of nature appears in all the 
English Social Contract Theorists of the late seventeenth 
century, Pufondorf considered first of all the "purely 
natural state" - the state of individual man abstracted 
from all human (social) and divine relation, This stateg 
he acknowlodgodg never roally. existed, In the 'purely 
natural state' jan appeared with appropriate physical and 
moral characterixtiass manva nature was defined by his 
"wealcnoss and natural helplessness" and "melf-love" was 
the moral quality appropriate to this condition* But 
even bore It was manIx very weakness and self-love that 
gave rim* too or added point tag his "sociability" . the 
characteristic most apparent In the "modified" or "mixed" 
statio of nature and the characteristic which ensured that 
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that state of nature should not be Robbesiane The 'purely 
natural state1q then$ was Juxtaposed against the tndxed 
state of naturel* And this *mixed state$ signified the 
natural state of men in social relations with one another 
but in the absence of a political relation* The 'mixed 
state of naturel,, Pufendorf believed, had once existed and 
still did exist In the form of the relations between 
Independent political commmitieso 
The 'pure state of natural was Inhabited by naturally 
free and equal moral personse Natural equality consisted 
of the absence of relations Of authority between Individuals 
and natural liberty was 0XPr683ed, iU the right of Self- 
preservation, The 1MiX6d State of nature# was characterized 
by the social rolations that arose from man's natural 
sociability, Its organizing principle and governing rule 
was- the law of natural the moral law whose fundamental 
proscription declared that rRvery mano so far as In his 
lien$ should cultivate, and preserve toward others peaceful 
sociabilitys, which is suitable to the nature and the goal 
Of universal humanityo"17 This fundamental prescription 
was the source of many loss fundamental dictates* Theme 
dictates Pufandort classified "under three =&in beadnt the 
first of which Instructs us how, according to the dictate 
of sound reason alone, a man should conduct himself toward 
Gods the seconds how toward himself, the third* how toward 
other mon*"18 The duty of man toward God comprised essentially 
"that we have right views of God, and secondly that we order 
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our acts In conformity witi, Itin wil],, "19 These were duties 
of natural rather than divine law because they arose 
: Lr=ed; Lat*ly Vrom th* considpratlan of U&tura]L soclabiLlity, , 
It was reason considering the object of religion solely an 
the "ultimate and strongest bondýor h1man socjL6tY, l20 that 
discovered thems and they were duties "Limited to the sphere 
oC this life" and were of "no avail to secure eternal 
SaIV&tjons,, 
21 The duty of man toward Iximself consisted 
of the duty of self-perfection so that man mey the better 
perform his duties toward God and to others* The third 
not of dutiong duties of man toward his rellowng Pufandorf 
divided into two kindst "absolute duties, j4, *, Ij of anybody 
to anybody" and "conditional" dutiess i. e. those owed "only 
toward certain personal sk certain condition or status beInS 
assumode", 
22 The absolute duties consisted of first$ not 
injuring others (although it injury did occur it alwuld be 
followed by "a voluntary offer of restitution'1123 Secondo 
of recognizing the natural equallty. of men, lee* oosch 
esteem and treat the other we his eqialg that Isq, an a man 
just an much an himself"; 
24 thirdg that "*very man promote 
the advantage of anotherg so far as he conveniently can. 0"25 
The conditional duties of man toward his follows comprise 
all the other obligations that a man might enter into with 
otherse for "All the duties net Already enumor%%04 Ei*Oe 
all duties other than the absolute ones] seem to presunsone 
an express or tacit agreaments,,, 26 And with all these 
conditional duties, "the Soneral dutY which w* Ows under 
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natural law lot that a man keep his plighted word$-that in 
fulfill his promises and agreementg;, "27 This postulate 4)f 
a natural law duty to keep promises was of crucial import&nco 
for the logic of Pufoadorf's account of a social state 0jr 
nature and of his theory, of political obli&&tion* 
Pufendarf felt that Hobbes# portrait of the state of 
nature as a war of all against all was mistaken both because 
it disregarded mants natural sociability and because it 
misrepresented the obligation to obey natural law* Although 
the rules Of natural law were deduceable by reason reflecting 
on the requirements of social life* those rules were not 
binding because of their utility alone, "Obligation", 
Putendort noted# "is commonly defined an a legal bond"$ 
to be-obliged to do something was to have "a kind of bridle oso 
put upon our freedom"a Obligationg he inxistedl could only 
be "Introduced into the mind of a man by a superiorg that 
in a person who has not only the power to bring some harm 
at once upon those who resist$ but oleo just grounds for 
his claim that the freedom of our will should be limited 
at, his discretiono" But this notion of obligation in no 
way contradicted man's natural liberty* For It was only 
in so far as man had free will that he was capable of being 
tuorally obliged at all I 
It follows then that ho is capable of an obligation 
who not only has a superior, but also can recognize 
a proscribed rule$ and furtber has a will flexible 
In different directiones but conscious Of the fact 
that* when the rule has been proscribed by a 
superior, it does wrong to depart from the same, 
Such is evidently the nature witil which man is 
endowed* 28 
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In the state of nature the only Isuporiort capable of 
obliging men was God. The dictates of natural law acquired 
their obligatory character only when God was recognized as 
their authors 
although those precepts of natural law have manifest 
utility, stillq if they are to have the force of 
law# it is necessary to presuppose that God existag 
and by His providence rules all thingel also that 
Ile has enjoined upon the human race that they 
observe those dictates of the reasong an laws 
promulgated by Himself by means of our natural 
lights For otherwise they might$ to be sureq be 
observed perhaps* in view of the utilityg like the 
prescriptions of physicians for the regimen of 
health, but not an laws* 29 
"Natural reason" alone could diecover that mants 
obligation to obey the rules of sociability (both taboolutel 
and 'conditional') ultimately rooted on the will of God* 
In virtue of t4ist the natural state of human relations 
the 'mixed stato of natural where natural inclination was 
allied with duty - could, be portrayed an a very social 
state ipdeed. The institutions of property, marriaget 
family and even plavary (which Pufendorf believed was just 
the extrpme form of themasterrservant relationship) were 
all appropriate to thia xtýxte of natures All of theme 
institutions were ip easonce contractual* They were founded 
by, and embo4iod, the mutual consent of individuals who 
voluntarily abridged their natural liberty for a reasons 
They were g0jAuml institutions in the spnse that they did 
not depend for their existence and riZht upon civil law, 
The function of civil law was simply to protect those 
conventional inxtitutions and to specify the practical 
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rules necessary for their peaceful conduct* 
The institutions themselves all involved relationships 
of an authoritative kind - based immediately upon consent 
but ultimately on natural law and GodIs will* Thus the 
natural equality of the tpurely natural state' was compromised 
in the $mixed state of nature's But this compromise hardly 
constituted a negation of natural liberty* Natural men 
limited their own rights to all things in the intorestj 
ultimatolyv of self-preservation when they consented to 
tile institutions of the 'mixed state of matur*16 but the 
limitations arose from enlightened self-interest and were 
C . 0arined 
to the ends tor which the institutions were 
extablishode The tend' of the institution of property was 
the satisfaction of physical need# and for this orivatO 
, property was necessary "to, avoid quarrels and to introduce 
good, ordorl'-s 
30 The land' of marriage was the propagation 
of children and ths load' of the family was the care and 
education of those children* The lend$ of slavery 
(including the maotors*rvant relationship) was the 
advantage to be gained by all parties from "exchAuglug 
material necessities for material convonioncios* 9131 Each 
of the institutions of the state of nature - marriages 
family and slav*ry . had a form of government peculiarly 
its own* And all differed from the government of civil 
society* 
The primary distinction between the institutions Of 
the $nixed state of natural Jay in their "Xp*ctiv* #ends'* 
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Political DOCiOtY too had 6 distinctive #Onde - "Mutual, 
defense" - and it was this which all the pro. -political 
institutions were incapable of securing and which therefore 
necessitated transcending the state of nature. 
32 Pufondorf 
addressed himself to these matters when he came to examine 
"Ihg jMojLljM& Caugg fSE 
-tile 
F. JLLAblIgbMj-. gL O-Stfutge" 
He noted his problem an followas 
Although th0r* Is Scarcely any pleasure and 
OdVantage which It seems cannot be obtained by the 
duties and situations so far enumeretted Liees those 
arininS from natural Institutjonz3 It remains for 
us to Investigat* the question, why men neverthelonal 
not content with those little first societiest have 
established the great societies which go by the 
name of states* 33 
He rejects as Inadequate the notion that human nature compels 
the formation of atat*xo For on the one hand man's natural 
selfishness makes human association difficult and on the 
other man's natural sociability could be satisfied by pro.. 
political social life* The reasong thong for the voluntary 
establishment of civil society "must" &rise because man 
"has had regard to some utility which be will derive from 
It for himsolf. "34 This utility had to be sufficiently 
groat to outweigh the considerable #cost$ that citizenship 
involved minces 
Ihs man who becomes a citimen suffers a lose 
of natural libertye and subjects himself to an 
authority which includes the right of life and 
death$ - an authority at whose cousnand one must 
do many things from which one would otherwise 
shrink$ and must leave undone wany things which 
one greatly desired to do* And then many actions 
must be refazz d to the good of the soclotyg which 
often conflicts with the good of individuals* 35 
Zu explaining why these burdens should be w; Llllngly undertaken# 
19.5 
Pufendorf adopted a Hol)bepinn cbArapterization of natural 
man -a characterization 
ho had rejected earlier uffien 
insisting$ against Hobbess that men's natural relations 
were essentially friondly and peaceful rather than hostile 
and warl: Ucoe It now appeared to Pufendorf thats 
no animal is fiercer cr more untameable than man, 
and more prone to vices capable of disturbing the 
peace of society*.. * 
Therefore the Senuine and principal reason why 
the patriarchal abandoninZ their natural libortyq 
took to founding atateog was that they might fortify 
them3elves against the evils whicli threaten man 
froas man. For$ attar Gods man can most help man# 
and has no leas Vowcr for harms 36 
Natural institutions could not effectively protect 
man from man because the tconzent* and lagroementt embodied 
within them could not bo relied uYon. And the natuml law 
which ultimately sanctioned sociability was not sufficiently 
resyocted by the "great multitude of those to vihom ovary 
right is worthlosag whenever the hope of gain has enticed 
themg or confidence in their own strength or shrewdness" 
leads them to believe that they may "be able to reyol or 
oludo those whom they have injurod. 07 natural law WaD 
still lair - Pufondorf did not deny this basic propouition - 
but ho now choso to omplmsise that i 
although the natural law sufficiently teaches man 
that those who Inflict injury upon others will not 
go unpunished$ nevertheless neither fear of the 
Divinity nor the sting of conscience In found to 
have strength to control the malice of all Sorts 
of =on* For with many# through defect of training 
and habit, the force of reason grows deaf as It wares 
The result in that they aim at things present only# 
indirrarent to the ruturo, and are moved only by 
what strikes upon the senses. But since divine 
venzeance co=only lmlkj3 with slow foote for that 
reason wicked men are given an opportunity to 
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attribute the evils which befall the impious to 
other causes so* But to check evil dosireas the 
prompt remedyg and one well adapted to human natural 
is found in istateso j8 
Thus civil society was necessary because the atfkto of 
naturo was incapable of providing the security essential 
for civilized lifoo Although the Imixed state of natural 
might allow a more comfortable existence for man than the 
tpurely natural statets still that life 
could not be compared in any way with civil life$ 
not 80 such On Account of wantq which the householdl 
with Its limited desires, seems fairly well able to 
banixhg as because security in not fully provided 
for there* Ands to be briefs in the natuml 
state each man In protected by his own powers onlys 
in the community by those of all, Xn the former 
no one has a certain reward for his industryl in 
the latter all have its In the one there in the 
rule of passions war, fear$ poverty* ugliness, 
solitudes barbarisms ignorance, savageryl in the 
other the rule of reasong peaces xecurityl riches$ 
beauty, societyq refinements knowledge, zood will* 39 
Security itself was a problem beeausa of the perversions 
in the make-up of natural man. In order to show how these 
cunning* short-sightede self-seekingg perverse individuals 
could be integrated into the moral and political community 
of the states Pufendorf elabornted a complex series of 
contracts. This exercise$ he acknowledged, was not 
historical* The historical origin of most states was 
"unknownj or at least *# not entirely certain. " The 
forizins' that he was concerned to portray were thus not 
historical ones but neither were they "imagined". They 
were* rather% the "necessary" origins of the state - 
"necessaryto that is. for the understandirr. of conteelporary 
political society and political obligation* The contracts 
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that he enumerated were necessary truths known "by 
reasoning" about the'okigin of states from the existing 
fact of them 
Wt 
for a state to coalesce regularlys two compacts 
and one 
' 
decree are necessary* For first of all# 
when the many mien* who are thought of an established 
In natural liberty, gather to form a states they 
individually enter into a joint agreements that 
they are ready to enter into a permanent community$ 
and to manage the business of their safety and 
security by common counsel and guldancel in a wordq 
that they mutually desire to become fellow-citizense 
They must all together and singly agree to this 
compactl and a man who shall not do sog remnins 
outside the state that is to be* 
After this compact a decree must be madeq 
stating what form of govezi ant in to be introduced* 
For until they have settled this pointl nothing that 
maks* for the common safety can be steadily carried 
out. 
After the decree concerning the form of 
governmentq another cokapact Is needed, when the 
personq or permonsg upon whom the government of 
the nascent state is conferred are established in 
authority* By this compact theme bind themselves 
to take care of the common -security and safetyl the rest to yield them their obediencel and by 
it also all subject their own wills to the will of 
that person or V*rsonsg and at the same time make 
over to hims or to them, the use and employment of 
their powers for the common defense, And only 
when this compact has been duly executedl does a 
perfect and regular state come into beingo 41 
Thlxg in ensepeet, was Pufendorf Is understonding of 
the xtat*9 The state united the private wills of each 
citizen by subordinating them to the single will of the 
sovereign authority* At the same time that sovereign was 
endowed with the power to punish offences against Its will 
and thusq in the last resort@ to either force the private 
will's compliance or eliminate It, Yrom theme considerations 
Pufondorf declared that "a state is defined an a composite 
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moral person# whose wIll# Intertwined and united by virtue 
of the cou"ets of the many$ in regarded an the will of all, 
so that it can use the powers and resources of all for the 
common pence and securitye 0,42 
The only way that such a uniting and intertwining of 
wills could legitimately &rise was through the consent of 
all those concerned* This fundamental proposition of 
contractarian. thought, howevors was not intended by 
Pufandorf to have any redicalg anti-govers ental Implications* 
Thor* was no suggestion that the private will night withdraw 
Its consent and forcefully resist established government 
and there was no insistence that the consent neconsary for 
legitimate Sovex out must in some, way be formally and 
freely ascertained* On the contraryl he was quite prepared 
to accept that "sometimes a people Is compelled by the 
violence of war to consent to the authority of the victor In 0 
43 
We have already encountered a v*rxion of this somewhat 
stranSo argument amongst some of the defenders of the 1688 
Revolution* Pufondarflo work was Just becoming well known 
by the Revolution and may well have boon the Inspiration 
for those pro. -Revolution argumentso But it should, be 
omphaslood that the Idea that 'consent' can be 'forced' 
empties the notion of 'consent' of much of Its meaning* 
And to go an to Insist that only government founded by 
$consent' Is lissitimateg Is not to may very much* 
Pufandorf appoars to havv boon at least one of the 
sources for another iWortant contractorian doctrine widely 
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hold in Xngland during tho late seventeenth ventury, This 
was that the 'original contractors$ - those whoso couxent 
vats essential for the legitimate foundation of a state . 
were only "the heads of households",, 
44 
or the 'fathers and 
masters of families#* Democracy he defined an that form 
of government in which "the supreme authority in in the 
hands of a council composed of all the heads of households"g 
and this section of the population alone was wjuit vas meant 
by "the people"*4,5 We will most similar ideas in the 
writing* of Algernon Sidney and James Tyrrell where they 
are used to identify that section of the community uUch 
can legitimately determin* when the sovereign has broken 
his contract* In Pufendorf's theory the ideas play a 
rather confusing role* On the one hand they repronont the 
logical outcome of his development from tho 'purely natural 
state' of isolatad individualsq to the 'mixed state of 
nature' of family lifeg to finally the civil xtatee But$ 
on the other hand# it is difficult to see w1hy paternal 
authority should convey a right to consent to political 
obligations for the whole of a family when paternal and 
political authority were by definition no vory different 
one from the other. 
Conxiderations of interest and convonience led the 
beads of households to enter civil society* But the 
oblirmatio-n- to obey civil authority was neither grounded 
on prudence nor utilitys Consent wax essential for 
incurring obligations butq as with natural lawe ultimately 
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the obligation to continue obeying civil authority was 
rooted in conscience conforming to God's wills Thus 
Pufendorf concluded his discussion ef the origin of civil 
society by noting thats 
what has been laid down with regard to the origin 
of states does not prevent us froin saying with good 
reason, that civil authority Is from God* For it 
in His will that the natural low be observed by 
all meng and in factq after the race had multipliedq 
life would have con* to be no barbarousq an to leave 
scarcely any place for the natural laws whereas Its 
observance In greatly promoted by the establishment 
of states* In view of all this$ and since lie who 
orders an end In understood to order also the means 
necessary-Lto the end, God too, through the medium 
of reasonOx rAndateg Is understood antecedently to 
have enjoined upon the now numerous human race to 
establish stateng which are aninatedg so to speaks 
by their highost authority. 46 
The point wag heavily underlined in Pufondorf's discussion. 
of the limits of political obliCation - the riCht of 
resistance. A properly constituted civil authority was 
$'supreme" and unaccountable "to any human being"t Pufendorf 
insizted*47 It was the source of all 
this meant neither that govornment van 
nor that all consands issuing from the 
obeyedo PILus noRull, ime indeed the 
rulers" sinco "authorityima conferred 
civil laws But 
neconsarilY un3. imit*dg 
sovereign must be 
"Cenoral law Of 
upon theml with 
the Intention that the and for which states have been 
established# should thereby be insured" . 
48 But experienco 
. had shown that under absolute monarchs this lendf might 
easily be perverted and thuts "it has seemed wise to some 
nations to circumscribe the exercise of this authority by 
certain limits. " Coronation oaths, fundamental laws, 
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regular parliaments appear to be what Putondorf -bad in mind 
here4,49 Nat-pral 141w and the Divine Will provided the 
limit on what & NOVOIreign Could legitimately commands fors 
every power is understood to be conferred upon any 
person without prejudice to the rights of a superiorg 
so *#, upon the establishment of a suprome civil 
power citizens were neither able nor willing to 
renounce GodIs sovereignty over themg and are* 
therefore$ not bound by any cominands of the civil 
xovereigntyg which are confessedly and openly 
repugnant to a command of God* So 
Yet an individuals$ citizens could not forcefully resist 
their sovereignIs encroachments upon their rightag save 
if they wore faced by 4m=Jnent death, Pufandort's advice 
to the oppressed subject vast endure the abuse of supreme 
authority or floe the, country rather than disturb even 
further the stability and quiet of civil JifeO A whole 
people, on the other hands did have the right to resist 
its sovereign when its safety was seriously endangered* 
But this was heavily eircumocribedl it did not mean that 
a people might resist whenever a sovereign ruled against 
its wisheso Pufendorf rested the solution to popular 
rights of resistance upon the terms agreed in the original 
contracte Those terms established the practical arrangements 
necessary for securing the tend' of the state - the safety 
of the people* Only in the most exceptional circumstances* 
when the lend* of the state was perverted could there be 
rightful resistance to the sovereign authority. 
51 
Although Pufendorf's argument is sometimes unclear and 
confuseds 
52 Its generul ch6racter in not difficult to as** 
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Unlike any or the Constitutional Contractarian literatures 
his vas not concernod to counsel intervention in the 
practical affairs of his day* Nor ims he concerned to 
justify any particular political activitiono He was 
interested instoad in portraying and accounting for the 
phenomenon of the istate as a complex of interrelated powers, 
righteg and duties. His enquixy was conducted for the 
sake of a-better understanding of the state rather than to 
recommend or Justify changes within any particular state. 
Ilia dispute was with othar theorists like Grotius and Hobbes. 
It uns not with current politicians. Now how far could 
this be said of those English writers in the late seventeenth 
century who employed tho vocabulary of Social Contxvtct? 
In many cases it most clearly could not. Perhaps the 
best wmmple of this body of Socia3L Contr-act literature in 
ToUls RoIJI&Cal Anhorljmej Ora Ele nalet )%X; Lm_g Of Goverm 
Dinlaxed .. RX wax -01 a alle=o 
tq DjC* 'WIXILOM Sher-lock 
(1690). Here the author was concerned to transcribe (though 
without acknowledgement) passages from vorks by contractarian 
vriters that might prove useful in practical argumento about 
the Revolution, His chosen sources mnZed from IPufondorfg 
Hooker and 14oke to Gilbert Burnet. And the points oxhis 
title indicatess 'Was a very practical one, EXAMP1028 of 
even more speelfically 'practical' Social Contract 
arguments appear in the tWo anonywous pamphlets & 
Ar=ent QE-Self-DefencO (1689) and A Poll-tital- S2nfer6ence 
bet"e" AuLigUl-a Courtjj)r Dams& a C-ovnjr=j2t-. ang .1 
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C: LXlcug.. & CIIIISM . (1689). ThO first *ndeavour*d tc)-p"Vo 
that the thr"t of violence against James II wax perfectly 
legitimate* The second attempted, to prove to, =031 Of 
wOrdiuaryCapacity" that govornment originAted by controcts 
or rather by aTufondorfian 'dual contractIq and thus 
resistence could be justified* And the author of, & 
Digeourse concerniaS the Naturom ftler. agd grone; c Eff-octs 
of the Ergeonj Conven-tigno - 
in kgth 
-Unsdoml 
(1689) v Introduced 
actions of 'state of naturelt OnAtural low"s and Idouble 
contract# into an argument designed to prove that the 
Conventions were legitimate bodies* This is the typical 
expedient of pamphleteers to resort to handy higher 
principles$ and it doext of-courxe6 134ve the effect of 
transforming the Ophilosophical, O arguments Into something 
quite difforeuts For 'those Arguments are lifted out of 
their context and are placed in anothere They are 
informed with particular moanijagol a narrow and specific 
relation to particular events or Institutional arrangements 
Is Imposed upon theml and they are. employed as 'weapons' 
In the cut. -and. -thrust of a practical debate that has meaning 
only tor ft particular : pl&co at sk particular timo-i 
VzoetiCal concern, thong pr*dom4natex Lu much Social 
Contract literature of tht, late seventeenth-contury, But 
what of the nore, famous cont-reatarian writings of the time - 
those of SiOnort TyrrolIs Locke and Paxton? Wor* they 
war* akin to Puf*ndorf'Os writings or- the pamPblet 1.1terstpre, 
that 1, have Just noted? At first glance Lockets work at 
: 2o4 
least seems very similar to Pufandorf's. Did be not rely 
exclusively upon the Ivueabularyt of Social Contra"t &nd 
did he not suggest that his own work wami like Pufandorfls? 
53 
But on closer mmmination this similarity appears more and 
more superficial. Tyrrellin and Sidneylgit workso too* 
contain extensive sections of-& highly theoretical kind. 
Yet once again when their cogMiete works ors considor*ds 
the theoretical sections acquire a very different' character 
from PufandorfIx* We will consider these writings in 
detail in the following, chapters but it should-be noted at 
the outset that the most obvious abaracteristic that these 
writings share and that separates them from Pufoudorfts 
is their urgent concern to refute a specific practical 
arguments that of Filmer. And their furgencyl Is only 
comprehensible when It is reca2lod that Filmor bad become 
the theorist of a powerful political factions a faction 
strongly opposed by Sidbieyq Tyrrell and Locke, Thus theirs 
was an attack on "Filmerism" . Film*rls theory as it 
appeared in the practical i=plications that wore currently 
being drawn from It* 
Of these more famous writings$ only Peter Paxton's 
C: iv-il PolklY (1703) which was written relatively late in 
our perlod$ escapes from the concern with Filmor, The 
tons of his argument In more reflective and he in not 
concerned to recommend or justify changes in the Xnglish 
polity-* But even though much of what he wrote might well 
have commnded th* assOnt of Sidneys Tywrells LockeO54 or 
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Pufandorfe his work was dwrpted to-ýhe answering of different 
questions from any or t1hpue otherse It waslutbaded to 
portray "from Wiat Source such a Diversity of Customs, 
Mnuerxg, Usages$ Lawz9 and Methods or Livingg that are 
daily to be obxerved amongst the Sons of Adage do proceed", '" 
English Social Contruct writing, then, appears vuri*4 
in "Ature but is generally more concerned with current 
politicaX pructic* than Putendorfla-ft JMXg NatDM-jj- 
GontLxg and He -OArfAg&g 
jLqgWf Lt C&U11o Lockelo . 
7ým 
j=&tIp. 2g Is clearly the most ftmous late savonteenth century 
English work In this Senr** Xf ve, now look-. more closely 
at his theory and the controv*rxiex that surround, its 
intellectual statues we way begin to see more distinctly 
the implications of SOCIA). Contract Theory for Englishmn 
durlngý our period* 
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CHAPrER VII 
JOHN LOCIM M 71M SOCLA 
.&-C. 
O.. Nracr 
Studies of ý Koko 
Ia political works have awltipli*d 
enormously in recent years* But a very confusins picture 
of Locke has oworSede Th* once undixputed oxponent of th* 
tyrinciples of 1688t and the lobampion of constitutional 
dovmo%zmcyl I has become a much more complex, contradictory 
an4 dovioux choractort Occasionally the more Itraditional 
Lockew- - the ebappioa of individualism and the elaborater 
of modern Liberalism. 
2 
. still musters support. But that 
Locke now contends with a series of Inew Lockefil - M, 
ebampion of majority rule$ an ideologist of the emergent 
bourgeoisie and a tacit exImnent of Ilobbian, 63 Avint 
although the LoCke who wax once an original and profound 
political thinker still has his defenders#4 he is pow 
challenged by Lock0s *&0 =P"51"d 32'otblng but "Pftrocb"' 
political orthodoxY"*-5 or who simply restated the aft'nilisr 
6 
principles q,, ge forged by the heirs Of John C-Alvin"* 
Xudeado pne of thoxe InOw LoOkOXI So dioappolut*d his 
croator that, 'the 122 Tr-0-4-tiser appeared an "tot) quaint and 
insubstantial to deserve tho admiration it has roceivod. "7 
W- Now practically all of these interpretations of Locke 
acknowledge that the arsýmeut of MM MC*atinj ix prosopted 
In & loose and unrigorous wayl andt at, least in partq it 
: Lx thin acknowledgement that has somstillem led to Locks's 
'relegation# fVOR the, rank of polItLeal. pbilosol)be; r to that 
of party pambletoer or tract writer* It ix the liomms , 
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involved in this question that will occupy much of our 
attention in this chapter& Is the understanding, of 'contract' 
presented in Wo &gatises, essentially the same an that 
presented in Pufandorf 'is j!. %jIvre Naturga ot Go-nUums or 
its it not? 
I propose to womino this very broad question by 
considering a number of narro4ort more specific ones. 
First# what occasioned Iockoln writing the Two 1ý. %atlsob? 
What effect did he hope his writing and publishing the work 
would produce? Second* Wbat vas the character of ; 4ckels 
notions of the #state of mturel and the 'social contract#? 
Were they understood historically or$ as by Pufendorfl as 
hypothetical and neceBsary concepta for a proper understanding 
of the state? Third, Is the argument of I! Lo Tresitlisgs more 
appropriately viewed as political philosophy or an political 
rhetoric7 And f; Umllyg how did Uck*lx contempozaries 
view the argument of Jý! Lusatlxes? What impact did the 
vork have on political debatev especially In Nvalands during 
the first fifteen years after its publlcationl' I *ill look 
at each of thexe quextiouss or xetx of quastlosixt In turn- 
Locke studento are uow practically unanisoUSlY ugr**d 
tbAt the MM MCOAtimos, was largely written mme ton years 
before the 1688 Revolution. Peter laxlett's detailed 
research during the 1950a revealed that the two essays of 
the Treatizen were conceived an a single work* that they 
were simply revised for publication after Locke's "turn 
trout "Ile in 16890 and that they had initially been written 
between 2.679 and 1681. 
a 
The considerable textuals biographical 
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and historical evidence Ithich Laslett presents for the 
earlier dating appears sufficient to uphold his thesis, 
But it is worth remembering that the case has not been 
established beyond doubte Much of Laslettle historical 
evidence about the relevance of Lockets arguments to the 
Exclusion Crisis rather than the Revolutiong for emuple, 
in suspeet*9 Yet fn)m his onquiriess laslett convincingly 
argues that Locke vrote the Treatises an a propaganda piece 
for a projected rizing by the larl of Shaftesbury* 
The contention that 3ýM 2: 1: eatises max a 12: tece d' Scap&Mj 
sk propaganda pieces does not preclude$ as Z. S. Do Beer I-viLs 
recently suggesstedl that it wats also a "speculative troutiss 
written in answer to a "culative treatise", 
" Xt clearly 
us's the CaS6 that one Of LOckO"8 purposes in writing the 
work was that whieb is expressed in their title, The first 
treatise was designed to Metect and overthrows the-"Zjjge 
d Found2tio" of Sir . 
2gkort PlImeM and his am 
Followers"I the second was intended to display the "True 
Originalg Rxtent,, and Znd of Civil-Government. " The 
connection between the first and second parts Una quite 
simplyg as the first review of toockes work pointed out# 
that the first revealed the ahortcomingpe of the principal 
royalist theory of political lef; Jtjr8acy whilst the second 
provided an alternative rind supposedly vuucb more adequate 
theory* 11 LocUe himnelf explained ti2e purpose of the 
Second Trog-time 'alonZ these lines in its first pamgrvýph* 
., nod 
to "find out another rise of It uns an enquiry desig 
Govai ents another Orisinal of politicAl Powers and anothor 
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way of designing and knowing the Persons that have Its then 
what Sir !! gbqr6j F.., hath taught us. "12 
The anti-Xilmer design clearly runs throuZU the whole 
of Two T=tjo-egs and it In difficult to see why commutators 
like V. *I* Aaron should want to insist that Holbbex as well 
as Filmer was Lockets 'target' In the Secad- TjCggj1vg, *l3 
Locke and Filmer In XOverul r, 08pectgl were mueb more akin 
to one another than either were to Hobbes, Both accepted 
that Mhn was a creatwe made byl for and In the image of 
Gods that God had ordained govvz ent in the. worldo that 
the Bible contained a valid# and In no sense ximply 
metaphorical account of the first ages of the vorldg that 
the 13ible was a7ýs*lutely nutlioritative, in all moral questionag 
and both agreed on the methods of argument appropriate to 
resolving diapptemo 
Xt vas precisely thin considerable agrepmout between 
Locke and 11ilmer on certain. rupdameptal Ideas thatý made 
the republication of the latteres works such. 1m. serjLous 
oballengo to the Shaftesbury Whigs with whom Uýr , ko via a 
asso. ciatedt The orgumonts of Hobbes, Re Cive and LjjAAthM 
for the necesaity of absolut* sovereignty simply did not 
carry the 9ANO weight 090 Filmer's during the late x*veut, *enth 
century* The judguent of Filmor himself on3Uobb*s might 
b* talon as representing, tbat of even the most ardent 
rpyalixtx* "I consent with him about the rights of 
oxercizins Xqv*=wentI"- he d*cUredg "but X Cannot agree 
to bin meate of acquiring it ** Ip praise his building, 
and yet mislike his foundation". 
JL4 Indeedg the seemingly 
2a 0 
atheistic$ immoral theory ofHobbes was practically 
universally spurned in the very religion-conscious age of 
the Restoration and Rovolution, 
JL5 As we have seen, almost 
the only references to Hobbes In political debate$ particularly 
after the mid-1680al were as contemptuous labole for 
cateCorizin, S opponents4o It was Filmer and not'Hobbes itho 
was the principal authority for late seventeenth century 
royalists. 
Hobbest political writingus thens'did not attract any 
significant following during the late neventeenth, centuryO 
whereas Filinerts did* Filmerts major works wert) first 
published at the height of the Excluxion Crisis apparently 
as an act of policy by the royalistg anti-Excluxionistso' 
At all events the works'were warmly recommended to the 
public by the official paper "tho Publick Gazej". 
16 It 
wong furthez res Filmer and -not Itobbes who appeared an the 
principal opponent of all those pro-Exclusionist writers 
who were concerned to raire their argiment above trudslinging 
and Coasip. 
17 And fineillys it was FiLner and not Ilobbes 
uho remained the principal authority of all those defenders 
of the English monarch's absolute power during the two 
decades following the Exclusion Crisis - non like Edmund 
13ohunt Jeremy Collier and Charles Legglie. 
18' In these 
cirCUM3tanCOO it is not surprizinS that Filmer should bAve 
appeared as the raost significant exponent of absolutist 
theory in the late 96*enteenth centuryg and that a writer 
of a different persuasion, like Locket should have found 
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it nocessary to devote considerable effort to ottocking 
Filmor so ti-At his own theory would stand more ebance of 
acceptance. 
TWO JEO&tiff. Us thOne aPPears to have been written by 
Locko with, & clearly pzitctical political end in vlowt to 
Undezvdne the theory of the principal royalist authority 
and establish an alternative theory to which Whig politicians 
could appeal* This and Two 3ýr. 22tlsos shared with a number 
of other political works composed at approxinktoly the name 
time . most. notably$ Sidney's Discou 
and TyrrellIx FAjj: LftXqhM E211 &Iw-r-clw Out Locke's work 
differed from these others in the InArrownessf of its 
critique of Filmer and the $generality' of its alternattva 
theorye Sidney and TY=611* an we shall se*s" were 
concerned to refute not only Filmer's theory of political 
logitimcy but ploo his notions about the English 
Constitution* And the general Oogial Contract Theory 
that they outlined was integrally connected to their viewx 
on English constitutional history and, law, 
Irilmorls politicAl work5 were indeed much more wide. 
ranging than Locke's 3ýM T-r-gatigele Apart f"M the famous 
enquiry into the nature of political po"rs F: LIMO#rlf writings 
contain cormentaries and critiques of Aristotle* IIobbG8# 
Milton and Gmtiust an wel. 1 ae; detailed wmminations of the 
power and Inter-relations, of tho various constitutional 
authorities in England* His general theory Of the necessity 
for ap arbitrarys unlimiteds sover*ignp monarchical power$ 
however$ pervades the whole of his work* Indoeds the 
.1 
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work In which he most carefully outlines this general theory 
tran conceived, an its sub-title indicateas with gnglish 
affairs in mind*20 And his argument proceedn'In a sinSle 
development from a refutation of "Natural Freedom" (the 
basic principle of his opponents), to a Justification of 
the #naturalness$ of absolute monarchy$ and on to an 
e5mmination of the BuSlish constitution 'provinSI it to 
be such a Inatuxult constitution. 
Lockets attack on Filmer did not take him into an 
examination of specific English constitutional laws at least 
the text which Locke published did not contain such an 
enquiry* Dut we can never be sure that Locke did not 
attempt to follow Fllmer into the consideration of Xnalixh 
law (at least until the *missing' part of the Treatises is 
recovered). For in the preface to the Treatisear Locke 
informed his reader that a considerable part of his work - 
"more than all the rest" - bad been lost. And this $middle' 
section of his work supposedly followed Filmer "through all 
the Windings and Obscurities which are-to be mat vith in 
the several Bx%nchieu of his wonderful System, &"21 Yet if 
there were any cuch missin.,; papers (Lockets word alone has 
always been accepted for it) it is difficult to imagine 
what they could have contained If not$ In part at least# a 
refutation of Filmorts theory of the ZnqP.,, lish constitution. 
The papers supposedly answered "the several Branches" of 
Filmer's tbousht. And yet one of the most outstftnding 
lbranchast of his enquiries . occu,,,, )y: Lng about one third %. V 
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even of the rgtr-ia-rLha itself - was poncerned vith the 
English constitution* 
22 Laslatt's contentions then$ that 
mince Loclco was never very interested in the conatituti; )na3L 
debates of hia clay it. is 'unlikely that the missing part of 
Two IkeatIseS considers them, 
23 
seems itself =likely* a. "MONION I 
There certainly are grounds for assuming that Loclce ims 
not an interested in the particular lawal customs and 
practices of the English constitution as he wax in many 
other things. Dut these pmunds are not sufficient for 
the further ass=Wtion that the lost part of the Treatimaxs 
followinS the plan Locke suggested In his prefaces would 
not have involved an examination of English constitutional 
affairso 11 
But no matter what, the ='Lissing papers may or may not 
havo containedl tho Treatises as published woo unique* 
Locke publipheds, as he wrote, with a practical political *ud 
In vlevo The workv he lu)podl van "suffic: Lent to optablinh 
the throna of our Great Restorers Our present King ! "jjW*24 
Dut L*cL-e# unlPce any of the other defenders of the Re"Jutiong 
2,5 
made no AttOMVt to proVO tbAt the establishment of William 
and Mry on the English throne had been warranted expressly 
or tacitly by English constitutional law. His referenco 
to William an the "Cwoat Restorer" was certaInly a reference 
to the 'constitutional Justifications' of the Revolution 
where William appeared as a legal kEng according to the law 
of the *ancient English constitution' whielk he bud lr*ntoredt 
after James IXIp attemopts at $subverting' it - but Locke's 
23.4 
axTumcnt did not pursue the constitutionalist line further* 
It seemsq then, that in terms of the circumstances or 
their creation and publication jXo Treatises and Purendorris 
works were very different* But what of the cbaracter of 
the concepts of *state of nature# and #social contract# 
that each e=mined bud built upon? As we bave. seen$ 
Pufendorf understood these concepts to relate to neither 
the historical nor the conjectured forigint of the state 
they were rather therogeosaa concepts for a proper 
understanding or the nature of contemporary civil soci*tyo 
Uckels undoratanding of *state of nature' and #social 
contract## howevers has been the subject of numerous$ 
conflicting interpretationse If we now look at these 
controversies we may gain a clearer view of the nature of 
Lockels Social Contract Theory* 
Comentatoris hardly differ over the nmetion of the 
Istate of naturel": Ln Lockets arjp=ento It is accepted at 
establishing the natural$ pro-civil rights and duties of 
wan and as indicating wby civil government in necessary, 
for social life* The controversies have arisen about its 
status* Some bave argued that it is a purely WCPOs: LtOrY 
devices 26 others that it in partly expository and partly 
historic&l 027 and others still that it is principally 
historical* 28 Again* it has been vimied as an exposition 
of the pro-sociai. 
29 
pro-political, 30 or pro-civil 
31 
eondition of iman., It ban also been argued that Locke has 
not oneg but two conflicting notions of the Istato of 
rAturel - the one a istate of peace, the other a state of 
21.5 
waro 
1,2 And finallyg Locke's lst*t* of n&turOl 1148 been 
considered as either an abstract construction of reanons 
or as based on "experience and on the observation of th* 
Actual beliaviour of men,, 933 or as essentially A 
theologl6al 
axiom* 
34 
Some of these characterizations are p1minly wrong 
according to explicit statements by Lockes but others havv 
strong textual evidence to support them. Lockets views on 
the status of the 'state of uaturet are far from unambisuous 
and it in thus unlikely that any account will prove finally 
conclusive* Perhaps the most that can be hoped for Is an 
account which does least injustice to the evidence of the 
texts* 
We way begin by considering w1wat the 'state of UAturel 
most clearly was not* In the first plAce it'vas not a pro- 
social condition* Life in the tatate of nature$ van depicted 
an one in which family life existed on a grand mtale,.. with 
faniLlies consisting ofrelationshipx between "Man and Wifes 
iddeh save beginninS to that between Parents and Childrent 
to whicho in timel, that between Master and Servant c*me to 
33 It wan also a rok" of social life in Which be addedY* 
"ftvwisoz"q "Co"cts" and "Bargains" co&Ud be effectively 
uAde Sinbe'"Truth aild''Zoopins Of palth*uoloaxv to 34eng UX 
Men$ and not as Members of civilj Society. "36 b his. then, 
was as isociAl a tatate of naturet as Puf*udort's finixed 
state of nature 16 
Secondly* the #state of nature' was not a IGoiden Agog 
ai6 
the development of mankind - Mi virtuouss. hormonioux ptate 
into which corruption penetrated$ eventually necessitating 
the harsh controls of civil society,, Th*reare elements 
37 
of this view in Locket but he mentions the "Golden Age" 
an rather the early stages of Sovernmnt than any pro- 
Governmental pariod*38 
Locke raost frequantly dofinon the IsUts Of nAtural 
*n terTas of it not being "Politick Society"* Xt in the 
state "all Man are naturally in ... and romin SO* till 
by their own Consents they make themselves Members of soluG 
Politick Sgciety"*39 nut, atille the 'state of nature, iis 
not a pro-politIcal SoCiOtY in the XOPGO thAt P011ti"I 
power. does not exist within its at least in embryo* For 
"PojLtkWI- Po= in thatl Power which every Mant haviug In 
the state of Natx; re,, has given up into the hands of the 
Society, and therein to the Governouris"s 
40 
political power 
is derived from the aggregation of the, executive power of 
the law of nature which each exercised Independently in 
the #state of nature$* Thus the 'state of natural is 
wcamined an the state of mankind In the absence of organized 
government* And the point of the enquiry In to show first* 
that man stands In dire, need of governmoutl, second, that 
he is capable of organizing itl mind third9 that only a 
certain (though very general) form of goveri out organization 
can properly be seen as government at p1l, - In particularg 
that arbOmryll abpoluto rule ing properly speakings not 
a form of government,, 
017 
Here then are threo thins* whith the tmtat* of natural 
most defJnJtely wax not* But from what sources did 14eke 
derive Me conception ý of the I state oir nature I- and in 
particular$ whftt role dId Ustorical ovidonce play? 14oke 
wag aware tl)at Ixtato of nature argvnents' and loriginal 
contractal lad been objected to owthe grounds that they 
were not evidenced In humAn history. kl Yet be beUevod 
I 
the objection could be easily countered* His answer vas 
twoVolds firsts there was ample evidence in hlxtoryýand 
current practice of the tatate of nature# and foriginal 
contractall and &*condo even i: r history appeared to lend 
support to the patriarchalint case this could not undermine 
his own argument* It in this last point, that his 
contractarianism was immune from historical criticisms 
that linked LoWces' theory with P"endorfls Do Jure Nal-m-r-00 
et Gentium and separated It, as we &hall sees fton the 
apparently xixdlar works by Sidney and Tyrrell* 
Lacke Insisted that "tho World ueve; r vast nor ev*r 
will bag without, Supbers of Men In that State [of Naturq]o Im42 
And he pointed to the rulers of independent states and to 
U*OILOrIx authority for evidence of this. 
43 He 0: rten 
xpoke of the Istate of maturel and its supersession by 
contract as an historical eventg and here he countered the 
objection that history ; lid not support him* Xn the first 
placet he arguedl "it in not at al3L to be wondertdg that 
HistgEX given us but a very little account-of Mons -that 
l1yed- together In- 
-the 
!. tgjq 91 NatHEem " But this was not 
because it had not happened in the past* The reason was 
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rather because the period of the $state of natural was 
exceedingly short and anyway had been superseded before 
there were any records* Yet what little evidence, did 
remain of the origin of governments, Locke claim*dq did 
support his argument* The accidental, recordd "we have, of 
the beginning of-any Polities in the'Woridg" he d*olaredl 
"excepting that of the Jewav whore God himself immediately 
interpoaldg and which favours not at all Paternal Dominiong 
are all either plain instances of such a-boginning as I 
have mentioneds or at least have manifest footsteps or, it. 1144 
And he pointed to Rome, Venice and the omigrents who left 
Sparta with Palantus as historical examples of original 
contracts; 
43 
and to "many parts of Amorica"46 (which was 
fAstill a Pattern of the first Ages in Asia and,! S=*r47) 
as evidence of the continuing existence or $states or nature*. 
Despite all this evidence from history and contemporary 
experiencel Locke denied that such evidence could either 
support or refute In alaX Sonclusive rearD*ct, the principal 
argument of Two Treatix*s* This argument was about right 
rather than fact** Thus Locke noted that ov*n If history 
supported the Paternalist can* "one aightg, without any 
great dangerg yield them the cause". He could concede 
that in the past govermaents began In paternal rules and 
yet the argument of In Troatises, would be substantially 
unaff*ctod* * The argument thorewas about right, andg- 
according to Locke, *at best anArgument, from wbat has been, 
to what should of right beg bas no groat forces" The only 
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occasion when such an argument might have force was where 
"th* went of such 
[historica. ý] instancox be regarded an 
argument to prove that Government were notg nor could not 
be no b*sun"o 
48 
Since this was not thoc; ises and since 
any"y history, did provide lnet4nces of oriSinal contractal 
then one main arguatent &X&Lnut contractarianion could be 
rejected* 
Throughout ble argument 1, ockells appoal was prILmr: LIY 
to Roaxono History wax, evoked simply as evidence that 
the conclusions of Reason were not at variants with the 
practices of mankind* Reference to history was important 
because of the current ptate of debates about 'contractle 
As we have seen, practically all Lockets contemporaries who 
appealed to 'contract' believed It to have been an historical 
occuranteg and an* of the most troublesome criticisms was 
the absence of historical evidence* Thus in arguing that 
History and Reason were not at varlanceo and at the same 
time immunizing his *do& of contract from historical critIcIxm9 
44ekets Contract Theory could accommodate any historical 
evidence whatagavoro Indoods having considered the historical 
objection to his theory, Locke proceeded to note the 
historical evidence of the rise of government* His point 
was to prove that Reason and, Hixtory were not discordant 
by s! mwing "tbalt an fair as we have any light from Historys 
we have reason to conclude,, that, all peaceful beginnings 
of Gove=mSgl Nalre been lAjLg 113 tive collge9l -the PISOIDJLIM. '49 
locke bogan, this examination by acknowledging, with 
th* Patriarchalluts, that the earliest recorded sovernments 
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were usually monarchies. lie was even prepared to admit 
that in certain circumstances the monarch might well have 
been the father of his people, 
50 But this evidence, 
Lacke insisted* "destroys not that$ which I affirm, (=i 
That the beginning of Politick Society depends upon the 
consent ot the Individuals# to joyn into and make up one 
Societyl who, when they are thus incorporatedg might not 
up what form of Government they thought fit, "51 The 
evidence merely suggested that there must have boon good 
reasons why the first framers of government should have 
decided upon, and been content with$ monarchy ratbor than 
any other form of governmento These roaxonsg Locke felt* 
were so simple and obvious 
52 that in "the first Ages of 
the World" it was "almost natural" for family government 
to change into political governmente It would be brought 
about by a "scarce avoidable consent" and the change would 
be "insensible, ", 33 Thus the historical evidence advanced 
by anti-contractarianx could be accepted without destroying 
Lockets basic contentions about the Istato of nature' and 
the 'original contract'. 
It would seem, then, that those interpretations which 
insist that Lockets fatate of nature$ and $social contract' 
are based on historical or empirical evidence are wide of 
the mark* Recently, hovever, an alternative view of these 
concepts has been suggestods that the tstate of natur*t 
is essentially a theological axiom, Now whilst both Polin 
and Dunn have both convincingly argued that a religious 
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conception lay at the bottom of Lockets reflections on the 
nature of man and the law of nature, this does not warx nt 
the further contention that it wax religious conviction 
rather than rational enquiry that led Locke to his views 
on the 'state of nature', For Locke himself believed that 
his basic religious ideas were themselves capable of 
rational demonstration* God was a rational being whose 
existence could be rationally proveds and his ways for man 
portrayed a rational design* 
34 Thus only by expanding the 
UOtiOU Of & th*0109ic&X Argument to Include any discusxlon 
about the nature of man ax a rational being could we concludeq 
with JOhn Dunns tI'At thO lqst&t* of nature ix a topic for 
theological reflectiong not for antWmpological regearch, "55 
But In doing this the distinction between anthropology and 
thoology collapsomo 
Locke's 'state of naturegg an I bAve suggeptedg seems 
rather to have been essentially an expository device, it 
established the natural rights of mans indicated the 
noc*sxity for civil xocietys and provided the key Vor 
distinguishing between th* legitimate and illegitimate 
oxeraixe of political powers Both the tatate of nature' 
and, the foriginal contract$ which opeasipned Its supersession* 
were viewed by Locke an evidenced in history, but their 
status in the argument of the Treatises was not dependent 
upon thato They served as crucial copcopts in a rational 
explanation of the nature of political *ocletyj rather 
than an historical account of the rise of government., As 
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rational constructions they were not susceptible to 
refutation by anything but similar arguments from reasons 
as far as Locke himself was concerned. His description 
of life in the fetate of nature' supposedly accorded with 
the evidence of reasons historyg experience and theology. 
And though evidenco from the last three of these Isourcoss 
could conceivably cast doubt on the validity of his argu=ental 
none alone could disprove them, 
So far we have seen that Locke's Two Treatises were 
conceived and publisla*d as contributions to political argv=ents 
that were very closely related to the practical political 
conflicts of late seventeenth century Eng1and, In this 
respect the Treatises wats very different from Pufoudorf's 
Do- Jur-* Naturne st Go-nt-ium and Do orficio Homijais et cLvjLs. 
But the understanding of 'state of natural and $social 
contract' expressed in the argi, nt of the Second-Tiroatine 
appears very similar to Pufandorfla., Considerations such 
as those have given rise to widely differeut Interpretations 
of the general nature of Locke's Social Contract Theory. 
On the pne side it is asserted that Locke's theory represents 
a gonuino philosophical enquiry into the nature of the 
states whilst on the other it in insisted that the Seg*D4 
Treatise Is essentially sham philosophyq &'work of political 
rhetoric. The debate Is important for our purposes because 
the character of Locke's appeal to 'contract' depends upon 
it, What then are the sources of these disagreements and 
how might Locke's argument best be represented? 
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I shall argue that in part these dissagreements arise 
from the preconceptions of Locke scholarse and in part from 
the writinge of Locke himself. Xn outlining the first of 
these I ahall cOncentrate upon the two opposed accounts 
which seem the most coherent and substantial: those of 
Peter Laslett and Raymond Folin, In examining the seconds 
X &hall coacentrate on Locke's notion& of natural law and 
consent bocauso theise notionn. bav6 been at the centre of 
most disagreements over the general nature of the Treatizeso 
In the Introduction to his critical odition ýof ZýM 
Treatiogs, Laslett assertu that to call this work "Opolitical 
philosopby'. to think of 
[Locke) 
as a tpolitical philosopher's 
in inappropriato. "56 The obaervations he makes in defending 
this view art persuasive. Two IrealLM, he shows$ was 
most probably first written as a response to the Rxclusion 
Crisis and not to the 1688 Revolution, It was intended as 
a call for revolutionary action rather than &a. & justification 
forýa revolution that had already occured. It was intended 
to justify the activities of the Shaftesbury Whigs* it 
-ievS 
dloggpionl and t1lat &Ione*57 was az 
"' According to 
Lamlett Locke$ on his own testiviony at the time he was 
writing the Treatiseaq believed that true knowledge of things 
political was impossible* Politics was the sphere of 
opinion and probability which by itis nature eluded the - 
philosophical uAderstanding* 
58 And thus# IAxlett asserts* 
with this view of politic& it was unlikelythAt Looks Would 
have attempted to write political philosoPhY* Lockes 
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indisputably philosophical works the Come-Y-Coll-Ver-nigg KHMA 
Mderstandings expresses ideas especially in respect of 
natural lavvMch are Irreconcileable witl) the views 
contained in Two Treatises. 
" It is only pooterity that 
has looked upon the Essay and the Treatises an "coWplementary"l 
Ucke bimxelf uax anxious they should be seen &part 
6o (,,, 
was In fact most reluctant to admit his authorship of the 
political wor1c 
61) 
0 The Two Treati-ses, was not written 
according to the *plains historic method' of the RosaYe 
Had It beent laslett assertxe it would have invipted on 
the limitations of our social and political understanding* 
It would baye, demonstrated JLts conclusions 1by arguments 
proceeding from definitions of 'simple i0eaxt to the 
construction of 'complex XdeaxVin a way capable of 
"entering Into a mathematically demonstmble-m1walitye"62 
Instead Or this* most Of the notion* that fkre crucial to 
the argument of the SegqMd Ztgjtj9e, . notions of natural 
lavs consent$ freedom, laws roaxon, wills Sovorpmentg 
justice - are "nowhero discussod as oubjects In themseXvox"o 
The ýdeax of $political y9wer' and 1proportylt Laslett 
admitxl nre defined in the SqcgUd TreatIses but they are -011.0mm 
defined 'P-uot In philo4ophic terms* on nothIng like the 
principles laid down In the Elsays" 
63 From all these 
obiservations. Laxlett concludes that Two_Tx! *atjsex should 
be viewed an the work of a man who irrote on economics, on 
toleration& on religion, on education, who was also an 
Spist9woloslots Each enterprise was different and 
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therefore it in "Pointless to look upon Lockets worIc as 
vin integrated body of speculation and SeneralirAktions with 
a genoral, philosophy at its centre and an ito architectural 
; Cram, swork. t, 
64 
It was precisely this finAl point of Uslett's that 
Polin sets out to reject in his la Politiclue Norale do John 
122M. All Locke's speculations an matters moral and 
I 
politýcal# Polin argues$ were informed by a rational theologye 
Lockets philosophys ho assertag is "inseparable frota his 
relit, onn65 bec&ube "throu&hout his philosop, 44a, works 
Locko aypealed to Gods and without this racourse to Godg 
all the coherence of his yhilosophy would dissolve*" 
66 
Thus in Polin's workq Locke's enquiries into woralso 
politics$ religion and epistemology are portrayed as just 
so many parts of a Single philosophic enterprisO, Polin 
accepts Laulett's arguments that the Treatises was composed 
around 16130 as part of the attempt to exclude the Catholic 
Duke of York# the future James 110 from his right to 
succeed to the throne, But he refuses to follow laslott 
in takinS the further stop of arguiug that because In 
TreatLzos was, thus a vio'co d #occasion 
'I, 
a work of circumattnees 
it could not be philosophy, In PoIALuls vi*wl, the 
circumstances or tile Exclusion Crisis simply gave Locke 
the impetus to consider the "universal problems of Volitics"s 
The constant interest whicU philosophers have shown in the 
Treatises Is indicative$ he argues* or the extent to which 
the work texcapedl from the circumstances of its cr*ation* 
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Yetq as well as beinr, an enquiry into the eternal truth,, 
,e of morals and politics, 
the work had a practical mes&ar 
too. It was concerned both to counsel and Justify a Iset 
of present political activities S&I to explain the essential 
nature of moral and political experience., 
67 
It is apparent from those sketches of lAslett*s and 
Polinle interpretations of the general character of Ty IM 
Treatises, that they express different conceptions of the 
nature of philosophic enquiry. To lasiett philonopllical 
enquiry is necessarily non-practical - it is enquiry conducted 
in a particular way for the sake of truth, and this inevitably 
precludes a concern to justify or counsel intervention in 
practical affairs* To Polin philosophy tan both justify 
or condemn political practice gal illuminate universal and 
eternal truths, Political philosophy and political doctrine 
are one and the same, or can be - all that matters in that 
the argument be pitched at a sufficiently general level* 
In Polin6a work philosophy and Waltalasclk! xiiinit are equivalents 
(or at least compatible), in lazlett's work they are mutually 
exclusive Categories. It is this sort of disagreement 
that constitutes one of the main sources of confusion in 
the current literature an the character of Locke's work'on 
government* Recognition of this basic point helps explain 
why so many contemporary Locke'scholars can agree that Two 
TEgatistAg considered in isolation frogs the rest of L*cke's 
writingxs appears confusedq repetitiveg unrigorous and so 
ong and yet they can differ so widely in their interpretations 
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of the general nature of the work. 
Tho socond source of confusion for Locke scholars arises 
from Locke's o-im writinEs and reflections about the reneral 
character of the argument of MM- Troatipes. Lo cite wa gi a 
very solf-conscious uriter. His jourimis and letters 
contain intorestInZ reflections on tho nature of political 
studios, the nature of philocophic argt=ent in moral and 
political affairs, and on tho sort of work timt ho believed 
INto TroatIsem represented. A consideration of these 
reflections and an examination of the argument of the 
Treatises i1i the light of them will help to clarify the 
nature of Locke's Social Contract Theory. 
Wo have ulready 1300n that Ucke distinguishad'betwaen 
theoretical and practical enquiries Into politics and 
classified his own In Treatlegg as a theoretical studyg 
the best exAmple of which was Pufendorf Is De J! Me NatuM*. 
et-GorttLM* 
68 It seems that this distinction botwean the 
theoretical and the practical boa a counterpart in Lockets 
Seneral distinction between the two kinds of kno'46096 that 
the buman mind is capable of acquiring. He outlined this 
Soneral distinction in a note in his Jouzval of 1681. it 
Is this note uhich lAslett interprets as an argument against 
the possibility of certain knowledge in political affairs 
and uses as evidence that the Two lCeatiaLS., could not bove 
been intended an political philosophy, Lockets 'note contains 
the followinS observations: 
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There are two sorts of knowjeds In the world, 
generall and particularj founded upon two different 
principles, i. e. true Ideas and matter of fact or 
History. All generall knowledg is founded only 
upon true Ideas and soo far as we have these are 
capable of demonstration or certain knowledg. 
wl; 
ust 
as in mathematics] he that ag) Lziýj a true Idea of 
Qodq of himself as his creature, or the relation 
he stands in to God and his follow creaturess and 
of Justice, goodnesseq lawl happinessel etc*$ in 
capable of knowing worall things or Laws$ [of having] 
a demonstrative certainty in then* But though I -- 
say ek man that hath such Ideas is capable of certain 
knowledS in them, yet I do not any that presently 
he hath thereby that certain knowlodg *. * He may believe others that tell him , *, but know it not till he himself hath ... made to himsolf the demonstration I, e, upon examination seen it to be 
8060 69 
If we Interrupt Locke's reflections at this point we 
may ewjýhasise a number of considerations that are imortant 
for his conception of philosophy, morals and politics* ýn 
the first plý%cej for Locke the philosophical concern with 
knowledge and truth %me a concern with 'true ideas' . mud 
this concern involved a clear understanding of the limited 
capacity oV the human understanding for apprehendins 'true 
Ideas! # and hence the necessity and grounds for oplnion 
and belief* The RaggX Co cernin, tandInEs of n- - it 
11turAn Uhd!. rjLt - 
course, had this an its central concern* Secondly$ the 
essential nature of true knowlefte was that It mags "general' 
and Idemquatrableto Thirdly, @ "morall ... Laws" were 
presented an capable of mathematical demonstration* and 
hence were proper subjects for philosophical enqttirys 
And, finallys some, aspects of humn e; Kporlence wero inherently 
incapable of the demonstrative cortainty necessary for true 
knowled5oo In the remainder of Locke's reflections he 
notes that "physique Emedecine]q polities and prudence" 
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are three such &roan In which 'domonstration' Is Impossible 
and hence they concern merely lopinjont and 'probabIlityl, 
Uix concauxion : Lx Instructive i 
Knowledgg theno, depends upon right and true ideasl 
Opinion upon history and mlitter of facts And hence 
it cones to pass that our knowledS of generall things 
are eternae veritates and depend not upon the 
existence or accidents of things ,,, But whether this course In publiqu* or private affairs will 
sucooed wells whether rhubarb will purso or 
QuInquina cure an agueg is only known by experiencel 
and there Is but probability grounded upon exporlan 
or analogical reaxoninSq but no certain knowled [sicT 
or demonotratione 70 
It Is clear that what I-coke means by "politiat' bore Is 
221AUt not all things political* Thus lAslattOx Inference 
that Locke excluded politics from the proper field of 
philosophical enquiry cannot be sustained. Indoodg Laxlott 
was forc*4 to argue that Look* changed his mind on this 
point* For only In this way could he account for Locke's 
views exprossod in 1697t that "True Politics I look on as 
A part of moral philasophy"*71 And anywayt in th* Igmay 
S90221MIVA- HM1v-Th%dJkrxt*ndinx Locke did present two examples 
of how certain knowledSe was ascertainable in political 
studies* He considered two propositions . "'Where there 
Is no property$ there Is no Injustice$$# and "Mo Sovernment 
allows absolute liberty'"s Provided we have true Ideas of 
the concepts of 9proportylt $justices, 1governmontl and 
'liberty** Locke assartedg and provided we use the terms 
tonxistOntlYs 'then the truth of these propositions can be 
dononstrotede 72 
50 "3r WO h^Ve N*on Vat Locke boJLiev*d his Ttg IMIlsog 
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was a contribution to that branch of political studies that 
was "very different from" tho'concern. with policy; that 
Pufendorrts Do Jure Naturae at G-ontium was the best treatise 
of the same kind as his worlcl that within this branch of 
political studies certain knowledge %ins possible; and that 
the purpose of a plicilosophical enquiry into morals and - 
politics uas to doiaoustrateg according to tho mathematical 
method, the eternal truths t1mt this area of enquiry admitt*d. 
But if we now look at the way the arguments of the Treatises 
are constructed it bocomes extremely difficult to see how 
Locke could have considered the work philosophy of a 
Putendorfian kind* The is nothing more 
than'its title indicates - an attempt to Idetoct and over- 
throwl 4Thp. False Pringinlex aUd Foundation of'Sir 1! 2bea 
FlUer and his Followers% It is a classic example of a 
piece of rhetorical writing with arguments of all kinds and 
from all sources being introduced to persuade the reAder 
that the principal text o: r Locke"x Royalist opponents was 
worthless, even ridiculous, Tho-Second Treatiaev howevers 
is more problematical* Its title asserts that it is 
concerned to portray "The True Originaig Extent and End of 
Civil-Government". a genuinely philogophical concern according 
to Lockets viev of political studies. The chapter headings 
seem to indicate that the argument will parallel the middle 
part of Pufendorf's De Jure Waturae et Gentium. And the 
Treatise beginx, an it must if Locke were going to pursue 
a philosophical anquiry according to his own method, with 
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a deflnitlon of Opolitical power$ and a declaration that 
his task was "ro understand Political Power, right, and 
73 derive It from its Original". 
The general outline or Locke's argument'after this 
point is quite familiar and I do not propose* to labour, yot 
another summary of theme What ii most significant for our 
enquiry here is that the argument does viot proceed fron 
definitions and the establishment of fixed and definite 
ideas to the, demonstration of more complex but equally 
certain truths concerning politics. Several Ideas crucial 
to Locketx argument - likes for examples natural laws consents 
liberty, and obligation - are not defined at all, Others$ 
of similar importances are not employed consistently according 
to the definitions Initially established. 'Propertyl is 
a well known case in point. Also$ the notions of "Society"I 
"Politick Society", and "Civil Society" are often used 
interchanGeably even though a crucial point of Lockets 
argument in to indicate bow #natural society# differed 
fi-om 'civil society#6 And still other notionst like the 
nature of man and GodIs purposes for him, 
74 
are introduced 
in a caBual W&Y almoist an an after-thoughts yet they are 
asisential for the coherenco of the argunent. 
Considerations such as these do Indeed invite us, on 
Laslett line suggested,, to look upon Two- Tr"tIMOR 'AM' DomOthiug 
other 'than political philosophy. How in itq then$ that 
Locke could insiat, that his work was of the same kind an 
Pufandorf's? Was he simply mistaken7 Or wasT . jwM 
Treatlaos 
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so bad an example of the Mort of -work represented by 
Pufendarf's De Jure NatuE! e et G*nt_: iumo that it In difficult 
to see any but the most superficial similarities? Or can 
some other considerations explain Locke's view? If we look 
at 14cketz references to natural law and consent in the 
Treatises and compare these with Pufendortto supposedly 
similar referencopq we may begin to gain a clearer perspective 
on this pv)blem4, 
Xn the schem of the Seggnd TjMtjge natural law 
guarantees to natural man their natural rights and teaches 
them their duties in respect of one another. It provides 
an eternal standard for judging the rectitude of positive 
human laws* And It provides the ultimate grounds for 
roxistance. But neither the First Mceatine nor the S*92. U 
In concerned with the questions which concerned Puf*ndorf 
about natural law. In his Do Offigio TIOM11118 Ot CI ýW 
Puf*ndorf's shortened version of the mammoth Do JuE! hJul. 00 
ot-Genti. um - he noted that his concern with natural law 
wax to portray its "character" and "nectxzity" by examining 
"the nature and disposition of man". 
75 And this involved 
enquiring into the nature of human actions exhibiting the 
characteristics of moral experience and dintinguloobAng 
between the sphorem of rational morajityg civil legality 
and moral theology - all of which had become confused* he 
thoughtg In the raoral discourse of his day*76 Locke Ia 
TreatixO89 howovvro was concerned with no such onqUirY Ax 
I 
this* Indeed, Locke claimed that "it would be besides my 
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present purpose to enter here 
Fin 
the argument of the socMW 
Troal. isal, that is3l into the particulars of the Law of Naturej 
or Its measures a 
77 f K11 that Locke was 
interested in was that his reader should acknowledge that 
"it in certain that there in such a taws and that too* as 
int*lligible and plain to a rational Creatureg and a Studier 
of that Laws as the positive Laws of Commonwealthaf, nay 
possibly plainer". 
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The essential point here, which neither Laxlett nor 
Polin considers is that Pufendorf's work contained a 
consistent argument deriving the rights and duties which 
#defined$ natural law, from an initial characterization of 
the nature of man and o: r moral experiences whereas L*ckels 
did note. The point that divides Uslett and Polin in 
whether Lockets statements about natural law were inconsistent 
both within the Z= TroatJoSS and between the Treatises and 
Lockets other writings, Lasletts as we have seens, argues 
that Locke's references to natural lav in the Zssay and 
the Treatises are inconsistent and this provides him with 
one of the main reasons for denying that 3ýM 1"eatiles 
represents Locke 'the philosopher'st understanding of 
politics* Polin argues that Lockets religious Ideas 
provide the commn ground to which his statements about 
natural law must be referreds statements$ t1at is$ in 
the early L19a. n ... 
Xx o the- Law gg Nature, (16609 in the Elisay 
SgncejML=jhxrPn Underatap.. dirm (169o)s in the JjM 
-7, 
'rG&tlsep- 
(1690) and in De Reasomb12ne&g pristia. UttZý (1695). 
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lf this in done - and here Polin has John Dunn on his 
sidS79 . Locke's references to natural law portray a 
r~ rkable coherenco and consistency stretching over the 
last 40 years of his life. But In so far as these disputes 
amongst Locke scholars are intended to clarify the generol 
character of Lockets Social Contract Theory they miss the 
essential point that emerges most readily from a comparison 
of Locke's and Pufendorf's works. 
rufoudorf In discussion of civil society ArOss Out Of 
a concern to explain the kinds of rights and duties that 
men in contemporary society possessed* The purpose of 
this enquiry in encapsulated in his concluding chapter 
entitled "On the Duties of Citizens", Lockels discussion 
of civil society in the Treatises arises from no such concern 
an this* His purpose appears rather to be to characterize 
political society in such a way that the convoon association 
of resistance with sinfulness (nations tied together in 
the Church of England's doctrine of Passive Obedience) 
could be severedl and thus an acceptable justification be 
rendered for resisting Incumbent magistrateso That this 
was Locke's point seems to emerge from the argument running 
from his nunmry chapter "Of Paternalg Politicalq and 
Despotical. Powerg considered together'19 to his conclusion 
"Of the Dissolution of Government". In arriving at his 
conclusiont Locke utilized propositions and arguments from 
his own philosophical works andl indeeds from Pufondorf's 
an well* But these propositions and arguments were neither 
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employed nor established to demonstrate the eternal truths 
of moral and political exporienco. They simply served an 
maxims or'promisses from uhich to arVue a case that was 
published in order to persuade his audience that tho-1688 
Revolution was justified and that Villiam and Mary were 
legitimate monarchs* 
If* theng an essentially rhetorical purpose Save rise 
.. -I 
Trea: k-joe, it in no longer to the &rsument of the jg2911c 
surprising that that arzument does not follow Lockets own 
philosophical method. It is not surprising. in resp*ct 
of natural lawg that Locke declared it lbesides his present 
purposet to e=ndne the "particulars" of that law. it 
certainly can be persuasively argued (as Volin does) that 
Lockets referencas to natural law in the Treatises are all 
0032sistG32t with h; Ls extended discussions of that lair in 
other works, But even if this is accepted it does not 
provide sufficient reason for categorizing the Treatises 
as political philosophy* Yet neither does the argument 
that the statements in the Treatises are irroconcileable 
with those elsewhere ft, e, Laslett's argumont)* provide 
sufficient reason to deny the Treatises that status* 
Similar problems arise from Locko's references to 
"consent' in the Second TMatise as those we have just 
axaminade Most contemporary 14cke scholars have followed 
H=e in believing that Two TI: oatiseg contains Locke's 
explanstion of the nature and grounds of political obligation. 
Lockeg it is thought, reduces the obligatioll to oboy government 
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to the obligation to koop promisess8o and this to supposedly 
the contral feature of his discussion of consent. This 
belief tends to-, 'p*rpOtuAt* the view that the Treatises is 
really a work of political philosophy. It is perhaps not 
too unfair to rep"Sent a prevailing view as follows: all 
works or political philosophy are concerned with 'political 
obligation'll 14ckoOm diseuxxion of lConsentl In thO SOME29 
TIM. Use Is an account of @political bbligationf I therefore 
Locke0s Second Treatise is a work of political PhIloboPhY* 
Now@ not only Is this a false Syllogism but also Lockolm 
discussion of lexpress' and 'tacit# consent In misunderstood 
if it in regarded as his account of political obliptiono 
81 
Locke did not commit the errors of which Hume accused him 
(of reducing one sort of obligation to &notherg whilat 
MvIdining noither)l nor van he guilty of the cont! usions 
and InAd*quacies of which vAny of hin, more modern critics 
accuse him* Mil discussion of express and tacit consent 
Is not a confused attempt to reconcile the oxproax consent 
involvvd In contracting with the grounds of political 
obligation in post-contractual situations, Yet Looks bas 
often been accused of thin confuslon. 
82 
Xt Is certainly true that Locke's -references to 'couxentl 
In the I; ggpj3d Mro-a-I&ge, bave something to do with political 
oblizatione But that they do not express the AE2MdO- of 
political Obliantion in awnifest, from the rest of 14cke's 
writingso L*ake soons, U bave distinguished between the 
questioU WbY Men are okIlLoW to create govertmentg and the 
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questions how RgEticMigr governments were established and 
wbat constituted the legitimate limits of political power* 
The Seggad MMtLee ioss. concerned more with the last two 
of these questions then the first, lConsent' explains how 
it in that men In= obligations to any particular governments, 
It explains the limits of political power and-bow legitimate 
government can arise* But it does not explain why men are 
obliged to obey the gove-wents they have thus consented 
too LookOx explanation of thin referred to natural laws, 
to the necessities of organized social life and to the 
Instincts of mant but ultimately the explanation rested 
on God's commande The obligation to obey. legitints 
Cover: out U. ee government that elicited the consent of 
itx citizens) van ultimately an obligation to God# in 
his Jourtmi for 1679* for examples Locke notedt 
Xt Emon] finds that God has made him & all other 
men in sk state wherein they can t subsist without 
Society & has given them the judpwnt to, discorn 
what is capable of prenervlng & maintaining that 
society can he but conclude that he is obliged & 
that god requires him to follow rules which conduce 
to the preserving of Societys 83 
N*n are created by Gods they are His servants, and they are 
not In the world &bout nits business. They belong to God 
and hone* they cannot have a right to destroy thomselvese 
Indeed$ the ilat of **If-proser tion in Itself a AjLtj to 
God. All men's responsibilities and duti*x are ultimately 
owed to God* Henceg an Locke noted in his early APMjs 
on__the- I&w. at Xaturo, "all obligation leads back to God-,, 
84 
But It Lockels discussion of 'express' and staciLtv 
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consent was not an account of the grounds of political ' 
obligation, what was itt One possible way of interpreting 
this discussion is to see it as a theory of 'citizenship's 
wbich has significance in the argvment of Two Trea 
because it identifies thAt section of society that might 
properly be styled MegjbeEgi of political society whose 
judgement will determine when government is "dissolved", 
In Other words, it can be seen an an attempt to theorize 
the actIELly of being a citizen in late seventeenth century 
Englands rather than as an attempt to theorize the sp. BAWon 
of being under an obligations And that this is not too 
unlikely an account of Lockels discussion is suggested by 
the apparently similar concern of Sidney and Paxton vith 
the distinction between teitizens' and Omero inbabitants1*83 
In the late sevonteenth, century only a armil proportion of 
the population-teas accorded the fullest rights and duties 
of citizenship and the import of Lockets discussion of 
'Oexpress' and ttacitt consent was'precilsely that it explained 
how this situation could arises That this was at least one, 
purpose of the discussion can be seen from the Conclusion 
Locke drawst 
submitting to the lAws of any Country$ living 
qmietlyq and enjoying Priviledges and Prot*ction 
under'thow ie* tacit consent-J. 32k. 2g pot-a Wn 
aý 'nr t. ý-.., *#0 Nothing can make any Ilan so$ but his actually entering into it by 
positive Bnvgwwnt, t and *xpremm PrOML84 and CO"ct T-i4ed, express CC)nsentj. This is that$ which I 
tbAnks concerning *** that Consent which vokem &AY 
Membtwship of civil society wall reserved for those Who 
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bad. WT3rexxly consented to It 9 although at, any given time 
the government of that society could woct obedience 9ýmm 
all those residing within,, or passing throuahe Its, territory* 
AU those who were thus subject to the govermsente but w1w 
were not fully members of the societyi bad 'tacitly consented# 
to obey*- Men bocamw subject to a Sovormwat by their own 
consent leither express or tacit) l but they only became 
siembers of a society through waxp"as rongmtv. But this 
notion of 'exproxx consent' Lock* nowher* explains* He 
Pimply &Xsertx tbAt "no-one doubts" that Impress C61244MV 
antitlox an individual to tull stemborship of a comossw Ithw 
07 
His maning can only be guos"d or Interpreted an "ferring 
to Isocial preamwomitions' and the Ilke 
88 
- to 14640 such 
age that it was Igentlevient ubo lexprosely consoutedl At 
their coming of age by accepting (or rejecting) th*Lr 
political responsibilitloul or that taking oaths of 
allegiance* as practically all pub]Ac officials did in 
seyenteenth, century Ruglands conatitute4 the $express 
consent' Looks, had In mind here* 
But no matter wbat ux* we make of locke Is "nocial. 
presuppositions" to elucidate his weaninsi, it is clear that 
his discussion of lexpreast and 'tacit# consent In not On 
account of WAt It weans to b* under on obligation tA) 
000"1200 Yet tbAs Is precisely the point of Pufavidarf Is 
ouperticially s4m4lar discussion of lconsontO in his PA 
MISLAR. 0 
It appearal theng that Lockets discussion Of 'consent' 
24o 
. 
Use. j Me his discussion of Inatural, law's in the Seeggg M "a& 
did not arise : Crom considering the same questions as Pufandorfo 
Apparently similar statements that occur in Pufondorf1p and 
L, ockels works are only xuperricially similare Lockets 
. 
4-- Tre >og like the ZAZ: st, $ in fundamontally a piece otis 
of rhetorical writing, Despite its 05anoralityls it does 
not portray the ebarecteristics of philosophical enquiry 
that Locke himself outlinedo Despite Locke's axsertion 
that it was a worIc of the same kind as Pufandorfl-sl a 
comparison or their writings reveals considerable differences. 
Despite the almost complete absence of any direct referenaus 
to English polAtiess the argusment was concerned to persuade 
Englishmen to take a, particular stance in relation to th4k 
major political conflict of the day* It wax published to 
defend the 1688 Revolution$ some of its arguments are only 
properly intelligible within the social context of late 
seventeenth century English politics$ and an we sball sea, 
the first reactions to the work interpreted it an directly 
related to English constitutional conflict4, 
But if the Treatises Ix essentially a piece of political 
rhetoricl how are we to explain IockeIx view that it was a 
work of the SftmG kind a3 Pufendorfts De Of; C: Jclo and Dg JvrQ 
Natures et Gentim Two considerations seem relevant horee 
The first concerns Lockets notion of the Otheoretical study$ 
of politics* the second concerns a common misunderstanding 
of tho nature of ruotorjLc* We nay conclude this part of 
our enquiry by briefly examining thesee 
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The readins that Locke suggested to the would-be student 
of the theoretical part of politics indicates that Umko 
himself made no distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, 
Pufandorf Ix De ;. MXg Natvaae Lt. Gentium was reproxented as 
the best book of the same kind as not only the MM Zroatleopq 
but also. Hooker's EccI-esJLagII&g2J 22, litX, Sidneyta DijIggurmets 
and Paxton Ia CLW Pgjjt. Z4. Now none of these works$ &part 
from PutendorfIx, even begin to construct arguments along 
the lines that Mcke believed necessary for the establishment 
of *certain knowledzeto All of them ware 'Zoneralts In 
the sense that they contained theories about govarnment# 
society and 3Awq but two of them at least were 'particular' 
and Opracticall an well. Those were dexignedt that is to 
sayg to persuade their audiences to adopt a particular stance 
in -relation to major 
tissues' of their days to reject 
Puritan opposition to the Elizabethan Church Government in 
Hooker#* casel to reject Filmerian Royalism and establish 
(or re-establish) PGrXiMmentary supremacy in Sidney's case. 
These other works$ then* in Locke's f: Lrat kind of 
political study were themselves rhetorical* But by calling 
them #rhetorical# I do not. mean that there was anything 
necessarily insincere or misleading about their argwentse 
IS&Ay writera in the modern world have emphasized these 
connotations of the idea of rhetoric. Kant# for examplog 
in his 
ISTAUM19 2L. 
JHd&em*nj (1790) notes A common meaning 
of rhetoric as "the art of persuasions iea the art of 
On 11 
deluding by mmus ot a fair imemblance", 
89 Porhaps one of 
the main reasons why Orhetorict . the art of persuasive 
discourse - has boen associated with insincerity and 
docep'tion in becauso of the experience of Scholastic 
disputation* or at least its dogeneration into disputation 
merely for its own sake* Locke shared t4iis common belief 
that rhetoric uas somewhat disreputable - he tended to 
associate it with Via excesses of Scholastic disputation 
and did not regard it an a isuttabl'O subject to be taught*90 
We may surnixeg then,, tluat Locke would not 13avo volcomed 
an Interpretation of his iiark an a piece of rhetoric* He 
believed that the principles and propositions employed in 
the Treatises - especially those concerning natural law 
could all be established as 'certain knowledsof through 
'mathematical domonstrationl* But this belief* an :1 hAv, * 
argueds in not nufficient to warrant'interpratiUS the 
Treatises an political pixilosophys even accordinz to Lockels 
own View of what philosophical argvment should look likee 
By Irbetorict"her*6 then# X mean simply a piece of 
writing that has an its principal worganizing ideal the 
concern to persuade its readers to tldzk and act in a 
particular vay. 
91 There are% o; C course# many different 
ways of pursuing this aim and there are* accordingly@ many 
different kinds of rhetorical works* So simply to call 
n!, 2 ZM11,02AL 'rh6toric' does not add much to our understanding 
of the vorko But it does clarivy some of the problems 
concerning the nuture of Lockets Social Contract Theorys 
2.43 
If we do regard that argument as rhetoric rather -than 
political philosophy then many of the disappointments that 
1, ocke scholars have encounteredg and that X have noted# can 
be removed$ they are born of confused expectationst 
Two :. E=tL8esq then# prexented an argument in Social 
Contract terms designed to have a specific impact an late 
seventeenth century Rnglish political practiceo But how 
effective was it as a piece of rhetoric? I will conclude 
this survey of Locke's theory by attempting to answer this 
questiono 
Clearly the Treatises was eventually very xuecessful* 
It came to be regarded as containins the "Principles of 
1688" and It supposedly supplied the Whig party of the mid. 
eighteenth century with its "philosophical or speculative 
92 system of principles". Iret the immediate reaction to 
the work seems rather surprisinS. It occasioned no replies 
until 1703,93 and It %as not until 1705 that any extended 
attempt Uax wade to refute lockets argum*nts.. 94 The work 
did not become straight-away the principal Authority of 
the Whigs* In fact, It did not Introduco any' startlingly 
now idsas Into political d*bate, Its main outline ms to 
be found In Tyrrell's Pajri^XSM- &n jLo 
. varSL. 1& 
(1680)0 
Sidney's R: Lsgo! MMes SMSor-n -J= 
G&veEMnnt (published In 
1698 but vritten before 1683) and Pufondorr's Do Jure N*IHM-o 
ot Gan (1672) and Rg 01ficto -Civis 
(1673)e &t 
The first two of these contained much more bexidesl but 
this will be examined in the last part of our enquiry, in 
most Whig witings it was as much, if not more, to these 
24k-;, 
taut. hor: Ltiesf (and the #authorities' like Hooker and Grotius 
t1lat they, jAd usod) all to Locke$ that reference ime, mokdee 
Indoods it appoars that Locho vas so far from occupying 
the front place amon5st lihir, lauthorities' that Benjamin 
Hoadly could urito a %.; orlc in the same idiom an Locke's 
(in 1710) , and be comn. ended by the Comwns for its with 
only pnq refcrence to Mlo . 
T"rr g ^; Us e And tImt reference 
aimply recommended the. re4der to look at the First Treatise 
for a criticism of "Some Branches" of the "Patriarchal Achbmeif. 
95 
That part of lloadlya, arSt=ent that paralleled the Segmd 
TZeatiLt, ums, prosented, simply as a "Defence of Mr, Ilooker.! s. 
Jud:: Pment". 
In the, loArned periodicals and book reviews of the daye 
Z= 191W11810 bad In similarly far from Oxcited reception& 
ft-the Continent the 131blioth % Ynixeraelle Ot Histori2ugo LOU* V 
pro4ucod by Locke's frlend, Jean le Clercq received both the 
CAglish first, edition and the first French trapgIation (of 
Only tho, Sýecoad Treatise) very enthusianticallyd, 
96 nut 
Henri Dannage go Mist2ire des Otmxeo goo Scavanis uss not 
taken by it at all, The review of ýhe French edition 
GimPlY concluded coldlys 
Cleat dommSe qua J'Auteur ula A ra bion pas toujou 
dosage' son ponse'ent ni blon develope sen sOntim*nB* 97 
The most notable of the English journalist Including Peter 
MOtt*'uxl* Journal, J. C. do I& Craze's 
. 
31to 
Hintorr gf jarninr,, John Ountonts Athoal&IL- 1, CI -%*MO&tO, s 
Riebard 
W003LOY115 232 92M210at UWMr-vq the MorcUrAU RjUrmatux and 
24.5 
LlgrcHXj. uL-pj: jtA=A=jj and the munoth fliartowny of -the 
Ym*o 
of Mg IMr-nods vore, all apparently uniMrsegied by the 
Treatises: none either reviewed any of its editions or 
mentioned it in any of their other reviewsm, Yet each of 
these journaln carried notices of political vorkag and some 
reviewed in detail bookx by Pufendor; r# Tyrrell$ Sidneyq 
and Paxton an well an Lockets own Egggv garnIng 11vm; M 
+g% j"m and his educational works* 
This rem ble, lack of Immediate response seems to 
Indicate that Idndsight ban Inflated our sense of Locks's 
Importance an a political writer during the late seventeouth 
and early eighteenth centuries* one recent hintoriang John 
Dunng ban noted this* Dut, his account is both mcaggamted 
and away from the point* 
98 From the more ephounral Party 
literature and from contemporary letters and reports of 
conversationag a slightly more familiar picture of Locke's 
: Lnfluenco emersex. But It in a Locke who to as significant 
for his YAUt Tv-oallsel an his Egggadq and one who sharem a 
growing reputation with Sidney whilst both he and Sidney 
wft*o overshadowed by the 11judiclous Pufondorfle 
Tlmt Looks's work did not pass unnoticed ftvm the 
prose in evidencod trout a num1mr, of sources* Xn August 
1690 IS& MMIAnon won apparently the subJect Of Adkd"tiOn 
and "culation amongist some c1rcles of learned societY In 
both Oxford and London199 a popular Whig pawlAilet entitled 
&111AGAIL AnhOjaRn (IL690) summrized and qlmtod extenslValy 
(without acknowledgement) frois the workl 
100 William Atwood$ 
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an we, have-, seoni adopted some of 14ckels argýmý; Its in his 
FlMdgment-aL Constitution (1690) and rafer, red- to the work 
as "the best 2ýroatisoz of ; iv: U Polity I hý%ve met with In 
the Enr-I: Lsh Tonsue"1101 and b7 1693, Pierre nayle could 
report to his Xtalian correspondent Minu, toXi that ýhe theory 
01 
of government outlined in -the Se22nd TreatlAq, waff "112vansile 
du jour a present parmi les Protentans", *102 
During-the early. yoars of the 1690sq James Tyrrell 
kept Lmketx Treatises In ýho public oye by numorous 
references and quotations fiýom then in his- ,, popular compendium 
ft692 of polit , Leal arguments ^. the Bibij. 21,0VIA pgýjjtj, ý& -4). 
But it is interesting-to note that the referenies, 411 Occur 
in the first. throe dialogues (ie. those conimrped ýrith 
the refutation of Patriarchalipm and the establishment of 
a right of, resixtence) 6 and 
that by far the, majority- of 
them were from the ! AI: xf IE: Mt: Lge* Xn 16911 Locke appear*d 
to Matthew Tindalf, the Deist$ as a "wonderfully Inj: eniouS 
and Judicious Authorli who I could readily be followed in 
103. irgumOnts about consent ond citizenship* 
In tha'Ute-1690s Lockesx Treatines continued to 
fs&turs As ah authority in somd political argumei2t,, 
second edition of the wo - rk vas published In 1694 and & third 
in 1698. During 1698 the argument of the Secgpd TroatImS 
became the xubjoct of a adnor $sectarian$ quarrel, The 
quarrel began when Lockets kriends Villiam MolYnOUXI adopted 
the arguments of the Treatises to waka a cane for Irish 
Independenc6. In particular, molyneux used Locke's 
247 
authority to deny that the English could have any right of 
Conquest, over the Irishe'and to assert that the Irish had 
a natural right to a government of their own choice* 
104 
The argumnt rapidly occalsionod replieb from Simn Clowentg 
John Cary and Charles Leslie* Clement and Cary acknowledged 
tb*t they were supporters of Lacke but they retused to 
&Ilow tli&t his argumenta applied to the Irish mituatiom 
Simon Clements for examplel Insisted that Holyneux's 
plausible Argiments for the Liberty and Right of 
all Mlankindl that Conquextx cannot bind Poxt*rJLtY@ 
Etc* arewholly misapplyId in this Case, and he 
abuses Wo 1114ok, or wWover van 
the Author of that 
%xcellent Treatise oir Governments in referring to 
that Rook on this occasion; for that Worthy 
Gentleman doth therein argue the Case o: C tho PeOVIO 
whose just Rights are violatedl their laws xubvertods 
and the Liberty and Property iuberent to than by 
the Fundamental IAws of Natures (which he accurately 
describos) is invaded and usur-pId upon, and t1wat 
when this in an evident and apparant as the Sun 
that shines in a clear days they way then take the 
best occasion they can find to right themselvese 
Thin is a Doctrine that all Cood Men wAy assent too 
but this is in no wine the Case of Xrelando 105 
Charles Leslie entered the dixput* against 14olyn9uxe He 
man no lAckian but his argument againnt Molyn*ux played on 
the lautbarityl of Molyneuxvx mentor* Lacke, had founded 
political authority on cons*ntj L*sli* noteds and two 
successiv* Zrish Parliaments (1692 and 1695) had submitted 
their allegiance to William and Nkry. Since the Irish 
parliaments had thus #consented# to Znglixh rule Molyne'uxlb 
'AutbADr; itY' in fact testified against him and he xhould 
concede the argument, 1106' 
The reputation of T.. w. & -Tr"t: 
i*Gx WOO thuO c'Ortainly 
growing throughout the 1690m. PracticallY all refermcon 
248 
t. 0 the'ir6rk wero fa I vourable I' and morO ofien than not the 
author'va's referred to as "Learned and Ingonious'% 
107 
or 
the Me* But this'evidence, only serves to modifY the 
initial: impression that tho'-'Treatises occasioned no great 
J=cdlate response* In all the arguments %diere appeal 
was made to Lockos he apVeared simply as one amonZat a 
number ot faut1i6ritios' and never an the #^uthority'. Hix 
work nover attracted the'attontion of'jourml reviewers 
iihere6s'i]ý* similar w6rks of Pufendor: r@ Tyri ýelj and Sidney 
did, And'it was not imtil as latio as 1703'that anY TOrY 
or Jacoýitb considered it max- h his pains to engage in A 
critical ex"inotion o: r tIsa Treatisegoo 
One dxplanation of Lockets j: ejgjU, 6, insignificance 
in the 1690a is tlb6i the Treatises sms written in the BAAs 
tradition as th6 worlw 6f two men bt'outstanding bontemporary 
reputation - Pufandore 
ýnd'Sidneý. The one was a tian of 
continental reputation. Tho other ims a great 'martyr' 
for English liberty, whoiie reputation initially depended 
more up6zi the circumstances of hits death than an anything 
he wrotee Furthermore, the reputation of th6 Treatises 
was probably slower iii gaining ground because its author 
was not widely Imown until Lockets death in 17011 (even 
though the truth'had been suspected from the very beginning)* 
The bookIx official anonymity may wall liave adversely affected 
the attention paid to'ito and its 'authority* ror Lockets 
reputation an philosopher and educational wýriter uns great 
and the Treatises may have 'been wiore widely read had it 
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derinitely, boon known., tbat, ho wax *tx 4&uthgrq 
IP*rhapa a more Oubstantial, explanations howeverg lion 
ill the argmuent, of the Treatimem, : LtaejLf. It. was notv - ax 
Dunn suggests$ that the Tre&tjsex contained notbing but 
"principl, es of, the most indubitablp and - paroc4ial political 
ortbod 
108 that. tboy did not create a cons*dproble stir 
when first publishoda, It Was. rather that, they'wers not 
exactly fitted to, perform the, task Locks intended . the 
justification of 16884, The ac! Ater minds of the t*meý paw 
that too "philosophical" a Justification coýlld not but 
oVerroach itxe2. f*, What ItIgainad In scope and grandeur 
It Aoxt in procision, and application to pa *he relevant 
d*tails. of the actual situation* Th4ar W11*10#1 wisdom 
was plearly more sophisticated tban, Uckolso for Loocke had 
boon led axtrayg an It weree by rationalist tendencies 
derlvvdgý ln parts from P4endorf, That thlsý loss *be 
'Problewl with Lockelx argument for the defenders of the 
1688 Revolution can b*ýxe*n moxt ralcarly in William AtwoQ01M 
qualified pralso of j=---TrgSt. LM* The Tr*otAxsx9 Atwood 
suggestedo "a unacceptable as a justification of 1688 
eventhough It con"Ined *hoý "at, pxau4 nation of "Civil 
Polity" In English. If it-wero acceptedl thou the Almelent 
Constitution 'Wpuld. bo endangered beca"o the people would 
be at liberty to alter that constitu - 
tion as they thought, 
rite ! 9ven though Lopket* argument. was clearly written 
with tnglis# *Mira in mind, the Revolution required a 
wore. legalixtic; justification. It required, an argument 
2.50 
that did not rest upon appeal to natural lawt natural rightq 
and the dissolution of governments but which appealed instead 
(or &, a well) to the constitutional rights of Rnalishmen and 
which restricted the limits or conatitutionAl chance to 
the 'reatorationk of the Ancient Constitution* 
log 
The loocklan argument that resistence to constitutional 
authorities mirht be morally justifiable or even a moral 
duty if those authorities encroached upon'men's natural 
rights was altogether,, unAcceptable to the Convention Parliament* 
Serjeant Maynard at one point interrupted the complicated 
legal disputes alxout the place, of "abdication" and "vacancy" 
ih, I9nZUsh jaw and suggested that perhaps the attempt to 
reconcile resisting James n with the strict requirements' 
of eonstitutional laws Iran misguided: 
"If we look but into the law of nature (that ib 
above &LI human Uws)"q he argued$ 7we hay* enough 
to justify us in what ve arb now a doingg to provid* 
for ourselves and the publick weal. in such an Oxigency 
an thillo 110 
But his voice van simply ignoreds the debate continued* and 
his Argumut formod no part of the Commonts case argued by 
Somers, Hong Sacheverell and Pollexfen. 
The argument of the So-cgjWLMMtjoj was thus felt not 
to be "sufficlentlIg AN L*Cko had hopedg to justify the 
Revolution. Th* Firjt ZtealLso, j however$ vas far lexe 
contentibus even though it was incomplete, * Xtuas from 
thix that Tyrrall quoted most extensively vhen compiling 
his Accordins tA) Atwoodo it was the 
brilliant exposure of "the faille pr: LncIj2.1 .. Lo. and 
Foundation 
23]. 
of Sir Robert Filmer On& his Admirers" that accounted for 
the Treatizes IgAining reputationl*lll It was to the 
Fir 
. 91--Trlgtt . 
Use that floadly directed his reader in 1710* 
And the first detailed anxwer to the Treatises - &n. ; Zoa. % 
. 
hM Egngr6MILt, (publlahed anonymously in 3,705 and reprinted t 
in 1706) - was almost entirely concerned with the Firjj 
Although *he Sgogd MMIAme, %ss quite widely read 
and admireds an we have 864int still the evidence suggests 
that the reputation of the whole work depended an muche if 
not =ore,,, on the Mst MMLJI pAle, Patriarchalism and Divine 
Right wore by no means extingvishod by the Revolutions in 
the early rmrs of the eighteenth C#ntury they - in, fact Spined 
one of their most able and effective chawpion*$ Charles 
TANIAO. Thus the innues discussed In LocImIn Fjrjj 
IM. Use remained points of contention until well into 
the Gishteenth. centurys, 
Tlie leoolnd "Use did *V*UtmIlY OcUPGO thO rOPut&tiolm 
of the EArAO The Treatises became the principal authority 
of the mid-eighteenth century Whigsand the argument of the 
SpSMI MCgetIM2. vss regarded an the #core$ of the work* 
The beginnings of thin fascinating cUnge can be soon from 
1698 to 1705, Xn 1698 Walter Noyie, one of the more 
. 0ond 
UeatLgo an containing radical UhIgsq described the Le 
"the first Rudimental' of political he ov*n knov of someone 
he said "Who calls it the A, BC* of ftjjjjSLkx*" But the 
point of so characterizing it was not to recommend it an 
2:; 2 
an -unquestionable Puthorityj but rather an a good introduction 
to, the study of Sidney* 
112 Sidney's reputation stood very 
high in Wig circles andq indeed, he was the only cont*Wor*ry 
authority referred to In the most prominent Whig Volitlcal 
newspaper (36 Tutchinfx bl. -weekly AbivIUM 
), botwoelu 1702 
and 1705* Sidney there appeared an the writer who best 
understood "the constitution of the RMUSH Gover onto 0213 
Even mhen the Obga3--y%jgj: defended the right of resistance, 
it Invoked the authority of Graftuxt not Looks* 
114 But 
it in from Charles Loollefs rival papers IlIg RLIMXj2I-2j 
ObxeK3Mj=jj and frois L*xliels politicalpamphlottag that 
Lockets growing reputation can. be meon* 
Xh 16981 vhilst opposing Maynoux's Cagig IL Xr@lmm. 
Leslie simply noted that Molyneux had takon. over Zrom "Mre 
. mks 
&co" arvuento whith could more plausibly be used I't 
avainat him,, 
11,5 By 1703% howeverg vhen Leslie turned once 
again to consider Locke's arguments# it was the "Great j: -jj 
in hig TM pIggglWas of g2vergWMt" who was attackedg and 
whose notion -of connent vmx 
declared "ftj! gnze". v 
116 And 
vhen, he returned to the attack In the following year it 
je$ , wen acainst "Nr L. X, b, ** In hin eo inuch )Pamtd MM Troal&, 
of covermbnt"0117 In bin weekly, ]! * 9 bog= ýhe 
mme year (1704) s Loolie rebutted again and again the "GrOat 
lock". Jocke and Sidney were xingled out as the two "man 
of yLt. " in the Whig party* 
118 But it won an the "Great 
LOSICS and sidne that they appearedJ119 and It van the 
"S"at pne , ]Le )qr. jele whogle Treftt: Lxex. was subjacted to 
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a detailed Scrutimr and criticism which occupied the bulk 
of eight weeks' issues. 
120 Yet even still, although it 
was l4ckelz notion of consent that Leslie most frequent3Ly 
critIcizedg the detailed eXamimtion of the Treatises was 
concerned mainly with arguments frow the IPir6st--jL*atjsg'S 
An a work of political rhetoric$ thong Two Z=ttmA-o 
was not an immediate success, Xt's argument was too gonerol 
to satisfy the contemporary deumud for a legalistic 
justification of the nevolution, It Vag most successful 
In its critique of Filmer and in this the Firal IMULpa 
was at least an significant an the Second* But the 
'weakness' of the Secglad jEeatigg, in the particular 
circumstances of the late seventeenth century turned out 
later to be the tstrangthl of the work an a wholee it 
was precisely the 'generality# of the doctrine outlined in 
it that enabled the work to become the principal vtextt 
of the'Whign In the very different circumstances of mid- 
eighteenth century politics* 
We have seen that Locke's Contract Theory was very 
different from Pufendorffs. TA)ckefx work xharod the sams 
practical Interest as Constitutional Contract Theories but 
its tYPO of arsument, wax very different, The argument 
'borroved' Its central notions from philosophy rather than 
constitutional law. It is In this sense (that the 
connotations of Lockets notions were lphilosophicall rather 
than 'constitutional') tbat L*ck*fn Social Contract Theory 
is an womplo of "Philosophical Contractarianism", His 
2.54 
argument most certainly was not lphilosophicall in any 
t-L es was unique amongst English other sense* Two- Trea : 
contractarian writings of the late seventeenth conturys 
It alone relied exclusively upon the Ovocabularyl of Social 
Contract* But I have suggested that. our period witnessed 
a third kind of contractarianism# and it Is to a consideration 
of thiss that I now wish to turnb 
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PART IV 
INTEGRATED CONTRACTARIANISM 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE COHERENCE OF INTEGRATED CONTVACTAW. NISM 
At first Xlance what I bAve called 'Utogroted 
CýOntractarjaftjmut appears nothing loss than an unaccountable 
confusion* In several political works we find arguments 
from natural rightist natural law and' social contract 
e. uplicitly invoked to answer questions recognized an 
concerning co3i8titutional law. Despite the very clear 
differences between Constitutional Contract Theory and 
Social Contract Theory$ many writers used arguments thAt 
intermingled them both* Often this intermingling can be 
fairly easily explained. political argument has a tendency 
to be an coercive and as all embracing as possible in order 
to persuade and convince its audionc** What way not have 
appeared thoroughly convincing when advocated in 
Constitutional Contract terms way have bacon* no If 
further supported by Social Contract argumontag and vice 
wersao But this kind of consideration seems Insufficient 
to account for a number of rather perplexing arguments and 
statements that appear in the contractarian literature of 
the late seventeenth century* We find Algernon Sidneys 
for exampleg Insisting that Englishmonts civil rights "are 
innatel, inherentg and enjoyed time out of mind"*' We 
find Lord John Somers arguing that the right to petition 
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" 2- Parliament is a "Natural Right of Mankind , We find 
sevirUl writers$ in this instance Jeremy Colliers the non. 
jurorg presenting arguments from "the Laws of Nature, 
which are part of the Constitution of this R*almvo*3 And 
a Whig political bi-weekly can be found asserting: 
For I dare engage to prove that the Law and 
92UMUtuti-o-n- of England is according to the low 
of Mature$ and prescribld by it: Nor are the 
%Kht-j! of zj1xl1rjMoD in point of NA a Rightso 
different from the Rixht of all Mankinde This" 
farthest Corners of the Earth* and the nearest 
Parts to Us have all the same Priviledgest They 
differ only. 1n X2rm9 not in Zggenceo We 0all 
Ours the Magna Charta of Enjilangl not to distinguish 
tot LXS RiLh Our Selves from Others In Point of, Nal: 
but because it is a Sumisary of what the People of 
England do claim as t4eir Hereditary Risht and 
Prýnertvq and which Ix indeed the -Hi-S-h-t and &. over-t-Y of the whole People of the Universes 
And consequently as all Mankind have ab irjxjn* the 
same Rights with Znglishmens So ougýtýthey to have 
the some sort of Xiugx with Uxt They ought to have 
the, same Currency of law an now we have in javdg 
they ought to have a 771nce on their several ron'se 
an in our Queen Anee 4 
will argue that statements like these are not Always 
just looms or confused uses of a technical vocabulary* In 
many writingnq arguments frost Social Contract and 
Constitutional Contract, from natural law and frost 
tundamental lawq appear integrated within a coherent 
framework* But an objection might be levelled agAIUxt 
our enquiry at this point* It could be argued that any 
apparent ", integration' is either a were rhetorical device 
or else the product of confused winds, If it Is a device 
of rhetoric then we can, easily account for it: in political 
argument there in nothing atrenge in appealing from 
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particular casess laws# events or arguments to general 
principlase If the apparent integration is the product 
of confused winds then the arguments themselves can be 
@written off$ an confused& It in certainly true that 
these two responses are appropriate In some caxese Dut 
we matt integrated arguments very frequently and It is 
difficult to so* then always an more confusions or rhetoric* 
At all oventag we cannot 'write ofV this literature without 
omitting from our consideration perhaps the majority of 
late seventeenth century appeals to fcontractl* The 
persuasiveness of the rhetoric must be explained,, 
As we look closer into this rhotorieg it becomes 
increasingly clear that Social Contract Theory and 
Constitutional Contract Theory are being associated together 
in a very specific way, Ideas of 'state of nature's 
'natural law#$ InAtural rights$ and $social contract# are 
merged Into the same flow of argument with ideas of 'ancient 
constitutionIq 'fundamental law's 'fundamental rishtsl 
and Ifundamental contract', But this is not all* For 
the assumption behind this merger was that the $fundamental' 
laws and rights could be derAnd from their $natural' 
counterparts, Yet we have *son a very clear distinction 
between Social Contract and Constitutional Contract Th*orys 
a distinction evident in the sort of questions asked and 
the kind of OvIdeace appealed to, We must attempt to 
explains thens how integration was possible and what made 
it plausible to both writer and audience* In the end we 
; rp va 
might still want to axxort that Integrated Contract arguments 
rested on a Oconfusiont. But having exAlained and accounted 
for the attractiveness of these arguments$ we will have 
explained a very prominent strand of late seventeenth century 
contractarian thought. We may begin our explanation by 
considering why Integrated Contract arguments should have 
been presented. 
The primftry impetus towards integration came from the 
character of royalist argument during our periode For 
royalist literature often appeared to worry philosophical, @ 
rationalist and constitutional arguments* The republication 
of Filmer's political works In a xjjnXl@ Ujumo is significant 
here* Film*rfx works ranged over many levels of political 
argument (from the constitutional to the seemingly 
philosophical), yet there was a quite explicit connecting 
thread running through then all* James Tyrrell drew 
attention to this 'thread$ In the Preface to his Patriarch& 
Non XoMrr,! * (1681): 
no man can imagine to what end the PatrLarcha and 
other Tracts should come out at such a TIMg as they 
didg unless the Publishers thouXht that these 
Pieceng which printed ^part could onely sorve to 
ensnare the Understandings of some unthinking 
Country-Gentleman or Windblown-Thoologueg could 
do no lesag beinX twisted into one Volume, than 
bind the Consciencest and enslave the Reasons of 
all his unwary Readers. 5 
Tyrrell proceeded to devote his own *single Volume' to & 
rebuttal Of &. U Filmerv a works, 
A specific example of typical royalist arsument can 
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be seen in a pamphlet 16y Robert Brady written against 
Someral A Drief flistoa of the Successi2p (1681)e bradys 
the prominent constitutional historians was confronted by 
a dispute over the English law oV Successions The questions 
then, concerned constitutional law* But to defend the 
hereditary Successiong Brady felt it necessary "to prove" 
that hereditary right was lawful according to both the moral 
law as well an the law of the English Constitution. His 
task$ he declared, was to show: 
First, That not only all Governments but particularly 
X does owe its Immediat Foundation and 
Constitution to God Almighty* 
Segogg&Xv That by the 1, aw of Gods Nature and 
Nations the Crown ought to descend according to 
Priority of Births and Proximity of Blood* 
lhlrdlv, ý That if an Act of Parliament were obtained ] would be unjust, unlawf [it, ul to exclude his R 
and Ingg fActo voidg-Ax contrary both to the Law 
of God and Natural and the )mown Fundamental Laws 
of the Land. 6 
Tho Integrated Contract response to this kind of 
argument is exemplified by Brady's oppon*ntg Lord John 
Somers. In his Jura Popmll Angligenj (1701). Somers met 
out to defend the Kentish PetitlonersO7 His pamphlet 
blended Social Contract Theory and an enquixy into English 
constitutional law. His point was to show that petitioning 
was rightful both morally and according to sp*cifically 
English lawe But Somerss unlike Bradyq attempted to 
extract constitutional low from the moral law. He 
interpreted English constitutional history in the terms 
and categories of his Social Contract ThoorYi And a 
principal conclusion that he drew from this exercise vas 
that the right to petition the Commons was an inviolable 
26o 
"Natural ]Risht of MankindIfe Thus ho argueds 
It this Right be natural, thO People of EnAlalidt 
who have lost an little by entring into Society an 
any otberaq must have an just and ample a Claim to 
it an any Nation in the World* That they have a 
Right to represent their Sufferingns and pray for 
a ROIOXstion of th*mq in evident from the Opinions 
of our Sages of the Lawq from Wiat our Kings have 
permitted and declaredq and what has been declared 
and enacted in Parliament, 8 
Legal history confirmed what Social Contract Theory had 
posited* The moral law and positive law were amalgamated 
together in the same flow of argument. 
This amalgamation was affected in two ways, The 
first way involved loosening the conditions of current 
legal theory. The ambiguities and difficulties concerned 
with the notions of natural law, Equity and $the Reason of 
the law' were of particular importance here* The central 
conclusion that Integrated Contract legal theory upheld 
was,, an one writer assertedg that "the Municipal Laws" 
were "grounded upon and derived from" the laws of nature 
and nationz, 9 The second imy moral theory and constitutional 
law were amalgamated involved loosening the Social Contract 
from Its rationalist moorings and interpreting it an an 
historical event. The plausibility of thin thistoricoll 
enterprise &rose from the current istAte of historical 
scholarship. It was# then, in the two areas of legal 
theory and history that lbridgest were conatructed between 
Constitutional and Social Contractarianizm* rn the 
remainder of this chapter I will eimmine each of these 
'bridges$ in more detail and suggest why they might have 
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appoared plausible and coherent to many gnglixhmsn In th* 
late seventeenth conturyo I will begin by examining the 
legal ideas of Integrated Contmetarialligm, 
We may best appreciate the peculiarities of Integrated 
Contract legal ideas by contrasting them with the principal 
legal doctrines of the Social and Constitutional Contruct 
Theories* Social Contract Theory examined the relationship 
between natural law and positive lawo The moist characteristic 
view of this relationship in expressed In 1. *ckels EssaYs on 
the-TAW ot NatHMO Natural low was the ground upon which 
obligation to obey civil law rented* Without natural lawe 
no compacts would be kept for long and peace could only 
be secured by force not righto 
10 Natural law stood an a 
constant guide to legislators and subjectas it provided an 
eternal standard to which positive laws and human action 
should strive to conform., 
11 Natural law was the criterion 
for assessing the justice of positive lawo In what we 
have discussed as Constitutional Contract Theoryq by 
contrast$ positive law consisted only of those pronouncemonts 
of a properly constituted legislature that furthered the 
lintentions' of the original contracteez: 1, e, the jajYuA 
IDOPHU- 
12 j&juq___voRulj was the criterion for determining 
the validity of positive law. In Intograted Contract Theory 
these two very different criteria of natural law and salus 
v2Ruli were merged* Natural 3L&wg or the law of reasong 
explicitly entered the English Constitution and became the 
most important criterion for determininS what was and what 
vas not valid as pogitive law. The effect of this juncture 
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can be seeng for examplel in Defoe's Tihe ArSxi-t-ml Power of 
the CollectIve HOdY of the Peonle or RnAland (1702)e Defoe 
asnerts that one of the Imximat or his arrm*nt ins 
That Reason In the Test &nd Toucb--stone of I^wsI 
&nd that all Law or Power that is Contradictory to 
Reason% is-irso-Lacta void in it self# and ought 
not to be obeyed* 13 
. -g; 
C Uns Jamesý The author of A Baer Acogunt Qr tLhe Nuillty On 
Title (nedb) was even owre explicit, He declared that 
"It is a Maxim of our 1&wq That the Laws of God and Nature 
should take place before all other Lnvg"o 
14 And Timothy 
Wilson reversed the Social Contract relationship between 
positive and natural (or divine) low when he asserted that 
it was the possession of a "Legal and Human* Right" that 
Savo a prince "Gods Authority"*15 It vans apparentlYe no 
longer divine law that determined which positive low right 
was valid,, but rather It was positive law that determined 
Divine Right) 
We are confronted her* with the rhetoric of political 
debate* As I have already suggested, It In not &Iways 
Obvious 'whether a simple confusion of concepts is occuring, 
or whether there is a genuine integration of constitutional 
and natural law arguments, But since we meet assertions 
like those just noted so often* it seems unwise to write 
then off immediately an more confusions, Indeodt if instead 
of writing them off we take then seriouslys we find that 
we can account for their plausibility and coherence to men 
in the late seventeenth century* How was It possible$ 
then, for the integration of fundamental and natura3L law 
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arguments to appear coherent? 
The anxwer Is complex. Me coherence of the legal 
arguments of Intogratod Contractarianism soemx to have 
derived from three main nourcess f; Lrxtg one coozoon 
interpretation of Natural low Thooryl second* a co wn 
misunderstanding of tho nature of Squityl and third, an 
interpretation of lawyers' arguments from "the reason of 
the Co - mn Law", The author of a pamphlet Of 11LO. -F-tindAR-Mental. 
Lems or. Politick Sgnstitution of thJLg -YAnxdcm- 
(nodJ illustrates 
the first two of them* sourcess He wx to$ 
The Fundamental, laws of 211XI&DA are nothing but 
the Common Laws of Equity and Nature reduced into 
a particular way of Folicy# which Policy is the 
ground of our Title to thems and Interest in thOmt 
For though it is trueg that Nature bath invented 
all Nations In an equal right to the Laws or Nature 
and Equity 9, os yet the several Models of external Government and Policy renders them war* or less 
capable of thin their comman Rights *,, where the 
outward Constitution or Polity of a Republick In 
purposely framed for the confirming and better 
conserving this common Right of Nature and Equity 
(&s in ours) there is not only a common Rightg but 
also a particular and lawful Power Joyned with 
this Right for its Maintenance and Supportation* 16 
Civil laws wero simply 11 confirma tions# or oxplicationx of 
the Law of Matureg or conclusions drawn frove iti, 617 Ideally 
all Xavermsents in the world would have the same conxtitutionse 
Civil rIXht and natural riXht were roally just two sides 
of the same coing or should b*,, From this theory of 
natural law it was a short stop to the view that natural 
law deterjain*d which civil laws were properly laws sit all. 
And the stop "as that much shorter when the comma Otis- 
understandinX of Equity was taken into aCCOUnte 
-, IiJmL-A 
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'Equity' 0 an eminent lawyer assertedt was the "opposite 
to regular law"6 
18 It was a necessary and recognized 
branch of English law* It was necessary becauses am the 
Common Lawyer Sir Robert Atkyns argued$ "No Makers of Law 
can forsee all things that inay happens and therefore it in 
convenient that the fault be reform'd by Equity& "19 There 
appeared$ thenj room in English law for the exercise of 
discretion to ensure justice6 But how far did thin go? 
It certainly did not involve the recognition that rAtural 
low should determine, what positive laws should be accepted 
an valid - the view Implied in Integrated Contract argm*ntse 
Judgments in cases of Equity were not given by considering 
divine law$ natural law$ salus pop . yU or some abstract 
conception of Itbe just$* Rather# an Lord Nottingham 
explained* in "suits in equity before the Chancellor, the 
Lord Chancellor must order his conscience after the rules 
and grounds of the laws of this roalmell"O Yet since 
judgment in Equity was given by reference to 1consciencels 
Iroason' and 'the justig those Judgments might aIR329gr to 
support Integrated Contract argumentsil For# to the mind 
untutored in legal technicalitieng It did sees that lawyers 
themselves recognized 'conzeiencese treasont and $the justl 
as arbiters of what law meant and which laws were valid* 
In similar fashions the appeals of great Common Lawyers 
like Coke and Hobart to "the reason of the comma law" 
might appear to support Integrated Contract arguments, 
The lawyers understood bylthe reason of the common law" 
something quite specific* The freasonl they referred to 
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was supposedly embodied within the history of common law. 
Only through a knowledge of that history could the $reason', 
the 'principlests of common law be understood* Yet herej 
once againg van evidence of lawyers appealing to freason' 
in disputes about the meaning and validity of laws. 
In their variouB wayaq thong current notions of natur&l 
lawl, Equity and Ithe reason of the comon law' lent credibility 
to Integrated Contract arsumentno The crucial idea that 
these notions Isupportedt was that slatural law was an 
integral part of the English Constitutione The historical 
ideas wMremm*d in Integrated Contractarianim made this 
crucial idea evon nore plausible* What were these historical 
Ideas? Integrated Contzmet. arguments borrowed the concepts 
of 'state of nature's Isocial contract' and $governmental 
contracti from Social Contract Theory and turned them Into 
historical events, This was done by both turning certain 
historical events (like the Norman Conquests Magna Carta 
and Coronation oaths) into #original contracts' as we have 
seen Constitutional Contract Theorists doing,, and by linking 
Znglish constitutional history with Biblical history* 
There was a period in the worldto history when political 
150CLOtY h4d not Yet been InVentede That period lasted 
trO'8 the OrO&U031 until 90032 atter the Flood* 
21 Indeedg 
there were still some, areas in the world@ as contemporary 
travellors seend, to be roportingg that had not yet ALdopted 
civil life,, 
22 During this time and in theme placoxg V*oplo 
actually lived in the lotate o; r natural. In Zurope this 
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period lasted until the sons of Japhat spread across the 
continent settling down into small commimities an they went 
and establishing government 5,23 Theme first civil societies 
were set up by contract between the heads of the separate 
households that were to be incorporated. Each family or 
household head sacrificed some of his natural right in 
order to overcome the disadvantages of the #state of 
natural and to ensure that natural low was made effective* 
This use the origin of the 'Gothic Constitution' - the 
purest and most just form of government that had once existed 
all over Europe but which, by the late seventeenth century 
according to many writers# only rerained In England and a 
few other countries. 
24 English constitutional history 
comprised essentially (as it did in Constitutional Contract 
Theory and the Common Law interpretation of the Ancient 
Constitution) the so far victorious struggle of the defenders 
of the pure and free Gothic 'balance' against encroachments 
by would-be tyrants. With this view of the historical 
development of the English Constitution, notions of 'state 
of natural$ #social contract'$ $natural rightt and $natural 
lawl became essential for understanding constitutional laws 
A law that most accurately followed natural laws it could 
be claimedg because it was framed by our ancestors whose 
sole consideration was to overcome the defects of the state 
of nature and ensure that natural law was made effective. 
So far we have cansidered the 'coherence' of Integrated 
Contractarianism. 6 But why mass It fattractivet to men In 
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the late seventeenth century? In part the lattroetivensox' 
arose from a general characteristic of much pOlsmical argumontg 
in part from the peculiarities of political debate during 
our period* The first of these I have already m*nt-to'%Od3 
there in a tendancy for political argument to be coercive 
and all-embracing in terms of Its audienct* Social Contract 
Theory presented a theory of political rjggLts Cork stitutiOnAl 
Contract Theory presented an interpretation of the fMg-%g 
of conntitutioml history and law. Both were familiar to 
audiences in the late soventoonth century and it in hardly 
surprising that several writers should have endeAvour*d to 
promote their views vith nrguments from Ix)th right and 
fact* Integrated Contract arguments, however$ seem to 
have confused arguments from right with arguments from 
fact. nut the confusion was a far from simplistic one* 
It was recognized that civil right and natural right wOrG 
notions of ftfferent kindog 
25 
and writers like Tyrrell and 
Sidney did consider appeal to moral law to, be 4ifforent 
from appeal to civil law or history* In discussions about 
rights Sidney observed* "that which ought. not to be is no 
more to be receiveds than it it could not b, 4.1,26 And when 
discussing vhether there was a rl&h of resixtAncOs TY=411 
asserted "that the question being only Moral# or POlit*G&It 
and not about any point of Faith., or laws it may be safely 
maintained by either party$ without any suiltq either of 
Heresiat or Treason, "27 Yet all the same these writers 
andeavourad to prove that Englisimen's rights were simple 
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derivations from the natural rights of man and that English 
law embodied the law of nature. 
A more complete explanation of the lattractiveness' 
of this rather peculiar attempt to marry moral right with 
legal fact, requires a consideration of some specific 
characteristics of late seventeenth century political 
argument, The attempted marringe was made by writers 
endeavourlickS to prove that It was perfectly Olawfull to 
exclude James ftom the Succession andl eventuallyt to rebel 
against hims Their principal opposition came from Filmerian 
Divine Righters. On the question of Successionj the Divine 
Righterp argued that "proximity of blood does give a title 
unchangeable by any human laws, "28 On the right of 
resistance, tho Divine right argument was ex9ontially that 
monarchy was ordained by Godl that 4dam was the first 
monarch; t1vit paternity gave rise to political rulet that 
the bond between father and children was analagous to 
that between ru 
, 
ler and rulodl and that therefore citisens 
could no more change their rulers than childrencould their 
parents* In the debates of the 1680s post Divine Rig4ters 
were concerned to go further than this, bowavere They 
attempted to show what the necexsary attributes of monarchical 
authority were in order to argue that the English king wax 
properly a sovereign and thus possessed those attributex. 
by English as well as divAne law* Faced by then* arguments, 
Exclusionists were forced back from English law to a 
consideration of Ifirst principles'* 
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Their arguments took the same form an the Divine 
Righteral and were dominated by the same fundamental 
conception: all phenomena were either natural or artificial, 
The form of argument was first to elicit 'original* Divine 
Righters insisted that political society was naturall originated 
by God with his creation of Adam. Contractarions responded 
that it was artificialg created by human design& But the 
notion of 'origin* was ambigmouss it might rater to 
rational origins or historical ones* Divine Right arguments 
appeared to merge the two, The Bible contained a true 
historical account of the first ages of the world. it 
portrayed political power originating in Adam's family* 
Reason taught that royal authority could be deduced from 
29 fatherhood, The first monarchs in the world were not 
only 2116e fathers of their peoplev they were also the actual 
fathers of them. The complete contractarian response was 
to show that political authority could only be understood 
if government was viewed am iL it were the product of the 
conscious design of its citizens and that as a matter of 
hiNtorical-fa-at government was set up that vays Having 
established these poiutxg contractarian arguments about 
the particular constitutional provisions of the late 
seventeenth century English constitution proceeded after 
the same manner an Divine Right arguments# What M and 
what Mel have been in the distant past was made a basis 
for insisting upon what was the pres constitutional 
positions 
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Xn one significant respect the difference between the 
three theories that were associated with appeals to contract 
in the Into seventeenth century can be seen in terms of 
diffor#nt, rennonses to Filmerian Divine Right Theory. 
Thus the Lockoan Social Contract Theory was a response to 
Filmor's theory of the nature of political power outlined 
In the first part of ratrlareha* Constitutional Contract 
Theory was a response to the sort of argument about the 
English Constitution promentedg for exampleg in the last 
part of PatrjLargba and in 1bg fMaholdgra 2Mnd Xnqy2A* 
And only the theory of Xnt*grated Contractarianism was a 
response to the whole body of FilmorIx writings* out we 
way gain a clearer appreciation of the peculiarities of 
Xntegrated Contractarianiom If we look in some dotall At 
the writings of Algernon Sidney and James Tyrrell. Sidney's 
theory of low and TyrrelllsAow of English constitutional 
history will be of particular importance here* 
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CHAPTER XX 
ALGERNON SIDNEY AND THE THEORY OP WrEGRATED CONTRACT 
Algernon Sidneyls name has been linked to tho tradition 
of European liberal thought ever since his Imartyrdon' for 
the "Old Cause"' in 1683, Various historians have 
described him agr a democrat. 
2 
a'republican$3 j, Commonvealthwan 94 
the philosopher of 1688,5 8 tacit proponent of constitutional 
monarchy, 
6 
and even as the upholder of the two lidealt 
constitutions that achieved their respective realizations 
7 in America in 17766 and in England in the aid-nineteenth 
century. 
8 
But, somowhat curiouslyg of all the historians 
who 'Ihave mentioned his writings, none have presented a 
critical examination of his ideang the purposes for which 
he wroteg or the coherence of his theories of societys 
government and law# Yet Sidney$& reputation was considerable 
in the late seventeenth centurys'9 He was the author whom 
14cke ranked with Hookers Pufandorfq Paxton and himself 
as recommended readins for the student of "the Original 
of Societies, and the rise and extent of political power* W10 
The surprising lack of critical work is even further under- 
lined by the fact that it %Ms partly on the evidence of 
his ideas that Sidney was convicted and executed for high 
treasone The opinion of Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys Is 
sufficiently dramatic to varrant a close enquiry into the 
Ideas of that book whichg lie said in his summing up: 
"'7,2' 
If you believe that that was Colonel Sidney0s, bookg 
writ by hJL=g no man can doubt but it is a sufficient 
evidence that he in guilty of compasaing and imagining 
the death of the K: Lng *,,, this book contains all the 
waliceg and revenge and treasong that mankind can be 
guilty oft it fixos tho sole powcr in the parliament 
and the people* 11. 
Sidney mvto his manuscript . the DiscourLe. 9 -Congorginst 
Goyerjwents principally to refute Filmer's doctrines and. to 
re-assert the idea of man's natural liberty to not up the 
civil society of his choice and control it t1woughout all 
its constitutional development* Nhny of Filmorls basic 
assumptions about the relationship of man to Gods the 
Importance of Scripture an historys and the necessity of 
inquiring into 'original to settle questions of right# were 
shared by Sidneye But Sidney totally disagreed with the 
principles that Filmer had deduced from these promises* 
"Patriarchal's he declared, ims "grounded upon wicked 
principles, equally pernicious to magistrates and people"* 
Forg an far as his reading of the work was concern*do it 
declared the opinion 
That all man are born under a necessity derived from 
the laws of God and natureq to submit to an absolute 
Kingly government, which could be restrained by no 
laws or oaths and that he ftat has the powers 
whether he came to it by creationg electiong 
Inheritanceg usurpation, or any other vayv had the 
rights and none must oppose his will,, but the 
persons and estates of his subjects must be 
indispensably subject unto it. 12 
The opposing view which Sidney claimed to stand for# 
and which he claimed to bnve defended in hix writingag were 
set out by him In a series of propositions in his lost 
Paper: 
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I an persuaded to believe,, that God had left nations 
to the liberty of setting up such governments an 
best pleased themselves* 
That magistrates were not up for the good of 
national, not nations for the honour or glary of 
magistrates, 
That the right and power of magistrates In 
every country was that which the laws of that 
country made It to bee 
That those laws were to be observed# and the 
oaths taken by thong having the force of a contract 
between magistrate and people, could not be violated 
without danger of dissolving the whole fabrice 
That usurpation could give no rightl and the 
most dangerous of all enemies to Kings were theyg 
who raising their power to an exorbitant height 
allowed to usurpers all the rights belonging unto 
it. 13 
A22 theme propositions are familiar as the stock. -In- 
trade of late seventeenth century contractarians* in 
order to uphold then against Filmerian attack$ Sidney felt 
obliged to contradict him point by point. This co=mon 
seventeenth century style of criticism tends to obscure the 
passiong determination and depth of feeling that clearly 
lay behind the views that Sidney was prepared to die fore 
The DIggourgen are too rumbling and repetitive to present 
a single developing line of argumente They sees over- 
burdened with an excessive scholarshipo 'Yet a passionate 
belief In often close to the surface and Sidney was prepared 
to follow through the consequences of his ideas in a much 
more rigid way than most other contractariAnse, 
Sidney's critique of Filmer began with an assertion 
of the far-reaching 12racticaL importance of such a task* 
"Such an have ressong understanding, or common senseq will, 
and ought to make us* of it in those things that concern 
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themselves and theirýposteriteo he doclarode "This rule 
obliSes us so for to search into matters of state,, as to 
examine the original principles of gover=ant in Seneralq 
and of our own in particular, I'll' The authorities which he 
claimed were necessary for this examination, and by which 
he wax prepared to be refutedg were those of Reasong lAwt 
History and Scripture*15 It is in terins of the Interdependence 
of the evidence from these diverse sources that the main 
characteristics of Sidney's writings an a form of Integrated 
Contractarianism can be seen. 
His examination of the "original principles of 
government : Ln general" brought Sidney into confl: Lct with 
Filmer's notion of 'natural subJectionl. Arainst this 
view that man was born under the dominion of a reliSiOuBlY 
sanctified absolute monarchv Sidney asserted "'that wan Ix 
naturally freell, 
16 But this natuxul treadom was far from 
unlimited* Sidney diapirted only that MU's U&tur*l ablicationn 
Involved a Ix)litical obligation, He Occeptod much SIXO of 
Filmerlx argument. Thus man$ he bolievedt was born under 
a complete obligation to Gods his Creator* But this simply 
confiru*d his own point about natural freedome for God 
had created free DIOnI17 Certainly# tooo man was born 
under an obligation to parentas but thix was not a volItIcal. 
obllgation*18 Yet this did mean that ultimtely only 
"every father of a family lis free$ and exempt from the 
do=JmAt: Lon of any oth*r". 19 
Basing himself on this principle of manIx natural 
275 
right to libertYs Sidney proce*4o4 to enquire Into the 
origin of government In the spirit of Nationalist 
Constructivisme Men were all equal in respect of natural 
righteg how then did the patent inequality In exinting civil 
societies arias? The argument from 'design's a crucial 
aspect of Rationalist Constructivisms provided Sidney with 
the answer* Inequality must have &risen in one or other 
of the only two types of consciously directed human actions 
that Oldnoy could imaginal 
It in hard to comprehend how one man can come to be 
waster of manyq equal to himself in right, unless 
It be by consentg or by force *so If by force o** 
It could not be justifiable$ and whilst our dispute 
in concerning rights that which ought not to be in 
no more to be received# than if it could not be* 
No right can come by conquest *** and] That vhich 
was unjust in its baginningg can oý itself never 
chnng* its nature* 20 
Thus of the two possible origins of inoqualltyq OnlY 
conscious consent could provide a viable and legitimate 
explanation of inequality* To the questions why$ how and 
to what extent natural equality should be relinquished* 
Sidney replied through a reference to 'state of nature$ and 
'civil contract'. It Is clear that he understood this 
eXPlanation of the origin of civil society an-something 
that had actually occurred In the history of mankind and 
not simply as a hypothetical construction useful for 
portraying the relationships Inevitably prexupposed in 
social existence. "The first fathers of mankind"* he 
argued$ "left their children independent on each othore and 
in an equal liberty of providing for thensolves"S 
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every own continued In this libortyip-till the number 
so increased$ that they became troublesome and 
dangerous to each other; and finding no other remedy 
to the disorders growingg or like to grow among 
them$ joined many families into ono civil bodyg that 
they might the better provide for the conveniency, 
safety$ and the dofence of them3el: vea and their 
children, This was a collation of every manOs 
private right into a publich stocke And no one 
having any other right than what was common to all, 
except it wera that of VhViers over their childrenj 
they were all equally free when their fathers were 
dead; and nothing could induce them to join# and 
lesson that natural liberty by joining in societiont 
but the hopes of a public advantage* 21 
The origin of societyg thong lay in the rational Oct 
of previously ; Creo and Independent family heado. 6 NA tura I 
liberty involved disadvantages, and the intention of over. 
coming these was the only motive for the formtion of that 
association which in called Icivil societylo ttsocieties 
cannot be instituted$ unles3 the heads of familieng that 
are to compose thems resign so much of their ri&Utq as 860as 
convoniontg into a public stock* to which every one bscOmOs 
subJect. It 
22 The public realm was created by a contract 
imposing restrictions on private right, But the extent 
of the restriction on naturul liberty ims left entirely to 
the subjective judZement of the participants, It was 
they who had to decide on the gravity of the disadvuntages 
of the state of nature - the insecurity, absence of a judge 
in disputes and each man's liberty being "thwarted by that 
of another"13 - and it Ims they who had to decide on the 
GiZS of their associationg for they alono would suffor If 
a mistako wore made, 
24 
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Thus the first governments were those set up by the 
consent of the governed6 Frove this proposition Pidney 
drew certain conclusigne which follow# in factq only when 
related to his fundamental amsumption of the rational design 
of humn institutionse 
If the power be originally with the multitudeg and 
one or more meng to whom the exercise of ite or a 
part of it was committedl had no more than their 
brethren, till It was conferred on him or th*ms it 
cannot be believed* that rational creatures would 
advance one$ or a few of their equals above 
themselves$ unless in consideration of their own 
goodl and then I find no inconvenience In leaving 
to them a right of judginge whether thin be duly 
performed or note We say in general$ who that 
institutes way alsp abrogate; " more especially 
when the institution is not only by but for himself* 
If the multitude therefore do inxtitutat the aniltitude 
may abrogatel and they themselveng or those who 
succeed In the same rightj can only be fit judges 
of the perfor-ence of the ends of the institution* 25 
Governmentg thong was entrusted to the care of magistrates 
on condition that its 'design' be fulfilled. only part of 
ments natural liberty was given up on entering civil societyq 
and that only conditionally, The reasons for establishing 
Rocletv in the first place were the continuing ends for 
which itowriment, existedo These endas according to Sidney$ 
must have consisted in "the public safety 
[beinjgýj 
ese 
provid*d forg liberty and propriety securedl justice 
admininteredg virtue ancouregods vice suppressed# and the 
true intereat of the nAtion advanced* 1,26 
This Strustl of governotnt was not without sanctionso 
laws originated frois attempts to direct and restrain magistrates 
in the performance of their duties, Andq according to 
Sidneyg l'nationso in variougoly AmaLing rr-onstILtutionÄ*] to* 
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[preserve) the possession of tb*ir natural righti to be 
governed by noneg and in no other way than they should 
appointit. -2.7 A natural right to rebel thus appeared as 
the inevitable consequence, of the Icarrect' view of the 
origin of government. When Lock* and Tyrrell argued for 
a natural right to rebel they hedged that right around so 
an not to seen to render government too unstablei, Sidney's 
argumontq howevers contained no such qualifications* In 
the opening pages of his D1122urapA he simply declared that 
tho danger& of asserting a right to resist and correct 
magistrates were, exAggeratede ullat was essential van 
that government be exercised with Justice. "Thor* can 
be no peaceq Ubere them is no justice'19 he Insisted, "nor 
any justic*9 it the government instituted for the g4wd of 
n the nation be turned to its ruin"* 6.8 In this statement 
Sidney summed up an enduring theme of his life in politid8o 
By far the gravest threat to the public woll. -beint c&MG9 
as he saw Ite frois established magigitrAUse No effort 
should be "red in opposing; tilleir abuxog of power* But 
the citizen body, for its parts almost an an An&lYtIc truth 
would hardly ever act contrary to its own interest* xt 
needed no harsh controls* Sidney does not seeim to havs 
had any partlaular comunItion in mind heres 110 wa a Simply 
juggling propositions about the caugow of civil disord*r, 
Ileroo then, we have Sidneyls theory of the *rJLsin of 
gov*rnment in soneral. All its ideas were quite familiar 
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in the late seventeenth century but it is romarkmble for 
its unqualified insistence on a popular right of rebellion* 
The idea of 'contract' ums clearly crucial to Sidney's 
notions of society# law and government* Society could 
only legitimately be got up$ and historically the first 
societies actually ygr. 9 set upg by a contract between the 
heads of independant Ccunilles6 Government was designed 
to perform tho ends adumbrated in the original contracto 
Laws wera designod to ensure that government fulfilled its 
only legitimate role and punished actions contrary to the 
to=s of the contract: 
"Hunan societies are maintained by mutual contractst" 
he asserted, "which aro of no value J. C they are not 
observed* lAws are madoo and magistrates created# 
to cause them to be performed in public and privOtO 
matters$ and to punish those who violate tham"s 29 
Sidney understood these contracts as much more then 
simply hypothetical devices for explaining and reconcilins 
individual freedom with the restrictions imposed by an 
increasingly powerf'ul socu. 1ar and sovereign stateo They 
were a constitutional reality* IIX will prove"$ he clAinOds 
and intended to devoto a chapter to that proofs 
in the first places that several nations have plainly 
and explicitly made contracts with their magistrates* 
2* That they are Implicit, and to be understoods 
where they are not plainly expressed* 
3* That they are not dreams* but real thing8o 
and Irrpetually obliging* 
. That judges are in many places appointed to 
decid; the contests arising from the broach of these 
contractal and whera they are not* or the party 
offending is of such force or prides that he will 
not submit, nations have been obliged to take the 
extremest courses* 30 
Unfortunately, the rest of the chapter was lost* but sufficient 
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ovidence existaq scattered throughout his vast Djxcoutsem. 
for us to present a fairly reliable account of what would 
bavo boen the lines of his $proof'. Us main concern was 
to establlsb the existence of constitutional rather than 
social contracts, 
as a weapon against 
Iliad always beent, 
both kinds of contr 
their existence and 
alternativas. 
The latter were only neceswry for him 
the Filmeriau assertion thAt govornment, 
nut the ultimate justification for 
act was the roaxonablelleas of an3erting 
the unreasonableness of their Filworian 
Sidney agreed with Filmer that the "Creation is exactly 
doscribed in the Scripture; but",, lie continued, "we know 
so little of what passed between the finishing of it and 
the flood, that [Filmer] mmy say what he pleagos, and X 
may leave him to seek his proofs where he can find theme 
In the mean times X utterly denyq that any power did remain 
in th6 hoads of families after the flood, tilat doas in the 
least degree resemble the regal in principle or practice. 
01 
Filmer's theory was thoroughly unreasonable because "though 
there had boon such a 
[politicaýj 
right in the first fathers 
of mankind ,* it must necessarily porishl since the 
generations or man are so confusadq that no man knows his 
OWn Originall and consequently this hair is no where to 
be found". 32 
Sidney next preaentod his own principles of natural 
libertyg natural equality,, and the contractual origins of 
soclaty and government as based on little wore, than common 
n. 8: L 
sonsel "Common sonso teaches", he anzartedI "and all 
good man aeRnowledges that governments are not set up for 
the advantage., profit, ploaxurej, or glory of one or a few 
men% but for the good of sociatyt,. 
33 And this sms the 
ultimate 'proof' of his general theory that mien voluntarily 
contracted together to set up civil societlese 
34 
Yet although nothing more might be required to prove 
his theory than Its reasonableneass Sidney laboriously 
produced $proofs' from history, lnwg and scripture as wells 
But since all his evidence from these sources was interpreted 
in tho light of what appeared reasonable to Sidney, there 
could hardly &rise any conflicts Sidney seems to have 
believed in a kind of IScholaxtic harmony$: the universe 
ims so ordered and guided by a reasonable God that everything 
in it contributed towards the divine (reasonable) plane 
Any evidence to the contrary wax either wrong or had been 
misunderstood. Thus# for wmmple, In the face of Filmer's 
demand for hixtorical evidence of loriginal contracts's 
Sidney simply repliedg "if there never were any general 
meetings of whole nations$ or of such an they did dalegate 
and intrust with the power of the whole, how did any man 
that Was Slec*bd come to have & power over the whole? "35 
He then proceeded to give several specific examples including 
the Romans, Gothsl Frankxj Vandals and the Saxonx*36 Indeed, 
he claimed that the "histories of all nations ,* are so 
full Of examples of this kindg that no man can question 
thems unless he be brutally ignorant$ or mliciously 
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contentious. 8"37 
An for evidence from constitutional law* Sidney claimed 
that this too 'proved$ the contractual nature of government. 
But his argument was as circular here an it was with 
historical evidence* There was a great variety of 
constitutions in the worldg he assertedl and "no other 
reason can be given for thix almost infinite variety of 
constitutionsl thAn that they who made them would have it 
sol which could not be, if God and nature had appointed 
one geneml rule for all nations",, 
38 
The evidence from roliXion and scripture "*s dealt 
with in a ximiInr fashion* The reasonableness and necessity 
of civil society for the life of mang Sidney argued$ must 
be presumed to prove that the contract of civil aocistY 
wax the will of God* God had made man and had ordAined 
that he live In society with otherse But He had left 
mn free to choose his own form of government, 
39 
The proofs that Sidney might have produced in the 
missing chapter of his DIscourses - proofsg that iog for 
the *reality' of contracts - are thus ultimtely circular 
and not proofs at all* What accorded with comonan sense 
and r"son provided the constant reference point for all 
his enquiries Into political affmirs* For all 2ils 
& asertions About "the political science* which of - A13LI 
others Is the most abstruxo and variable AccOrdinS to 
accidents and eircumstancea"*40 Siftey's contract theory 
can only be understood in terms of his rationalismo This 
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can be seen most clearly in'his reflections nbout law'and 
justice in his theory of Covernment* 
Sidney declared that his "purpose" for enquiring into 
the relative merits of the various torms of government was 
to "sook only that tehich is leral and J"st. 1041 110 love 
already seen that the attempt to marry law with morality 
was a central theme In Integrated Contractarinnizme42 
It involved far more than the common sense idea that there 
ought to be some correspondence botween legal r-tilos and 
moral precepts, In ftet, it seemed U involve a theory 
of law that bore closer resemblance to mediaeval than modern 
idens. 
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But it Is a legal theory of crucial importance 
for understanding the coherence of the lihig theory Of legal 
rebellion, Sidnoy's writings contain one of tile clearest 
statements of this Whig theory* The characteristics Of 
the theory emarged from Sidneyls search for the ]Awful and 
Just constitution, 
Ills enquiry proceeded along both historical and rationalist 
lines, The outcome of the enquiry was that the lawful and 
just constitution vas that uhich began in contrnct and 
persisted through the continuous consent of the citizens 
to IAWS which enshrined their purpose for originally setting 
up govcr=ent in the first pldCO. rn this constitution 
"the Iftwo of every people" were indicative of *the reasons 
for which, or the conditions upon which .. * heiý- consent 
It I 
was obtained" to be governed, 644 Justice was possible only 
if the constitutional arrangements guaranteed the &o . Ruamguff 
2U4 
right of the citimeary to alter their lawn an they saw 
fit. 
4.5 
Such a constitutiong Sidney arguedg was no utopian 
dream. It was a practical possibility which had been 
evidenced already in hunan hixtarye 
46 
The beat form of goverpment that the world had yet 
witnessed was that of Republican Rome& It had not, been 
'Perfect# forg after alls it had collapsed* But Sidney'* 
concern was Onot after that which in perfect* well knowing 
that no such thing in found among menj but we seek that 
human constitutiong which is attended with the least* or 
the most pardonable inconveniences* jj47 The considerotion 
of history led hims an it had led many before h: Lmq to that 
Classical Republicanism for which he is most famous* 
48 
Ancient Spartag Republican Romag and contemporary Venice 
had portrayed most effectively the characteristics of 
libertyt justice and durability that qualified them as the 
best models to be followed*49 Yet Sidneyls Republicanism 
"as neither populist nor antl-morairchicale Indeadq he, 
expressed himself opposed to "pure damcracy",. 
50 
The crucial common attribute of all these constitutions 
S: kdney admired was that they recognized a perpetual right 
in thO citizen body to change their local arrencementso 
This Weis the very "essence" of the "Just conatitxition"o 
51 
The OXcellence of this type of constitution consisted in 
Its securing the Ideals of Justice, Liberty and Property. 
By definition the "Just constitution" ims a constitution 
:! 8.5 
based on "consent", The sort of 'consentl that Sidne3r 
had in mind here seems to have been of a very oxnlicit 
kinds 
It in not **. the bare suffrance of a government 
when a disgust is declared* nor a silent submixsion 
when the power of opposing in wanting$ that can 
imply a consent or election, and create a rightl 
but an explicit act of approbations when =64 have 
ability and courage to resist or deny* 52 
The liberty guaranteed by this constitution did not 
involve relinquishing all mouls natural libertye Sidney 
distinguished liberty from& licence, very Clearly* The 
"liberty asserted is not a licentiousness of doing wbat, in 
pleasing to everyý-, Dne against the ComeAnd of God",, lie 
claimodg 111-out an exemption frout all human laws, to which 
men oo. *, love not given their as"ute"53 Liberty consisted 
solely "in an independency upon the will of anotherý1ý4 
and thus# Sidney concludbdo he 411s, a free son who livox an 
best ploaselis himselfs under laws made by his own cousent"*55 
The, contxuatual origin of civil society,, howevorl did 
involve the sacrifice of some fnatu. 3ral JAb*rty'* This 
Sidney rocognizod as legitionte provided both that the 
sacrifice was vmde willingly and equally by all and also 
that a sphere of individual liberty still reminedo 
56 
Ile also ac vlodged that society might have considerableg 
legitimAUt interests In the private atTeirs of individuals# 
Although the boundary between the public and the private 
should be very clear$ society might legitimately concern 
itself with an individualls property if the public good 
so requirede" 
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But the sacrifice of natural liborty and the acceptance 
of possibly considerable interference by society in an 
individual's aCfairsl were only conditional* The required 
#continuous consent# in the just constitution meants an far 
as Sidney was concerneds the retention of a natural right 
to reject the laws of that constitution both by individuals 
and by the general body of the citizenry. Without these 
rights, the just constitution would appear a more chimeras 
all laws must fall# human societies that subsist 
by them be dissolvadq and all innocent persons wTos*d 
to the violence of the most wickedt if men might not 
justly defend themselves against injustice by their 
own natural rightg when the ways proscribed by public 
authority cannot be taken* 58 
Yet this right of resistance vao neither merely a right hold 
in r*sezv for rectifying intolerable conditions nor vas 
It grounded on natural law alone4, It was the logical 
outcomia of Sidney's complex theories of the origing design 
. nstant, operationg and nature of governments 
Through the &o 
or tbz*at of operationg of this rightg the just constitution 
could be retained and corruption evoided3 
Laws and constitutions ought to be weighed; and 
whilat all due reverence is paid to such an are good, 
every nation way not only retain in itself a power 
of chanZin:; or abolishing all such as aro not 009 
but ought to exercise that power according to the 
beat of their underztandinSo and In place of what 
was either at first mistaken or afterwards corruptedg 
to constituto that which in most conducingý, to the 
establishment of Justice and liberty* 59 
And resistance van lawful not only according to natural or 
divine lawq but also according to human$ positive laws 
Sidney's arvwent (which might almost be taken an the 
fundamental principle of liberalism), wam the follOWiU9t 
207 
If the laws of God and men are **w of no effects 
when the magistracy in left at liberty to break 
theml and if the lusts of thoseq who are too strong 
for the tribunals of justices cannot be otherwise 
restminod, than by sodftiong tu=1tas and imras 
those noditionsg tumultsq and imrss are justified 
by the laws of God and maji. 60 
Sidney ftcLmolflodgod that "human laws do nots in all Cason, 
make men Judges and avengars of tho injuries ofrered to 
them"161 but on his theory this presented no obstacle to 
mintaining the legality of rebellion* 11is understandins 
or *law* is of critical iMortanco here* 
Lavr, j for Sidneys consisted of ruleis e4ilbiting ClOrtain 
distinct and related characteristica. Its orizin laY in 
the attempts by tile foup4ors of SOVOrnmOnts tlD secure the 
advantaGes of social intercourse* law was thus dist: Lllct: LV* 
in terms of being designed to secure not marely order but 
"good order" in society* This design was itself the 
highest of a3-I humn, laws - the ; Cirst, Inw in the light of 
which all other laws must be interprotede The "zoneral 
law to provide for the safety of the people" VUB tII8 
hishout laws the "umnicipal laws do only show lww 
[this] 
-we 
should bo performed. 116"n Tho vuricty of each country#s 
lawn indicate-d not only the freodom of oach nation to ; rrsm* 
lawsf, but also the judScraent of cach people of WhAt rulOB 
bout gw=nteed their well-beiMs 
Lawg thong %ma tll, 4i rasult of the design of ratiOU43L 
baiuss pursuing thqir own interest, It mud be judged 
either accordinZ to the lettor or according to the dowLen 
behind itq because both should point in VIG same directions 
63 
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The "true intentional meaning" of every law was to advance 
tho public good. law vras nothing loan than *hrritten reasOn"* 
64 
Sinca low ins I'mritten roasan", tho ixiterprotation of 
it did not involve au enquiry into law boolcus statutes and 
caseso It involved simply the application of rational 
gkxioms to the letter of the law, It -. ms not the study of 
past case law that produced legal axiomal instead, the 
axiom. s o: C tilo law uoro self-evident in exactly the Ga'66 
itay as mathematical axioms werol 
Axioms [in law] are not rightly grounded upon Judged 
cases; but cases are to be judged according to 
axioms: the certain is not provod by the uncertain* 
but the uncertain by the cortaing and every thing 
is to be esteemed uncertaing till it be proved to 
be certaine Axioms in law are, as in mathematicaq 
ovidant to common sense; and nothing is to be taken 
for an axiom,, that in not so a** The axioms of our 
law do not receive their authority from Col: o or 
Haless but Coke and Hales deserve praise for giving 
judgment according to such as are undeniably tru*# 65 
Many differont ruleal decrees and sanctions existed 
in the world& A rational examination of them not onlY 
determined the wisdom or justice of their nuthors, but also 
determined which of them were truly laws* it was not the 
antiquity of a rule or the reputation of its framers that 
prov-id6d it with the authority of lawl it was simply its 
"intrinsic equity and justice"* 
66 
Thurs Ilawl and 1JUsticel 
were made virtually synonymous$ or ratheri the name $-taw' 
was resarved exclusively for $just hirwn rulaisle 'That 
Which is not Ju3t". Sidney declared in a chapter headingg 
Itis not Law; and that which is Not Law ought Not to be 
Obe-yad". 667 But just as Ijustical was indispensable for 
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the notion of Il&w's so llawt was indispensable for 
understanding 1justicelo "If any mn ask"s he asserted, 
"u-bat I moan by justice# I answort that the law of the land# 
as Dir as it is feanctio rectai jubens bonesta,, prohibens 
coutrarialo declares what it is. tt68 And this question- 
beggring answer was all that Sidnoy was pr"red to give* 
He dids hovevert anticipate a number of questions'and 
objections thAt might be levelled against his legal theory. 
Ills answers were characteristically forthright and somewhat 
astonishing* He dismissed the suggestion that it might 
be difficult to determine which rules in practice should 
be considered just or unjust by asserting "that as this 
consists not in formalities and nicotieso but in evident 
and substantial truths* there is no need of any other 
tribunal than that of common senseg and the light of natureg 
to dotermine the mattertf* 
69 
To the question "who eshould 
judge7l',, he replied t1the people",, in the sense of the w1wis 
citizen bodyo "As kings# and all other imSistrates o. o 
are constituted for the Cood of the people, the people only 
can bo fit to judge whether the end be accomplished* "70 
Astonishingly, ho bad no roservutions to malte about the 
corractnoss of their estimmuon. The Issues umuld be 
straightforward and, any%my, as "IonS as men retain anything 
of that reason which J-15 tru: LY their nature they nover fail 
of judzinC rirhtly of virtue and v: Lcc,.,, 
73L This very "le 
thoory of human nature roots uneasily in Sidneyls otherwiso 
thoucht" work* It perhaps vorves to emphasise once aZaln 
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his passionately hold belief that maSistratess not the 
peoples represented by far the greatest threat to the public 
well being* 
Sidnoy was aware that excoption udght be taken to his 
legal theory on the grounds that it effectively dissolved 
all obligation to obey civil law, He denied that this 
was so by distinguishing between the obligation owed to 
magistratos by individuals on the one hand and by the 
$people# on the other* But his overriding concern to 
establish rWits of resistance against magistrates was 
equally visible even here: 
Allogiance signines no moro (as the words "ad 109*00' 
declare) than such an obedience an the law r8quir0file 
But as the law can require nothing from the whole 
peoples who are masters of its allegiance can Only 
relate to particularag and not the whole nationoo 
No oath can bind any other than those who take its 
and that only In the true sense and meaning of its 
but single men only tARke this oaths and therefore 
single men only are obliged to keep it, The body 
of a people neither (loses nor can perform any such 
acts Agreements and contracts have been mnde: 00* 
but no wise man can thinks that the nation did 
thereby make themselves the creature of their own 
croatureq, 72 
Thus the whole citizen bodys whose continuous consent to 
the law was a prerequisite for the just (and therefore legal) 
constitutionq could not be subordinate to their own creation* 
The idea of a rebellion by them ms, theng a contradiction 
in terms* Their consent was a prerequisite of laws the 
withdrawal of that consent simply involved the IlUsality 
of the rules which had previously governed theme "Those 
who seek after truth'19 Sidney concluded$ "will easily finds 
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that there can be no such thing in the world as the rebellion 
of a nation a5ainst its ot-m magistrates". 
73 Civil mar 
vas cortsinly an ovilg but it ims necossary when the 
alternative was tyranny, For,, although civil war was "a 
disease oes tyranny in the death of a state*,, 
74 Sidney 
recognized that civil war would involve extra-constitutiOnal 
or extrajudicial actiona But isince law and justico were 
virtually synonymouag civil war could not involve Illegality 
on the people's side. 
71; If the cause were just# then the 
neglect of the old law could not be stigmtisod an illegal* 
It is hard3Ly surprising that such doctrines an th, 956 
should havo encounterod tho censure of late soventeenth 
century royalists. The right of resistance was node the 
corner-stone of all legal arrangements* The citizen body 
was exhorted to constant vigilance over its righto and the 
activities of its rulers, Tho right to resist save this 
vigilance offectivone: w and mooning* The activity of 
resisting ensured the continuance of just laws* IProw 
these notions Sidney derivvd a most astounding conclusions 
resistance ims the foundation of all lave "Whoever 
disapproves -tumultat gieditionst or uneIg he argueds "by 
which Lan evil mmg1strate] ,* may be removed from Its if 
v gentler means are IneffeettmIs subv*rts the 
found&t: LOn of 
all law"176 Sidneyls notion of the ffoundationl of laws 
In in fact the negation of law, Tlie paradox, once again$ 
seems only comprehensible In terms of a one-sided concern 
that kings 1mre the only source of political evil to be ;, g' 
guarded against, 
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Since SidTIOY Proceeded to iutQSrAtO then* doctrines 
of legitimate resistance and deposition of kings into a 
specific interpretation of the English Constitution, it 
becomes easier to understand the violence of the royalist 
reaction asainst him, His theory of the English Constitution 
sbared many of the characteristics of Constitutional 
Contractarianismo The present constitution was essentially 
the some an the ancient English Constitution, English 
Constitutional development had been unbroken since Saxon 
tim*s* There had been neither a Saxon nor a No n 
Conquest. 77 The laws of the conatitutlon were initially 
tcu3tomary laws's and custom was limmemorialf tlwuZb not 
nacessarily funchanging'*78 Not all the laws of the 
Ancient Constitution were still in force in late seventeenth 
century Englandq but the constitution was gin wisencel th* 
SAMOO Parliament uas "as antient, an our nation". 
79 In 
brief$ tho Ancient Constitution uns an eloctives limited 
monarchy preserved by resisting and deposing wicked monarchs. 
80 
ThO historical and 10901 issues Of tho Ancient 
COn8titution debatog8l wOre cl0arlY Very important for 
Sidney, But they did not constitute the dominant elomonts 
in his theory of the English Constitution* Sidney's 
vritinS exhibita the conflict between arguments from history 
and from reason that we have seen art characterizing 
Constitutional Contract Theory* But Sidney was much 
more explicit than the Constitutional Contractarians in 
his ultimRtG reliance upon "reason" in constitutional dobatoe 
For exampleg when replying to Filmor's assertion that 
093 
parliaments did not exist until after the Norman CA)nquestq 
Sidney argued: 
I do not think myself obliged to insist upon the 
name or form of the parliament in pro-Norman times; 
for the authority of a magistracy proceeds not 
from the number of years that it has continued* 
but the rectitude of those that instituted it **a 
For an time can make nothing lawful or justq that 
in not no of itself (though men are unwilling to 
change tIjAt w1iich pleased their ancestors* unless 
they discover great inconveniences in it) that 
which a people does rightly establish for their 
own good is of as much force the first day# as 
continuance can ever give it: and therefore in 
matters of the greatest importance# wise and good 
men do not so much inquire what has beeng an what 
is good$ and ought to bol for that which of itself 
in evilq by continuance is made worse, ands upon 
the first opportunity$ Is justly to be abolishods 
But if that liberty$ in which God created man* can 
receive any stren5th from continuance, and the 
rights of Ero. ishmen can be rendered more 
unquestionable by prescription$ I say, that the 
nationsg whose rights we inheritg have ever enjoyed 
the liberties we cJLai=# and always exercised them 
in governing themselves popularly$ or by such 
representatives as have been instituted by themselvess 
from the time they were first known in the world* 82 
Thero are, in fact, only two apparently significant 
differences between Sidney's theory of the English Constitution 
and the general outlino of Integrated Contractarianism that 
I presented in the previous ebaptero The first im 
terminological. Whereas Integrated Contractarianism 
paralleled a theory of Social Contract with one of fundamental 
contractq nmdamental law and fimdamental rightaq the 
distinction between concepts or "the fundamental" and 
"the natural" play little explicit, part in Sidney's theori*xe 
I call this difference, merely 'terminological' becauses an 
we have seeng both Constitutional and Social Contract 
Theories contained conceptions of law which at the savie 
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time maintained a distinction and a necessary connection 
between positive and natural law, As far as the coherence 
of those contract theories in concerned (and therefore their 
Ousefulness' and apparent relevance for justifying particular 
actipua)g it was the supposed #connections between positive 
and natural law that was importante Sidneyls theory defined 
law in terms of this connoctiono As we have just aeons 
unjust rules were simply not to be considered as laws* 
Thus the key for determining ithothor a particular not of 
constitutional arrangements was justs And Car determing 
whether a particular law was Authoritative$ mao the same 
in Sidney's theory as in the general theory of Integrated 
Contractarianimo If a constitution could be seen to 
embody the consent of the governed$ then it was justo if 
a law did not vitiate the requirements of j! gJus-P-giD-HUs 
then (prov; Lded it had been promulgated in the proper 
constitutional vey) it was authoritativeo Xrrexpective, 
of whether these requirements of consent and nalus Pon-u-11 
were accorded the nominal status of fundamental laws or 
L%Wdamental rightal the argument vas the &awe* 
The second difference betwocn Sidneyls tUeory of tUe 
UnglAsh Constitution and that of Integrated Contractarianim 
concerns the role of historical evidence* Both ConstLtutignal 
Contract and Integrated Contract arguments appealed to history, 
But SIdneyq aswo have just seen, was prepared to argue 
from reason alone should history conflict with his notion 
of right-* Nonotholons, his view of English constitutional 
history ims substantially the samo as that of his contemporary 
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contractarians. Whereas contemporary contractarians took 
great pains to equate the Saxon Constitution with the late 
seventeenth century constitution (and rewrote history so 
that it accorded with their understanding of what was 
trationall)l Sidney acknowlefted that miny changes had 
occured since Saxon times but insisted that the constitution 
had remained the same #in essoncelo His history was 
certainly an frationalisticl as theiral but it allowed for 
a theory of $development$ idUch could not be contutplated 
within the frameworks of either Whig Ancient Constitution 
Theory or Constitutional Contractarianism, 
In company with tho Constitutional Contractarianst 
Sidney argued for the Germanic or Gothic origin of the pro. 
Norman English Constitution. 
" That earliest Znzlish 
Constitution uas a limited monarehys he claimedg and he 
cited Caesar and Tacitus as authorities for thiso 
84 After 
tho doparture of the Romans the Saxon Constitution could 
onlY have boon established by a contract. His argumonts 
to prove this were tho familiar frationalist' ones that X 
have examined in detail in Atwoodls writings, Since the 
Saxons "were free in their own countryl they must be so 
whon they came hither"s 
85 
he arguedo Furthermore: 
when the Romans abandoned this island, the inhabitants 
war* left to a full liberty of providing for themselvest 
and whether we deduce our original from thems or the 
Saxons, or from bothq our ancestors were perfectly 
free eeo whatever they did wan by a power inherent in themselves to defend that liberty in which they 
were born, All their KinZa wore created upon the 
same conditions and for the same ends. 86 
The dependence of this place of constitutional history 
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upon SidneYls general theory of the origin of government 
is quite clear* Where historical evidence was lackingg 
the gap was filled by evidence Crom wlwt appeared reasonable* 
The name of any nation that bad a I'legitimate, constitution" 
could have been substituted for "Saxon" or "our ancestors" 
in the above passage* 
According to Sidney* Englisai constitutional history 
consixtea exsentially of the preserwtion of an Association 
of "nAturally free" citizenjs*87 The Normaus "inherited 
the same right" as the Saxons "when they calne to be one 
nation" with them4o 
68 
And having thus assimilated the 
NormAn Conquest into the unbroken development of the 
constitutionji ho concluded: t1we cannot but coutinue 
[per: rectly rreqfl eo* unless we have enslaved ourselves* 
EAndj Nothing is more contrary to reasons than to imagine 
thil3o"'89 
The rights and liberties of finglisUmen were "irmate, 
inhpronts and enjoyed time out of mind$ before we lied 
Kings. "'90 The constitutiorial rights Of English c: LtJLFOnl 
were nothing lesa than the natural rights of manj guaranteed 
not so =uch by natural law as by Magna Cartas 
Magma Carta, uss made to asgert tile native and 
original liberties of our nation by the confession 
of the Xing then beingl that neither he nor his 
successors chould any wuy encroach upon theme 93L 
Unglish constitutional history showed that ths n&tiOI29 
far from baving, enslaved itself I had boon the best defender 
of its liberty in the vorld. Neither the Romans "nor any 
peop. Lo of the world, have better defended their liberties 
, 2-97 
than the English nation", 
92 The "Saxon Lawz"q Sidney 
assertedg "continue to be of force among u&"#, 
93 The 
particular Saxon Laws which he had in mind here were those 
which concerned the main outline of his idealized Saxon 
Constitution* 94 These ancient laws insisted that the 
king van below the law* Ile must "take the laws and customs 
an he finds theml and can neither detruct from* nor add 
any thing, to them,, "95 The particular laws relating to 
the succession had changed since Saxon times. The monarchy 
was no longer purely elactiveg but "hereditary under 
condition. "96 But this, lie argued# had been brought about 
by the vill of the people - the only legitimate means 
idieroby laws could be changed*97 
The right of altering law in the English Constitution 
lay in the peoplas or* more specificallyt In parliament as 
their representative, 
98 RVon the laws relatinZ to the 
monarchy (or perhaps especially those laws) could be changed 
or abrogated only by parliament. 
99 The laws in boins at 
any siven timog thong received their authority from the 
consent of the nations Those laws were of two kinds - 
itimmemorial customs" and "statutos"* Custom received its 
authority from the nation's consent expressed through 
parliamento 
100 Both kinds of laut he argued@ f1may be$ 
and often &rag chnnZed by ust' 
101 (a rather strange v: LGw of 
supposedly JmmeM2rjaj customl), taw was by no means 
vacrozancte It could and should be changed if the people 
so eacidede The only consideration that should guide the 
citizen body was "the welfare of the people"* It was$ In 
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facts the embodiment of saIgg Igonuli, est-RU-0roma Jakas 
the supreme constitutional jail that constituted the unchanging 
"essence" of the English Constitution zinc& Saxon timest 
Our laws were not sent from heavens but made by 
our ancestors according to the light they hadg and 
thoir present occasions* We inherit the same 
right from theml andq as we may without vanity says 
that we 1-mow a little more than they didq if we 
find ourselves prejudiced by any law that they 
madeq %to may repeal it, The safety of the people 
was their supreme laws and in so to us: neither 
can wo be thought less fit to judge what conducox 
to that ends than they were* 102 
With this statom*nt we goo how exactly the Englissh Constitution 
seemed to Sidney to portray the essential characteristics 
of the legitimate contract constitution* out all was not 
well in the constitution of Restoration England. The 
monarchy had risen to an ovorboarin!; position in the stato* 
Sidney blamed the decline of the traditional English 
nobility for the contemporary constitutional mmlaisoo 
His argument was reminiscent of Harrington* The designers 
of the original English Constitution had done vellq he 
argueds because they had counterbalanced the power of the 
k1mg with "the virtue and power of a great and bravo nobilitytI, 
This ancient nobility consisted of "those with tho greatest 
interest in L-the] *, nations, and who by birth and estate 
enjoyed greater advantage than Kings could coufor upon them 
for rewards of betraying their country.,, 
103 But in the 
intervening years "throuzh the wealmess of isome and malice 
of others"t this balance had been upset and the virtuous 
nobility had been reduced to the level of commoners and 
replaced by purely mercenary and self. -seeking. men, The 
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result was that the monarch bad risen in power because the 
corruption of the supposed counterv iling pressure prevented 
it from operating au designode Tho modern nobility had 
"neither the interact nor the ostaten required for so &x-eat 
a work" an to rostoro tho constitution to its original 
design* 104 
Yet the situation was not irreparable* We still had 
the evidence of our ancestors' intentions before un* And 
thus i 
If we will be just to our ancestors$ it will become 
us in our time rather to pursue idmt we know they 
intended* and by now constitutions to repair the 
breaches made upon the old, than to accuse them of 
the defects that will for over attend the actions 
of mono Taking our affairs at the worst,; we shall 
soon find# that if we have the same spirit they 
had$ vre may easily restore our nation to its antlent 
liberty, dignity, and happinosal and if vo do not, 
the fault is owing to ourselves$ and not to any 
want of virtue and ifisdom in them, 105 
We Imve now e=mined the principal c1mracteristien of 
Sidney$ a theories of both the origin and nature of government 
in general and the English Constitution in particulare His 
general theory soems to share many of the essential features 
of Philosophical Contra eta rianism 4. At least ita vocabulary 
and the broad outline of how civil society me composed 
appear the name, But several fundamental differences emerge 
on closer e=mjnation* Sidney's theory was much loosers 
much 108A rigorous, than, sayq Pufondorfla Social Contract 
Theoryo Sidney was not concerned with the question why 
civil society was 'necessary' for human life. Many of 
the central concepts of his theories were presented with 
little or no critical analysis and clarification* The 
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notion of Iconsent #B for example . wa s hardly exp4mined at 
all by Sidney, Similarly$ the problem of whether civil 
society was $natural' or 'artificial' did not trouble him* 
Ilis arL-uments simply presupposed its artiCiciality and 
the little that lie had to say wcplicitly on the subject 
was presented uncritically and contained contradictionso 
For example, in the only passage where lie addressed himself 
to the question of tho #naturalness' of civil society for 
man, he aesortedt 
man being a rational creature# nothing can be 
universally natural to him, that Its not rationald, 
But Add,, liberty without restraint beinr, inconsistent 
with any Sovornmentj and the Good which man naturally 
desires for himsolfj children, and friendsg we find 
no place in the world idiere the inhabitants do not 
enter into some kind of society or govenunent to 
restrain it see The truth ing man is hereunto led 
by roasong which is his natured. Every one seaS 
they cannot ifell live asunderg nor many togetherg 
without some rule to which all must submit, This 
submission in a restraint of liberty* but could be 
of no effect as to the good intended$ unless it war* 
gencrall nor generalq unless it were naturald, When 
all are born to the same freedom$ some will not 
resign that which is their own, unless others do 
the like. This general consent or all to resign 
such a part of their libertyg as seems to be for 
the good of allq Is the voice of natures and the 
act of meng according to natural reason neeking 
their win good eed, But as a few or many may join 
together, and frame smaller or greater societies, 
so those societies noy institute such an order or 
form of gowrernment an best pleason themselveal and 
if the ends of government are obtaineds they All 
equally follow the voice of nature in constituting 
themd, 106 
Mus Sidney arGued that forming civil society was 'natural$ 
for man, But he still insisted that "the establishmont 
of govvrnment *** The particular forms and constitutionag 
the whole series of the magistracy, together with the measure 
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of power given to every ones and the rules by which they 
are to exercise their charge"s were the result of '#an 
arbitrary actv wholly depending upon the will of man. "107 
Civil government was apparently both an artifact* and also 
natural* It was the product both of man's arbitrary will 
and reason* The only plausible way of reconciling these 
beliefs was by defining both natýuro and man's will in terms 
of their rationality* This$ an we have seen# in vhat 
Sidney dldg but then man's will could only be considered 
"arbitrary" by a somewhat confused us* of the terml 
Sidney's general theoryg thong wax either a very bad 
example of Philosophical Contractarianiza or it was a theory 
of a different kind* The latter seems more plausible in 
that the essential questions that Philosophical Contractarianism 
Got out to consider hardly troubled Sidney at all* In facts 
Sidney's general theory appears to underpin his account of 
the English Constitution and to provide further Justification 
for the practical political proposals that he, was concerned 
to recommends His general theory presented a rational 
account of civil society which se; rved to organ4so his 
research*& into constitutional history and onapled him to 
argue that what appeared reasonable to hist, was. in fact in 
accordance with constitutional low* His enquiries 
. -COME2 
throughout the Pjg *a can only be understood in, terms 
of his rationalismo The sort of enterprise ip which 
Sidney belioved. hims*lf to be *ngaged# the method of his 
anquiryg the evidence which he considered relevant to 
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Justify a particular ymposition and the nature of the 
$materials' with which he considered himself to be working, 
were all interpreted according to "the Light of Beason". 
This interpretation of Sidneyls writingag howeverI 
directly contradicts some generally accepted Interpretations* 
G. P. Gooch and W. H. Greenleaf express these widely hold 
beliefs. In his study of EVA116h Democratic Ideas I& thgj 
Seventeenlb CentuEX, for exampleg Gooch argues that the 
'$chief merit" of Sidneyls theories was their concern with 
"the historical sanction 
lrfttheýj than of the law of 
naturo. "'LO8 And W. H.. Greenleaf has more recently argued 
that "unlike Locke$ Sidney did not produce a document the 
essence of which was rationalistic* His book wais much 
more in the normal empirical style, depending for its 
arguments an the evidonce of experienco and of historyl 
ancient and moderng sacred and profaueo "log We may 
conclude our examination of Sidneyls theories by reviewing 
these Interpretations and the light that Sidney's own 
understanding of history canto upon them, 
It has not been my intention to deny that historical 
evidence played a very important role an 'Justification' 
for the propositions which Sidney wished to upholdg and 
the preferences that he wished to recomend, My point In 
ratherg firxtg that these principles and preferences were 
justified by Sidney principally on the grounds of their 
freasonAblenoxxl; second$ that history was seen by him 
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an a moral frame in which reasonable actions were rewarded 
and uareasonable ones punished; and thirdq that even if 
history were to contradict his rational propositions, he 
rocognised that this would not destroy their validity* 
We have seen that Sidney considered his dispute with 
Filmer to be one concerning Iright1s and that in this 
dispute any evidence of what "ought not to be in no more 
to be receivedq than if it could not be*"110 This 
proposition Sidney repeats several times in tho Discoursi-Bo 
One of them* repetitions clearly indicates how he was 
prepared to overrule historical evidence if It conflicted 
with what rational men ought to consider right: 
Though it should be granted that all nations had 
at first been governed by Kings* it were nothing 
to the question Fof what now ouSht to ba]l for 
no man$ or number of meng was ever obliged to 
continue in the errors of his predecessors* The 
authority of custom# as well as of law oo consists 
only in its rectitude* Ill 
The whole of Sidney's theory of laws his belief that 
government could be understood as the design of rational 
loans his fundamental belief in man's natural freedom, 
equality and rationality are all rationalist premixest 
independant. of any historical or empirical ev; Ldencee 
Even in his theory of the English Q)nst. 1tutiong historical 
evidence was regarded as of questionable relovapeeo Much 
more important was the idea that "in matters of the 
greatest importances wise and good men do not so much 
inquire what has been, as what in goods and ought to be", 
112 
It in not even true to say that empirical evidence 
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alone determined the outcome of Sidneyls search for those 
constitutional arrangements that would beat aecure the 
ideals of libortyl justiceg property and virtue. For the 
general outlines of that constitution were elicited on 
rationalist lines, He certainly did argue against each 
of the Aristotelian 'pure format of government on the basis 
of "what hiatory, and daily experience te&cll us"6113 And 
he did also argue that historical evidence would justify 
his preference for a mixed form of gover: ente 
l14 But 
Sidney's understanding of historical change exhibited 
beliefs in both the progress and refinement of the human 
intellect and in the more common seventeenth century view 
that history was a moral story* The first of these 
beliefs led Sidney to argue that past actions should only 
be interpreted in their historical contexts, The second 
belief appears to have persuaded him that there were 
'universal' rules in politics as in other 'sciences's that 
changes in the form of government led inevitably to either 
virtue and persistence or vice and destructione 
The second of those beliefs predominated in Sidney's 
historical thought, It restricted how Mr arguments about 
historical relativity could be taken and maintained a firm 
connection of relevance between actions in the past and 
those in the present, In short, there was a tension in 
Sidneyla understanding of history between ideas which 
emphasized particularity and change and Ideas which 
emphasized universality and constancyo His very wide 
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reading of history led him to the view that "political 
matters are subject to o., mutations" and that "no right 
judgment can be given of human things, without a particular- 
regard to the time In which they passede'"l" Political 
change was inevitable because "the wisdom of man in 
imperfect, and unable to foresee the effects that toy 
proceed from an Infinite variety of accidents"& 
116 But 
it, must be emphasined that government was still being 
viewed on the rationalist promise that it was the result 
of the conscious design of =on* Every effort ought to 
be made "to constitute a government that should last for 
evar"S 
117 But since men were Imperfectq the best that 
could be hoped for was "such as in relation to the foreaug 
manners, nature, religion or interests of a people, and 
their neighbourag are suitable and adequate to what in 
seeng or apprehended to be seen* "118 The study of history$ 
then$ certainly did teach that government and law should 
be tailored to prevailing customs and manners, It taught, 
too* that "the laws that may be good for one people are 
not for alls and that which agrees with the manors of one 
ago in utterly abhorrent from those of another* "119 
But, as well an containing these notions of Chang* 
and historical relativityl Sidney's writinse occasionally 
refer to a doctrine of progress. Had this doctrine boon 
developed to the point where Sidney might assert that 
whatever had happened to provious generations was 
irrelevant to the question of w1lat the presentl superior 
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generation ought to do$ his historical enquiries would have 
lost much of their practicalýimportance, History would 
have become a mere catalogue of falsity and error. Argumonts 
from the Ancient Constitution or the $intentional or the 
Saxon contractees would have lost all force* Sidney did 
not pursue the notion of 'progress' this far* Ho introduced 
the idea in order to justify an assertion that Englishmen 
In the present were not bound to adhere to the laws of 
their predecessors$ but they were bound by the mtioMl 
'intentional of their ancestors* His doctrine ran an 
follows: 
The bestial barbarity in which many nationst 
especially of Africa* Americaq and Asia, now 
lives shown what human nature Ing if it be not 
improved by art and discipline; and if the 
first errors* committed through ignorancog might 
not be corrected$ all would be obliged to continue 
in them; and for any thing I know$ we must return 
to the religion$ mannoraq and policy. that were 
found in our country at Caesar's landinge TO 
affirm this is no less than to destroy all that 
is commendable in the iforldq and to render the 
understanding given to son utterly useless* But 
if it be lawful for usq by the use of that under. 
standingg to build hounoxg ships, and fortag better 
than our ancostoras to make such arms as are most 
fit for our defence, and to Invent printing# with 
an infinite number of other arts beneficial to 
mankind, why have we not the same right in matters 
of government* upon which all others do almost 
absolutely d*pond7 120 
In the light of these notions of changeg relativity and 
progress, the 'pastl could only remain relevant to the 
present through a rationalist understanding of that lpaatlb 
Sidney dids In factq understand tho past In this way6 
His Interpretation of the past rested on two main 
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principles. The first was that "as there may be some 
universal rules in physic, architecture# and military 
disciplines from which men ought never to depart, so there 
are some in politics also"'121 The second principle was 
that changes In the fortunes of a nation were produced only 
by changes In it3 SOvernmOntv and not I! Ice versae 
122 
These two principles amphmvi3od the renson in the past. 
The tension between the rationalist and empiricist threads 
in Sidney's historical thought remained concealed within 
the general view of history as 'moral philosophy teaching 
by examplef: 
The nations which have been governed arbitrarilyg 
have always suffered the name plagues, and been 
infected with the same vicesq ithich is as naturnIq 
as for animals ever to generate according to their 
kinds$ and fruits to bo of the samo nature uith 
the roots and needs from which they come. The 
same order that made men valiant and industrious 
in the service of their country during the first 
ages, would have the same effectq if it were now 
in being. 123 
Sidney's onquirions thong despite the widely hold 
views expressed by Clooch and Careenleafs can only be 
understood in torus of his rutionalismo His general theory 
served as a basis on which to build a view of the Znglish 
Constitution. A practical political concern ron through 
all his work, Thist as we have seeng in most clearly 
visible in his theory of laws Sidntylx historical ideas 
are a little more problematic. They reveal a barely 
concealed conflict between a past that was fusefull to the 
present and one that was not, Tyrrell's historical thought 
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contained no such conflict, It was touch more conventionally 
#seventeenth century' in this respect* Tyrrell's writings 
expressed very clearly how common seventeenth century 
notions of history could serve the purposes of Integrated 
Contractarianism. It is to a consideration of these 
writings that I now irish to turn, 
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CHAI! l]CR X 
JA14ES TYRRELL AND Tilt MORY OF INTEGRATED CONTRACT 
Janos Ty"*11 (1642-1718). unlike Sidneyq did not 
engage himself actively in politics. It seems that local 
administration -was the extent of his ambition in public 
life. As the oldest son of Sir Timothy Tyrrell, the heir 
to an estate in Buckinghemshireg and the grandson of 
Archbishop Usshert he seemed to prefer a more secluded and 
a more academic life* His education van typical for a 
man of his social positions Oxford and then the Xnner 
Temple. But the legal profession proved unattractive* 
He retired to his **tat* and become a deputy lieutenant 
and J, P, Xn 1687 he was deprived of these offices by 
James XX for refusing to support the Declaration of 
Xndulgence and he devoted the rest of his life to writing* 
The Exclusion Crisis occasioned his first major 
political work, The Patriarche lion Monarcha appeared In 
1681 and was concerned to attack Filmer's recently published 
defence of absolute monarchy. Tyrrell's book caused some 
controversyg and practically the whole of Bohun's lengthy 
Introduction to the next edition of PatElaCghS was written 
an a reply. 1 Thomas Hunt, the radical Exclusionist 
recomended Tyrrell Ia work an "a very candid and judicious 
book*, 2 and Locke referred to "the Xngenious and Learned 
. rgalechs 
Nov_ jq0. Ugraha,,. im3 Author of &t, It was not until 
the 1688 Revolution that Tyrrell wax once more stirred to 
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bring his views before the reading public* This time he 
did so in great style$ showing, if not the dopth, then at 
least the considerable breadth of his reading* The 
Bibliotecha Polilica appeared in the form of thirteen 
dialogues between the years 1692 and 16949 a separate 
fourteenth dialogue was added in 17029 and two complete 
collected editions appeared in 1718 and 1727* The dialogues 
take place between Freeman$ "A Gentleman",, and Meanvell, "A 
Civil Lawyor". 
4 
Freeman in fact represents a Whigo Meanwell 
a Tory$ and their discussion covers practically all aspects 
of the current debate about the $lawfulness$ of the Revolution* 
The BiblLotecha-Polit: tg-a was very favourably received 
by Peter Notteux's The Genilemn-lit-JoUrnal* In the 
December 1693 issuet for exampleg the work w&u recommended 
as "in effect a whole Library of Politicag and the Sentiments 
of the greatest Politicians of all Parties are so fairly 
laid do*n a*e that our Nobility and Gentry will hardly have 
OccAsion to read any other [wor1c] to be fully iuform'd of 
the Constitution of our Government"*'5 Even in the mLddl* 
of the nineteenth centurys a legal taxt book continued to 
recommend Tyrrell's work to students an a "perfect ffiLge of 
con8titutional learninat which the student will be very, 
fortunate If he can succeed in obtaining"* 
6 
Whilxt writing the BiblJotogha PolitiCas Tyrrell 
published a translation and abridgement of Cumberland's 
De Leiribus Naturg* (1672), A BLIet R£sqä&oition-2, f tbll 
Lal Of-Hat"Ell Appeared in 1692 and ran to one further 
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edition in 1701, Cursberland's, work wao wid*ly read and 
was frequently repriuted and translatod into Englizhjý German 
and French throughout the eigbtoonth century* He was 
associated with the Cambridge Platunistzp propounded an 
optimistic theory of human natureg and deduced a law of 
nature that had much influence on later Utilitarianse 
7 
Tyrrell followed Cumberland quite strictly in the first 
part of his abridgement$ but he did add lengthy 'supports' 
from Locke's psychology* In the second part lie extracted 
all the arguments Cumberland had used against Hobbes and 
put then into a consistent form* Againg he added some 
knowledge of his own% principally from history and anthropology* 
The PjAgL Djmciu&xiti-pA was reviewed very favourably in both 
Wooley's Comnleat Libi-ary a and Notteux'sgatleggall Jgur-nal, 
9 
And Dr, ManningbAw reca=4onded it to the House of Commonx 
in A sermon preached in 1692.10 
In 1696 Tyrrell published the first volume of M11 
-Y ot 
Earland. ag well Ecclgsjggt; Lgaj *I Civj. GgnerajL Himlor 
From the SaIC1.1elt Acgounts of Time. - 
lg the I! eisrn 9L-A& 
Erelsent Ho-Jesly Kinz WILLIAM* Two further volumes appeared 
in 1700 and 17040 but the history only extended to the end 
of Ric-hard Il's reign. His interest seemed to have waned 
considerably and the projected abridgement of the first 
three volumes never waterialisedo The historyg howeverg 
was written from the point of view of a Whiz constitutional 
theoristo And from that point of view@ a history which 
covered in detail the period from the exit of the Romans 
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to the reigns immediately following the Norman Conquest, 
had completed the bulk of Its ttaskl, 
11 As D. Ce Douglas 
has remarkedg Tyrrell's history 
propaganda to inquiry". 
12 The 
of the Revolution like Locke913 
and displeased opponents like % 
"never subordinated 
work pleased nupporters 
Atwood, 14 and Toland. 
1,5 
ýiomaz Hearne, 16 Yet all 
the same, Hearne wets moved to remark tbAt TYrrell wa's "A 
learned man$ although he runs counter now and again to 
usually-received opinions,, 617 
Tyrrellls vork was not that of a first-rate mind* He 
has none of the stature of Locke or Cumberlande But hi a 
writings, nonethelesal represent the single most comprehensive 
indication of the character of late seventeenth century 
political argument. He devoted cousiderablo time to 
reading the then 'standard# works on politics and history* 
He was a friend of two influential contemporary writers on 
these subjects: John Locke and William Petyt, Ilia 
bibliatelDS Politica, was designed to give the general 
reader the 'beat arguments out of the boat authors' on the 
major problems of political theory and constitutional 
history. 6 All his work was of this eclectic nature* 
Thus it is difficult to discern any more than the general 
pattern of Tyrrelits own Ideas, Petyt and Locke influenced 
him greatly and the beat way of characterizing his t1wught 
i8s a$ POCOCk SU9&CStSq in t8rW9 of tho "Mingling" of them 
bothe 18 
Tyrrell began his polomica. 1n. career%. thong with a book 
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against Filmere But$ even more than 14cke# Tyrrell was 
so much in agreement with his adversary on fundamentals 
Nspecially in the view of man an a creature made by and 
for God, and in the acceptance of biblical 'history' an 
valid) that he constructed a variant of Social Contract 
Theory characterized by rather tortuous distinctionse 
Filmer's Patrkagoba was written "against an Opinion mAintained 
by some Diviness and several learned mens That Mankind in 
naturally endowed and born with Freedom from Subjection$ 
and at liberty to chuse what form of raovernment, it pleases 
and that the Power which any one mans hath over otherag 
was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the 
Multitudo"*19 Tyrrell was determined to rescue and re- 
establish those ideas. He adopted current notions of a 
Ixtate of natural an the means to uphold those natural 
rights that Filmer's disciples were denying* But he 
believed that the 'state of natural should stand the texts 
of historical and empirical analysis* His interpretation 
of Filmor in part necessitated this. 
Filmorls arguments from biblical history were formidablee 
If government originated with Adang there could be no doubt 
that not only government but also absolute monarchy was 
ordained by God, Tyrrell did not dispute the validity of 
Genesisfj but lie felt obliged to dispute Filmer's interpretation 
of it* llis argument depended on a distinction between 
'paternal' and 'Political# power* If this distinction 
could be upheldq Gencais could be accepted whilst Filmer's 
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arguments were refuted, It could be argued that there 
had been a period in the worldIs history before civil 
society existed* This 'state of natural would caste doubt 
on the historical foundation of Patriarchalismo If man's 
condition in the #state of naturel were then portrayed In 
naturul law and natural right termal the proposition that 
"Mankind is naturally endowed and born with Freedom from 
Subjectiong and at liberty to chuse what form of Government 
it Please" could be defendedo Tho 'state of natural thus 
performed a dual role in Tyrrellfs writingx. It portrayed 
the historically and empirically verifiable condition of 
man outside civil societye And it also portrayed man 
outside civil society go as to establish his essentially 
Inaturall attributes (particularly his natural rights) 
and then determine the 'necessity$ for civil governmOnt-6 
This second role was notcidependent upon historical evidence* 
In the first dialogue of the 13111Aiotecha PolitIlga. 
Tyrrell affirmed that his idea of the %state of nature I 
accorded with prevailing Christian belioft 
"Pray Sir, " says Meanwell, "begin fjj: st with the 
Natural BtAtS of Mankindq but remember to do it 
likO 0 Christiang and one that bolioves that we 
are all derivId from one -first 
Parent* and that 
We did not at first spring up out of the Earth 
like MuSlUvoicaq or an the Men whom feigns to 
have been producId of the Dragons Teati Cadrmin JIB 
feigned to have sown, Who on soon an they sprung 
Out of tho Earthl i=mediately fell a Fighting and 
Killing each otheet. 20 
By accepting this "honest and kind advice"g Freeman has 
suAranteed that ILis state of nature will not be Nobbesian, 
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But exactly what Tyrrell meant by 'the ptate of nature' 
is confusingo 
At times Tyrrell refers to the state of nature an the 
state of innocenco before the Fallq 21 at times it appears 
as tho depraved state of post-tapsarian mane 
22 On on* 
occasion he even refers to a monarch existing in the state 
of nature . 
23 But most often he refers to the notion In 
its generally accepted sense as the natural condition of 
mankind beCore or outside civil societys into which man 
would again fall if civil government were dixsolvede Like 
Pufandorf and Locke$ he believed thin state to be 'social'* 
When attacking Hobbes In the Dri-efLisaulgItIoul for wtample, 
Tyrrell accused him of confusing "that first, and most 
natural amity, and sociableness of Persons of one and the 
same Fomllyj as of Husband and Wife, Parents and Childreng 
Etee towards each other 
[ýitlj] 
that artificial Society* 
which proceeding wholly from Compacts$ we call a Commonwealtho "24 
The state of nature was cbaractorized by family life on a 
grand scale. 6 The institution of marriage was one of its 
cornerstoness a contractual relationship sanctioned and 
limited by the law of nature* 
25 The relatlonship between 
parents and children was also of a contractual kindq 
26 
and so too was the relationship of "Masters of Families" 
0 to their servants and even their slavea*"7 These 
observations on mankind's natural state clearly evoke 
Pufendorf's "mixed state of natum", 
28 And like Pufandorf's 
notionss Tyrrell's remarks depend upon a prior conception 
33L 
of natural law and natural rights, Tyrrell$ of course, 
rocoZnized this and the first part of the Brief 13lv(j-vj$jt: LOn 
was dovotod to establishing tho status of that law, 
In a lengthy and difficult passage$ based on the 
scientific ideas of his dayg Tyrrell determined the first 
law of nature* God was the author of all "natural and 
nocessary" processes, he ast; ertedo Human ideas of natural 
and moral affairs arose naturally from sense experiences 
Thus God was the author of these ideas* Knowledge developod 
throuEh the comparison and combination of theme first ideas 
and God 'encouraged* teen to teomparo and combine'. One 
of the most Sencral ideas resulting from thin activity of 
the human mind was that "a Ai2le signifies the same irith 
that of all tho soverol Ideno of the particular parts put 
tosethor". From this idoa, Tyrrell continues, the mind3 
in thence carried on to malcO 0 Proposition of the 
Identity of the whole# with all its part8l and 
can truly affirmq that the namG Causes 'Alich 
preserve the whol*g must also conserve all Its 
constituent parts; and then from a dili ent 
Contemplation of all these Propositions 
iz; 
ch 
justly Challan o the title of the more Genorftl 
Laws of Natural we may obxerve, that they are all 
reduccable to one Proposition, from whose fit and 
just Explication, all the Limits or Exceptions* 
under which the particular Propositions are 
proposed, way be sought forg and dixcovereds an 
from the Evidoneo of this one Proposition . &* vim* 
I 
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All other laws way be deduced from thing TYr"ll continued, 
"as their Foundation and Originall according to that respect 
or proportion they bear to the common Good$ or happiest 
state of the whole aggregate Body of rational Beingse"30 
Theme natural lawn could justifiably be considered am 
laws when once we had a knowledge of Gode Since then the 
two conditions that Tyrrell believed necessary for some 
rule to be properly law would be satiefiedt the rules 
would have a known and authoritative sources and there 
would be known rewards and punishments attached to theme 
The Rr&ej Dig Uiýaitlqm was concerned to establish precisely 
these points about natural law and to draw out certain 
implications from them. 
Natural law defined and gvarenteed man's natural rights* 
In the state of nature men had a natural right to self- 
preservation, to private property &Ad to self-governm*nt 
(although this last was iontricted to the heads of families)e 
Xn the transition to civil society* some of these natural 
rights were limited in order to secure the remainder* But 
before examining Tyrrelils views on the formation of civil 
societys we should note one significant aspect of his 
understanding of the state of nature* 
A valid portrait of life in the state of nature, Tyrrell. 
believed$ Igist be evidenced by empirical observation and 
divine historye Since he believed the state of natur* to 
have been an historical condition, as we have seen$ his 
appeal to historical evidence is quite understandable* But 
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analysis of a state of nature was also an enterprise in 
moral philosophy. An such an enterprise it in by no 
means obvious what relevance historical and empirical 
evidence might have for the validity of the speculationx,. 
Yet Tyrrell believed they were essential* for as far an 
ho was concernedt 
the X grant it in both lawful and usual for natural 
Philosophereg who not being able, through the imbecility 
of our humane Facultions to discover the true nature 
and essencies of Bodies, or other Substances, do 
therefore take a liberty to feign or suppone such 
an Hypothesis, as they think will boat suit with 
the nature of the things themselvess or which they 
Intend to treati and from thence to frame a body 
of natural Philosophyt or Physickog an ArIltotle 
of oldq and Nbnsieur Dan Calftes, in our-age have 
performed: Yet can wo-not allow the same liberty 
in moral or practical Milosophys as in speculative* 31 
One of the most Important things that divine history 
and empirical evidence Oprovedl was that Hobbest state of 
nature as & war of all against all was wrong, Divine 
history 'proved' this because it showed that human life 
had from the start boon organized In families$ and there 
had been an effective law governing human relations (as 
God's punishment of Cain Indicated)*32 The evidence of 
contemporary travellors served to reinforce the conclusion 
that Hobbes$ account of the state of nature hod been 
mistaken, For this evidence referred to peoples living 
peacofully togother without governmnt*33 
Thus the evidence in history and contomporarY trovel 
literature about life In the state of nature served to 
dixprove Hobbest theory. But if life were genuinely 
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Isociall in the state of nature* from whence arose the 
necessity for constructing civil societies7 And what uas 
the difference between the state of nature and civil society? 
Thero was one fundamental difference between natural society 
and civil society: in the former there was no political 
authority although there was "Domestick Government"., 
34 
We must return to this distinction in a moment* But 
given that civil and natural society were significantly 
different, wby did men leave the state of nature? 
One reason might well havo been that soperate famili'82 
were forced to #combine' in defence against a common anomy, 
as Aristotle had auggestedo Very occasionally Tyrrell 
did argue this* but more typically he asserted: 
it is absolutely impossible to suppose, that any 
great number of people not pressed by the Invasion 
of a powerful Enemy from abroad (which could not 
be supposed in this early Age of the World 
twhen 
governments wore first establishe0j) would over 
be brought to consent to put themselves under the 
absolute power of others, but for their own greater 
Good and Preservationg or to part with, their Natural 
Liberty without advantagiug themselves at all by 
the Change. 3.5 
This or&tiona. I: Lty postulate# was comon to all the contractarian 
writers that we have considered* It xezv d them in their 
quest to explain why the dangerously powerful sovereign 
state lno*d*dl to exist and it helped them in their attempts 
to harness that power in the linterests' of the governeda 
In Tyrrell's argunent the postulate provided the most 
general reason why civil society was formed* The 
Aristotelian explanation was rejected because it was too 
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narrow and could not account ror government &rising in 
the circumstances described In Genesis$ "this oarly Age 
of the World". 
In explaining why the state of nature should have boon 
so unattractive an to lead men to sacrifice their natural 
liberty and enter civil society, Tyrrell dropped some of 
his Isociability' assumptionso His discussion continued 
in an historical veins 
the necessity as well an being of all Civil Governments 
proceeded from the Fall of Adamq since if that had 
not been* we had still liVId as the Posts fancy Men 
did under the Golden Age, without any need of Xinge 
or Common-wcaltbe e, * But after the Fall, the state 
of Mankind was elteredq and Self-love, and the desire 
of Self-preservation grow so strong and exorbitant 
above all Natural Equityt that the inordinate passions 
of Men blinding their Reasons# they began to think 
they had a Right not only to the Necessaries of Life# 
but to whatever their unruly Appetites desiredl or 
that they thought they could make themse2ves Hkoters 
of* To remedy which Inconvenionceso I suppose the 
Father& and Masters of Families$ and other Freemen 
(in whom alone then resided that little Government 
that then was in the World) were forced after some 
time to agree upon one or more Men into whose hands 
they might resign all their particular powers$ and 
to MAL-0 Laws for the due Governing and Restraining 
those disorderly Appetites and Passionag and also 
endowing them with a sufficient Authority to put 
them in Executione 36 
It was because of the Falls thOno that civil SOVOrnm*nt 
both had to be$ and in fact was, instituted* Right reasons 
or the law of natures taught men that it was beat to establish 
a civil society. In particulars it was the abuse of men's 
natural right to "the Necessaries of Life" that led to the 
state of nature being superseded, And Tyrrell made the 
definition and protection of property rights "one main end" 
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of government*37 The ýFathers and Mitaters of Families and 
rreemen" were the sole parties to the contractb Indeadl 
aa with Pufandorf 9 they were the only ones who could be 
parties because they alone had a natural right to self. 
government in the state of nature* 
38 Hereq perhaps more 
obviously than anywhere also In Tyrrell's writings$ the 
social assumptions of his time led him to a contradictory 
positions In arguing; against Filmer he was at pains to 
prove a natural right of resistance for women against their 
husbands. * This he did by reference to the natural rights 
of freedom and self-governmentg deducing from them the 
notion that marriage van contractual* But when he come 
to consider the formation of civil societyq it appeared 
that husbands wore naturally superior to their wives and 
children. The "Power of Father* and Hastere Is Natural. #$ 
he asserted, "whereas that of Kings and Republicks in 
Political and Artificial$ as proceeding from compacts. or 
the consents of diverse Heads of Families and other Froe. uen". 
39 
The origin of civil society, thong Jay in the consent 
of the prospective members. I bave arsued that Tyrrell 
believed the state of nature had been evidenced in history* 
It should follow that lie sait the social contract ago an 
historically verifiable event also* Indeedq it appears 
that lie did but to establish this Tyrrell could not use 
sacred history directly since it contained no explicit 
references to such contracts, He turned thin potentially 
embarrassing absence into an irrelevnneyo Ilia general 
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claim was that "the Scriptures" were not "wrAtten to show 
us the original either of Governmont, or Propriety". 
40 
nut evon Civen this, lie felt moved to 1provel at length 
that biblical history must be presumed to be on his side* 
41 
The care lie took indicates how important such 'historical' 
evidonce was for him, 
42 
Like sacred history, profano history was far from 
unequivocal about the contractual origin of commonwealthes 
Whilst acknowlodging this$ Tyrrell argued as beforet where 
history in not explicit It still must be presumed to be on 
his side. Thus,, for example, lie asserteds 
the beginnings of most Kingdoms **** like the head 
of Ns. 
-luss 
are hard to be traced up to their Heads 
or Fountainag and no man can positively toll the 
manner of their beginning so But since 
LVilmer] 
puts me to name any Commonwealth out of History 
where the Multitudeq or so much as the greatest 
part of it ever consentedg either by Voice or 
Proxieng to the election of a Princel I will name 
him two Commonwealthoi the first was Vqmq# where 
all the People or Freemen consented to7ihe olection 
of no lus, oo. and the second shall be that of 
yenice ,. * which plainly proves oome Governments 
to have bad their beZinninZ by the consent of the 
People, 43 
The point Tyrrell. was arguing here was that Rome and Venice 
had no governmentog no political authorities# until the 
compact or consent of the "Multitude" established them, 
They were in the latate of nature$, although he did not 
expressly state that here,, 
Tyrrell then proceeded to distinguish between governments 
begun by conquest from those begun by consent. His 
conclusion uns extremely important for his analysis of 
the English Constitution. 
"- dt &- j 
And though some Governments have begun by Conquests, 
yet since those Conquerors could never perform this 
without men over which they were not always born 
Monarchs, it must necessarily followg that those 
Souldiers or Volunteers had no obligation to nerve 
them, but for their own agreements with their 
General, and for thoso advantages he proposed to 
them in the share of those Conquests they should 
wake. Thus were the Goths. Vnndalso and our Soxon 
Kingdoms erected by Generale Lyho when victoriouj! 
] 
could have no farther Right over tho men they brought 
with them than what sprung from their mutual Compacts 
and Consents. 44 
Tyrrell's examples of contracto froin profane history 
clearly concern more the 'contract of government' than the 
specific 'contract of societyt. It is not difficult to 
explain thiss and the explanation will shad light on the 
character of his Contrac+ Theory. In the first placet 
on his own asl3umptions of tbe sociable state of naturet a 
'contract of society$ is almost unnecessary. ilia problem 
was all the greater here because he also wished to deny 
that society uas at all lartificiall. Second$ Iiis Idea 
of a 'social contractl was almost completely merged with 
'the contract of governmeutt - the latter Cava substance 
to the former. And finally, Tyrrell's concern throughout 
his general theory was to establish a governmental contract 
so that he could then *locate' it in English history (and 
thus provide lammunitionl for defending first* resisting 
Charles II and ultimately,, the 1688 Revolution), I shall 
examine each of these points in a little more detail* 
Tyrrell adopted social contract ideas in opposition 
to Filmarian Patriarchalixm. Uut his insistenco that the 
world must have been peopled as recounted in Old Testament 
, OIL 
4w -x 
history, led him to portray the state of nature &X & very 
social state, The pro-civil state differed from civil 
society In respect of the size of communities and their 
kind of government, INAtural governmentl existed In the 
family* but was very different from 'political government$* 
It was different because 'political power# was "Artificial# 
an proceeding from compacts or *o consonts"a 
43 But the 
distinction woo rather forced* There vam a right of 
resistance under both sorts of govext onto guaranteed by 
the law of nature, A contracts then, did not establish 
any difference here, But "hat It did peem necessary for 
was to explain the bond that tied so ma= people together 
in civil societies. That bond could not be 'natural's 
according to Tyrrells because civil societies were manifext 
not single families* The only alternativeg given the 
universality of the Nature/Art dichotomYs 
46 
was that it 
must be lartificiall - the product of human design* The 
Idea of an $historical# bond had yet to enter the mainstream 
of Ituropean. consciousness, 
But TYrrell was not content with the rigid distinction 
between natural and artificial societies, His Isoalable' 
state Of nature was sufficient to arouse some misgivings 
about it ends Indeeds occasionally he pursued the logic 
of its sociability& The difference between pr**. and post. 
contractual society was not so great$ he argued at one points 
"that there can be no passinS : rrow one to the other" almost 
iisperceptibly. 47 The same notion appears In Lockets Two 
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TreatIMIX and like Lockej Tyrrell Insisted that although 
such a change might be imperceptible still a 1contractl 
must be supposed to have been made* Without It, there 
appeared no other way of explaining the bond holding civil 
society togetherg or of justifying the supposed limitations 
of political power. 
His concern to define political power in terms of Its 
'Or: Li; izlBl (isee consent and contract) whilst distinguishing 
it from PAt6rMI powerg Inecessitat*0 the view that civil 
society wax artificial* Hobbes had quite happily maintained 
this$ but Tyrrell would not* In the Btief DjgqjAsitLgP 
he attacked Hobbes and attempted to restore civil society 
to a place amongst natural phenomenao Civil societyl he 
argued$ proceeded "wholly *** from the Rational 
Nature of 
Mankind"I 'reason# was a *naturel FacultylIg therefore civil 
society was natural, 
413 
Tyrrell was clearly more avoiding 
the problem than solving it, but he did go on to explain 
Why he could not be matiefiedwith accepting civil society 
an artificial. All political obligation proceeded from 
consent, If that consent were viewed as something artificial, 
as something "quite opposed to what is natural"$ then "it 
may become thereby lose firm and durable". Hobbes had 
committed this ezz r for he had failed to sea that although 
"those words by which Compacts are expressed" arose "from 
the Arbitrary agreements of men", still the consent itself 
arose frOm natural reason - it was a "natural Consent, 
constituted by words$ with some kind of Art" but this 
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"doth not at all diminish Its firmness or duration, "49 
Thus Tyrrell attacked Hobbes and Insisted that civil 
society was a natural phenomenon because otherwise political 
obligation would be too insecurely foundede Yet he still 
maintained that 'consent' was the only legitimate banis 
of civil order. It had to be if resistance were to be 
'proven' legitimte* Thus Tyrrell's own foundation for 
political obligation turned out to be on 'precarious' as 
the one he was rejecting* His final statemont on the 
problem concluded by locating that foundation in "gratitude" 
alonel . 
50 But thist Tyr-roll insistedt would not endanger 
a Commonwealth, His insistence appeared completely 
unequivocal* But, as his justification of the 1688 
Revolution will showg the appearanco masked a rovolutionary 
doctrine, Nonetheless$ lie asserteds 
I uttorly deny that these Principles I have here 
laid downs do at all countenance Rebellions as* 
since I grant no particular Subject can contradict 
or resist the Supream Power of the lawful Magistrate 
(however unjustly exercised) by force, without 
disturbing or at least endangering the quiet and 
happiness of the whole Communityg and perhaps the 
dissolution of the Government it salts which is 
against the duty$ not only of a good Subjects but 
also of an honest Moral Man* who will not disturb 
the public tranquillity for his own private security 
or revenge. 5JI 
An a second oxplanation of the historical examplox 
Tyrrell gives of the social contractl I have suggested his 
'merging' of the social and the governmental contractse 
That he should have done so would certainly follow from 
the kind of state of nature he envisaged# Society was 
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natural and had always existed, it needed no contract to 
invent it. Yet both Pufendorf and Locke had portrayed 
life in tho state of nature as Osocialle Tyrrells &a we 
have seen,, had cortainly read both these writers and his 
own viewis seen often to have been borrowed from theme 
Pufandorfs howeverg had rigidly distinguished between the 
social contract and the governmental contractl whilst Locke 
maintained a distinction between the sociaX contract and 
the $trust$ of government* At times Tyrrell approa6hed 
Pufendorf's views but its never austainod it. For exampleg 
in tho Zatriarcla Non- Monarsba. 9 he suagested that there 
were two contractst 
at the first institution of the Government, the 
first Compact mass That the agreement of the major 
part should conclude the 141ole Assemblyl and whoever 
either then would not, or now refuses to be so 
concludedg is still in the state of Natureg in 
respect of all the rest$ and is not to be loolct 
upon as a member of that Commonwealth, but an an 
Enemy, and a Covenant-breaker. 52 
Occasionally, toog Tyrrell employed Lockets notion of the 
Itruxt, of government. But this was rare and onlY wh*n 
explicitly quoting from &o Tj: eat-jm; ejb53 Much more 
frequently there was just one contract and that determined 
the form of the government, 
54 
Tyrrell was clearly not too concerned that he merged 
the social and governmental contracts* This lack of 
concern$ and the looseness in his thinking about the vital 
transition to civil societyq can be further explained by 
looking at his focus of interest* Contract seems lose 
important to him as an eventq although it was crucial to 
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his Argumant that some contracts had occured In hintory# 
than an a continuing process* In all his major vorkas 
wccopt the MU*f DigS, %AgJJJgRg Tyrrell was ultimately 
concerned to provide an Interpretation of the English 
Constitution* His general theory of "the Original of 
Societleas and the rise and wctent of political Power"'" 
was included as a foundation for erecting a Itrue viowl 
of the seventeenth century constitution* Within that 
constitution, he needed to locate an undeniable right of 
resistance* The PAk]AglgWZ DAIIIS-A Provides thO ClearOst 
evidence of this* Tyrrell explAinod his purpose as followss 
X think X can w! kke it an clear an the Day that 
ý-tho Nobility# Gentry$ Clergyv and Poopl; 
I have 
done nothing in Joining in Arms with the Prince 
of op but w1wat in justifiable by the Principles 
of elf-prenervations the Fundamental Constitutions 
of the Governmentq and a just Zeal for their Religion 
and Civ. U Liberties, as they stand secured by our 
lawng, 
. 
56 
Later,, ho informed the reader that the "basit method" for 
exandnins this 'Woble Controverale" wass 
to look into the Natural state of Aknkinde 
the Fall of Aem, and enquire Firet. If God 
0. ="n ban appointed any kInd of Government 
jAvjjty. jLM before another* Sqcondi,; 
Zý010 
bad 
notj how for Civil power May be lookt upon as from 
Godq and In %diat sensop an derivId fr*m t1w peopleo 
ThLr-d&X9 Whether Besistance by the Subjectse in some 
canes be incompatible and absolutely destructive to 
all Civil Goverment whatsoevere FQHEShjZj whether 
such raoistance be absolutely contrary to the doctrine 
of Christ contain'd in the Scriptures and that of 
t1w Primitive Church pursuant thereuntoo F. ULIQ 
Whether ouch Resistance be contrary to the 
Conutitution, of this Governwnto and the express 
Laws of the Lands iw+ii r what has been iiiam i ethe done by the Prince of 2& . MS. and 
those of the ; robility 
9 CA4MtrYo Etca' in pursuance of these Principles, lime been done according to the Law of 
Watureg the Scripturegg and the Ancient Constitutions 
of thin Kingdom* 57 
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As we shall see, these three 'principles' were related 
directly to one another in Tyrrell's thought, Thus they 
did not form three seperate sources for justifying actions* 
Insteads they were so inter-woven that each conjured up 
the suggestion of the otherse 
Tyrrell's constitutional onquirles seem at first glance 
to have been conducted within the frome of reference of 
58 
the fairly longstanding Ancient Constitution debatoo 
-jes- 
and The Ilia *forks# especially the BILbliotecha Poj: Lt 
General Higtory of Engla-Mg retain the key concepts of that 
debate but they are given different connotations* 
tFundamental lawls 'fundamental rights#$ lfundam*ntal 
liberties's 'ancient constitution's 'common la, w1q Icustoml# 
all appear with monotonous reCularitys but they are woven 
into a tapestry of moral theory. The justification for 
each is no longer that they have 'always been#, but that 
they are right, intrinsically good# 'Constitutionality$ 
is no longer solely determined by precedent, rather by 
natural law, 
His constitutional theoryg however$ still purported 
to be historicall it was an interpretation of the English 
Constitution. But the method he pursued and the conclusions 
he reached bear the unmistakeable traces of social contract 
analyxis, In The General History of -Ensl-and 
he presented 
an account of the origins of our ancestors based on the 
book of Genesis: 
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I shall ee. now proceed to somewhat more Solid and 
Useful, and try If we can discover who were the 
first Inhabitants of this Islandl but since the 
Scriptures* an well an Prophane Historiess are 
silent in this Pointg it is impossible to tell the 
Name of the Man who brought the first Colony hithers 
Only this much seems probable$ that Ru was 
Peopled by the Posterity of JaRhet ooe and *** this Island was first Inhabited (at least an to its 
Southern Parts) from the Continent of Gau-Ig an In 
delivered by Bode in his first Chapter as a current 
Tradition in his Time* 59 
The records of this time were extremely sparxe* There 
were "no Authontick accounts left us of the BritIL11 Kings 
first that reigned in this Island till Julius CUsa 
Expedition hither'le 
6o 
But this was really immaterial since 
Tyrrell's aim was to give the origin of the present 
constitution. That origin occured at a specific time 
in history whens after the Romans had lefts the country 
was conquered by the Saxons* But* because of the problem 
of 'conquest' in constitutionAl thoughts 
61 
Tyrrell hastily 
added that the Saxon Kings were jai2. t kings "by Rirht -2LE 
sm. tiolit " since their own soldiers "sot them up for what 
they were" and tho Britains were either driven out of 
England or were "by Degrees XncoMorated with the 1ALOp. 8"O 
62 
Thus none of those who became subjects of the Saxon Icings 
had been conquered. 
The ultimate biblical basis of history appeared once 
again when Tyrrell turned to enquire into who these Saxons 
were* They too were the posterity of Japhets the son of 
Noah. There was definitely the Implication here of the 
ropopulating of the world under the heads of households 
who eventually contracted amongst themselves to establish 
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civil societies* , 
Tyrrell had arguod an much In his S*neral 
theory* 
The Saxons aPPeared aim a branch of the "R2LaA or ggilil",, 
and these in turn were the descendants of Japhat and 
poyulators of Scandinavia and Europe* 
63 Wherever they 
settled the Goths contracted together and set up limited 
monarchies* Thus when pressed to state what the earliest 
Saxon constitutions were likeg Tyrrell could argue timt as 
records again were scarcog one could look to other Gothic 
constitutions described by Roman writeral and then draw a 
parallel* From theme Roman accounts it appeared that the 
"Nations of the Gotlao Qrixignal, were never Governed by 
Abs. olute ýWnazohsj but by jjn&s or Princes 1 by the 
INLAwis and 
;: 
-o WMINNOW muo -S2Mcils of their own -n 
Natioux, an were all 
thaza that 
-descend&d. 
from this Gothic OFASLmaj 64 
,, 
" 
The consequence of all this for Englandl Tyrrell insisted, 
was that it too must have boon a limit0d monarchy* The 
Saxons only came to seek new homes$ their armies were composed 
of volunteers and, as general theory proveag conquest by 
itself cann t establish governmentso The Saxons were free 
men when they cameg thus their government must have been 
set up by contract after victory bad been gained and the 
army dissolved. This must have been the casel Tyrrell 
argued2 for "I can give no account, how these Princes should 
become. Kinzo but by the Eo asent or Election of their 
Souldiere or Followers"065 And thing he assured the readers 
"is no Romance but true History, 1166 
There were few records of the Saxon Heptarchyq but 
there was evidence of a contract unifyinZ all EnCland. 
8*67 For this Tyrrell pointed to the Mirror of JuntLce 
The bargaining with the first prospective Icing of all 
England wans according to Tyrrells the "original contratt"I 
that original contract established "fundamental laws" (or 
"constitutional'); and the fundamental laws defined and 
protected certain "fundamental liberties"* What made 
these lava and constitutions Ifundamentall was no longer 
that they 'had always been$$ but that they were the content 
and conclusion of the historically specified original 
contract. 
68 
They owed their being to the e: Kpress consent 
of the Covorned and they could only be modified with that 
consent, Thoy wore Ifundamentall to the form of government 
decided upon at the contracts and that form of government 
could be changed only through the consent of the majority 
of the citizens. These fundamental lava varo basic 
constitutional laws and not natural laws, but through the 
notions of tfundamental rightst and 'constitutional law' 
this distinction practically evaporated* Natural law was 
brouaht down to earth in the guise of the Ruglish Constitution. 
Tyrrell1n examination of Znglishments fundamental rights 
revealed that they wore both #natural rights' and the further 
particularisation of those rights, Thay were natural rights 
because, as; he insisted, "the people in a limited Kingdom 
remain an to the defence of their Liveng Liberties* RelixionA 
and Properties% always in the state of nature# in respect 
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of their Prince an well as all the rest of Mankindwo 
69 
Thoy were also the particularisation, of these naturol 
rights, When $Freeman$ was pressed to state "what these 
fundamental Rights and Liberties are"t he argued: 
they are only such as are contained In MAW&Carlta 
and the Petition of Rights and are no more than the 
im=emorial Rights and Liberties of this Kingdom$ 
and that first* In respect of the safety Of meUB 
lives and the liberties of their personst 21ye 
The security of their Estates and Civil Proportion, 
And 31y. The enjoyment of their Religion an it in 
established by the common consent of the whole 
Mitiono 70 
Englishinents fundamental rightso then$ were more specific 
than the natural rights that formed their basis* Since 
the function of fundamental law v*9 to define and protect 
fundamental rigbtag we might expect some close rPlAtiOnIjhI, P 
between fundamental and natural law* J, W,, Gough has shown 
that just such a close relationship WaO IMPlicit in SONS 
late seventeenth century ideas of fundamental. l&W. 071 
Tyrrell# however# seemed too over* of the differences to 
bring them into even a partial unione He argued$ for 
G=NPJLO* that the Saxon kingdoms were olectiv* monarchies* 
This 'wait an essential part of their fundamental IaIW6 But 
he van* of course$ aware that the seventeenth century monarchy 
was not elective* To explain this he had to admit that 
fundamental law could changee Thus it could not be 
oquiValent to the immutable law of nature* 
72 Yet he 
st: LU asserted that natural law was part of Znglish 
constitutional law. Thing an we shall sooo was bocause 
he needed some criterion of Uegality' *part from the 
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istrictly leonatitutionait. Thus he wrotes 
It its already granted, that all UIOSO Laws in a 
limited Governments but those of Nature$ and right 
Reason are alterftbleg because the Government Cnic3 
itself is sog and in respect of which alone they 
may be called Fundamental$ or Foundations of the 
Government$ but these being altered$ it would cease 
to be the same kind of Government it was before* 73 
By acknowledging that fýtmdamantal law both Could be 
and had been changed, Tyrrell opened to question the practical 
point of enquiries Into the Saxon constitution* What 
relevance did the Saxon constitution have for men in 
seventeenth century Encland? What claim did any real or 
supposed Saxon law have to the obedience of men in the 
seventeenth century? Tyrrell suggested two reasons why 
the Saxon constitution was still binding On the proxento 
The first van that the original contract was renewed each 
time a new king took the coronation oath* Taking that 
oath thux became a sort of controct in ltsel: r*74 But 
this# Tyrrell foltq map an InCOMPlOtO OXPl^nftt1OU both 
because son* king* could not be shown to bAVO taken any 
such oath and because the coronation oAth. (whereby a monarch 
undertook to rule according to *ptablishod law) could not 
Account for the binding force of chanson In constitutional 
law* His solution was to add a second notion# a restricted 
idea of popular novoreigntys and make the consent of the 
governed the basis and binding force of the constitution* 
To his mind$ the limited monarchy he supposed established 
by the Saxon coutrect wax the only form of government that 
people guSht to consent to. His argument on these points 
was: 
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it the first King of the Saxon Race took the Crown 
upon condition to maintain the Fundamental laws, 
and constitution of the Governments and that he 
was never invested with an absolute despotick power 
of making Laws, and raising Money at his pleasurej 
but tho people reserved to themselves their share 
of both$ at the first institution of the Monarchyl 
all those Princes that claim by Vortue of their 
Rights are tied by this first original contracts 
whother they ever took any Coronation Oath# or notj 
nor thot the Crown now become no more Electives 
does its at all alter the condition or the limitation 
of his Ancestorse as long as tho present King holds 
by, and under the same Title, and by vertuo of the 
same original contractl sincog an it was by the 
Peoplos will, that it was at first Electives so it 
vas also by their Will, that it became successivel 
since ovary ontail of the Crown upon heirag can 
only proceed from the Peoplen agreement or consent 
to maintain it as a standing Laws or else every 
King might alter it at his pleasure. 75 
The Danish and Norman Conquests were still obvious 
problems for this interpretation* If either of them had 
fundamentally altered the constitution established by the 
Saxon contract, there would have boon as little point in 
discussing that contract as Tyrrell admits to be the case 
of government before then., Thus Tyrrell renorted to the 
same unhistorical arguments as a host of provious theorists 
like Petyts Atwood and Perguigon$76 in order to $prove' 
that no conciuests had occured since Saxon times: 
As for the Invasions of the Danes, under KingAnutes 
and by th N O. Wý"MMMO 
,: 
ormans under ng W61 conwilly 
called tt, Connuerorl th ugh itlWs! be granted$ 
that these Princes were victorious by their Arms* 
yet was not this Nation subdued by either of them 
so entirely, as that its Submissions could properly be styled Conquestse but rather Acquisitions gained 
by those Princes upon certain Compacts between them 
and the People of Enstlanll both Parties standing 
obliged in solemn Outhsl--mutually to perform their 
parts of the Agreement- 77 
Cnuto and William 19 thong were Kings by right of compact 
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and not connuesto Their part of the fbargaint was to rule 
according to established lav*78 And in the eircumstancox 
of the debatol once these points had been established then 
the contemporary rolovanco of Saxon law had boon socured*79 
So far I have cmamined tho principal ideas in TyrrellOs 
theories of Sover=ent in general and the English Constitution 
in particular* His political imitings were long and elaborate$ 
but a fairly simple argument ran through theme Hix purpose 
was to present an interpretation of the English Constitution* 
Englishmen had. natural rights# part of which they gave up 
In order to reap the benefits of civil life6 They agreed 
to a constitution which guaranteed the rights they retained* 
In return they owed allegiance to their government* The 
violation of the constitution Natablixhed by contract and 
altered by consent), gave a constitutional right of resistance. 
This woo the crux of Tyrrell's defence of the anti-monarchical 
movement which forcefully manifested Itself from the Exclusion 
Crisis to its culmination in 16886 The whole argument was 
presented an according with English constitutional law* 
The Zar.: Laj: cha Non MoWXc1&j, for example$ was written "in 
defence of the Government as it is establishts and the just 
Rights and Liberties of all true English. men 0a 
80 The 
purpose of the massive and wide-ranging BibUotechG-E? 2jiticA 
was summarized by 'Freeman' in revealing detail as followss 
I thought I had sufficiently proved in our former Conversationaill that taking up Arms in defeuce of 
our Religion and Civil Liberties$ when no other Remedy could prevails w-as not unlawful, according 
to our Constitution* Secondlys That there is such 
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a thing an an Orljzinal Conjr-Act however ignorant 
you are pleased to Mko yourself Or Ito Thirdly, 
That by the AkdjMtjqA or Forfeiture or Xting igneg 
(call it which you please) the Throne did really 
become vacantl and that it is legally filled by 
their present Majesties. That the Oath or 
Allegiance is of perpetual Obligationg I also 
grantl but it in still on conditiong that the 
King shall likeuise truly keep and perform that 
part of the Contract contain'd in his Coronation 
Oath$ without going about to alter and invade our 
Religion and Civil Liberties by an armed Forcel 
and arbitrary Power eee These are indeed the 
Principles I have all along maintain'dq and I hope 
I shall never have occasion to be ashamed of theme 81 
But two outstanding problems confronted any 'constitutional' 
justification of the Revolution* The one concerned the 
statute laws of Charles 11 outlawing armed resixtoncel 
82 
the other concerned James 11's souls title to the thrones 
In meeting these problems$ Tyrrell was obliged to by-pass 
constitutional laws and appeal to natural law, nut he 
refused to admit that he had shifted the grounds of his 
defence* In response to the first of these, for eXamples 
Tyrrell argued that despite Charles 11's laws Englishmen 
still have a good and sufficient Right 
defending their Livest Religiong and L 
the King *, * in case of a general, and Breach and Invasion of the Fundamental 
Kingdomq or Original Contractq (if you 
it so)- 83 
left th*m of 
ibertiOR aSA: LUSt 
universal 
Laws of tho 
will Call 
But his final statement on this problem shown how far outside 
positive law he was prepared to go in order to defend what 
he felt right, Yet lie still believed that his justification 
had to be related to constitutional grounds and not to the 
much more general and abstract ideas of natural law and 
natural rightat 
I do not, deny that *.. our written, 14wa do no ways 
allow any Resistanceg or Imprisonment of the King 
but however# there are divers Actionag uhichg thol 
not juntifiable by the strict Lotter of the lAw. 
yet being for the publick Goodg and Preservation 
of the Governments and oriZinal Constitution thereof 
andg in cases of extreme Necessity$ when done indeedq 
ought to be justify'd and pardon'd by subsequent 
Parliaments* 84 
In response to the second problem$ Tyrrell was even 
more explicit in forsaking the strictly IconstitutionAll 
law and appealing to a 'higher' law* The problem arose 
because Tyrrell accepted that the monarchy was hereditary 
and that James may have had a legitimte son just before 
the Revolution* Both points wore fiercely contented by 
some writers at the time mince an inescapable implication 
seemed to be that James' son had a constitutional right 
to succeed should James 110 for whatever reason, be removed 
from the thrones Tyrrell, however$ argueds 
I will not deny that the legal and common course of 
Succession ouZht to be inviolately observed according 
to the Rules go* laid downj when ever it may consist 
with the publick Zood and safety of the Xingdoinj 
and yet for all that I cantiot believes that the 
XinZ himself much less any other, that only pretends 
as next Hair to hims can havo such an absolute Right 
to a Kingdom, an that no considerations wbatsoever 
can make him lose or forfeit the Right thereuntol 
1 in the Right to a Kingdoms I tako it to be EFor 
a true Mxims That the Reprosentat; Lves of a Nation 
(as the Convention was) ought to have more regard 
to the happiness and safety df the ithole, Peoples 9*o 
than to the Dignity or Authority of any particular 
Person whosoever . ** when it is evident that the 
advancement of such a Person to the Thrones will 
prove destructivo to our Religions Civil lAbertiess 
and Properties. 85 
Thus in justifying William and Mary's rights to the throneq 
Tyrrell by-passed strictly positive law and appealed to a 
#higher' law, Yet he still believed timt his Justification 
338 
6 
was $constitutional$$ for the higher law was at least 
#implicit' within the positive law, 
This finAl point highlights the connection between 
Tyrrell's Social Contract Theory and his theory of the 
RnSlIsh Constitution* We may conclude our examination or 
his works with a number of remeirks on that connectiona 
Tyrrell's analysis of the general nature mud extent of 
political authority took place within a rationalist framework, 
Xt had all the trappings or natural rightso natural law$ 
state of nature, social contracts ate** that were involved 
in the political theory of lConstructivist Rationaliml*86 
But Tyrrell re: Cused to allow that there was anything 
1hypotheticall or $abstractive$ about his theory* At 
every turn he looked for empirical equivalents,, Logical 
consistency was not anoughg his theory had to accord with 
the evidence from history and contemporary Oprimitivel 
societies* He was much more at home idth the common-smBe 
Empiricism of Locke (which he greatly admired) than with 
seventeenth century Rationalism. His interest In 'original 
was an historical and not a philosophical one* Many of 
the peculiarities of his Social Contract Theory spring from 
this, For wmaple, the sometimes confusing and contrudictory 
Ways in which he used the term tatate of nature$ becomes 
a little more comprehensible it that concept was concerned 
with Ithe earliest age of the worldl rather than with 
determining the fundamental cbar*cter of civil society, 
But perhaps most important, Tyrrell's historical concarn 
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accounts for the otherwise extraordinary absence of any 
precis* notion of a 4ocial contract' in his #Social Contract 
Theory'* As we have seen# Tyrrellss characterization of 
life in the state of nature was similar to Pufendorf's 
$mIxed state of natural* Yet for Tyrrell a 'social$ state 
of nature seemed to imply that there was no problem in 
explaining how social life originatedg whereas Pufendorf 
was at pains to explain that society originated In contract, 
The crucial difference here was that Tyrrell and Pufandorf 
were asking themselves different questions. Tyrrell wanted 
to know what human life was like in the earliest times (and 
the Bible answered this for him)g Pufandorf wanted to 
characterizo the kind of relationship between individuals 
that van presupposed in social life* Hance Pufandorf 
began his enquiry with the individual abstracted from social 
relations# and Tyrrell did note 
Tyrrell's Social Theory performs two functions in his 
political arguments. It served to combat the basic 
principles of Filmerian Patriarchalism and it provided 
the general outline of a flogitimate constitution'* Since 
the English Constitution was flegitimatell tho Social 
Theory provided in Isenerall what a proper examination of 
English constitutional law and history provided in"Particularle 
A frationalist' Social Theory could do this because English 
constitutional history was written by Tyrrell In the light 
of the theory* Thus the $critical pointal in the history 
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(the origin of the Saxons, the original contract, the 
Jimplicit' rose tions in English laws# the Danish and 
Wortman contractsq etcJ were presented not as what simply 
man the caseg or what m_y__have_be&O the cases but rather 
ws what ILust blve been the case* 
It was to bo a comparatively easy task for writers 
like Hume to show that the historical accoxmt of the origin 
of society and government prosented by Tyrrell here was 
wrong$ thore are Ivardly any contracts In history. Even 
at the time Tyrrell was writing* doubt was being caste on 
the validity of Biblical histo 
7 
and thus his #crucial# 
evidence from this source was loosing its perisuasiveneas. 
Yet despite his appeals to evidence* Tyrrell's theory was 
rationalist in form. As such it was open to still further 
lines of attack* Tyrrell himself was awara of two main 
difficulties.,, the 'artificiality* of the social bonds and 
the concomitant foundation of political obliention in the 
subjective will, Bernard do Mandeville, in the first 
decade of the eighteenth century$ was soon to revoluti6nise 
the conception of social cohesion (at least implicitly) by 
introducing a middle term Into the ancient dichotomy of 
naturo and art* Society might no longer be viewed an 
either natural or artificial but It could be a sort of 
mixtures Ithe, reau3. t of humn action but not of human 
defiNignt* 
88 
The problem of political obligation could be 
re-examined along similar JLines,, A partial solution came 
with HUMOO WO do not obey governments because we have 
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consciously chosen so to do# but because of habit or 
custom* Yet in the meantime the ideas we have examined 
in Tyrrell claimed many adherents* They didg after aIIq 
and despite the problems they involvedg serve a popular 
political purposes 
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In the preceding pages I have attempted to clarifY the 
understandings of 'contract' that are exhibited in Nnglish 
Political literature of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centurion* Many comoonly accepted generalizations 
both about the history of Contract Theory and about political 
ideas and groups in the late,, novepteenth century pust be 
rejected or considerably modified in the light of the 
evidence I have examinpdb There was not 2pA Contract 
Theory that ba, s appeared iTt a. variety of more or less 
incomplete forms throughout historye I Contractual political 
theory "s not "universally pjasociated with the rights of 
the Individual persong With consent As the basils Of 90vGZ Onts 
and with democratial republicant or conxttuttýnal : Llmsttutionoo"2 
References to a ''Social Compact" were not only concerned "to 
A=Lish either (A)# a theory of polit; LcaJL duty$ ort (B), a 
theory of politlemi origins, "3 App"ILB to ýa "Soclal 
Contract" ware not solely couce; med with the ituature" 
rather than "the origin" of 89ciety. 
4 
The "state of 
nature" = O: rten ! "Meant to be taken as a Ilixtorical factllt. 5 
And English political theory after the Restoration vas not 
neatly divided "between two M&in schoolis - the Anglican 
344 
Royalists who believed in the divine hereditary right of 
kingship$ and their Whis opponents" itho held the contract 
of government as a "cardinal principle"* 
6 
Appeals to #100ntrAct' in, JL4tG BOVOnteenth coritury 
English political argument seem rather to fall into one or 
other of three categories* These categories I have called 
Philosophical$ Constitutional and Integrated Contractarianismo 
The differences between theme types of contractualism are 
most imodiately apparent in terms; of their distinctive 
vocabularies, In Philosophical Contract literature we 
constantly come across terms like natural rights$ natural 
law# state of nature$ and social contracts In Constitutional 
Contract literature we keep meeting terms like fundamental 
rights$ fundamental laws fundamental liberties$ fundamental 
contract$ original contract and fundamental constitution* 
In Integrated Contract literature we find these two 
vocabularies related togother In a particular way* The 
differences in vocabulary reveal much more substantive 
differences between the various kinds of contractuali"m"o 
They reveal that different quent&bno aro being asked and 
dilTorent evidence in being roZorred too This is most 
apparent in the distinction between PlailLosophical and 
Constitutional Contractarianisms phijLosophic*l Contractarianism 
wag, concerned to answer quostions likes why in CiVil Society 
necessary* vhat is the essential nature of-glyAl relations 
and what sort of government o it men to have? Constitutional aw 
ý 
Contreet Theory askedi how did Jbig particular constitution 
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originates what kind of constitution in its what specific 
rights and duties do its laws define and guarantee and what 
implications does all this have for current political practice? 
Philosophical Contractarianism appealed primarily to reasonA 
Constitutional Contractarianism appealed to the evidence 
of history and law, Integrated Contract literature seemed 
to pose the some questions an both Philosophical and 
Constitutional Contractarianixmxl and it appealed to the 
evidence of historyg law and reason* The agtual issues 
at stake in all three kinds of contractuAlism, were frequently 
the same, But an between Philosophical and Constitutional 
contractualisms, those issues were transposed into different 
idioms and were accordingly treated differently* In respect 
of these Idionag the most difficult distinction to draw 
in that between Constitutional and Integrated contractuAlixwo 
For both of these differed from Philosophical Contractarianism 
in that they were explicitly concerned to answer questions 
about the iDar-ticulal: requir*mentx of martigular constitutions 
(usually the EnSlish Constitution)* But in Constitutional 
Contractarianism an attempt was made to portray the PozitiVQ 
law ax rational - though the emphasis was always on positive 
law. In Integrated ContractArianisms on the other hands 
the Attempt was made to Incorpqrste, the rational into the 
positive law - the emphasis wax always on natural law ax 
both an integrAl part of$ and the source ofj the positive 
law* 
The burden of my argument has been to insist that 
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there was not a single Contract Theory to which various 
writers subscribed with greater or lesser degrees of 
tcomploten*xsle Yet this fallacious view seems to have 
been held by most writorx who have considered the history 
of Contract Theory. If we accept their view then we miss 
the crucial differences of levels of argument$ types of 
question asked and kinds of evidence invoked by contractari&n 
writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* 
Furthermore$ we import into our account of Contract Theory 
entirely inappropriate criteria of criticism* For we way 
be tempted to criticise an Uncopplete$ works that could 
never have been Intended to be 1completel according to our 
preconceived notion of what IlLe Contract Theory was; rgally 
about'. Similarly* we may be tempted to exaggerate the 
historical importance of certain contractarian works which 
soon the more Ocompletel and to underestimate the importance 
of supposedly $incomplete' worksm, For example,, in terms 
of the literature, X have reviewed it would seem in 2!! Et for 
this reason that the importance of loockolx MM Treat-imes 
has been exaggerated whilxt the writings of Atwoodl Forgumong 
Tyrrell and Sidney bays been neglected* In shortg if we 
adopt the kind of approach to the history of contractarianism 
charekcterintic of Goughl's The Social 92ntract then we ore 
certain to misunderstand the meaning of appeals to 'contract' 
to both writers and audience& at any particular time* 
Some of the differences between the various kinds of 
C011tractu&I: Lsu that I have depicted have notg of course, 
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entirely ascaped the notice of historians of late seventeenth 
century political thOughte GouZh himself pointed to 
differences between Locke's Two Treatines and the maJoritY 
of Whig pro. Revolutionary tracts.. But these he interpreted 
in terms of his tmachanistic' division of the Social Contract 
Theory into two parts -a contract of government and a 
contract of society* 
8 Sir Leslie Stephen, however$ caus 
much closer to the point when he spoke of two different 
$schools$ of contractarian thinkers - social contract/natural 
law theorists and writers of "a different school's who 
believed the "compact" to have been an historical reality 
which "might vary indefinitely according to circumstancenj 
and be the foundation an well of a democracy an of a 
despotism. ft This second type of contractualiong he 
asserted, "was used *oo not to preserve the absolute 
character of certain laws,, but to justify the most purely 
empirical methodsot'9 And Professor Pocock I-As noted that 
around JL688 the iCommon law View of the Ancient ConStitutiOn' 
did in some respects turn Into a 'conservative and legalistic 
version$ of Contract Theory*10 But none of these authors 
pursued their suggestions much further* 
Although it has been my point to insist an the 
differences between the various kinds of contractualism, 
I have attempted to show that they did share certain 
features In common, In particularg I have argued that 
the coherence and persuasiveness of each depended upon the 
widespread acceptance of #rationalist constructiviaml* 
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But even in the late seventeenth century (the 'heyday' of 
contractarian. thought") some of the central notions of 
'rationalist coustructivisul an wall as notions more 
Immediately related to the three types of contrActurian 
argument were coming under attack. In 1705 Nkndevillefs 
The Grumbling Hive was published* Although the potentialities 
of the work were not realized until well into the eighteenth 
century, still Mandevillefs argument implicitly attacked 
'rationalist constructivism' by denying that sociul and 
political institutions were solely the product of humn 
design. Human inxtitutiouxo It appeareds were the product 
of human action but not of human designs Xn making this 
claims Professor Hayek has argueds Mandeville "made Hume 
Possible"S 
12 In terms of political explanation there Is 
evidence, too, of attention being directed away from the 
search for rational @original that was characteristic of 
'coustructivist rationalism'* Sir William Petty's PIWICAL 
Arithmeticic, published In 1691, exemplifies one of the 
directions in which a now kind of, explanation of political 
phenomena was sought, Petty himself declared that his 
"Method" was "not yet very usual": 
for Instead of using only comparative and superlative 
Wordeq and intellectual Argustentos I have taken the 
course (as a Specimen of the Political Arithmetick 
I have long aimed at) to express my self in Terms 
(if Numb=, Wei&bt or Measurel to use only Arguments 
Of Senseq and to censidor only such Causeng as have 
visible Foundations in Nature. 13 
In his A Dipgo%irge of t1le Contents anlDissenglong Detwoen 
the KAble-ts aind the_Sainimlogs : in Atheng and Rome (1701)t 
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Jonathan Swift seems to have been infected by a similar 
kind of spirit an Patty when he declared that his task vas 
the now one of presenting a "pathology of politicks", 
14 
His concern,, that in to say, was with the relations of power 
within states and the causes of strength and weakness rather 
than any search after 'origins'. But Swift did not engage 
in the 'weighing and measuring' characteristic of Patty's 
work* Both Petty and Swift dog howevere indicate the rise 
of a now focus of attention in political enquirys a focus 
of attention concerned not with $original but with the 
relations of power, indedd, the #balancing of powers' within 
statese 
15 
Of the three types of contractualist argumento it wAs 
Constitutional Contractarianim that came under the most 
severe and sustained attack an the period I have considered 
advanced* The Marquess of lialifaxg for exampleg in his 
unpublished LoUtteal Thogghto ang- Rerj! jcj_"sl6 savagely 
and wIttily criticisod the notion of "F2gdamenta-lug! '* Three 
of his remarks may serve to indicate how at least one of 
the Constitutional Contractarianst audience viewed their 
use of this central idea: 
Every Partyq when they find a maxim for their turns 
they presently call It a FundamQUI&ILe They think 
they nail it with a peg of irons whereas in truth 
they only tie it with a wisp of straw* 
The word soundeth so well that the impropriety 
of It hath been the less observed* But as weighty 
as the word appeareths no feather hath been more 
blown about in the world than this word Fun-dangntalo 
* 00 "; 
undamental Is a word used by the laityq an the 
word sacred is by the clerSyl to fix everything to 
themselves they have a mind to keeps that nobody 
else way touch it* 17 
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Daniel Defoeq from within the ranks Of the contractarianx, 
attacked the Constitutional Contractarian appeal to the 
'intentions of their ancestors# and the supposedly 
Iniaznificent' Saxon Constitution, In Thgj True. 13g 
-- -Im 
EnAliabOn (1700) he insisted3 
Thus from a Mixture of all Kinds begang 
That Hetfrogeneaus Things An En "ll sign aI 
In eager Rapes and furiou begot 
Between a painted Briton and a Scotj 
Whose gendoring offspring quickly learnt to bow 
And yoke their heifers to the Roman ploughl 
From whenco a Mongrel half-bred Race there camet 
With neither name nor Nation, speech or Fame* 
In whose hot veins now Mixtures quickly rang 
Infused between a Saxon and a Dan*, 
While their rank Daughters% to their Parents just$ 
Received all Nations with promiscuous lust* 
Thin nauseous Droodl directly did contain 
The well extracted Blood of Englishmen. 
6*00 Then lot us boast of Ancestors no more, 
Or Deeds of Heroes done in days of Yore, 
In latent Records of the Ages past, 
Behind the Roar of Time, in long Oblivion plac1d. 
**so What isIt to us, what Ancestors we had? 
If Godd, what better? or what worse$ if Bad? 
And In a similar vein to Defoe$ Humphry Hody criticized 
the whole debate about the Norman Conquest an pointless 
since whatever had taken place son* seven centuries earlier 
could make no significant different to the present 
constitution, 
18 
Wny of the major elements in late seventeenth century 
contracAualiet thoughts then, were under scrutiny and attack 
from various quarters. Appeals to 1contractl eventually 
lost their purchase in political argumonte But the story 
of how they did so is long and complicated* The Ideas of 
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Scontract' that I have examined all changed their meaning 
as the eighteenth century proceeded* But any account of 
those changes must begin with the recognition of how complex 
the understandings of 'contract' were in the age of the 
1688 Revolution. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE IDEA OF---ICO! MUCSTI IN THE CONiTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSIES OVER THE 1088 REVOIAMION 
James II himself was partly responsible for introducing 
the notion of conquest into the debates over the Revolution, 
In a Declaration or 28 September 1688s he announced that 
the Dutch wore planning "an absolute Conquest of these 
our Kingdomsel"' To many observers also, the arrival of 
a Dutch fleet and army,, the skirmishes in the West Countryl 
the eventual armed escorts for James and the replacement 
of English troops in the City by Dutchman might fairly 
reasonably have appeared as a conquest* The famous 
GInvitationt, the several fAssociationst of English noblemen 
in support of William, and the Prince's own declaration of 
Purpose (ax limited to ensuring the election of a free 
Parliament), need not necessarily have modified this view. 
The form of the conquest might have alteredg but it could 
still be seen as a conquest nonetheless* 
The events of tho Revolutiont then, gave some credence 
to the belief that England had been conquered by William* 
Out one of the strangest features of appeals to conquOst 
in the Revolutionary debates was that they appeared most 
prominently in dafences of the rightfulness, of 1688. 
Conquest arguments, that is to say, wero not so much 
arguments from might, as from right* Blount's Xiwol William 
and- Qhwega Mar -Y 
S&IM Wgror's (1693) illustrates tho point. 
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Mount divided his defence of the Revolution into four 
parts. In the first he asserted that William and Mary 
had just grounds for war with James because he had both 
attempted to subvert the fundamental frame of the English 
government, "which the next Heirs are supposed under 
obligations of preserving"q and because he had$ by a trick$ 
imposed "an Heir to the Crown upon their Majestiemg and 
these three Kingdoms. " 2 In the second part he attempted 
to prove that James had been conquerede but that his 
conquerors had gained "no Right .9 over the Lawag or the 
Peoples Liberties*0 This he claimed followed because 
only James and those who had activelyAl. 'fought against William 
had in fact been conquerede The third part argued that 
conquest in a just war gave William and Mary a lawful title 
to their thrones, becausel by provoking 0 war and loosing 
its James ims no longer able to "answer the Ends or Government" 
thus his former subjects were left with "a rightful Liberty 
of transferring *** Allegiance to the Conqueror" who was 
now the only one in a position to 'answers those ends - 
and any attempt to restore James would expose the nation 
to the ruin of another war* 
4 
And in the final part$ 
Olount listed a number of conclusions which he felt his 
arguments 'proved# - conclusions which certainly imuld 
have been supported by most defenders of the Revolution, 
Viewing the Revolution an a conquest in 0 just were proved* 
so he claimed, first, that William and Mary had acted with 
"Justice and Honour", second, that their subjects could 
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swear allegiance to them an "Princes do Jura 1 third, 
that non. juring was a "very great Sin"; fourthq that 
James 11 no longer had any claim to the throne and that 
if he were to attempt to regain hIs crown ho should be 
treated as an invaderl fifthq that the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of the Prince of Wales was no longer of any 
interost since he had lost whatever rights he might have 
had along with his father's falli and finallyq that the 
Church of England had not been disloyal in transferring 
allegiance to William and Mary. 
5 
The attraction of this kind of argument was that it 
effected some sort of reconciliation between beliefs in 
passive obedience, non-resistance and the sacrodness of 
oaths and beliefs in the rightfulness of the Revolution* 
It could do this because in an age still deeply religious 
and indeed superstitious a conquest could pass as the 
determination of a benevolent Providence, Since a regime 
thus established must be presumed rightful before Gods man 
must acknowledge its rightfulness and swear obedience to 
it, This sort of argument was quite common in the 
Revolutionary debates and$ as Burnet reported at the timel 
it "brought off the greatest number of those who came In 
honestly to tile new government. *6 
But the Idea of conquest uas peculiarly ambiguous in 
the late seventeenth century. This ambiguity explains 
why 'conquest' wan go soon rejected by f1tarliazient as an 
adequate Justification of the Revolution, During the 
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constitutional controversies of the early 1680& 1conqu*xV 
had become practically the monopoly of the champions of 
royal as against parliamentary power, 
7 To talk of a 
conquest invited associations with the debates over the 
Norman Conquest and Tory attacks on parliamentary rights 
an simply the concessions of conquering king5o Jeremy 
Collier emphasised this association when he attacked the 
Revolution In generalg and one of Gilbert Burnetts defences 
of It in particularg on the grounds that the "Kings of 
Rngland claim their Authority by Conquest and Succession" 
and hence the liberties of the citimens were "but Acts of 
Royal favours and Condeacentione of Sovereignty, * "a And 
in the early 168ox William Atwood had summed up a principle 
position of the assertorx of parliamentary righto against 
the king in these wordes "Admit a Conquest 
[: Ln JL066--jg and 
the Inheritance which every one claims In the laws will be 
maintainable only an a naked Rigbt"*9 In 1688. too$ a 
conquest would destroy the old Iowa and require a now 
defence of the liberties which Englishmen had sought to 
secure by resisting Jowese Those liberties might appear 
an simply the concessions of the now conquerart the Prince 
of Orange, to be resumed at his will and pleasure in exactly 
the same way aim Royalist constitutional historians had 
claimed the king could do In the pro-1688 constitution which 
they hold had been established by the No: n Conquest " 
20 
Given these associations of 'conquest' with obsolutioul 
it In hardly surprising to find appeals to tconquestl in 
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arguments totally opposed to one another. The author of 
The Dear Bargaip. (1690) pleaded for the restoration of 
James 11 because William's government was illegitimate and 
based upon self-destructive contractarian principless It 
was raised "by parricide and usurpations entred into by 
violation of his 
[William's 
own declarations supported by 
the overthrow of all our laws sacred and civi3L# and the 
perjury of the nation*"'Ll Jeremy Collier argued to a 
similar point and insisted that James 1I remained do-Jura 
king as lawful successor to William the Conqueror* 
12 
Edmund Bohuno however, asserted the legality of Williams 
regime on the grounds of a just conquest in a just more 
13 
And Gilbert Burnet amplified this point by indicatingg in 
a similar uny to Blountla, what the grounds of the just 
war were - ioeo that "by all the laws of the world* even 
private as well as public$ he that has in him the reversion 
of any estates has the right to hinder the possessor# if 
he Zoos about to destroy thatq which in to come to him 
after the possexaorts death*"14 The author of A Letto-r- 
to a BJ_8bQV_ co-ACOMIB& tbe- igroxent Sottlempgt ., 
(np, 9ndJ 
insisted that at the Revolution "the King alone was 
conquered and not the nation with himl" so that (again 
like Blount) he could conclude that the usual consequences 
of a conquest such as the subject's loss of I, iberty and 
property had been Avoided in this cagel, 
15 And finally, 
the Bishop of Ste Asaph attempted to persuade the conscience- 
troubled non-jurorn that Allegiance could be sworn to 
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William and Mary without sin because God had expelled James 
and given the kingdom to the now monarchn an just conquerors 
in a just ware 
16 
Arguments from 'conquest's thong certainly played a 
significant role in justifications of the Revolution* 
They proved unsatisfactorys however$ because they might 
equally be used to attack the rightfulness of the William 
and Mary regime. The ambiguity of the idea stemmed in 
part from the association of conquest with slavery and 
absolutism on the one Imnd# and with the determination of 
a benevolent Providence on the other. But the ambiguity 
also stemmed from abstract nature of the notion of 'conquost's 
The notion was simply too abstract for the specific purpose 
which defenders of the Revolution wished to put it* in 
this respect the idea of conquest portrayed the same kind 
of ambiguity as a bout of-other notions (like fliberty's 
'Justicel, 'rebellion's frevolution') portray in practical 
political argument. They are open to almost any specific* 
particular interpretation* - 
Although appeals to 'conquest* in defence of thO 
Revolution were shortlivedg there in considerable evidence 
to suggest they were significant in rallying support to 
the new regime, MUs evidence$ however* appears to have 
been overlooked by recent historians interested in the Ideas 
J*G*Ao Pococks for exampleg In his studyoof historical and 
legal thought In seventeenth century Sngland noted many 
authors arguing against justifications of the absolute 
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power of English kings based on the idea that they were 
descended from a conqueror* but was unable to fiud any 
of the original asxertors of this view* 110 was thus 
forced to conclude that if there were any proponents of 
the conquest case they must only have expressed themselves 
in the most ephemeral and now lost literaturo, 
17 And 
Peter Uslett, following Pocock's evidence, pushed this 
argument even further, Laslott denied that an argument 
from conquest had any relevance at the time of the Revolution, 
When, in produeing his critical edition of Locke's MM 
Treatin0a Laslett came across Chapter 16 of theEesMd- 
TreatIsO the problem of conquest confronted him directly* 
For Locko determined to refuto in that chapter the "many" 
who "have mistaken the force of Armes for the consent of 
the Peoplol and reckon Conquest an one of the Originals 
of Governmente" But because of the supposed absence of 
any writers who believed that conqudst conveyed a right 
to govern* Laslett concluded that Locke did not have Any 
immediate opponents to -refute when he published thin part 
of his Troatises: he was simply "writi" in the tradition 
which dictated that the conquest argument had to be refutedevIa 
Having surveyed the debates about conquest from 1688-1693o 
howeverg ife can see that Jeremy Collier, a leading member 
of the non-juring Church$ argued precisely along the lines 
which Pocock expected but could not find# and that arguments 
from conquest were far from irrelevant at the time of the 
Revolution. 
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APRENDIX D 
PETYTIS COMBASIUALISH 
Even in 
. 
21ýe Antien BIght, of thg Com=nR of Engjftnd 
Asserted (1680), the work which most consistently presented 
tho Common Law view or the Ancient Constitution$ Petyt can 
be found arguing; that "the ancient Coronation Oath of our 
Kings e.. certainly shewas that the peoples Election had 
been the foundation and ground of antlent Laws and Customs. "I 
Both this argument and the assertion that the Saxons had 
transplanted into England the government they had bean used 
to in Germanys 2 were expanded in Petytin manuscripts of 
the into 16805, The Ancient Constitution was still 
PrOJOGnted as a Mixed Monarchy. It was of tho same kind 
"the Antient and General Government Of 411 Kingdoms in 
3 this Part of the World"s It was At "Rare Mixture"$ 
A Kingdom of a Perfect and Happi* Compositiont 
wherein 1. The King bath his Full Prerogativet 
2* The Nobles All Due Respect* 3,, And the POOPIO, 
amongst other Blessings perfect in Thisq That They 
are Masters of their own Purees and have a strong 
Hand in the klakeing of their own Laws, 11 
But now this Mixed Honarchyg although Gormnic in origing 
was compared with the texcellent' Roman Government which 
had harmoniously combined "? Ujosteg "Authority",, and 
"Incorrupted Liberty", 5 And the link which this appeal 
to Romoin excellence suggests with the more radical 
P&r]L'am*nt&rian Argumsntb, In confirmod bY Petytlx furthor 
claim that the monarch's prerogatives were "astled upon 
Them by Original Grants from the People*" 
6 
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Arguments of this sort certainly modified Petyt's 
interpretation of the 'immemorial' Ancient Constitution. 
11o did continue to deny that there had ever boen a Norman 
Conquost but now he emphavised the contractualist argument 
for tho legal continuity between the Saxon and Norman 
Constitutionoo William Is he insisted, 'Iliad taken the 
Soverai, gnty upon Compact with the English and that solemnly 
ratified and confirmed by his sacred Coronation oath. o, 
7 
Yet despite all these concessions to contractarian argument 
(argumentx that were increasinZly used to justify the legal 
sovereignty of Parliament)o Petyt still insisted that 
the English Constitution was a Mxed blonareby and that he 
was writing to defend "the ImmemoriAl Freedom and Liberties" 
of the various constitutional partnerse 
8 
Ile never Wrote 
about 'the original English contract' and he never made 
use of tile most important single source of historical 
evidence for Constitutional Contractarianism: Andrew Horn's 
M1.0 MixTor of justic2g,. Peter Allixt William Atvoodv 
James Tyrrell and Sir Robert Athynx all made use of one 
important passage from this work&9 And there is evidence 
too that John Locke believed The Miz7vE of Justjogg 
important for an understanding of the Ancient Constitution 
of Englande 
10 But Petyt was perhaps too good an historian 
to have accepted the validity of either The HIM2r as an 
&uthentic account of Saxon government or of an grizinal 
gOIAXISI &N the historically provable origin of the English 
Constitution. 
362 
NOTES 
Imommmom 
10 Loco cit. pp. 59-60. 
2o lbida Preface ps 6. 
3- Petyt IT. MS* 512 OUI (fole 253)- 
4. Ibide (fole 284), 
50 lbid& 
6. lbid& (fol, 6 
7. Petyt IT* HS, 
64 Petyt IT* Wo 
was defending 
9, See above Ch,, 
G). 
. 
51-2 flit (fol, 12), 
512 lUl (fol* 341)e 
the House of Lords. 
III* 
In this case Petyt 
10* Locke quotes John Sadler - The Rights of the Kingdomg 
and Customs of our Ancestors (1649) and recommends 
the work to the prospective student of English politics (see Cho VII above), Sadler's argument relies heavily 
on The-Mirror of Justices, 
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APPENDIX C 
*CONTRACTS$ AND 
-IREASONI 
IN LATE SEVENTEEM11 CENTM 
HISTORICAL TIMMIT. 
During tim into sevanteenth centur-y England was certainly 
not alone in having an original contract written into its 
constitutional history, Indoodg a group of historical 
writers that included James Tyrrollg DernArd Connorl, John 
Savages Peter iýllixq Robert Holesworth and Gilbert Burnetq 
believed that most of the European kingdoms could be shoWn 
to have either originated by contract or to have present 
constitutions which embodied a contract* These writers 
accepted that Gervany vas "the commn Parent"" of VAG 
European statese This meant that their first constitutions 
followed the Gothic model* or$ an Peter Allix assorted3 
that all those Kingdoms Tof Western Europ*D never 
in the least supposed thit their King had an Absolute 
Power over them* And gee that almst all those States have always waintaineds That the Power of 
their Soveraigns was so limitods 
2, That they could make no Laws without the 
States-Goncral of the Kingdom* 
2, That they could not levy any Mbny on their 
Subjects without their Consents* 
3. That they could not break the Laws according 
to their Will and Pleasure* 
4, That In case of their violating the Fundau*ntal 
Laws of the States they were liable to be deprived 
of a Power which they abused* 
5. That the States were free to chuse such a 
Form of Governments and such a Person for to govern 
thaws an they thought most expedient for them* 2 
These were precisely the same conxtitutioMl prov'is: LOnB As 
tilose Atwood wished to prove were part of English 
constitutional law. But Allix was concerned to show that 
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they were not only the Ifundamentals of English law' but 
3 also of "PolaIld, Franpa, Scotland, and Enrland", And in 
a number of studies of Germany, 
Ik 
Holland95 Denmarks 
6 
and 
7 Poland, either the aneiont or the contemporary constitutions 
of thoso countries were represented as embodying a contractj 
In some of those studies the Coronation Oath was emphasixed 
as the mark of such a contract8 in exactly the same waY 88 
many writers about England were insistinge 
These studios did not go uneballangod particularly 
uliere, as in accounts of Englandq their rotation to Pr&ctic&l 
political argument was clear. But the idea of History 
which lent credence to them was much more generally accepted* 
Despite the prevalence of Antiquarian scholarshipq History 
was not valued for its own sake. John Locke appears to 
have expressed a common view when lie wrote: 
X do not dony but history in very useful and very 
Instructive of human lifel but if It be studied 
only for the reputation of bainZ an historiant it 
In a very empty things and he that can tell All 
the particularities of 11crodotus and Plutarche 
Curtius and Livyt without making other use of them 
may be an ignorant mnn with a good memoryg and with 
all this bath only filled his head with Christmas 
talos. 9 
And oven such a devoted Antiquary as Thomas Hearne felt 
moved to defend the practical utility of historical study* 
His Ductor Historictis (1698) was written against Norrials 
Reflections U-non the Conduct of Hunnn Lifou-Ith reIntioin to 
Lp. anninnj 111rhich had argued that only the istudy of Religion 
and Morals ims necessary for the proper conduct of life. 
Hearne, insisted that History wns just as necessary, as these 
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and produced a list of the benefits that studying history 
brought. At times this list becomes incredible, Historyq 
he claimed# informs us of past happenings that we would 
otherwise be ignorant of; it was "the most excellent and 
most entertaining Diversion that a Man could possibly have"l 
it provided an Invaluable guide to those "designd for great 
Employs" because it presented e-. --, perience to the Inexperienced 
and bestowed greatness on the Good and ignominy on the badl 
it also, amazingly, "has those Charms$ that It has recovered 
its Readers from the most dangerous Sicknesse, nay even 
when the Art of Medicine has been at a lose for a Remedy. 
Examples of which we have In two Kings$ of Spain and SicilY9 
Alrh6nwiS and Ferdlopds both whose Maladies were so charmId 
by reading hl= and Ciirtitiss that they were restorld to 
their Health when they had been given over by all their 
Physicians"I and finally$ History was "of that known 
Benefit In discovering the Truth of the Christian Religiong 
that without the Assistance of it and Philosophys WO could 
never be able to oppose Atheists and Pirrheni2. nse "10 
Hearne certainly appears exceptional in attributing the 
power of healing to History, but his other characteristics 
were widely accepted* This was especially true of the 
idea that history was a study of the utmost importance an 
a guide to right conduct in public and private affairs. 
11 
Itwas generally regarded an the duty of the historian 
to Interrupt his narrative and point out the moral of the 
tale., Thung for exampleg Hearne : Lnsiatal 
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P211tich Reflect 
. I 
Lgns are to be always practisldg 
for what good will reading do a Man If he make 
no use of it? 12 
Historios of particular countries were written as illustrations 
of a seneral moral, Robort Holeavorth, for exampleg wrote 
his Account of Denmark (1694) to show that: 
Want ofiLiber-t-y is a Disease in any Society or Body 
Politick# like want of 110. a. 1-th in a particular P*rzonj 
and as the beat way to understand the nature of any 
Distemper aright, is to consider it in several 
Patients* since the same Disoaso may proceed from 
different causes$ so the disorders in Society are 
best perceived by observing the Nature and Effects 
of them in our several Neighbourso 13 
This prescription for a sort of Comparative Politics has 
an interestingly modern ring to ite Yet It appears to 
have been simply a more thoughtful version of the popular 
understandinS of History as expressed by the author of . 
7TLe. 
HiBt-*r6X ot NhIll (1704) 9 
"This TJr*&t; Lx*" he W& too "is Chiefly desiguld to 
oncrease Knowledro. promoto Virtueg discover the 
Odiousness of coo and furnish Togjckp for Innocent 
and Ingenious onversationo And if that Maxim 
be true, That Man "a Influenced kX Eagumlost 
-thall 
Proceptsq here are nough to better Mon's 
LIvess by XmitAting the Exumples of the Just, and 
to dater others from the Commission of Gross Enormities, 
by abhoring the Practices of the Wkekegr7m. 
1y these 
Lxamples Pringes may luiow how to Govern, and Sub-lects 
to Obey. '14 
Although History was thus viewed an essentially the 
recounting of moral stories* this did not Imply that the 
historian had a completely free rein with his evidencee 
The historians of the late seventeenth century Imposed two 
limitations on the cavalier use of historical evidence,, 
One was that the historian should be impartial in his 
accountq and the other was that he should not accept 
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uncritically previous histories particularly of the earliggt 
ages of the world. Thomas Hearne, once atain, way serve 
to illustrate the first of those* "Partiality", lie declaredo 
Ithow well soever managed, will ever be prejudicial to Historyq 
and therefore that Rock ought principally to be avoided"J5 
Sir William Templots stricturon against previous accounts 
of early Unglial-i lastory are well Imoun. Ile set out to 
attacki 
Thoso Tales we have of what passed before 
LC&esar'S, 
_) 
times of Brute and his TmAu-nAl of many 
Adventures and Succe7sýzionse Coince -Uhesýqj are covered 
with the Rust of Times or involved In the Vanity 
of Fables* or pretended Traditions; which seem to 
all Men obscure or uncertaing but to me, forged 
at Pleasure, by the Wit or Folly of their first 
Authoraq and not to be regarded* 16 
And this scepticism was reflected In tho works of OR12Y 
other writers of the time* Bernard Conner* for exompleg 
In his Histgry of Polagd (1698) noted that: 
The first Writers of tho Polish History. IikO most 
other Ilistorianal wore credulous and sýýorstitious, 
and have fillId their Writings with a great mftny 
Romantic and almost fabulous Storiosq which I have 
omittedo 17 
But these limitations in no way interfered with th* 
historian's principal task of presenting a moral guide* 
Gilbert Surnetq for examples in ilia M-le Ili togýLof tbgL Ristht-IL 
gf Princes In tj]e gisDagill-c OL ESSjgSiasjjgS: L Bengaggs *13d 
q2ur&b-; ^-ndz U682)9 declar*dt 
I bAve endeavoured to write an becomex;. an Historian 
that in of noither Party, and approves nnd condemns 
both sides$ as he seen cause for its and not for 
any partial affection to either of the Courts of 
Rome$ or of Francel since I can hardly measure 
for which of these I am least partial in my 
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inclinations or wishese I hope I shall offer 
to the Reader some useful parts of Ecclesiastical 
Learning, that may not only entertain him as they 
are Historical Relationag but give him some Lights 
to judS of sovoral other things. 18 
Since the tagsk of History was thus viewed &is the 
presentation and illustration of moral principleag it 
is easy to sea why Reason and History should have been 
inextricably intermingled. The principles of morality, 
whether derived from Revelation or Natural Laws were 
established as j2rinci by Reason. Those principles -plea 
were the primary element in good historical writingg an 
Locke implied when he recommended history only "to one who 
hath well settled in his mind the principles of moralitYs 
and known how to make a judgement on the actions of men". 
19 
In this way Reason bacame essontial to historical reflectiong 
and thiel coupled with the premiseSs that We TIAVO 660n as 
basic to Atwoodle historyg 20 established Reason as the 
essential criterion of historical truth* 
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AE. PICNDIX D 
FERGTJSONs "THIC PLOTTER" 
The political activities of Forgusong Cron his association 
with Shaftesbury in JL679 to his ardent Jocobition during the 
reign of Queen Anneg were sufficiently full of intrigue 
and conspiracy to justify the epithet that has become attached 
to his nameo, Ilia career seeox to lack consistent political 
objectivesq and attempts to supply theme have done injustice 
to the complexity of his character and motives* Jon* Jones 
has recently argued that Ferguson "worked against every 
administration because he believed that all ministers were 
and muntg under the existing myoteng be always oppresmiVes 
corrupts and parmaitices' 
1 out xince Forguxon never 
justified himself on these grounds* and since he plotted 
jr= so many different endx$ Jonests attributions of consistent 
moral principles behind Ferguson's shifting political 
persuasions clearly miss the points 
Gilbert burnets Ferguson's coPtONPOrArYs find A : r*I'Ow 
ScOtxmans imputed a cousixt*ncy to his career on psychological 
grounds, Thus Ferguson oppearm As simply tos, hot and bold 
Nang whose spirit was natprally turnod to plotting" and 
who was always "setting on some to mischief"* 
2 Burnetq 
Izowevorg like Jonex aftor hlmfj updoX-valued Forgumon's own 
explanations of his conduct* 
The many pamphlets that ixaued rrom Ferguson's pen 
between 1680 and 1706 Xudicate two overriding concerus* 
371 
The first was the protection of the Protestant religion 
from Catholicism. The second was a concern witb his own 
well-being* Each of the intrigues in which he was engaged 
were justified especially in terms of the needs of religiono 
And each of the explanations of his own conduct afte r 
the intrigue had failed (which in fact they all did) were 
attempts to maintain his life, 
He was a party to all the major conspiracies against 
King and govermsent, during the turbulent yearts of the 16808 
and 190xo He plotted with the more radical Exclusionists 
against Jameng Duke of York and Charles IXj and a ROY&I 
Declaration in 1683 described him as "the comm" agitator 
between all parties In the several conspiracies"03 W013t, 
a follow conspirator in the Rye Houso PlOts accused him of 
boing "by far the most guilty man In every part of the 
conspiracy". 
4 
Ferguson himself excaped to Hollandslyhoro 
he spent most of the 1680s. 
In 1683 a "reward or 5oo i. each ror apprehensiOu or 
Jamms, Duke of Monmouths Ford* Lord Q"Ys Sir ThowAg 
ArmstronS9 and Robert Fergusons who conspired against the 
King and the Duke of York" was offered by the Crowne-5 in 
1685. Ferguson sailed with Mormouth In tho deeporoto &ttemPt 
to rid England of James 11 that ended In total failure* In 
an effort to save his own life, Monmouth accused Fergumon 
of having pressured him into undertaking the invr4g on, 
6 
but Ferguson escaped again to Holland with another %arrant 
being Issued for his arrest for treason* He returned to 
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England once more in the fleet of William of Orange - the 
only successful attempt to rid England of its Xing in the 
late seventeenth centuryl and the only attempt In which 
Ferguson appears to have played no significant part (at 
least in terms of planning) although he did write one of 
the most popular justifications of it* 
From 1679 to 1688g Forgusonlis career in politics doom 
have a strongly consistent element apart from Any psychological 
need to be constantly engaged in treasonable activities* 
He considered the dominant political issue to be the conflict 
in the state between Catholics and Protestants* This 
conflict could never end in compromise because Catholicism 
Implied the need to convert (by force if necessary) all 
people to the Catholic religion* and all states to the 
service of the Papacy, He was far from alone In this 
diagnosis of the crucial contemporary political issues and 
to himself and many fellow. travellers it seemdd that Potential 
fore* must be met by force, The Popish Plot ups a straight-w 
Cox rd attempt by Catholics to possess the Otatel and 
Exclusion was necessary to prevent a Catholic prince ascending 
the throne* When Exclusion ftiledq attwWted assassination 
or the Catholic James and the Increasingly pro. Catholic 
Charles 11 was necessary, * When the Rye House Plot failedt 
Monmouth$ the popular, Protestant% bastard son of Charles 
11 appeared to offer the beat "r*placoment" for a Catholic 
and therefore "hoxtile" King, After Monmouth's failure, 
the Protestants William and Mary appeared to offer a last 
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chance of regicuing Zngland from the clutches of the Pope. 
At no stage in his career of treason did FerSuson consider 
altering the monarchical nature of the Constitutionj7 his 
career to 1688 was consistent In that he was propared to 
support and fight for any prospective or actual monarcht 
provided they defended and upheld the Protestant religionip 
Yet only some eighteen months after willisin's successful 
landing in England$ Ferguson vex again suspected of plotting 
against the Crown 
8. 
this time in the interests of J4mOs 
rill A warrant was issued for his arrest in June 16909 
and his seized papers revealed that he hAd been in "constant 
correspondence" with some of the "Jacobite Club", &9 
According 
to Carmarthens Wildman and Ferguson were so deeply involved 
in Jacobite conspiracies that they could "give all If they 
would of all the transactions of the Clubs who Appear to bee 
ingaged wth the 'ate King *"010 Ferguzong 
however* once 
more escaped arrests and his name appeared again in connection 
with Lord Atholl1s plot against william III in 1696. Another 
warrant was lasued for his arrest# yet again he escaped* 
Indeed$ the only success that Ferguson's "plotting" career 
reveals Is the ability to avoid punishment - an ability 
that Allowed him to run the full length of his lifeg and 
to die SiMPIY Of old ago* 
The unusual volte. face in Forgumon's career during 
JL690i ftom support of the successful William Oud )IftrY to 
the defence of the claims of James 11, has caused most 
difficulty to the few histarianx who have renarked upon 
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the ideas of this interesting and influential political 
figure, 11 J. Ri. Jones's attempt to understand it in terms 
of Ferguson's high moral scruplos is unfortunately basod 
upon no evidence and indeed conflicts with Ferguson's 
explanations of his own conduct* G. Burnet's accounts 
accepting the contradictions and accounting for them in 
teme of Ferguson's psychological defects$ whilst it may 
be partially Justified, 
12 does not take note of the evidence 
Ferguson himself provides of tho consistency of his stands* 
To Terguzong the battle between Protestantism and Catholicism 
for a dominant, voice in British affairs of state neither 
ended with James Ills departure nor even produced significant 
gains for the Protestant causeol-3 He admitted making two 
serious mistakes of judgement# neither of which involved 
his general view of the main issue in British politicso 
or his willingness to go to any lengthis to xee that 
Protestantism was secure. His first mistake vas hills 
failure to see that Charles II and eventually James n 
wore genuinely committed to upholding the Protestant 
religion$ and his second was his failure to recognise that 
William III was really a Catholic adventurer who cared 
little for Britain or the Protestant religion* The result 
was that Britains and especially Englands had boon deceived 
into overturning its Constitutiong ousting the rightful 
King$ putting the uhole institution of mon^rehy in jeopardy 
and yet still lotting in Catholicism unmolostod*14 
Concern for the Protestant religion, theng marks the 
375 
main explicit motive behind Ferguson's political career 
through all its twists and turns, Ito may wall have been 
wrong in his analysis of the attitudes and motives of the 
various -political figureB whose causes he chose to championj 
but we must take seriously the consistent concern that was 
his main criterion for taking sides in the controversies* 
James Ferguson# Robert Ferguson's only biographers attempted 
to reconcile the apparently conflicting elements in his 
career by portraying him an the consistent defender of 
James IX. 15 Thus his participation in the plot* against 
Charles 11 and James is made to appear as an attempt to 
thwart their designs from "the inside"* J&mOS FQrSUSOU1B 
cases howevers rests upon only one piece of ovidencov and 
that in Fergusonts own account of his activities during 
the Rye House Plot$ written in exilo in 11ollande probably 
an an attempt to vindicate himself should lie over be caughts 
16 
Ferguson's account in this document is completely at odds 
with the evidence of all the other participants in the 
plots, 
17 
and it in doubtful whether much significance can 
be attached to it as a faithful account of the proceedings* 
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X (1946-7)o passime 
36. The Case of Allegiance due to Sovereign Powers atcog 
Preface, 
37* Cfe Us Every . The High Church Party 1688-17101 P. 64* 
38* Loco cite pp. 1-2o 
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39o lbid* p* 3, 
400 lbid* Pe 5* 
410 lbide pe M, 
42. Dr. Sherlockle Case of Allegiance Considered* Etcol p. lo 
43* lbido pe 74* 
44. Reg. To Downes - An Examination of the 
Arguments **, 
In Dr* Sherlockle Case of Allegiance etc69 ppo 14-151 
Cfalaoq Anon. - Histario-Theologieux 
(London 1715)o 
Preface P, 3, Here Hobbes appears an the intel-Tecti3al 
forbear of all those uho, changed allegiance in 1689,, 
4.5. Dr. Sherlockle Two King, % etces V. 4* 
46. The Second Part of Dr. Sherlock's Two Kings Otcos Pe 
47, The Titlo of an Usurpor otees po 32* 
48* The Revolution of 3L688, po 87* 
49., This speciric pin-aeo is taken from Sir Q* ZyreD - 
Reflections Upon the late Great Revolutions po 1, 
. 509 
Remrks Upon Dr. Sherlocks Books Intituladq The 
Case of Allegianco ate,, Preface pe ili* 
510 Lac, cit. p, 34* 
52* Loc. cit. p. 3 
53,, Anchitell Grey (ed. ) . Debates of the House Of Conaons. Vol. Xe ppe 297-8- 
54, Cobbettla parliamentary Ilistory of England* Vol. V. 
Ps 756. 
55* Anchitall Grey (ad*) . ope Cit* p* 2-97a 
56a See Appendix A* 
57. See Ch. VII below for a discuxnion of Locko's notion 
of tconsent'* 
580 Loco cit* ppe 12-139 
. 
59" IA)C* cite 1)* 13* 
We Q& Skinner - 111istory and Ideology in the English ReVolution"s In The 11irtoj: JLS! 3L j2yr *Is (81 1965)9 
OsP& ppe 171-8, be* also Ch6 III below* 
-i 
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61. An Enquiry into the Measures of Submission to the 
Supromo Authority (1689), This pamphlet ran to at 
loast six editions within a year* 
62, Ibid* Pe 9* 
63, Ibid. ppe 9.10* 
64* Ibid* ps 10* 
6! i* See M. III below. 
66. op. cit. P* 10. 
67* Ibid, ppe 10.11. 
68* lbide pe 10, 
69. Dr. Shorloclcls Two Kingo etc** po 4* 
70* lbido V. 18. 
71* lbide po 2le 
72* lbid, 
73. Remarks Uýon Dre Sharlocklo U00ho Intituladl The 
Case of Allogianceg pe 19* 
74* Ibide yp* 1.2* 
75* On this argument from designs see below Chso 1119 
V1 and V111,6 
76. E*g* T, Wilson . Gods the King and the CountrOYs 
ppe 11 and 34. 
77s, E*C* see Ja Collier's refutation of this ArgutuOnt In 
his Animadversions upon the modern Explication of ll# 
Hen* 7* Cap* 1: Or a King de Factol and D, Whitby 
Obedience due to the present Kings passimo 
78 ip Z*go Anon, . Four Questions Debat*dg passiml and 
Anon. . Their Present Majesties Government 
Proved 
to be Throughly Settled* V. 9. 
79& Eege S* Johnson - An Argument Provings etcos Prefickee 
po 3*1 Anono - Some short Considerations relating to the sottling of the Governments passim* 
800 Sea above peg. 
810 An Examination of the ScMl*0 of those Wo re" 
to take the Oath of Allegiances V6 302* 
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02* Sao A Collection of the Parliamentary Debates In 
Englaude C*vm the Your Mgl)ClLXVM To the present 
Tima, Vol. X19 ppe 2484o 
830 Ibido po 244o 
840 Ibido po 204* 
8!;. Tho Historical Manuscripts Commitsisiont 12th M"rtq 
A ýpandix Part VI. Tile M. 9S of the House of Lords 
JILE89-90, pe 150 
860 lbld* PPo 15-16o 
07o Good Advico boforo it be too lates atcog p& 21o 
88.6 Sir Jo Montgo=ry - Groat Britain's Just CoWlaint 
etc*# pe 4681 For Ro Forgunong noe below Cho V4, 
890 God# the King and the Countroy etcog p* Ile 
90* Anon* - The Dour Bargain: etc** po 377o 
919 Jo Collier . The Desertion Discunald etc*,, po 110* 
92* Vindiclao Juris Regii, pp. 42-3* 
930 lbide 
940 Cto So Kliger . The Gothm In Ungliftndo PABBiwo Solo 
bolow Che Me 
9!; 
4, A Driof Juatification of tho Princo of Orannell D08c*nt 
Jzto Enslai2d atceg pp. . 5.6* 
96. This term was Vrequantly used to charactOrlsO those 
that opposad a right of rosistAnco on tlO &WOUM9 that 
it wan against the Church's doctrine of Passive 
Obedioncoo 
97* Sao bolow Chao V119 XKq and Xe 
980 Anon. - Some Remrics upon Govormant I etc* 9 ppo 
6-7o 
n 990 Anon. .A Political Conference eta*$ ppa 22sw3* 
100* Eege Jo Locke - Two Troatises of Goverment$ II& 
all* JLO. 59 1100 
101* Anono . Some Remarks upon GovurImOutt Otcot VO 
102o Anon* -A Polltical CAmforence etcal ppe 22-3ok 
103& The Jacobite Principles Vindicated etc*, pe 526,6 
1040 Loco alto P6 Me 
3311 
10!; 4 The Title of an Usurper etc. # po 57- 
1o6. Ibido p* 59o 
107- Loc, cit* 11, as- 97-99- 
108* Ibid* pe 171o 
109* See Cho VII bolow. 
1100 As most writers idio have considered this subject have 
suggestode Crt J. W. Gough - Tho Social Contracts p. 1351 
and Sir Ho Barker - SociaI Contract etc. 9 Introduction 
4,114 Pr CV-xvi 
III* See Cho VII bolow. 
112* As J*W* Gough . The Social Contractq panximo 
113* For a very clear and concise outline of the status 
of a similar kind of anquiryg See W. 11. Groonleaf - 
Order$ Empiricism and Politicx* Cho le 
2L4MER III 
le The Fundamental Constitution of the English Governmentg 
P* 32* 
2* Ibid, p, 84, 
3* Ibido p* 59, 
41 Ibide Po 79* 
So Ibido P* 78o 
6* This information in derived mainly from F&Wo Maitland's Introduction to W*J. Whittaker (ads) . The Ktrror of Justices$ Seldon Society, London (1895)1 and 
Ho Butterfield - The Englisbman and his Historyl Archon Books (1970)9 Reprint of the 1944 C*U*Po 
edition% ppq 29-30* 
7- Loc. cit. p. 6. 
8. See Cho* 4 and 11 respectively* 
9. Parliamentary and Political Tractag p. 61. 
100 See Cho VII below. 
385 
Ile For the first two of these traditions sees 
J*G*Ao Pocock . The Ancient Constitution and the 
Feudal 1Av; and S. L. Kliger - tho Goths In Enk-,. Unds 
The latterg howeverg should be read very war*ly since 
it contains somo astonisIxina errors of fact (noeq 
for emamplog foot. -noto 4 to Chapter 10 below) and it also appears to cxm=orato tho axtent of Gothleim 
during the soventoenth century (see Pocockq loco aite 
vp* 56, m8) o 
1.20 71iis appears to have been the view of James Tyrrell 
(zoo below Cho 10 Cfo So K11ger . The 
Goths In Cnalund. 
l3e Pocock - ops cito rps 57-So 
140 See belov Cho XX. 
156 Cf, C9 Itobbins (04j . Two English JWpublican Tracts, Introduction# passim. 
, 166 Cf- D. Behrens - 'The Whig 
Theory of the Constitution 
In the Reign of Marlon III In the ! Lb,! 10 
J23MAX VOl* VXX* No* 1 (1140- 
r -SO. - 
jlj! dgxA9aL 
L74 Ro Umdy - An Introduetion, to the Old English History, London IMle T118 cpiatle to tile Candid 
R"der# pp* 3.4* 
Lee See3 An Introduction to the Old EnSliali 11ist0rY* 
1, ondou UGWO. 
Igo Potyt - Lmor Temple (IT) We 512 IMO 
(tole 22)o 
ftsft copy of oeTho ItigiLts of t119 Commons of England 
=88STI cigninst Dre Dradye" Cf. alsoo lbtYt - 3M 
me 512 lut (role 304)0 
200 lbido 
210 COCO Western - 01, egal Sovereignty In the DVDdY Controvorzy' IligIOLIcal 4-0-u-"jL-1. j XV* 3 
(1972)o 
po 417* 
22* Petyt ZT* HS* 512 W (Colo 22)o 
23a Qre COCO Western . ope c: Lt* ppo 4179f 9 Western'S 
criticims of Pocock are thus wide of tho marke 
Sao Appendix no, 
Indead ono contructarjun, %witerg Thoms 11mitt argued 
exactly this in the early 1680st He was however 
nevoroly critioizod by William khrood for doing so (See Lord Hollis las Raminag London 1682). 
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26, % Xuz Anglorum Ab Antique. Preface* 
27* Cf. To Hunt - Postscript p. 6. 
28o Cf* Pocock op* cito pp* 217-8* 
290 Ibid* ppo 217-223* 
30. Cfo. e*go Filmer - 'The Anarchy of a Limited or 
MIXed 
Monarchy' in Patriarch& ooo and othor Political Works 
of Sir ]Robert Filmer (ed. P. Laslatt)q passime 
31. Cf. F*A,. Hayek - Minds of Ration*119=1 in 
Studi'88 
in PIxilosophys Politics and Economics, noutledge 
and Kogan Paul (1967) p- 85- 
32o lbido 
33- R. Brady -A True and Exact HiStOrY Of the 
Succession 
of tho Crown of England (London 1601) pp- 1-2o 
34* R& Brady - opq cit6 pe 2. and A. Sailor . The 
History 
Of PA6SiVO Obodience silica the Reformation (Ainstardamg 
1689) Prerace. 
3!;, b R, Brady - op, cit. p. 2. 
36. Anon* - The Royal Apole or$ An Answer to the Rebels Ploa (London 168PAT* Boo full title in the 
bibliographyo 
37- A. Seller - ops cit, Preface* 
38* Anon* . Th* Royal Apology (London 1684)o To 
The 
Reader. 
390 B. 9. A. Sidney - Discourses p* 5* 
40. E,, Sb James Welwood -A Vindication of the Present Great Revolution in England (London 1689) p, 2, 
111.6 Eoge Anon* - Tito Supremacy Debated: OrO The Authority 
of Parliaments (form*rly owned by Romanish Clergy) 
the Suprectest Power. In State Tracts 19 pe 231* 
42* Cf* T, Hunt - Poetscript ppe 1.5* 
43., Go Burnet . #An Anwar to a Paper Printed with 
Allowanceg Entitled, A Now Tost of the Church of 
EnglandIs Loyalty$, in A Collection of Eighteen Paperxq 
Relating to the Affairs of Church & State, ftring the 
Reign of IU=g James the Second* (London 1689) p. 55. 
44, Lor-o c: it* pe 3* This is the first page of the tract* 
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4.5, Bixhpp Burnet's History of Ilia Own Time,, (TA)ndon 13: 13) 
regg) pp, '57 -7d - Vol. IV. 
46, The Historian Ummaskldl Etc* pp* 7-9* 
47e An A ology for the Now Sepezutions etc* (London 
3.6913 PrePtce, 
48. Animadversions upon the modern gxplication of 11 
7 Cap* I* Or a King do Facto, (nopo node) V*I* 
49a See above P*57. 
. 
50.0 Christianity a Doctrine of the Cronat or,, Pasaive 
Obediencog under any Pretended In vasion of Legal 
Rights and Libertieso, (London 1691) p, 80, 
510 E*9* Ce Loslie - The Now Association of 
those Callodq 
Hodorato-Church-Mnq with tho Modern-Whigs and Fanatickne 
Third odition (London 1702) pe 10* 
52o E. So, Sir G. Mackenzie -A Vindication of the 
GovernmOnt 
in Scotland$ During tho Reign of King Clmrles II* 
(London 1691) in The Works$ Vol* II pe 346& Cf* 
alsov Anon. . Tile Charactor of a Rebellion And what England May expact from one* (London 16811 p. 4* 
53, A* Seller - op, cit* Preface* 
. 
5110 An Inquiry Into the Remarkable Instances Of HiBtOrY* 
and Parliament Recordag used by the Author Of th* 
Unreasonableness of a now Separation on Accoul't Of 
the Oaths whother they are faithfully cited and 
applied, 
In. 
p. 169o) p. 20. 
5.5. See above ppo 
56, The Title of an Usurper After a ThoreuZh Settlement 
Exawinedg Etc. (London 1690) p. 32* 
57- Soo J. C. Corson - fRosistance No Rebellion'* in The 
. 
1dicial Review (Septo 1930) pp* 24!; -6, Corson , 
jur 
claims PollochIs authority for this point, * 
58. Loco cit* P. 317- 
59* Remarks upon Dr, Sherlock's Bookg Intituled The Case 
of Resistance etc. (London 1689) V. 19. 
60, A Sober Enquiry into the Nature, Meftsurej and 
Principle of Moral Virtue$ Etc* (London 1673) po 77o 
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CHAPTER IV 
10 Similarly called William - see 71is Case or William Usq. 
etc** (London 1703)o This is not noted in the article 
an Atwood in the D*N*Do 
The DbN*De igurmises this. 
34 Most notable, amongst thelse were Robert Brady in his 
An Introduction to the Old English History etcoo 
(London 1684) and James Anderson An Historical Essay 
oteal, (Edinburgh 1705)o For Atwood's Seneral reply 
see The Scotch Patriot Unmasked (London 1705) pp- 4-5* 
40 The Glorious Revolution of 16889 p. 145. 
Fundamental Law in English Constitutional Itistoryl 
P. 163. 
6* Order$ Empiricism and Political pp, 142# 1071 1941 
". 80,6 
Two English Republican Tracts# p. 18. 
80 John LacUel Two Troatimes of Governments pe 90 
f*n* 326 
The Pillars of Parliament Struck at by the Hapda of A 
Cambridge Doctor$ OR a Short View of some of his 
Erroneous Positional Destructive to the Ancient IAWG 
and Govarnment of England 11 
(London 1681) pe 9a In 
Petyt IT* IIS. !; 38* Vol. 16 (folo, 324ff),, 
100 Ar-gumentum Anti-Normannicumv pe Ixixe 
134 Plato RedivIvuse in Ce Robbins (adJ - TWO ZAS-Iish Republican Tracts* pe 16"00* 
120 In 1681 even James Tyrrell was writing to Petyt aB 
his superior in historical lcarnina* Petyt IT4, MS* 
538* Vol* 17 (folo 302). Letter dated Oxford JaU* 
i2s 16ft, 
13* Jant Analorum Facies Nova, Etc, (London 168o); Jun 
Anglorum ab Anti uos Ctc* (London 1681)1 Lord Hollis 
Ilia Remains (ed, 
11 
(London 1682)1 Reflections Upon 
Antido^.:, = Britannicums etc. (London 1682). 
14 0 Loc. cit. P, 4, 
150 Lord Hollis His Remainss pe 230& 
16, o Jus Anglorum ab Antiquol P. 117- 
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17-o Ibid. Prefmce* 
18& lbido 
190 lbid* 
200 Lord Hollis fts Remasiml p. 266o 
21. Ease "I know that it has been whisperld aboutg as if 
I would have this Government to be now modelled,, 
which I utterly abhor Jus Anglorum ab Antiqwg 
Prefacoo 
22* Lord Mllis His Remainsg po 271- 
234, Jus Anglorum ab Antiqxws Additions ete*s pe 37* 
24. Tho Fundamental Constitutions etc* po 2* 
25. The legitimacy of James IlIx son was fiercely 
contested in 1688* 
26* The Fundamental Constitutions pe 3* 
27- Lord Hollis Ilia Remains$ po 293o 
28. The History$ and Reasonst of the Dependency of Ireland 
ýxpon the Imperial Crown or the Kinzdoin of EnSland* 
(London 1698), po 23.1, This book was directed 
against Holyneux' defence of Irish independences 
29* The Superiority and Direct Dominion of o so USIAnd 
over *** Scotland etco (London 1704)s po 392* 
30o Atwood, of course, was a lawyer& 
31* The Fundamental Constitution$ ppo 2-3* 
32o Sao bolowg Part We 
33,, The Superiority and Direct Dominion of &oe Zngland 
over ooo Scotland otcos p, 487o 
34* Ibide, pe 391* 
350 The Fundamental Constitution$ Preface pe xx: Lio 
36. Ibid, Preftco po xxi* 
37* E&S. see above pp. 35 ýf - 
38, Lord Hollis His Remainis, p. 271* 
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39. ThO Fundamental Constitution, p. 4e 
400 See above 1). %. 
4le See below pp. j33ff. 
42* The Fundamental Constitution, pp. 9.10. 
43e Sao above pp, 8.1- J. 
4 The Superiority and Direct Dominion of *** En,,,,, Iand 
over *** Scotland etc*, pp* 377-Co 
45. See above pp,, Ss-(. 0- 
46. Atwood writess "The -Mr-rourg 
at leasto puts this 
COntrAct out of disputel showing the Very Institution 
of the Monarchyl before a Right van vested in any 
single Family, or Person". lie then paraphrases the 
quotation from the Mi: &x r noted on p. 513 above* See 
The Superiority and. =rect Dominion of ,,, England 
over soo Scotland etc., pp. 377-81 CC, also The 
Fundamental Constitution, po 30e, 
47# IIOC* Cite PP6 31-2* 
48, The r-undamental constitution, Preface pp. xxxii-xxxiii. 
49., Ibid 5ý* Atwood is here quoting Robert Shoringhan (1602148 
va Royalist Divine* 
50,8 Ibide p. 50. 
510 See aboVe ppa eT-S- 
52s, Atwood's "Apology for the East-India Company' 
(London 1690) was occasioned by "I* The two great 
Charges against the Company are the seizing of Ships 
and Goods of ILt. 2EXopor& and condemning them as 
forfeited* 
11, The passing 
Sentances of Deaths and executing Hong by the Governor 
of St. llejeW# in a Mothod not wholly agreeablo to 
the of-911, S]-al3al or else the procuring a 
Commission from the Kings for trying and exocuting 
Men theref, by Martial Law,, " p* Ike 
53* An Apology for the East-India Cowpany,, p. 31* 
54* The Fundamental Constitutionj p, 786 
53* Ibido p. 81. 
560 The Superiority and Direct Dominion of ... Rngland over oes Scotland etc*q pe 
391 
57* The Fundamental Constitution, p. 
58. Be Behrens . 'The Whig Theory of the Constitution 
in the ReiCn of Charles 111, in the CrimbEldxg. 11joSgrica-1 
Jonrnal, Vol* V11s No* 1 (1941) , Soo bolowg Section 77-9-for a fuller wmmination of the Idea of 11istorye 
59* The Fundamental Constitutiong pe 27* 
60. Probably Villiam Bedell (1571-161109 Bishop of 
Kilmore and Ardagh, 
619 The Fundamental Constitutiong pa 26. 
62* Ibid* p. 61, 
63. Ibid* p. 65. 
64. Ibid. p. 64. 
65o Ibid* pP6 78-9* 
66* On this aspect of modern rationalism 1500 Me ()AkGBhOtt - 
'Rationalism in Political$ in his book of GOORYS of 
the same titlel and F*A* Hayok - 'Types of Rationaliaml, 
in Philosophys Politics and Economical (Routledgo and 
KQ9an Paul, 1957)s Chapter 59 Cfe also Section V 
below* 
67* See Chapter 
68. The Fundamental Cauxtitutions pe 129 Exactly the 
same passage occurs in the Preface to $Wonderful 
Predictions etc0 (1689) except the word "common" 
is spelt with a capital 'Cf* 
69. On the notion of 'fundamental law' in the early 17th 
century$ see John D. Eusdon - Puritanag Lawyers and Politics in Carl Seventeenth Century Englandq (Yale 
univ. Press, 19,5b. Cf. also J. W. Gough . Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (OaWas 1961), 
for a general survey* The work vas : rirst published 
in 1955e 
70* Seeg e. g. $ Sir C. K. Allen - Law in the Making 
(7th 
ed*s Clarendon Press$ Oxfords 1964)j Ch. VI* 
7le The Fundamental Const: Ltutione Preface p. x=jjq 
72o Ibid* pp. iii-iv. 
73* Ibid6 p* v* 
74* Ibide pp* v-vi. 
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75- lbid, po 34e 
76., rbid, p. 36. 
77o Ibido pe 33* 
78- lbide po Olle 
79* lbid, P. 72. 
800 Ibide pe 100* 
al, Ibid* 
82* For a fuller discussion of Pufandorf sea Chm. VI 
and VII below. 
83* The Superiority and Direct Dominion of 
over ... Scotland ote. P, 309* 
84. See below Ch. VII V. 149. 
85,0 The Fundamental Constitution, pe 101* 
86. lbide po 10le 
87- Ibid* 
08.1 Ibide po 102* 
89. A brief suanary of purendorfln Contract Theory in 
given by J. W. Gough - The Social Contracts ppo 121"124* 
go* The Fundamental Constitutiong p, 102, Cf. Wonderful 
Predictions atces Preface* 
1910 The Fundamental Constitutiong pe 359 
92* "the King for the time being# is the only RirhtUl 
King' Atwood asserted in Reflections upon a Treasonable 
Opinion, p, 2& Atwood's denial of the validity of 
a distinction between dl Jure and go Lactg kings in 
fact follows from his theory of the constitution only 
when applied to what he believed had occured in 1688* 
Yet Atwood was here claiminS the -tiniversal ineptitude 
of such a distinctiono Here we see a first glimpse 
of what was to become a major problem for Whig 
constitutional historians in the first decade of 
the eighteenth century. Whig theorists were assorting 
that only contract kings were rightful kings* From 
this it followed that non. -contract kings (kingag for 
examplol by conquest), although . 
49-facto monarchs, 
were not rightful kings* In the post-1688 period, 
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holfeverp many persistently argued that William and 
Mary were only do facto monarchs whilxt James 11 
remained king do Aure. To combat these claims several 
Whigs compromised-ific-ir insistence that legitimacy 
could only be derived from contract by either admitting 
that allegiance wan due idienover 'protection$ was 
e 2tive, or by reinterpreting tconquest' so that 
it inevitably involved 'consent# (cfe the ftorlock 
Controversy outlined in Ch. 11 above), From these 
it followed that an effective king, or a do ; M-ctg 
kinZ, boc-ags2 he wus effectively king was aloo do Auro, 
The Whir, concern with legitimate government once a-ge-in- 
turned from a concern with the explicit ORIGIN to 
a concern with the CONTINUING PUIWOSE of government, 
But in this process benevolent conquerors became 
legitimized and t1lo Mligs themselves could argues 
as Sir John Willos and William Higdon did@ that 
o Juro William Is though a conqueror in fact* had been do 
king because of the effective , protection 
he 89ve to 
his subjects. The Norman Conquent thus became an 
event acceptable to MUS historians# whereas in tile 
1680s it solely featured in Tory histories of a 
Dradyito kind* On this aspect of the Norman Conquest 
debates see 4luentin skinner . 111istory and Ideology in the English Revolution' in 21,10 Hiptoric-Al JQ!! M5ls 
Vol. 8v No, 2 (1965). esp. pp, 171-170. 
930 References to$ and quotations froms All these writers 
begin to appear in Atwood's tmriLs only after 1689s. 
94. The Fundamontal Constitution, pp. 3-11a 
9,50 See above P01105. 
96. Wonderful Predictions etcas Preface& 
97e See below Ch, Vlo 
98e The Fundamental Constitutiong ppo 10-ILD 
990 D. Behrens - 'The Whig Theory or the Constitution In the Roign of Charles Z11,9 In C4mbridite lljotorical. 
jmIMI, Vol* V119 No, 1 (19111) pp* 50-53e 
1000 See above ppeSIff. 
101* Reflections upon a Treasonable Opinion (1696L The 
Epistle Dedicatory to the Duke of Shrewsbury* The 
'treasonable opiniont was that the English Constitution 
did not require taking an additional oath of allegiance 
to the present monarch and expressly disavowing allegiance 
to a pretender, 
102* The Superiority and Direct Dominion of ,,, England ovor Scotland, po 111, 
391A 
103* 
1046 
loso 
106* 
lbid* V* 559* 
Tho Pun&mautal Constitutiont V* 9.5* 
The Suporiority and Direct Dominion of England over 
Scotlandq p* 20r, 
Ing The Ifistoryg 
Ireland upon *so 
witi, Lmolynoux-1 
and IlLessonng of the Dependency of 
Englandg Atwood wrote 111911 agree 
107o Ibido po 5& 
lost The Scotch patriot atee Pe 359 
109. The Fundamental Constitution* PrOfACG Pip V`iie 
1100 The Superiority and Direct Dominion of 9091and 
over 6* Scotland* Po 3869 
III* Ibido pt . 
5699 11ore Atwood argued "As I rememberg 
that croat Man +411a- in his Treatise of the Truth V of the Christian Zion$ uses It an an undeniable 
argument of the Rly-ing P v. 1ftnceg and interposition 
In Humne Affairml that whatever form of GoversullOnte 
has obtainad in any Nationg is preservadq notwithstanding 
All the plots aud Machinations of Hon to tile contrary*" 
That this does 1*1 mean that Bly. enduring form Of 
sovernment is legitimate in God'Fa eyes in appArOnt 
from Atucod's translation of Grotius' text* The 
JrOJL*Vunt stanza implies not only that moll 2M 
impose other forms of government then tTloso based 
On popular consent on their follow c1tizenn 9 but 
also that the Divine providence Is most apparent At 
the xgW&. j&M of states (I**& at the contract)* 
The stanza runs: 
XX9 Uhat tho universe Is gov*rrAd by God, 3 ooo Vrov'd 
Crom the preservation of Governments* 
2ý1110 OP'Oc; LOJL Int'lulence of a Pow'r above, 
Kingdoms and Common-waalths continuede prove. 
A form of GoVeranant that Cirat prewiltd, 
HAa &]lot through many tracts ot 4ages ftilldo 
For this; we might all Histories apply, 
TWItere a Republicks where a Monarclayg 
All the contrivaucan and Plots; of Mong 
If they unsettle, bring the same agenj 
So that against a long fixt Powr to : riZhto Scous ev'n the Providence of Ileaven to slight. 
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Tho Human Wisdom might preserve it long$ 
Yet the subjected Rabble are so strong$ 
Such the Vicisituden of human thingal 
That none could fix them but the King of Kings. 
But then this Providence chiefly appeareq 
When the Foundations o. 04' a State he tearal 
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